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PREFACE 
Some years ago, while I was still an undergraduate 
student, I had occasion to assist my father, who was 
then involved in legal practice, on a matter that raised 
a difficult point of law. It concerned the scope of the 
hearsay rule and the applicability of one of the common-
law exceptions to the rule. Having little knowledge of 
hearsay law, I consulted the major texts on the subject, 
but what I found there only increased my sense of bewild-
erment. The hearsay rule, I remember thinking, was 
certainly an odd part of our law. At any rate, with my 
legal studies imminent, enlightenment was surely at hand. 
A few years later, and a course in the Law of Evidence richer, 
t was ruefully to recognize that the hearsay concept 
remained, for me, an enigma. It seemed, moreover, that the 
full complexities of the hearsay rule were not taken very 
seriously in practice, an attitude which I found rather 
puzzling in the light of the long tenure the rule has 
enjoyed in the Anglo-American evidentiary system. Something, 
it was clear, was seriously wrong with the common law, and 
I resolved to find out what it was. This thesis is the 
result of that resolution. 
I wish to express my heartfelt appreciation to my super-
visor, Professor David Zeffertt, for his invaluable 
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advice and insight, to Mrs Stella Beyleveld for her 
willing and excellent work in typing the thesis, and 
to the members of my family for their help in proof-reading 
the drafts and for their moral support. I am indebted, 
also to the Australian Law Reform Commission for their , 
swift and helpful co-operation in making available to me 
copies of their Research Papers on the reform of the hearsay 
rule in Australia. 
Johannesburg Andrew Paizes 
December 1983 
THE CONCEPT OF HEARSAY WITH PARTICULAR 
EMPHASIS ON IMPLIED HEARSAY ASSERTIONS 
PAIZES, Andrew Peter, Ph.D University 
of the Witwatersrand, 1983 
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This thesis explores the reasons for the frustration 
and confusion elicited by the hearsay rule and seeks 
to remedy the problem by proposing possible ways of 
improving the present state of the law. The rule is 
critically examined from three separate angles, its 
historical origin, its rationale and its scope, and 
the following submissions are made: 
(i) The hearsay rule is largely a product of the 
adversary system of trial procedure. 
(ii) Hearsay is generally excluded because its ad-
mission would violate the values served by that 
system, in that the adversary would be denied 
access to those standard procedural devices to 
which a witness is normally subjected. 
(iii) The exclusion of hearsay evidence is thus only 
justifiable if the prejudice caused to the 
adversary and the prestige of the fact-finding 
process exceeds its probative value. 
(iv) The inflexible exclusionary rule of the common law, 
qualified as it is by a host of equally inflexible 
exceptions, does not square with this conception 
of hearsay and is thus unsatisfactory. 
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(v) The courts, appreciating the untenable state 
of the common law, have sought to mitigate its 
effect by resorting to a narrow definition of 
hearsay which, in effect, excludes from the 
scope of the rule evidence of so-called "implied 
assertions"; such evidence, however, shares the 
same dangers or testimonial infirmities as that 
evidence which is excluded, thus causing a dis-
tortion of the hearsay concept. 
The artificial definition of hearsay and the rigid ex-
clusionary rule at common law emerge therefore as the main 
reasons for the present impasse. The thesis accordingly 
concludes with draft proposals for the reform of the law 
in South Africa in which: 
(a) hearsay is defined as evidence raising particular 
dangers, thus bringing within its purview implied 
assertions; and 
(b) the admissibility of hearsay evidence is governed 
by a judicial discretion which, although not 
fettered, is guided by criteria which seek to en-
trench the values served by the adversary trial. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1842, Simon Greenleaf looked at the law of evidence as 
a whole and was favourably impressed with what he saw. 
He wrote: 
"The student will not fail to observe the 
symmetry and beauty of this branch of the law, 
under whatever disadvantages it may labor from 
the manner of treatment; and will rise from 
the study of its principles, convinced, with 
Lord Erskine, that 'they are founded in the 
charities of religion - in the philosophy of 
nature - in the truths of history - and in the 
experience of common life. '" 1 
As Morgan puts it: "God was in His procedural heaven and 
2 
all was right with the world of evidence". Half a cen-
tury later, however, this euphoria had evaporated - so 
much so that Thayer was moved to write: 
"I think that it would be juster and more exact 
to say that our law of evidence is a piece of 
illogical, but by no means irrational, patch-
work; not at all to be admired, nor easily to 
be found intelligible, except as a product of 
the jury system, as the outcome of a quantity 
of rulings by sagacious lawyers, while sett-
ling practical questions, in presiding over 
courts where ordinary, untrained citizens are 
acting as judges of fact. Largely irra-
tional in any other aspect, in this point of 
view it is full of good sense; - a good sense, 
indeed, that occasionally nods, that submits 
too often to a mistaken application of its 
precedents, that is often short-sighted and 
ill-instructed, and that needs to be taken 
in hand by the jurist, and illuminated, sim-
plified, and invigorated by a reference to 
general principles." 3 
one of the major causes of this disenchantment was the 
hearsay rule, whic~Thayer found, presented "an instruc-
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tive spectacle of confusion". 4 He added: 
"Now a great deal of perplexity exists, in the 
law relating to hearsay, from a failure to 
understand the scope of [the] exceptions; and 
from an uncertainty whether and how far they 
are to be freely developed, or to be strictly 
limited, as being mere exceptions, while the 
main rule itself which prohibits hearsay is 
expanded." 5 
Today the law journals and text-books abound with criti-
cisms of the hearsay rule. The following represent a 
random sample: 
"The rule against hearsay, together with its many excep-
tions, is probably the best known, and at the same time, 
8 the least loved of the Anglo-American rules of evidence". 
"The present evidence rules fall short of providing a 
satisfactory solution to the hearsay problem. They ex-
elude evidence that has a higher probative force than 
evidence they admit [and] [t] hey fail to provide adequate 
procedural devices to minimize the possibility of misjudg-
7 ing the probative force of hearsay admitted". 
"Many lawyers and judges view hearsay in the same manner 
that Winston Churchill viewed the action of Russia in 1939 
when he said, 'It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside 
an enigma.' While the hearsay rule is probably the most 
widely known rule of evidence - to both lawyers and laymen 
- it is surely the most frequently misunderstood and mis-
e 
applied." 
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"There are undoubtedly no other rules of evidence that so 
consistently baffle and frustrate students of evidence, be 
they law students, trial lawyers or judges, as much as the 
hearsay rule and its myriad exceptions. Even the gordian 
knot, presumptions and burden of proof, presents less 
f i II 9 rustrat on ••. 
To what may this volteface be attributed? According to 
Me Cormick, the answer may be found by examining the rOle 
of the jury in shaping our evidentiary rules. He wrote: 
"The jury no longer is looked on as an essential 
in our ideal of a trial, but it is the presence 
of the jury that has shaped the pattern, with 
its characteristic feature of production of 
oral proof by the parties, in waves of attack, 
counter-attack, and repulse, with its atmos-
phere of conflict, so clearly manifested in the 
traditional hostility of tone of the cross-
examiner, and with its process of attempting to 
sift out the chaff in the testimony on the spur 
of the moment by objections and rulings accord-
ing to rules that must be invoked and applied 
on the run. 
These influences have determined the character 
of the extensive body of doctrine known as the 
law of evidence. Many of its notions origi-
nated in early rulings of English judges at 
nisi prius, and it still tends to be formulated 
in terms of rules of sharp outline, rather than 
in terms of wider standards. A century of re-
porting of evidence points and of the writing 
of evidence texts has multiplied these rules 
and filigreed them with distinctions and excep-
tions. When applied at all in the trial 
court, they are applied as they were originally 
designed to be, that is, rather inflexibly. 
This tradition of crisp analysis, and the usa-
bility of the rules for dogmatic solutions 
makes them a happy feeding ground for the law 
schools. As taught, the law of evidence fur-
nishes for the milk teeth of the law student, 
an abundance of those hard problems which are 
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supposed to be so invigorating, but which often 
seem beyond the infant's powers of mastication." 10 
On comparing the theory of the law with the way the rules 
of evidence were applied in the courts, moreover, the 
learned author found a "strange disparity": 
"The lush exuberance of doctrines which bloom in 
the digests and the six-volume treatises on evi-
dence, and the sharp quiddities of the class 
room, though they were fairly well known to the 
advocate of a generation ago, are not familiar 
ground to the average successful trial lawyer of 
today. To master these rules so that they 
could actually be used, to retain them, and to 
keep abreast of their changing current, would be 
a mammoth task, and one which as a practical man 
he believes is not worth the cost. Of what use 
to learn Culbertson's canons of bidding at 
bridge, unless your partner knows them also? For 
even the trial judges today, with notable excep-
tions, have only a discreet bowing acquaintance 
with the evidence rules." 11 
Our treatment of hearsay evidence has, therefore, en-
tangled us in what one cc,nrnentator has described as an 
"unintelligible thicket". 12 In this dissertation I shall 
endeavour: 
(a) to examine critically the origin, rationale and 
scope of the rule against hearsay; 
(b) to probe the weaknesses in the present state of 
the law; and 
(c) to submit tentative proposals for its reform. 
In the pursuit of these objects, I shall use, as an analy-
tical tool, the concept of implied assertions. This 
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topic, which lies in the twilight zone of hearsay, has long 
vexed academic and practical lawyers, and, in the process, 
impeded a clear vision of the hearsay concept. 
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CHAPTER II 
ORIGIN OF THE HEARSAY RULE 
Is the hearsay rule the "product of the adversary system" 
or the "child of the jury"? This debate, which has illus-
trious participants ranged on opposing sides, is dismissed 
by McCormick on the basis that it "may be of no great con-
temporary significance". 1 In countries where trial by 
jury is the norm, this comment may be valid, but, in a 
country such as South Africa, where jury trials have been 
abolished, the question assumes more than mere academic 
importance. If the hearsay rule is a legacy of the jury 
trial, then there would seem to be no sound historical 
basis for its retention in non-jury systems. If, however, 
it is the progeny of the adversary system, then the argu-
ment for abolishing the hearsay rule in jury systems, but 
retaining it in non-jury jurisdictions, would be falla-
cious. 
It is not my intention to embark on a comprehensive analy-
sis of the history of the hearsay rule, as the literature 
is well-served by many excellent accounts of this intrig-
2 
uing topic - one thinks particularly of the outstanding 
3 
contribution by Wigmore in his Treatise on the Anglo-
American system of evidence - and it would be both presump-
tious and tautologous to attempt a similar exercise. How-
ever, in order to answer the above question, or, at least, 
to appreciate the debate to which it has given rise, it is 
necessary to consider briefly the major stages in its 
development. 
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According to Wigmore, 4 the hearsay rule as we know it to-
day, evolved through three distinct phases: 
I. Up to the mid-1500s Until the middle of the 16th 
century, Wigmore observes, no objection was seen to the use 
by the jury of testimonial statements by persons not in 
court. During this period, the fact-finding process was 
characterized by a practice of obtaining information from 
persons not called to testify. This constituted the 
primary source of material for the jury, and the witness, 
as it is understood today, was "a rare figure, just begin-
s 
ning to be known". 
II. From the mid-1500s to about 1700 : During this 
period, in the words of the learned author, 
"a sense arises of the impropriety of such 
sources of information, and the notion 
gradually but definitely shapes itself, in 
the course of hard experience, that the 
reason of this impropriety is that all 
statements to be used as testimony should 
be made only where the person to be 
affected by them has an opportunity of 
probing their trustworthiness by means of 
cross-examination". ~ 
What caused this change in attitude? Wigmore identifies 
two main factors: 
(a) The jury came to rely to an increasing extent on 
evidence presented to it in court by witnesses, un-
til, by the early 1600s, this had become the chief 
source of information. In 1650, in Bennett v 
7 Hartford, it was held that "if either of the 
parties to a trial desire that a juror may give 
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evidence of something of his own knowledge to the 
rest of the jurors, the Court will examine him 
openly in Court upon his oath and he ought not to 
be examined in private by his companions". The 
practice of jurors relying on their own private 
knowledge, however, continued until 1816, when it 
received its quietus in ~ v Sutton. 8 
(b) Owing to the increased reliance placed on the tes-
timony of witnesses, the jury began to concern it-
self about the number of witnesses required to 
prove a fact and the sufficiency, in both quantity 
and quality, of their evidence. It came, there-
fore, to be asked "whether a hearsay thus laid be-
fore them would suffice", 8 and the notion evolved 
that a hearsay statement was not alone sufficient, 
but could be used to corroborate or confirm other 
evidence. 
(III) From the early 1700s onwards : This period saw 
the "general and settled acceptance" of the hearsay rule, 
and whereas decisions in the early part of the 18th cen-
tury expressed a certain tentative unsureness about its 
tenure, by the middle of the century it was viewed as 
10 
something "no longer to be struggled against". 
Commenting on this development, Thayer was prompted to 
remark that the English law of evidence was "the child of 
the jury", 11 and that "the greatest and most remarkable 
offshoot of the jury was that body of excluding rules 
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which chiefly constitute the English 'Law of Ev1dence'". 
It is important to note, however, that Thayer seemed to 
have understood the term "jury" as encompassing a concept 
somewhat broader than merely that system of procedure 
whereby a jury - as opposed to a judge or any other judi-
cial officer - is instituted as the trier of fact. This 
is evident from his qualification of the above observa-
tion, viz. that "(i]f the petit jury had kept up the older 
methods of procedure, - if, instead of hearing wit-
nesses publicly, under the eye of the judge, it had heard 
them privately and without any judicial supervision, it is 
easy to see that our law of evidence never would have 
taken shape". Thayer's conception of jury trial proce-
dure, then, constitited a system whereby a witness gave 
his testimony in open court, subject to judicial safe-
guards that ensured accuracy and fair process, and in the 
presence of the adversary. 
Despite this qualification, the notion that the hearsay 
rule is the "child of the jury" seems to have survived in 
its more literal form, and Baker records that "(aJ part 
from one or two exceptions ••. every one is agreed that 
the Hearsay rule is the product of the jury system of 
1 3 
trial". One of the few writers to take issue with 
this prevailing view is Prof. Edmund Morgan, 14 who main-
tains that it is a proposition that was foisted upon the 
rule by the judges and writers of the nineteenth century. 
The birth of the hearsay rule, according to Morgan, does 
not accompany the transition from trial by ordeal and 
compurgation to trial by jury, but rather the progression 
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from an investigative or inquisitorial proceeding to an ad-
versary proceeding. Referring to the approach of the 
courts in this regard, the learned author states: 
"The early and late cases ••. seem to me to 
warrant the conclusion that it is more than 
a coincidence that the evolution of the 
hearsay rule synchronizes with the evolution 
of our system from an investigative to an 
adversary system, and that as early as 1696 
we find not lack of cross-examination but 
lack of opportunity to cross-examine stated 
as a reason for the exclusion of hearsay." 15 
In support of this contention, he adds that the two prin-
cipal reasons advanced by the courts for the exclusion of 
hearsay - viz. the lack of the oath and the absence of the 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant - were intended 
primarily to protect the adversary, and had little to do 
with the ~· It might, he continues, be argued that the 
jury "must have the benefit of a cross-examination of all 
statements offered to induce pursuasion as to the facts", 18 
but this argument is fallacious, as (i) the adversary may 
waive cross-examination and (ii) the judge is not required 
to cross-examine, and, indeed, where he does so, he must 
exercise the greatest circumspection. Accordingly, Morgan 
concludes, because no official inquisitor is provided, "the 
~may ••• be required to do its best (or worst) with 
testimony that has not been purified by this greatest of 
truth-revealing devices". On the other hand, he adds, 
"the adversary may not be compelled to forego cross-examina-
tion". 17 
18 Baker criticizes Morgan's views on the grounds that (a) 
his attempts to "explain away the many statements of judges 
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and textbook writers in the nineteenth century that the 
Hearsay rule owes its origin to the jury, as being falla-
1 9 
cious and foisted upon the rule" overlooks the fact that 
"this was the general view in the nineteenth century and 
seems so at the present time"; and (b) the rule has its ori-
gins considerably earlier than the seventeenth century, 
indicating that Morgan's theory is not borne out by the 
historical background of the rule. Even if Baker's 
second comment is true, viz. that Morgan's "adversary 
theory" lacks historical support, it is clear that the 
"jury theory" is similarly deficient. As Morgan points 
out, this latter view "seems never to have been suggested 
until about the second quarter of the nineteenth century", 
whereas, as was shown above, the hearsay rule had crystal-
lized by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Trial 
by jury, moreover, had been operative in England since soon 
after the Norman Conquest of 1066; if the hearsay rule was 
the "child of the jury", it was certainly a protracted and 
painful birth. It is submitted that it is more realistic 
to see the emergence of the rule as a product of two inter-
dependent factors : first the flowering of the adversary 
system of trial procedure, which may be considered the 
spark, or direct cause of its development, and secondly the 
jury system, which may be seen as the catalyst in this his-
torical melting-pot. As Baker puts it, "[i] t cannot be 
denied that many of the facts will fit either theory", and 
the "absence of the Hearsay rule on the Continent can be 
attributed as well to the absence of the jury as to the in-
20 
vestigative nature of the trials there". 
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The abolition of jury trials in South Africa is, therefore, 
not automatically a signal for the abolition of the hearsay 
rule. The rule is primarily a servant of adversary trial 
procedure, and to allow the free reception of hearsay with-
out considering its effect on its hallowed master, would be 
both rash and dangerous. It has been argued by Prof. 
21 Stanley Schiff, another advocate of the adversary theory, 
that the rule makes good sense within the workings of the 
adversary system, and that any attempt to create a broader 
basis for the admissibility of hearsay must take account of 
the dictates of that system. It would be prudent, there-
fore, to take cognizance of this caveat, and to keep in 
mind the origin and historical function of the hearsay rule 
before embarking on a programme of reform. For reform is 
both essential and inevitable, and our legislature should 
not be deterred from this path by a natural reluctance to 
tamper with "that most characteristic rule of the Anglo-
22 American law of Evidence"; as McCormick observed, "the 
rule against hearsay taking form at the end of the 
seventeenth century was neither a matter of 'immemorial 
usage' nor an inheritance from Magna Carta but, in the long 
view of English legal h~story, was a late development of 
23 
the common law" • 
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Chapter III 
THE RATIONALE OF THE HEARSAY RULE 
The discussion in this Chapter will take the form of two 
separate enquiries, each of which is considered in a separ-
ate section: 
Section A : What reasons are advanced for excluding hear-
say? 
Section B : Do these reasons in fact warrant the exclusion 
of hearsay? 
It may be seen, therefore, that the enquiry in Section A 
rests on the underlying premiss that hearsay is generally 
excluded, and the focus falls on the reasons that have been 
advanced for this exclusion. This necessitates an investi-
gation into the basic values which the hearsay rule serves 
to protect and its rOle in the adversary system that spawned 
it. Section B, on the other hand, involves a questioning 
of the basic premiss of exclusion, and involves assessing 
whether in fact the protection of the values identified in 
Section A warrants an exclusionary rule : Is the exclusion 
of all, some, or even any hearsay justifiable in the light 
of the reasons advanced for such exclusion? 
SECTION A WHY IS HEARSAY EXCLUDED? 
Baker, 1 after a "fairly careful search of the cases and the 
textbooks" 2 identifies the following ten reasons: 
1\(a) Because it is irrelevant. 
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(b) Because of the dangers arising from the repetition of 
statements. 
(c) Because of the undue protraction of trials its recep-
tion would result in. 
(d) Because of the possibilities of fraud. 
(e) Because hearsay evidence possesses 'an intrinsic 
weakness.' 
(f) Because its rejection encourages stronger for weaker 
proofs. 
(g) Because its exclusion prevents surprise and unfair 
prejudice to the parties. 
(h) Because its exclusion prevents the jury being con-
fused and misled. 
(i) Because the testimony is not given on oath. 
(j) Because there is no opportunity to cross-examine the 
3 
maker of the statement." 
The first of these reasons Baker rejects out of hand, argu-
ing, correctly, it is submitted, that in many cases hearsay 
has considerable probative value but is nevertheless not 
received. 
4 
Tatham: 
As Baron Parke said of the rule in Wright v 
"Its operation clearly proves that in some 
cases it excludes the proof of matter which, but for it, 
would be regarded not only as relevant to particular facts 
but as good grounds for believing in their existence." In 
5 Phipson On Evidence, the distinction between the criteria 
for rejecting hearsay evidence on the one hand and irrele-
vant evidence on the other hand, is well put: "The doubt 
and suspicion attending (hearsay) are a doubt and suspicion 
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attaching to its accuracy, and are wholly distinct from the 
reasons excluding facts as not tending to prove the matter 
in issue, which are based upon logical inference." 
Baker also rejects (f), 6 a reason which he claims is based 
unjustifiably on the view that the hearsay rule is part of 
the Best Evidence rule. In South Africa, this theory of 
the hearsay rule has been rejected by the Appellate Divi-
7 
sion in Vulcan Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v SAR & H. 
As regards the remaining eight reasons, it is submitted 
that these traditional arguments justifying the rule 
against hearsay fall into four distinct categories: 
Those reasons which have as their basis the fact 
that hearsay evidence cannot be tested or evaluated 
by means of those standard courtroom devices which 
characterize our adversary system of trial procedure. 
(See (i) and (j) above.) 
Those reasons which emphasize the intrinsic weak-
nesses of hearsay evidence, i e the dangers which are 
inherent in hearsay but which are not normally asso-
ciated with original evidence. 
above.) 
(See (b) and (e) 
Those reasons which view all evidence as containing 
certain latent dangers or infirmities, but which 
maintain that these dangers are particularly strong 
in the case of hearsay because of the absence of 
the procedural safeguards mentioned above. (See, 
for instance, (d) above.) 
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Those reasons which stress the inconvenience that the 
reception of hearsay would cause to trial procedure. 
(See (c) , (g) and (h) above. ) 
Each of these categories merits closer attention, as the 
scope and nature of the hearsay rule can only be properly 
understood in its true perspective if the reason for its 
existence is appreciated. In what follows, therefore, an 
attempt will be made to explain, illustrate and assess 
each of these four factors, thereby exposing the set of 
values on which hearsay theory rests and preparing the way 
for an investigation into the nature of the hearsay con-
cept and the deficiencies of the hearsay rule. 
(A) The inconvenience caused to efficient trial 
procedure: 
Baker submits that the admission of hearsay would give rise 
to the following disadvantages: 
(i) The undue protraction of trials: If hearsay were 
freely admissible, he argues, it would "open up 
fields of inquiry and call for the production of 
witnesses that would never have been necessary if 
8 
such hearsay had been excluded". 
(ii) Unfair prejudice and surprise would be caused to the 
opposing party: This flows from the fact that the 
other party would not be able to prepare its briefs 
sufficiently for all eventualities. 
(iii) The jury would be confused and misled, and the evi-
dence could enjoy an exaggerated or disproportionate 
degree of influence or weight on their untrained 
minds. This theory received considerable judicial 
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9 
support in England, although it cannot, of course, 
be invoked to justify the retention of the rule in 
those jurisdictions where trial by jury is no longer 
operative. 
It is submitted, however, that the first two factors are 
more properly considered in relation to the rules regarding 
relevance. All evidence, in order to be admissible, must 
be "legally relevant" in the sense that it must be suffi-
ciently relevant to outweigh the undesirable effects of its 
reception. 10 As Hoffmann and Zeffertt put it, legal rele-
vance is a function of two variables, viz. the probative 
force of the evidence and the disadvantages it would cause 
by way of prejudice, confusion, the need to investigate 
lengthy collateral issues or the need to consider difficult 
questions of credibility. 11 In the words of Nicholas J, 
this conception of relevance would allow evidence that is 
logically probative to be received "provided that it is not 
oppressive or unfair to the other side, and that the other 
side had fair notice of it and is able to deal with it." 
It is submitted, therefore, that these two factors should 
be subsumed into the enquiry concerning the relevance of 
the evidence, and should not be considered an independent 
reason for the justification of the hearsay rule. Not all 
hearsay raises these difficulties, and, where it does, they 
may be considered together with all the other circum-
stances, in determining whether the probative value exceeds 
the disadvantages and prejudicial effect of the evidence. 
The third factor concerns possible dangers that may be 
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latent in the evidence and that may not be properly identi-
fied owing to the absence of cross-examination and the other 
standard procedures normally available to a court. This ob-
jection is therefore more properly considered in {C) and {D) 
below. 
{B) Hearsay contains intrinsic danqers or weaknesses 
that are not normally present in original testimony 
Consider the following situation: X is charged with exceed-
ing the speed limit. The prosecution calls a witness, W, 
who testifies that he spoke to Y, who was a passenger in X's 
car at the time, and that Y said to him, "X was speeding". 
What dangers are involved in receiving this evidence? Clear-
ly there is the danger that Y might have been lying or mis-
taken, dangers relating to Y's sincerity, memory or powers 
of perception. These dangers, however, are present in all 
evidence, whether hearsay or original: even if Y were to 
testify himself, there would be no assurance that he had not 
intentionally or honestly misrepresented the facts. The 
difference, however, lies in the opportunity which the ad-
versary has to reveal, assess and probe these dangers. 
Where Y testifies personally, he does so subject to the oath, 
in open court, and in the presence of the adversary {the 
accused), where his demeanour may be scrutinized, where he 
must answer questions which together make up a coherent 
whole, and where he is subject to cross-examination by the 
accused or his legal representative. Hhere he does 
not testify personally, and the court is required to 
rely on W's account of Y's narrative, these procedural 
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safeguards are not available to the court or to X. The 
dangers, nevertheless, are the same; it is only the method 
of exposing them that is different. These testimonial 
dangers, which are latent in all evidence, will be con-
sidered separately in (C) below. What remains to be ascer-
tained is whether hearsay contains "intrinsic" dangers or 
weaknesses that are not normally present in original evi-
dence but that arise purely from the nature of a hearsay 
assertion. 
12 In Mirna Queen v Hepburn, Marshall CJ said the following 
of hearsay: "Its intrinsic weakness, its incompetency to 
satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds 
which might be practised under its cover, combine to sup-
port the rule that hearsay evidence is totally inadmis-
sible." 13 And Story J in Ellicott v Pearl was of the 
view that "it is peculiarly liable to be obtained by frau-
dulent contrivances, and above all that it is exceedingly 
infirm, unsatisfactory, and intrinsically weak in its very 
nature and character." Furthermore, Fletcher J in Lund v 
14 Tyngsborough emphasized the "danger that casual observa-
tions would be misunderstood, misremembered, and misre-
ported". 
In short, then, these objections are to the effect that 
hearsay, by its very nature as an intra-curial recollection, 
of an extra-curial act or statement by a person not before 
the court, has a peculiar susceptibility to fraudulent and 
honest errors in transmission. 
(i) Fraudulent errors in transmission: 15 Wigmore 
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explains this objection as meaning "that oral utterances of 
the sort can by false witnesses be placed in the mouth of 
16 
absent persons", and Baker states the argument as fol-
lows: "How easy it would be, it is said, to manufacture 
false statements as if corning from reputable persons and 
adduce them through the mouths of unscrupulous witnesses." 
Both authors, however, reject this reason, primarily be-
cause it does not explain the exclusion of written hearsay 
statements or the admissibility of other oral evidence 
(such as admissions or the res gestae) which raise the 
same problem. It is submitted, however, that these argu-
rnents are not totally convincing: the fact that this rea-
son alone cannot justify the existence of the hearsay rule 
in its present form does not necessarily imply that it 
does not form one of the threads in the entire argument. 
1 7 As Baker points out, the reasons for excluding hearsay 
should not be considered separately, but rather as a con-
nected set of interdependent factors. By identifying the 
weaknesses of hearsay, a better understanding of this net-
work is possible. 
(ii) Honest errors in transmission: This argument has 
caused a great deal of academic debate. The authors of 
McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence express the 
view that hearsay is particularly vulnerable to errors in 
transmission, adding that "the reporting of words spoken 
is subject to special dangers of inaccuracy beyond the fal-
libility common to all reproduction from memory of matters 
of observation". 18 The learned authors dismiss Wigmore's 
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criticism of this contention as being inconclusive, remark-
ing that this criticism merely outlines the failure of the 
existing rule to distinguish between written and spoken 
hearsay. As regards oral non-hearsay statements, such as 
legally operative utterances (e g words of offer and accep-
tance or defamatory statements), the learned authors concede 
that the dangersof errors in transmission are similar to 
those in oral hearsay,but submit that the admissibility of 
the former statements is explained by the greater need for 
their proof. It is submitted, however, that their recep-
tion may be explained on far more cogent grounds, viz. the 
fact that their evidential value does not rest on an evalua-
tion of the credibility of the absent declarant. The 
dangers that will be considered in category (C) below, 
therefore do not arise, as is the case in oral hearsay 
statements, and the absence of the standard procedural de-
vices does not materially affect their value as evidence. 
Even if it were conceded, therefore, that both hearsay and 
non-hearsay evidence of extra-curial oral statements raised 
similar dangers of error in transmission, a logical basis 
could still be found for justifying the exclusion of the 
former and the reception of the latter. Put differently, 
it does not follow that this danger is not ~ valid reason 
- as distinct from the only reason - for excluding hearsay 
merely because other types of evidence, which are admis-
sible, share the same or similar dangers. 
Lempert and Saltzburg, 19 however, are of the view that the 
danger of error in transmission is in fact normally greater 
in the case of oral hearsay than non-hearsay statements, 
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submitting that Wigmore has failed to appreciate the follow-
ing important differences between the two: 
a. Hearsay statements are generally single statements, and 
the danger of honest mistakes about crucial matters is 
greater when a single statement is reported than when a 
complex one is related. If, for instance, Y tells W, 
"X was speeding", and W hears the statement as "X was 
not speeding", then the single word "not" is capable of 
reversing the meaning of the single assertion. On the 
other hand, the failure to appreciate one detail of a 
com~lex set of facts is not likely to be as crucial, 
especially since other evidence may normally be used 
to fill the gaps. The dangers are increased, it is 
argued, where the error in reporting is an honest one, 
as then the oath and observation of W's demeanour will 
not assist in revealing the mistake. 
b. Cross-examination is likely to be less effective in ex-
posing mistaken reports of out-of-court statements than 
other mistaken testimonial claims. This is particu-
larly true when the witness is intentionally misrepre-
senting the facts, as the lying witness does not have 
to fit his assertion into a consistent set of support-
ing facts (as, for instance, would an eye-witness), 
but can hide behind the impermeable veil of someone 
else's credibility. Thus, whereas an eye-witness 
would have to present a consistent and satisfactory 
account of all the facts that he himself had perceived, 
a hearsay witness, relying on what someone else said or 
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did, need offer no explanation for any inconsistencies 
and may escape further probing by affirming that he 
knows nothing more than what he was told. This free-
dom from testimonial responsibility would reduce sub-
stantially the efficacy of cross-examination in un-
covering untruths. 
c. Because hearsay statements involve assessing the credi-
bility of two declarants instead of one, difficult 
questions may arise as to the weight to be attached to 
the evidence. If, for example, the court were to de-
cide that a witness's report of an out-of-court 
declaration was, say 70 per cent reliable, and the 
out-of-court declaration had, say, a 50 per cent chance 
of being correct, then what weight should be given to 
the composite assertion? Clearly the problem is not 
capable of a mathematical solution, but will be decided 
on intuition, which is likely to be unreliable. 
In an attempt to assess the errors that are made in the 
20 transmission of hearsay evidence, Bartlett conducted the 
following experiment: he presented a short prose selection 
to various people who, after reading it twice, conveyed the 
contents to other people who had not read it, and they in 
turn did the same. He found that the quality of the repro-
duction deteriorated as it passed through the various phases 
of repetition; even in one-step reproductions, the degree 
of distortion was significant. The nature of these distor-
tions he described as follows: 
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"Epithets are changed into their opposites; inci-
dents and events are transposed; names and num-
bers rarely survive intact for more than a few 
reproductions; opinions and conclusions are re-
versed - nearly every possible variation seems as 
if it can take place, even in a relatively short 
series. At the same time, the subjects may be 
very well satisfied with their efforts, believing 
themselves to have passed on all important 
features with little or no change, and merely, 
perhaps, to have omitted unessential matters." 21 
The latter observation is of particular interest, as it shows 
that cross-examination will be of limited value in extracting 
from a hearsay witness the correct version of a declarant's 
statement. Bartlett also found 
"that proper names and titles are especially un-
stable; that there is a strong tendency to 
develop a concrete version of the account with 
the result that general opinions, reasoning, and 
arguments are transformed and omitted; that the 
language is transformed into more conventional 
and popular phrases; that in all cases there 
was much abbreviation; that rationalization re-
sulted in changes in various types; and that 
the changes that are introduced may be radical." 22 
In a refinement of Bartlett's experiment, Allport and Post·· 
man 2 
3 found that this verbal distortion is caused by 
three basic processes: 
i. "Leveling", 
24 
which eliminates details so that the 
account becomes easier to manage. 
ii. 25 "Sharpening", which produces selective perception, 
retention, and reporting of a limited number of de-
tails. There is a concentration on a selected num-
ber of stimuli at the expense of other stimuli. A 
particular aspect of this phenomenon, called "clo-
sure", manifests itself in a tendency to make are-
port more meaningful by adding material that was not 
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perceived by the reporter. 
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iii. "Assimilation", which is the process of referring 
to things as they are normally perceived and remem-
bered despite the nature of the stimulus. In one 
experiment, for instance, where a Red Cross ambulance 
is depicted as carrying explosives, the reporter re-
calls it as carrying medical supplies. In the words 
of the authors: "where an actual perceptual fact is 
in conflict with expectation, expectation may prove a 
stronger determinant of perception and memory than 
27 
the situation itself." 
From the above discussion, it is submitted that the follow-
ing conclusions may be drawn: 
1. Hearsay normally contains more inherent weaknesses or 
dangers than other evidence. 
2. These dangers concern the peculiar vulnerability that 
hearsay has to honest or dishonest errors in transmission. 
3. They therefore relate to the sincerity, memory and 
powers of perception of the witness and not the original 
declarant who uttered the statement. 
4. Even if other non-hearsay evidence of extra-curial 
statements often contains similar dangers, a logical basis 
still exists for distinguishing between the two classes of 
evidence as regards admissibility. 
5. This fact, furthermore, does not reduce the value of 
identifying these dangers as possible contributory reasons 
for excluding hearsay, even though the existence of these 
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dangers alone cannot justify such exclusion. 
(C) All evidence presents certain dangers of unreliabil-
ity. In the case of hearsay, however, the absence 
of the standard procedural safeguards renders these 
dangers peculiarly difficult to assess. 
This argument is inextricably linked to category (D) below, 
and, as will become apparent in the course of the discus-
sion, it is probably incorrect to separate them. For the 
purpose of analysis, however, each will receive individual 
consideration. 
28 Morgan, with his usual clarity and inscrutable logic, 
identifies the problem by comparing two situations: 
Situation I : Assume the proponent wishes to prove X by 
way of witness W, who testifies before the trier of fact, 
T, that he saw, heard or otherwise perceived x. In order 
to accept W's evidence, T must make the following set of 
inferences, each of which depends on the one preceding it: 
(1) that W actually said what he seemed to have been saying; 
(2) that W intended thereby to express the same proposition 
that T would have intended if T had used the same words or 
sounds; (3) that W believed he had perceived X; (4) that 
this belief was due to an actual experience of W, and was 
not the result of a reconstruction or a flight of the 
imagination; and (5) that the sense impressions of W cor-
responded with the objective fact. 
Situation II : Assume now that the proponent wishes to 
establish X by calling W who testifies as follows: "De-
clarant, D, told me that he had perceived X." In order 
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to accept X, the fact sought to be proved, the trier now has 
to conduct two separate enquiries: 
(a) Did D tell W that he had perceived X? 
(b) Did D actually perceive X? 
In the first enquiry, T has to employ exactly the same mental 
process as he used in Situation I, but this enquiry yields a 
result no more dramatic than that D, in the presence of W, 
made a particular statement. For, as Morgan puts it, 
"(h]ere the personal experience of which Witness speaks is 
not the perception of X, but the auditory perceptions of 
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words uttered by Declarant." It is the second enquiry 
that the proponent relies on to establish the perception of 
X, and here various new factors are brought into play which 
complicate the issue: 
"Declarant is not now speaking under oath, subject 
to a penalty for perjury, at a public hearing in 
the presence of Trier and subject to cross-
examination by Adversary. Furthermore, none of 
these conditions existed at the time when Declar-
ant made the utterance. Yet Proponent is asking 
Trier to rely upon Declarant's use of language, 
his sincerity, his memory, and his perception; 
and if Trier is to find that X occurred or 
existed, he must treat Declarant in all respects 
as in the former situation he treated Witness. 
In short, for this purpose Witness is merely the 
means of getting to Trier the statement of De-
clarant, and Declarant is the real witness upon 
the issue of the occurrence or existence of X." 30 
The reception of the evidence in Situation II would, there-
fore, according to Morgan, "render nugatory most of the reg-
31 
ulations imposed on witnesses". The questions concern-
ing D's narrative ability, sincerity, memory and perception 
would, therefore, not be adequately answered, and the risks 
involved would not even be properly gauged, let alone re-
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duced. It is these risks, which Morgan calls "hearsay dan-
gers", that lie at the heart of the exclusion of hearsay 
evidence. 
Professor Laurence H Tribe, in an article entitled "Tri-
angulating Hearsay", 32 has devised an ingenious schematic 
model for identifying and analyzing these hearsay dangers. 
According to Professor Tribe, the basic hearsay problem is 
that of "forging a reliable chain of inferences, from an 
act or utterance of a person not subject to contemporaneous 
in-court cross-examination about that act or utterance, to 
an event that the act or utterance is supposed to reflect". 33 
The first link in this chain is from the act itself to the 
belief it is supposed to express or indicate, a link which 
Tribe likens to a "trip" into the head of the declarant to 
see what he really thought about that act. The second 
link is from the belief of the declarant to a conclusion 
about an external event which either gave rise to that be-
lief or is in some other way related to the belief. This 
involves a "trip" out of the head of the declarant, and 
necessitates a comparison between the declarant's belief 
and the objective reality sought to be proved. 
Tribe depicts this series of inferences diagrammatically in 
34 
the form of the following "testimonial triangle": 
(1) ambiguity 
(2) insincerity 
B 
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(belief of actor responsible for A) 
erroneous memory 
faulty perception 
AL---------------~------------~c 
(action or utterance) (conclusion to which B points) 
This inferential chain is employed by the trier every time 
a witness gives evidence in court. However, if the act or 
utterance is not made in court, subject to the normal pro-
cedural requirements - as in Situation II discussed above -
then the trustworthiness of the declarant's assertion be-
comes questionable. To investigate the dangers involved 
in accepting such an unchallenged act or utterance, Tribe 
considers each leg of the inferential chain separately: 
(i) The trip from A to B As has been shown, this in-
volves a trip into the head of the declarant, and the 
question that must be asked is, "Did the declarant really 
entertain the belief he allegedly represents to have held?" 
In other words, if X is the fact sought to be proved, the 
question is, "Did D subjectively believe that he perceived 
X?" An affirmative answer to this question depends on two 
factors: 
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(1) Did D, by the words or actions that he employed, in-
tend to convey the idea that he perceived X? The 
danger here is that, owing to poor narrative ability 
or a certain ambiguity in expression, W may under-
stand from D's words or actions something other than 
what was intended by D. 
(2) Was D sincere in representing his belief by those 
words or actions? If not, then the intra-curial re-
port by W will, of course, be incorrect. 
(ii) The trip from B to C : This trip raises the follow-
ing question, "Did the declarant's belief in fact reflect 
accurately the external reality on which it is allegedly 
based?" This, in turn, deper~s on the following two addi-
tiona! factors: 
(3) Was D's recollection of X sufficiently fresh to en-
able him to make a reliable observation? 
(4) Were his powers of perception sufficiently competent 
to warrant placing reliance on his observation? 
Either of these dangers may distort D's vision of reality 
and inspire a belief, which, although honestly entertained, 
does not correctly reflect the true facts. 
Professor Tribe then demonstrates how his "Testimonial Tri-
angle" may be used to identify the presence of a hearsay-
type situation: If A is used to prove C by travelling 
through B, then, he submits, a traditional hearsay problem 
arises. It is only when A is used to prove C without the 
need for a detour through B, either explicit or implicit, 
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that no hearsay problem can be said to exist. To illus-
35 trate the point, he provides the following two examples: 
Example I : This illustration is based on the Amchitka 
nuclear test in 1971, 36 where the Chairman of the Atomic 
Energy Commission told reporters that he was taking his 
family to the site of the Amchitka blast in response to a 
challenge by a State Governor who was opposed to the blast. 
Suppose now that the issue were to arise as to whether suf-
ficient safety precautions were taken for the nuclear test; 
could the conduct of the Chairman of the Commission be used 
in evidence to support the contention that the site was 
reasonably safe? Clearly, in order to travel from A (the 
conduct of the Chairman) to C (the fact that the site was 
safe), it is essential to consider the belief of the Chair-
man, thus necessitating a detour via B on the model. Ac-
cording to Tribe, the evidence is therefore hearsay, a con-
clusion that he submits is borne out by examining the 
dangers involved in receiving the evidence. It is quite 
possible, for instance, that the Chairman may have wished 
to dispel any fears and doubts that may have existed about 
the site's safety, and he may have accepted the challenge 
either without forming any opinion at all on the question 
or even despite a belief that the precautions taken were 
inadequate. Alternatively, although he may honestly have 
believed that the site was safe, he may have misread the 
situation or he may not have considered properly all the 
data at his disposal. 
Both legs of the triangle therefore reveal dangers that 
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could be reduced, or at least properly identified and 
assessed, by means of cross-examining the Chairman in a 
court-room situation, where he would be under oath, where 
his demeanour could be observed under the critical eye of 
the trier and adversary, and where he would be obliged to 
present his testimony formally in the question-and-answer 
manner that characterizes the adversary system of trial 
procedure. 
Example II : Assume that the issue before the court is 
whether D is capable of speech, and that W testifies that 
D said to him, "I can speak". Here the trip from A (the 
statement of D) to C (the conclusion that D can speak) may 
be made directly, without the need to consider D's belief 
as to whether he can speak or not. The conclusion is borne 
out by the very fact that D spoke to W, a fact which lies 
within the perception of W himself. The evidence is thus 
non-hearsay. If, however, the issue was whether D could 
read, and W had testified that D had told him "I can read", 
then clearly the trier would have to consider D's belief to 
that effect, and the evidence would be hearsay. 
The model devised by Tribe is therefore a very useful ana-
lytical tool for identifying what Morgan calls the "hearsay 
dangers". It does not, however, purport to reflect the 
entire series of inferences that a trier has to draw in re-
lying on a hearsay statement. This refinement of the 
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model is effected by Lempert and Saltzburg, who consider 
the following example: Assume that the accused, the owner 
of a red motor vehicle, is charged with knocking down and 
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killing victim V, and leaving the scene of the accident with-
out reporting it to the authorities. Assume further that a 
witness, W, gives evidence that he arrived at the scene of 
the accident after the driver had fled, but that he heard 
declarant D state: "A red car hit V". In order for the 
trier to conclude from this evidence that a red car did in 
fact hit V, he must make the following set of inferences: 
( i. ) W's evidence that he heard D say "A red car hit v. 
:::;- (ii.) w believes that D made this statement. 
=1 (iii. ) D did make this statement. 
~ ( iv.) D believed that a red car hit v. 
~ (v.) A red car did hit v. 
These inferences, the learned authors submit, may be re-
solved into the following two distinct testimonial 
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triangles: 
Tntlmony Giv.n in Court Stalei'Mftt of Huraay Declarant 
Belief: Y£...s belief that 2. said. ··A reel car hat lhe victim." Behef: O's belief that a red car hat the vactim. 
TrianglE> I 
Acllon: 'J£.J statement that.Q. 
said, "A red car hal 
the victim." 
B 
Conclusoon: ~in fact said, 
"A red car hit 
thr victim." 
B 
Acloon: .Q:.s statement, 
"A red car hu 
lhe VICtim." 
(established by 
W's lnlunony.J 
TrianglE> II 
Conclusion: The car 
which hat 
the victun 
was red. 
II 
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Each of these triangles concerns a different issue: whereas 
Triangle I is concerned with whether D made the statement, 
"A red car hit V", the issue in Triangle II is whether a red 
car did in fact hit v. These two questions correspond 
exactly with the two-stage enquiry identified by Morgan in 
Situation II above, and, in conjunction with what was said 
there, the following observations may be made: 
a. The determination of the issue in Triangle I is 
greatly facilitated by the fact that it lies within 
the perception of W, who is subject to the standard 
procedural devices demanded by the Adversary System 
of trial procedure. 
b. The nature of the evidence that W gives, however, con-
tains certain intrinsic dangers. W is recounting a 
hearsay statement, and, as has been observed above, 
such statements are peculiarly vulnerable to errors in 
transmission. 
c. These errors may be either fraudulent (encountered in 
the trip from A to B in Triangle I) or honest (en-
countered in the trip from B to C in that triangle). 
d. Triangle I, therefore, illustrates those dangers that 
are inherent in hearsay evidence and which have al-
ready been discussed in (B) above. 38 
e. In Triangle II, the determination of the issue is 
rendered more difficult by the fact that it lies with-
in the perception of someone who is not subject to the 
standard procedural requirements, viz. D. 
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f. The dangers presented by all evidence, therefore, con-
cerning the sincerity, narrative ability and powers of 
memory and perception of the attesting party, which 
are normally satisfactorily assessed by means of those 
procedural devices, remain unmeasured. 
g. Triangle II, therefore, illustrates those dangers 
which, although not peculiar to hearsay evidence, are 
rendered more difficult to ascertain and assess in 
such evidence because of the absence of procedural 
aids. It is these dangers that have constituted the 
focal point of the enquiry in (C). 
h. It may happen that in a particular item of evidence 
these dangers may be satisfactorily assessed and 
accounted for by various circumstantial indications 
of trustworthiness, despite the fact that the declar-
ant is not subject to the oath, cross-examination etc. 
Yet such evidence is usually excluded. 
i. It would appear, therefore, that the absence of these 
procedural norms constitutes the main reason for the 
exclusion of hearsay evidence. To test the validity 
of this conclusion, it is necessary to examine these 
requirements more closely. 
D. The absence of those standard procedural devices 
that characterize the Adversary System 
It has been said that "toJne of the psychological assump-
tions implicit in the law of evidence is that all human 
testimony in its natural state is too untrustworthy to be 
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considered by a jury unless its narration be conditioned in 
a manner calculated so as to improve it in trustworthiness 
as to avoid the danger of the jury's being deceived into an 
erroneous verdict." 40 
Of these conditional devices, the oath and cross-examina-
tion have traditionally enjoyed the greatest prominence. 
Today it is fashionable to explain the hearsay rule entirely 
in terms of the latter requirement. 41 Wigmore, for in-
stance, expressed the view that "the essence of the Hearsay 
rule is a requirement that testimonial assertions shall be 
subjected to the test of cross-examination, and that the 
judicial expressions ... coupling oath and cross-examination 
had in mind the oath as merely the ordinary accompaniment of 
testimony given on the stand, subject to the test of cross-
examination." 42 Cross states that " [tJ he absence of an 
opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement is 
•.. the best all-embracing reason that can be given for the 
43 
rule", and Morgan makes the following observation: 
" [s] o great is the emphasis upon cross-exami-
nation in modern decisions that it seems 
reasonable to assert that the principal 
ground for rejecting hearsay is an idea 
basic to our entire system of litigation 
the adversary has a right that the trier 
shall not be influenced by testimony which 
the adversary has had no opportunity to 
cross-examine." 44 
The point has been made by some writers, however, most not-
ably Strahorn and Schiff, that this view unjustifiably ig-
nores the "other conditioning devices which, in co-opera-
tion with cross-examination, seek to improve the trustwor-
thiness of normally unreliable human narration". 45 It is 
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convenient, therefore, to examine individually the views of 
these two writers in order to identify and evaluate these 
devices. 
I. STRAHORN : Strahorn lists what he calls the "con-
46 ditioning devices" as follows: 
Group 1 : Those devices which purport to improve the 
trustworthiness of human testimony by presenting the stimu-
lus of fear in the witness. This fear may be either that 
of divine punishment (the oath), of human punishment (the 
penalty for perjury), or of public disapproval incidental 
to the witness's being contradicted either by himself or by 
others (in the form of discovery, publicity, confrontation 
and cross-examination.) 
Group 2 : The device of normal testimonial narration 
in the presence of the trier of fact, a device that "pre-
sents to the witness the stimulus of fear of the power and 
dignity of the tribunal and also leads to more accurate ac-
quisition of meaning by the latter because of the advantage 
of the fact finder's being able to observe the demeanour 
47 
and tone of voice of the witness as he narrates". This 
requirement, the learned author remarks, affords certain 
other devices which are also available to improve the 
trustworthiness of human testimony, such as the process of 
refreshing memory and the use of aids such as maps, dia-
grams, photographs and interpreters, all of which concern 
the memory, perception and narrative abilities of the wit-
ness and tend to remove from his testimony some of its 
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native untrustiworthiness. 
The hearsay rule, Strahorn submits, is essentially a func-
tion of two variables: 
i. the requirements of the conditioning devices and 
ii. the testimonial elements of perception, recollection 
and narration. The basic objection to a hearsay 
statement is therefore that "it was not made under 
the beneficent influence of the conditioning devices 
calculated to make human testimony sufficiently 
accurate". 48 
But apart from this, there is, he adds, another factor that 
further shows the untrustworthiness of hearsay, viz. the 
reception of such evidence generally entails running twice 
the normal risk of defect in the testimonial process. The 
reason for this is that, although the witness relating the 
hearsay statement is subject to the conditioning devices, 
there is still no guarantee of the trustworthiness of his 
testimony. The conditioning devices merely aid the court 
in measuring the deficiencies of human testimony; they do 
not ensure its reliability. 
In thelight ofthese observations, Strahorn prefers the view 
that it is the absence of all the conditioning devices and 
the benefits of normal testimonial narration that makes 
hearsay objectionable, and not merely the absence of cross-
examination. He believes it is helpful to consider hearsay 
evidence as "human testimony in the raw, unfit to be used 
for narrative purposes unless it has been exposed to all the 
processes set up for all raw human testimony and without 
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which none may be considered". The hearsay rule, there-
fore, he submits, is "nothing more than a detailed applica-
tion of the several requirements for the improvement of all 
50 human testimony". 
II. SCHIFF : In an article entitled "Hearsay and the 
Hearsay Rule : A functional View", 51 Schiff also rejects 
the conventional wisdom that hearsay is objectionable 
merely because the declarant was not under oath and not sub-
ject to cross-examination when he made the statement in 
question. This traditional statement of the rationale of 
the hearsay rule, he submits, is far from the whole story. 
In order to appreciate the true picture, it is necessary to 
examine carefully the demands which the adversary trial 
system puts on a person who testifies. Such witness is 
subject to at least eight procedural constraints, all of 
which, Schiff says, "the law puts on him with the condition 
that if any one is not satisfied, his testimony about the 
52 
relevant matter will not be heard": 
(1) A pre-trial interview with one or both counsel, in 
order to ascertain what he personally knows rele-
vant to the dispute, and at which witness state-
ments are taken. 
(2) Just before the trial, a last-minute review of evi-
dence, during which counsel refreshes the witness's 
responsible memory, takes him through a mock exami-
nation-in-chief and cross-examination, explains the 
necessity of speaking the truth, considerations of 
relevancy, personal knowledge and the operation of 
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the exclusionary rules. 
(3) Trial in open court, with testimony given in the pre-
sence of judge, trier of fact, parties, their counsel, 
and spectators. 
(4) The swearing of an oath or taking of an affirmation 
prior to giving evidence. 
(5) The witness must be shown to have perceived or have 
had an opportunity to perceive the relevant matter 
relating to the subject-matter of his testimony. 
(6) He must also be shown to have had the capacity at the 
time to perceive the matter accurately, "capacity 
spanning the instant of perception and the instant of 
testimony to remember accurately what he then per-
ceived and capacity as he testifies verbally to com-
53 
municate that memory to the trier of fact". 
(7) He must speak in response to questions put to him 
during examination-in-chief, guiding both the format 
and content of what he says. 
(8) He may then be cross-examined by the adversary, in 
which case he must again respond to questions, which 
are designed for any one or more of a number of pur-
poses: 54 (a) to show that he had no opportunity to 
perceive; or (b) to show that he did not have the 
ability to understand what he perceived; or (c) to 
show that he did not in fact perceive it accurately; 
or (d) that his memory has faded between then and 
now; or (e) to show that he deliberately did not re-
flect his memory in his examination-in-chief; or (f) 
to show that there has not been accurate verbal com-
Page 43. 
munication of his memory to the trier of fact, be-
cause his use of language is different from what the 
trier has understood from his evidence-in-chief; or 
(g) to cause the witness to withdraw or at least 
alter an assertion made in his examination-in-chief; 
or (h) to elicit from the witness new matter not 
touched.on in chief but which is helpful to the 
opponent's case or harmful to the case of the call-
ing party. 
In the case of the hearsay declarant, in Schiff's view, none 
of these procedural demands is satisfied, whereas all these 
requirements must be satisfied when a witness gives oral 
testimony. Functionally, therefore, Schiff concludes, the 
hearsay rule "bars evidence of words offered to prove the 
matter they assert when none of the standard demands imposed 
55 
upon testimonial evidence has been satisfied". These de-
mands, as he points out, go far beyond the traditionally 
cited procedures concerning the oath and the opportunity to 
cross-examine. Furthermore, he argues, when the focus is 
on the opportunity to cross-examine, it must "be understood 
in the light of the potential results of its skilful use", 58 
keeping in mind the possible uses to which it may be put as 
discussed above. 
Both Strahorn and Schiff, therefore, are in accord in re-
jecting the absence of cross-examination as the only factor 
that warrants an objection to the reception of hearsay. 
They both require human testimony, before it may be admitted, 
to be subjected to a whole series of procedural devices of 
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which cross-examination constitutes only one - albeit part-
icularly important - of the components. Where the two 
writers diverge, however, is in their perspectives of the 
aims and purposes of these devices. For Strahorn, the 
purpose of the conditioning devices is to improve the 
trustworthiness of the evidence so as to avoid misleading 
the trier of fact and to prevent the trier from being de-
ceived into an erroneous verdict. Schiff, however, fol-
lows a different point of view, claiming that the procedural 
demands of the adversary system are imposed largely in the 
interests of the adversary, and not the trier. He states: 
"In sum, the hearsay rule functions almost 
not at all to protect the triers of fact 
from making erroneous findings. It func-
tions mainly to protect the opposing party 
against evidence of relevant matters pre-
sented in a fashion not satisfying the 
well-settled demands of witness examination 
in our trial system. In this light, the 
rule makes good sense in the context of a 
system with those demands." 57 
Schiff's view in this regard is more in line with the modern 
conception of the hearsay rule as a device for protecting 
the adversary. In the words of Professor Morgan, "while 
the earlier emphasis appears to have been upon guarding 
Trier from being misled either by an honest, credulous wit-
ness or one seeking to deceive, the present doctrine 
stresses protection not of Trier but of Adversary". 5 8 
In the United States, in criminal trials, the basic values 
underlying the hearsay rule have become inextricably linked 
with the constitutional limitations of the Sixth Amendment's 
Confrontation Clause, which was held to be applicable to the 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment in the case 
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of Pointer v Texas. This clause provides that " [i] n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right ••• to be confronted with the witnesses against him 
" The United States Supreme Court has held that the 
"hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally 
designed to protect similar values", 60 and "stem from 
the same roots", 61 but, since 1965, it has grappled to 
come to terms with the difficult task of reconciling and 
determining the relationship between the two rules. In a 
. f 62 ser~es o cases, the Court has attempted to formulate 
an approach that would satisfactorily accommodate the in-
terests of both, but, until the recent decision in Ohio v 
Roberts, 63 no integrated theory had emerged. 
In the seminal decision in Roberts, however, Justice 
Blackmun, writing for a six member majority, conducted a 
thorough analysis of this problem, an analysis that sheds 
valuable light on the rOle and rationale of the hearsay 
rule. The Confrontation Clause, said the learned judge, 
"reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at 
64 trial", in which is envisioned 
"a personal examination and cross-examina-
tion of the witness in which the accused 
has an opportunity, not only of testing 
the recollection and sifting the con-
science of the witness, but of compelling 
him to stand face to face with the jury 
in order that they may look at him, and 
judge by his demeanour upon the stand and 
the manner in which he gives his testi-
mony whether he is worthy of belief."65 
These procedural devices for testing the accuracy of testi-
mony, he added, are "so important that the absence of pro-
per confrontation at trial lcalls into question the ulti-
Page 46. 
86 
mate integrity of the fact-finding process'". On the 
other hand, the Supreme Court has recognized that "com-
peting interests" may in certain cases warrant dispensing 
with confrontation at trial on the grounds of public pol-
icy and necessity. This tension between competing in-
terests has been resolved by recourse to the dual principles 
of necessity and reliability. In order to dispense with 
the requirement of confrontation, therefore, the prosecution 
must satisfy the court that: 
(i) the declarant, whose statement it wishes to use 
against the defendant, is unavailable (unless the 
utility of trial confrontation is so small that the 
production of an available witness is deemed unneces-
87 
sary : Dutton v Evans ); and 
(ii) the hearsay evidence of the absent declarant is 
"marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no 
material departure from the reason of the gene~al 
88 
rule'". 
The latter requirement was clearly explained in Mancusi v 
69 Stubbs, where the court stated: 
"The focus of the Court's concern has been to 
insure that there 'are indicia of reliabil-
ity which have been widely viewed as deter-
minative of whether a statement may be 
placed before the jury though there is no 
confrontation of the declarant', Dutton v 
Evans [400 u.s. 74 (1970) at 8~ ••• and to 
'afford the trier of fact a satisfactory 
basis for evaluating the truth of the prior 
statement', California v Green [399 u.s. 
149 ( 1976) at 16 fJ . It is clear from these 
statements, and from numerous prior deci-
sions of this Court, that even though the 
witness be unavailable his prior testimony 
must bear some of these 'indicia of relia-
bility I 0 " 70 
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What are these "indicia of reliability"? In the words of 
Justice Blackrnun: 
"The Court has applied this .•• requirement 
principally by concluding that certain 
hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid 
foundations that admission of virtually 
any evidence within them comports with the 
'substance of the constitutional protec-
tion • In 7 1 
The learned judge commented on the close association be-
tween the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule, and 
concluded as follows: 
"In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not pre-
sent for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause normally requires a 
showing that he is unavailable. Even then, 
his statement is admissible only if it bears 
adequate 'indicia of reliability.' Relia-
bility can be inferred without more in a 
case where the evidence falls within a 
firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other 
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at 
least absent a showing of particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness." 72 
The majority of the court then applied these principles to 
the facts in Roberts's case, which were as follows: The 
defendant was charged with forgery. At the preliminary 
hearing, the defence called the daughter of the victim of 
the forgery as a witness. At the trial itself, the pros-
ecution, after unsuccessful attempts to secure her testi-
mony, produced the transcript of her testimony at the pre-
liminary hearing in rebuttal of the defendant's own tes-
timony. The court held that the admission of this tran-
script did not violate the Confrontation Clause because 
(1.) the record disclosed that the witness was constitu-
tionally unavailable for purposes of the trial, and (2.) 
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the witness's prior testimony "bore sufficient indicia of 
reliability and afforded the trier of fact a satisfactory 
73 basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement." 
This was so despite the fact that defence counsel's ini-
tial questioning of the witness occurred on direct exam-
ination as opposed to cross-examination, because: 
"Counsel's questioning clearly partook of 
cross-examination as a matter of form. 
His presentation was replete with leading 
questions, the principal tool and hall-
mark of cross-examination. In addition, 
counsel's questioning comported with the 
principal purpose of cross-examination: 
to challenge 'whether the declarant was 
sincerely telling what he believed to be 
the truth, whether the declarant 
accurately perceived and remembered the 
matter he related, and whether the 
declarant's intended meaning is ade-
quately conveyed by the language he em-
ployed.' Davenport, The Confrontation 
Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception 
in Criminal Prosecutions : A Functional 
Analysis, 85 Harv LRev 1378 (1972) ." 74 
This treatment of the Confrontation Clause by the United 
States Supreme Court is in harmony with the views of 
Strahorn and Schiff concerning the rationale of the hear-
say rule, to which the Confrontation Clause is so closely 
related. It is submitted, moreover, that this approach 
provides a useful pointer to resolving the hearsay prob-
lem in countries that do not have a Confrontation Clause, 
such as South Africa, because, by identifying the values 
that underlie the principle of confrontation, a better 
understanding of the theoretical foundation of the hear-
say rule is possible. The reason for this is that every 
hearsay question automatically involves a consideration 
of the problem presented by absence of confrontation 
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(although the converse is not true), and the Confrontation 
Clause was added to the United States Constitution to pre-
vent the abuses that were possible under the common law 
hearsay rule. 75 
To illustrate this proposition, let us consider again 
76 
Morgan's example in which the proponent wishes to es-
tablish X by calling a witness, W, who testifies that "D 
told me that he had perceived X." This is clearly a 
hearsay statement, transmitted to the trier in such a way 
that the adversary has no opportunity to confront the de-
clarant, D. With reference to the analysis presented by 
Justice Blackmun in Roberts, what factors must be con-
sidered by a court in weighing up the merits and demerits 
of this evidence? 
A. Factors militating against admissibility: 
a. Prejudice to the adversary, owing to the absence of 
confrontation and all its attendant benefits in the 
form of the standard procedural devices enumerated 
by Schiff above. 
b. Prejudice to the integrity of the fact-finding 
process, owing to the absence of testimonial nar-
ration as a means of allowing the trier of fact to 
evaluate more accurately the evidence at his dis-
posal, as explained by Strahorn above. 
B. Factors promoting admissibility: 
a. Factors mitigating the prejudice to the adversary: 
The adversary only suffers prejudice if the absence 
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of the procedural devices is detrimental to his case. 
A finding, therefore, that either (i) these devices 
would not have enjoyed any substantial utility on the 
facts of the case, or (ii) adequate substitutes exist 
in that particular case for the unavailable proce-
dures (as in Roberts above), would remove the sting 
from this objection. 
b. Factors mitigating the prejudice to the trier and the 
integrity of the fact-finding process: 
A finding that either (i) the evidence contained ade-
quate "indicia of reliability" to merit reliance 
thereon by the trier of fact, or (ii) that any preju-
dice caused to the integrity of the fact-finding 
process was outweighed by considerations of public 
policy operating in favour of reception of the evi-
dence - such as the need for the evidence, unavail-
ability of the declarant to be called as a witness 
and the probative value of the evidence - would 
provide a cogent basis for admissibility. 
It is immediately apparent that these factors, apart 
from their utility in resolving a Constitutional confron-
tation issue, also lie at the very heart of the hearsay 
problem. It is submitted, moreover, that the absence of 
confrontation constitutes the major objection to the ad-
missibility of hearsay, and that, in countries such as 
South Africa, where the issues of hearsay and confronta-
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tion have not been separated, and where the right of confron-
tation (at least in criminal trials) has not been constitu-
tionally ensured, any attempt to reform hearsay law would be 
greatly enhanced by assimilating the product of the American 
courts' experience in grappling with this vital issue. 
By way of illustration, it is interesting and illuminating 
to look at the decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of 
77 Appeals in United States v Payne. The four petitioners 
had been convicted by the court a quo of conspiracy for ob-
taining, possessing and passing counterfeit Federal Reserve 
Notes. Four other co-defendants, including one Burrell, 
had pleaded guilty to the same charges. Before pleading, 
Burrell had been interviewed by a Secret Service Agent, one 
Donald. During the interview, he made a statement to 
Donald in which he confessed his own guilt and also impli-
cated the petitioners. However, the interview was termi-
nated before Burrell signed the statement, as he claimed to 
be suffering from dizziness and lack of memory. At 
Burrell's arraignment, Donald gave evidence concerning the 
confession made to him, although the statement itself was 
not admitted. Donald made no mention of the reference to 
the petitioners in the statement. In the court a quo, 
Burrell was called to testify as a government witness 
against the petitioners, but, when questioned, he claimed 
to be unable to recall either pleading guilty, talking with 
Secret Service agents, or any scheme to counterfeit notes. 
Donald then gave evidence as to the substance of Burrell's 
statement, and, despite the objection of the defence 
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counsel, the statement itself was admitted in evidence. 
On appeal, it was contended that the statement and the 
evidence given by Donald should have been excluded on two 
grounds, viz. that it infringed the rule against hearsay, 
and that it fell foul of the Confrontation Clause, in that 
Burrell had not made his statement in court, and the peti-
tioners were denied an opportunity to confront him on 
account of his loss of memory. In a divided decision, 
however, the court held the evidence to have been properly 
received. 
Judge Winter, delivering the judgment for the majority, 
considered first the hearsay objection, and seemed to take 
the view that the evidence could be admitted by way of the 
78 
exception concerning "recorded past recollection". How-
ever, he went on to say, it was unnecessary to decide on 
the applicability of this exception, as the evidence was 
admissible on another ground: It is established United 
States law that prior inconsistent statements of a witness 
available for cross-examination may be received as affir-
mative proof when they were made at a former trial or be-
fore a grand jury. 7 a The rationale of this rule, he 
added, is that "the fact of an oath or possible cross-
examination provide sufficient assurances of reliability 
that the statement ought to be admitted as substantive 
80 
evidence of the fact it contains". This principle, 
the majority found, was equally applicable to Burrell's 
statement in the present case, as "his statement was suf-
ficiently tested as to reliability that it, too, ought to 
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be held admissible to prove the truth of its contents, even 
though technically it had not been sworn to, or he cross-
81 
examined". 
These indications of reliability, according to the learned 
judge, were furnished inter alia by Burrell's silence dur-
ing his arraignment at which Donald had testified about the 
contents of the statement. Although Burrell, admittedly, 
had not been specifically asked if he controverted the re-
sults of his interview, he added, there could be no ques-
tion 
"that Burrell's attention was directed to his 
statement, that he had ample opportunity to 
disavow the fact of the interview and what 
was discussed, or to assert his lack of re-
collection of all or any part of it, and 
that his silence, in the presence of the 
court, amounted to tacit admissions that the 
interview took place, that he remembered it 
and that he acknowledged the correctness of 
Mr Donald's testimony of his answers." 82 
In conclusion, the majority opined that the reliability of 
the statement had been sufficiently established "that ad-
mission of the record into evidence was not barred by 
mechanical application of the rule against hearsay testi-
83 
mony". 
The Confrontation Clause, too, the majority found, was no 
insuperable barrier to admissibility. Relying on the 
principle enunciated in California v Green that "the Con-
frontation Clause .•• reaches no farther than to require 
the prosecution to produce any available witness whose de-
84 
clarations it seeks to use in a criminal trial", Judge 
Winter found that there was no denial of the right of 
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confrontation in the present case. He conceded, however, 
that Burrell's alleged loss of memory reduced the efficacy 
of cross-examination substantially, in that inquiry into 
the evidence of guilt on the part of the petitioners would 
now be excluded, but added that "this was no different, 
except in degree, from a case in which a declarant has 
made a detailed earlier statement and at the trial, despite 
efforts to refresh his recollection, remembers only some, 
85 
but not all, of the details". 
Moreover, the learned judge added, Burrell was available 
for cross-examination on other matters, such as possible 
bias or prejudice towards his brothers, whether any pres-
sure had been applied by his brothers to encourage his loss 
of memory etc. He added: 
"The jury would thus have had a substantial 
basis on which to determine the truthfulness 
of Burrell's previous statement and full 
opportunity to observe Burrell's demeanour 
and manner of testifying so that it could 
make a determination of whether there was a 
genuine failure of recollection and its sig-
nificance on the persuasiveness of his 
earlier statement." 86 
Accordingly, the apparent loss of memory had not made "a 
critical difference" in the application of the rights of 
confrontation, and no basis existed for excluding the evi-
dence on that ground. 
In his dissent, however, Judge Widener disagreed on both 
the hearsay and confrontation issues. In his view, the 
evidence did not qualify under any recognized hearsay ex-
ception, and, moreover, had "few, if any, attributes of 
87 
reliability". He based his latter contention largely 
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on the fact that Burrell had never been subjected to oath or 
cross-examination on the statement, that the part of the 
statement implicating the petitioners had never been brought 
into issue at Burrell's arraignment, and that the statement 
itself, on its face value, was incomplete, unsigned and 
highly suspect owing to Burrell's lapses of memory and diz-
ziness. 
On the issue of confrontation, he found that Burrell's fail-
ure to repeat his incriminating statements at trial consti-
tuted a violation of this right, as the petitioners were 
unable to avail themselves of effective cross-examination 
in the sense that it is understood in true adversary trial 
procedure. 
In a thorough analysis of the issues raised in Payne, 
Worthington 88 criticizes the reasoning of the majority on 
the following grounds: 
(1) As opposed to the traditional view adopted by Judge 
Widener, the majority eschewed dogma in a more flexible 
approach to the hearsay problem. In so doing, it tacitly 
approved a doctrine of judicial discretion to admit evi-
dence when its potential unreliability is outweighed by 
the probative value of the evidence. The problem, accord-
ing to Worthington, is not so much this "progressive 
approach", which finds substantial judicial support in the 
88 United States, but rather "the court's failure to temper 
its relaxation of the hearsay rule with any objective 
standard of trustworthiness beyond 'sufficient reliabil-
80 ity'." Thus "the weakness in Judge Winter's opinion is 
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the failure to establish any formula to justify his conclu-
91 
sion of 'sufficient reliability'", and the court accord-
ingly "seems to have conferred upon the trial judge limit-
less discretion to admit evidence when he feels that the 
cumulative impact of the circumstances attests to its re-
92 liability". 
(2) Even if the "progressive approach", as set out in 
general terms by the majority in Payne, is accepted, the 
decision of the court to allow the evidence was incorrect. 
The value of Burrell's statement as substantive evidence 
was slight, containing only minor references to the peti-
tioners. Judge Winter's "constructive oath and cross-
examination", moreover, are subjected to the following 
criticism: 
"Primarily, although Burrell had the oppor-
tunity to challenge Agent Donald's testimony, 
the agent was reciting only what Burrell had 
told him. Thus, only the accuracy of 
Donald's transcription was tested. Burrell, 
who made the statement, was never subjected 
to cross-examination on the facts contained 
in the statement. Next, the nature of the 
proceeding - a guilty plea arraignment -
cast doubt upon the existence of any adver-
sary process which would insure reliability 
of the statement. Finally, the absence of 
any reference to statements inculpating the 
defendant, the fact that Burrell did not 
testify at his arraignment, and the lack of 
any meaningful cross-examination at the 
present trial certainly cast doubts upon 
any resemblance to the criteria of former 
testimony." 9 3 
(3) As regards the confrontation issue, Worthington 
again prefers the dissenting view of Judge Widener, on the 
ground that the Confrontation Clause requires not only the 
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formality of an opportunity to cross-examine, but also the 
reiteration at trial by the witness of his accusations 
against the defendant. This, he argues, is more in line 
with the nature of adversary proceedings and the values 
underlying the principle of confrontation. 
It is respectfully submitted that Worthington's criticism 
of the majority decision is valid. While the progressive 
approach of allowing a judicial officer a discretion to 
admit hearsay when the normal objections to its reception 
are disposed of is to be welcomed, it is nevertheless sub-
mitted that some parameters or guidelines are necessary to 
temper the judicial discretion. A proper consideration 
should, therefore, include an assessment of all the fac-
tors identified above as being crucial to the enquiry, in-
cluding the utility of the inoperative procedural devices, 
the adequacy of the substitute safeguards, the circumstan-
tial 'indicia of trustworthiness', the need for the evi-
dence and its probative value. If these factors had been 
properly considered in Payne's case, it would have been 
evident that Burrell's silence at his arraignment during 
Donald's testimony was no proper substitute for the oath, 
cross-examination and the other procedural standards; that 
the utility of a proper cross-examination of Burrell would 
have been substantial; that the statement, in Judge 
Widener's words, had "few, if any, attributes of reliabil-
ity"; that the need for the evidence was slight as the 
prosecution had introduced other, more substantial evidence 
inculpating the petitioners; 94 and that the evidence en-
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joyed little probative value owing to the inconclusive ref-
erences to the petitioners' guilt. 95 
CONCLUSION TO SECTION A 
If there is one aspect of the hearsay rule on which most 
writers are ad idem, then it is its unsatisfactory state in 
most jurisdictions, including our own, and the dire need 
for reform. We have, at least in South Africa, a rigid 
exclusionary rule with a number of tightly-structured excep-
tions, which has created a situation where "[i]n Pavlovian 
fashion any evidence falling under a recognized exception 
(is) admitted, regardless of its reliability, while suffi-
ciently reliable evidence not falling under a traditional 
98 
exception (is) excluded". The direction that the re-
form should take is, however, a matter that has caused much 
academic debate. i7 Judge Weinstein, for instance, lists 
six possible approaches which could possibly be adopted as 
alternatives to the status quo: 
(i) Exclude all hearsay. 
(ii) Admit all hearsay. 
(iii) Liberalize and codify present rules. 
(iv) A general principle rule, in terms of which a judi-
cial officer is given a general discretion to admit 
hearsay in respect of which there exists a sound 
basis for admissibility (such as adequate indica-
tions of trustworthiness). 
(v) A selective application of different principles to 
different types of cases, a criterion which in-
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volves differential treatment of civil and criminal 
proceedings. 
(vi) Retain the present rules and ignore them, a practice 
that, it is respectfully submitted, describes what 
happens in the practice of our courts on frequent 
98 
occasions. 
No matter which of these paths our legislature in due time 
follows, however, it is certain that no satisfactory solu-
tion will be arrived at unless the principal values 
underlying hearsay tteory are properly identified, evalu-
ated and appliee. The dangers of ignoring these values 
are vividly demonstrated by the decision of the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in Payne, where the court followed 
the current American trend of allowing the admission of 
hearsay evidence in the absence of a recognized exception 
on the basis of "sufficient reliability", and in the pro-
cess admitted ev~dence which flagrantly violated all the 
values on which the hearsay rule is based. 
What then, in sum, are the values that the hearsay rule 
serves to protect? It operates to exclude, as a general 
rule, evidence of an extra-curial assertion, which is 
tendered for a purpose that would require the court to 
treat the out-of-court actor or declarant as a witness, 
because such evidence is not subjected to the standard 
procedural devices that the adversary system of trial pro-
cedure considers necessary and equitable in the interests 
of both the adversary and the integrity of the fact-finding 
process. 
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The question that remains to be considered in Section B, is 
whether the protection of these values, in the for.m of a 
general exclusionary rule, is justifiable. 
SECTION B IS THE EXCLUSION OF HEARSAY JUSTIFIABLE? 
(I) The Exclusion of All Hearsay 
"If, then, hearsay is not as satisfactory as other kinds of 
99 
evidence, why not •.. exclude all hearsay?" The reason, 
according to Judge Weinstein, is that "[e] xcluding all hear-
say would substantially decrease the probability of our 
achieving truth in the courtroom increase the cost of 
litigation and lead to worsened calendar congestion by re-
quiring the calling of innumerable witnesses". 100 No 
lawyer, he adds, can seriously support this approach, as it 
would "deny to the trier much useful information which 
should be available if he is to have a substantial chance 
101 
of coming to a correct conclusion on the facts". 
Clearly the analysis of the reasons for excluding hearsay in 
Section A is not a rational basis for excluding all hearsay. 
The practice of the courts, furthermore, is against such an 
102 
all-embracing exclusion, and, according to Judge Weinstein, 
the hearsay rule is applied strictly in only one per cent of 
United States civil litigations. In effect, he adds, "(i) n 
the sea of admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a 
small and lonely island" which is "being constantly eroded 
by steadily rising waves of exceptions and growing breezes 
103 
of oversight". Moreover, in the words of Prof. Morgan, 
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"[t] here never has been a time when the courts of England 
or America rejected all hearsay evidence; and there once 
104 
was a time when hearsay was received without questi.on". · 
II. The Exclusion of Any Hearsay 
In its present form, the hearsay rule operates to exclude 
all hearsay that does not fit within the tightly structured 
and rigidly defined common law or statutory exceptions. Is 
this residual exclusion of hearsay justifiable? Should 
the courts be deprived of evidence that may carry a strong 
degree of probative force merely because such evidence is 
hearsay? 
In a recently published article in the Harvard Law Review 
entitled "The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay 
105 Rules", the view is expressed that the hearsay rule 
should be abolished, as the reasons traditionally advanced 
for its eAistence are incapable of rationalizing the exclu-
sian of any relevant hearsay evidence. Although this ar-
gument focuses on jury trial procedure, it is nevertheless 
of some assistance in non-jury systems as a model for de-
termining when, if at all, the exclusion of hearsay evi-
dence is justifiable. 
At the heart of this model lie two basic assumptions : 
(i) that a primary goal of our legal system is to achieve 
accurate case results, and (ii) that the reason for exclud-
ing relevant hearsay evidence is that the trier of fact -
in this model referred to as the jury - will erroneously 
overassess the value of that evidence. Because of the 
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absence of cross-examination, the argument goes, the jury 
may be inclined to give the evidence an inflated value in 
excess of that value which an expert would give it, which 
is referred to as its "absolute value". The cost of ad-
mitting such evidence is therefore the difference between 
the two values, which is referred to as the "residual gap". 
If assumption (i) is borne in mind, the exclusion of this 
evidence is only justified if the cost of receiving it ex-
ceeds its testimonial value, i e if the residual gap ex-
ceeds the value of the evidence. Expressed mathematically, 
a prerequisite for exclusion is that: 
Jury perception Absolute Value ~ Value. 
For most practical purposes, however, it is argued, "abso-
lute value" and "value" will be equal. 
sion, it is required that 
Thus, for exclu-
Jury perception Value )" Value 
or : Jury perception ;> 2 Value. 
Therefore, it is argued, hearsay evidence should only be ex-
cluded, when the value that the trier of fact places on the 
evidence exceeds twice its true value. This event is, how-
ever, unlikely, as "it requires the existence of factors 
that indicate to the experts in the legal profession that 
the credibility of some evidence is very low but that are so 
far beyond the comprehension of laypersons that juries still 
10 6 
would assess the credibility as being quite high". 
Therefore the hearsay rule should be abolished. 
This argument, it is submitted, contains the following cen-
tral weaknesses: 
Page 63. 
(a) The premiss that hearsay is excluded because the trier 
of fact is liable to overassess its value is an over-
simplification of the reasons considered in Section A. 
It emphasizes the prejudice caused to the trier and 
the integrity of the fact-finding process without con-
sidering the prejudice caused to the adversary. No 
account is therefore taken of the incalculable damage 
to the adversary's case caused by denying him the 
right of confrontation and the concomitant procedural 
aids to which he would ordinarily be entitled in bol-
stering his own case and attacking that of his oppo-
nent. 
(b) The equating of the absolute value and the true proba-
tive value of an item of hearsay evidence is unjusti-
fiable. The primary objection to the reception of 
hearsay is that, owing to the absence of the proce-
dural safeguards, its true value is peculiarly diffi-
cult to assess from the point of view of the trier, 
and the fact that the trier is an expert instead of a 
jury will not completely remedy this problem. This 
does not, however, necessarily mean that it has a low 
true value; it may in fact be highly reliable evi-
dence with a high probative force, from an objective 
point of view. To equate these two concepts is, 
therefore, to pre-judge the issue and to ignore a 
vital portion of the cost of receiving hearsay, viz. 
the fact that even an expert cannot assess accurately 
its true value. 
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(c) Because of the difficulty of assessing the true value 
of hearsay, the formula laid down as a criterion for 
exclusion - viz. that the value placed on it by the 
trier must exceed twice its true value - is of no 
practical value. To argue that this requirement will 
seldom be satisfied is also not very helpful, because 
in each specific instance the court will be unable to 
assess the true value of an item of hearsay evidence. 
(d) A serious defect in the cost-benefit model, moreover, 
is that it compares the total benefit of receiving 
hearsay evidence against, not the total cost involved, 
but that part of the cost that is attributable to the 
hearsay quality of the evidence, i e the marginal 
cost or the increase in cost caused by the fact that 
the evidence is not original, but hearsay. This 
exercise, restricted thus in its ambit, must therefore 
not be allowed to enjoy exaggerated impact; it merely 
yields a conclusion that the hearsay cost alone - de-
fined as the increase in total cost attributable to 
the fact that the evidence is hearsay instead of ori-
ginal - is normally insufficient to justify excluding 
hearsay evidence. This, however, takes no account of 
the other costs incurred in receiving the evidence. 
All evidence, whether hearsay or not, is admitted at a 
cost. This cost is normally assessed when the court 
considers the relevance of the evidence. At this 
point, the court compares two variables : 
(i) The probative value of the evidence - its abil-
ity to persuade reasonable men of the truth of 
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the fact it is tendered to establish. 
(ii) The disadvantages or inconvenience caused by 
receiving it, in the form of collateral side-
issues, confusion, surprise, unwarranted con-
sumption of court time etc. 
The evidence will only be considered sufficiently relevant, 
107 i e "legally relevant", if its probative value exceeds 
the disadvantages raised by its reception. Assume, for in-
stance, that, on a scale from 0 to 100, the probative value 
of an item of evidence is 60, and that the disadvantages it 
creates may be expressed empirically as equivalent to 40 
units; the evidence will be considered legally relevant, 
and, all else being equal, admissible. Suppose, however, 
that the evidence is, in addition, hearsay, and that the 
hearsay cost measures a further 25 units. This increases 
the total cost to a reading of 65 units, which exceeds the 
tot~l benefit of receiving the evidence (i e its true proba-
tive value) by 5 units. A strong argument may now be made 
for excluding it. 
The point that emerges from this argument is that the hear-
say cost, while itself not normally sufficient to warrant 
the exclusion of hearsay evidence, may be a decisive compo-
nent in determining the total cost of admitting such evi-
dence, and, therefore, in deciding a question of admissibil-
ity. 
Despite this criticism, it is submitted that some helpful 
points emerge from this argument : 
(i) The question of whether to exclude an item of hearsay 
Page 66. 
evidence should be resolved by weighing up the cost 
and the benefit of receiving such evidence. 
(ii) As the writer of the article points out, in assessing 
the cost of admitting the evidence, "(~ ost investiga-
tions look to the reliability of hearsay in a vacuum 
instead of focusing upon the reliability~"· 108 The 
cost of admitting the evidence, for instance, is 
greater where the evidence is fairly reliable, yet the 
trier still significantly overassesses its credibility, 
than where it is unreliable, but all its defects are 
obvious to the trier. The traditional approach of 
admitting reliable hearsay and excluding unreliable 
hearsay would, however, admit the former and exclude 
the latter, even though the cost of receiving the evi-
dence is greater in the former instance. 
(iii) Arguments on the question of admissibility often con-
sider only the cost of admitting hearsay and ignore 
the other side of the scale, viz. the benefits derived 
thereby. To exclude an item of relevant evidence 
that is hearsay, the cost of receiving the evidence 
must exceed its probative value; to ignore this 
"value lost" when evidence is excluded is to forget 
108 
that hearsay often carries considerable force, 
which Weinstein defines as "its power to convince a 
dispassionate trier of fact that a material proposi-
11 0 tion ••• is true or false", or "the increment, re-
sulting from admission of evidence, in the degree of 
111 
belief which it is rational to entertain". 
Keeping in mind all the above considerations, it is submitted 
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that a modified model may be devised to determine when the ex-
elusion of hearsay may be justified. I concede readily that 
the value of such a mathematical model may be limited, but 
the current trend towards scientific analysis 112 cannot be 
completely ignored, and, having had a mathematical background 
myself, I find it difficult to resist entering the fray. It 
would be wise, however, to keep in mind the caveat of Prof. 
Laurence Tribe: 
"In an era when the power but not the wisdom of 
science is increasingly taken for granted, 
there has been a rapidly growing interest in 
the conjunction of mathematics and the trial 
process. The literature of legal praise for 
the progeny of such a wedding has been little 
short of lyrical. Surely the time has come 
for someone to suggest that the union would 
be more dangerous than fruitful."113 
Without losing sight of these dangers, I nevertheless feel 
that a mathematical exposition of the theoretical foundations 
of hearsay could be beneficial, in that it would help to sim-
plify many complex and nebulous concepts by representing them 
empirically as concrete values. As the subject of our 
114 
model, let us consider again Morgan's example, cited 
above, where the proponent wishes to establish X by calling 
w, who testifies that D told him that he had perceived X. 
Assume that the value of evidence, as well as factors en-
hancing or negating its value, may be quantitatively re-
fleeted on a scale calibrated between 0 and 100. For the 
purposes of this model, four separate readings on this scale 
are relevant: 
(1) That value which the court will give it, in the know-
ledge that it is dealing with hearsay, after caution-
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ing itself as to the relevant dangers involved in re-
lying on the evidence, and after examining the var-
ious circumstantial safeguards that may be present to 
mitigate those dangers. Let us call this value v. 
(2) That value which the same court would have given the 
evidence if D had come to testify himself in open 
court, subject to the various procedural safeguards 
available to the trier and adversary. Call this 
value R. 
(3) The true, objective value of the evidence in proving 
the existence of X, a value that will not necessarily 
coincide with R, because the procedural safeguards 
are not guarantees that the true value of an item of 
evidence will emerge. In the words of Prof. Morgan, 
"if a witness is prepared to commit perjury and coun-
sel is willing to co-operate, neither oath nor cross-
examination will be of much avail to expose the will-
ful falsehood unless either witness or counsel is un-
11 5 
usually stupid". Let us call this true value Q. 
(4) The non-hearsay disadvantages - such as surprise, con-
fusion, raising of side-issues etc - considered by the 
court in assessing the legal relevance of the evidence. 
Let us refer to this "non-hearsay cost" as N. The 
empirical value of N will, for the purposes of this 
model, be taken as being smaller than Q, otherwise the 
evidence will not be sufficiently relevant to warrant 
its reception, and the hearsay question will not even 
need to be considered. 
As has been submitted above, the exclusion of an item of rele-
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vant hearsay evidence (or, in fact, any other evidence) may 
only be justified if, from an objective viewpoint, the total 
cost of receiving it were to exceed the total benefit caused 
thereby. 
(A) Total benefit : This is reflected simply by its true 
value, viz. Q. If the evidence were excluded, therefore, the 
court would be losing evidence having an objective evidential 
value of Q. 
(B) Total cost This is the aggregate of three separate 
cost functions: 
a.) Non-hearsay cost : This, as has been demonstrated, 
is reflected empirically by the reading N, a value which is 
taken as being smaller than Q for the purposes of this model. 
b.) Hearsay cost : This cost represents the difference be-
tween the value that the court gives the evidence, v, and the 
value it would have given it if it were not hearsay, R. The 
hearsay cost is, therefore, V - R. It would be erroneous to 
consider the hearsay cost to be the difference between V and 
Q (the true value of the evidence), as this includes a non-
hearsay cost (R - Q) which reflects the error which a court 
makes in assessing non-hearsay evidence. This is caused by 
the fact that the standard procedural devices, although they 
are the most effective means at a court's disposal for ascer-
taining the true value of evidence, do not ensure absolutely 
correct results. The function R - Q, therefore, represents 
a built-in cost attributable to the imperfections of our trial 
system, and must be considered a third component of total cost. 
0 
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c.) The built-in cost, caused by the imperfections of the 
standard procedural devices, R - Q. 
The total cost of admitting hearsay evidence, therefore, is 
the sum of these three components, or N + (V- R) + (R- Q). 
To justify its exclusion, this total cost must exceed the 
total benefit derived by its reception, i e Q. 
N + V - R + R - Q must exceed Q. 
i e N + V must exceed 2Q. 
In other words, the exclusi9n of hearsay evidence is only 
cost-efficient if the sum of its non-hearsay cost and the 
value placed on it by the court were to exceed twice its 
true value. 
This model may be expressed diagrammatically as follows 
Total Benefit 
N 
Non-hearsay Cost 
Hearsay Cost 
Q R v 
Cost caused by imperfection 
of procedural devices 
100 
Out of this analysis, two separate questions may be con-
sidered : 
Question 1 : How often will the hearsay cost alone justify 
the exclusion of hearsay evidence? 
It will only do so when the hearsay cost, V - R, exceeds 
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the value, Q, of the evidence, i e if V- R)'Q 
or V > Q + R 
or V > 2Q + a, where a = the 
cost caused by the imperfections of the procedural aids. This 
means that the value which the court places on hearsay must 
exceed more than twice its true value before it may properly 
be excluded. Clearly this will very seldom be the case, as 
it is highly unlikely that a court will be misled into such a 
gross misperception of the value of an item of hearsay evi-
dence. B h 116 . 1 f h b 1' . f h rys , 1n an appea or t e a o 1t1on o t e hear-
say rule, maintains that any overassessment there may be of 
the value of hearsay evidence - a proposition that he con-
siders, in any event, to be questionable - is mitigated by cer-
tain aids that are available to the trier of fact in evaluating 
it : 
J1l Comment upon the value of the evidence by opposing coun-
sel, in which is pointed out "the general unreliability of cer-
tain types of second-hand information and the specific unrelia-
bility of particular statements offered at trial". 117 
~ Circumstantial evidence relating to the credibility of 
hearsay declarants. The adversary could lead evidence to 
impeach the declarant's credibility by, for instance, showing 
that he is generally untrustworthy, that he had a motive to 
lie in this specific case, or that he was not in a position 
to observe properly the events contained in his statement. 
Jll The cross-examination of the witness who is relating 
the hearsay statement. This aid is usually underestimated, 
as cross-examination of W may often elicit much useful infor-
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mation concerning the reliability of the statement, or, at 
the very least, raise the necessary questions concerning the 
dangers latent in the evidence, which may thus be brought to 
the attention of the trier of fact. To illustrate the 
point, Brysh gives the following example of a cross-examina-
tion of a witness whose evidence contains hearsay : 
"Counsel: Ms. Andrews, you testified that Mr. Lane 
told you that he saw the defendant shoot the victim. 
Is that correct? 
Witness: Yes, it is. 
Counsel: Ms. Andrews, how long have you known Mr. 
Lane? 
Witness: I'm not exactly sure, but at least two 
years. 
Counsel: How well have you known him? 
Witness: Not very well. He's lived on the same 
street as I have for a couple of years. I've had 
brief conversations with him a few times. Mostly we 
just say hello to one another on the street. 
Counsel: What would you estimate to be the length 
of the longest conversation with Mr. Lane you've ever 
had? 
Witness: Oh, ten or fifteen minutes. 
Counsel: Ms. Andrews, are you aware of Mr. Lane's 
reputation in the community for truthfulness? 
Witness: I don't think I've ever heard anything 
one way or the other about that. 
Counsel: So you are not aware that Mr. Lane has 
any reputation for truthfulness? 
Witness: I guess not. 
Counsel: Has Mr. Lane ever told you anything you 
later found to be false or inaccurate? 
Witness: No. 
Counsel: Are you aware of any difficulties Mr. 
Lane may have in seeing? 
Witness: Well, he generally wears glasses. Be-
yond that, I don't know. 
Counsel: Did he tell you whether he was wearing 
his glasses when he observed the shooting? 
Witness: No. 
Counsel: How well does he see without his glasses? 
Witness: I don't know. 
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Counsel: Did Mr. Lane tell you where he was wh 
he allegedly saw the defendant shoot the victim? 
Witness: Yes, in the parking lot of Jay's Supe 
Market where the shooting occurred. 
Counsel: Did he say how far he was standing 
from the shooting? 
Witness: No. 
Counsel: 
isn't it? 
That's a rather large parking lot, 
Witness: I would estimate that it is several 
hundred feet square. 
Counsel: So at the time Mr. Lane could have 
been standing several hundred feet from the person 
firing the gun? 
Witness: I really don't know. 
Counsel: It is possible, isn't it? 
Witness: I suppose it's possible. 
Counsel: Are you aware of any motive Mr. Lane 
may have had for lying about what he said? 
Witness: I don't understand what you mean. 
Counsel: Is there any reason why Mr. Lane 
might have lied to you concerning the shooting? 
Witness: Not that I know of. 
118 Counsel: Thank you, Ms. Andrews." 
As the learned author points out, although the hearsay 
statement has not been discredited entirely - an event 
which would not occur very often - counsel has at least 
raised the necessary questions concerning the reliability 
of the statement which the trier of fact should be asking 
himself: 
"The first four questions test the witness's 
knowledge of the declarant as a basis for the 
witness's evaluation of the declarant's cre-
dibility. The fifth and sixth questions 
test the declarant's credibility by means of 
his reputation. The seventh question tests 
the declarant's credibility by means of the 
personal knowledge of the witness. The 
eighth through fifteenth questions test the 
!i 
<I 
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!I 
declarant's perception by means of his eyesight 
and position at the time of the event. The final 
two questions test the declarant's possible 
motives for lying." 119 
In the light of these factors, Brysh concludes, it is unlike-
ly that the trier of fact will be misled by the admission of 
hearsay. This does not imply, as Brysh would have it, that 
the exclusion of any hearsay is not justifiable. It merely 
means that the hearsay cost alone, being the increase in 
total cost attributable to the fact that the evidence is hear-
say instead of original, will very seldom justify the exclu-
sion of an item of hearsay evidence. To argue, as Brysh 
does, that this is a valid ground for abolishing the hearsay 
rule, would be to ignore the fact that the reception of evi-
dence that is hearsay may involve incurring other costs, 
which, together with the hearsay cost, may indeed warrant the 
exclusion of the evidence. 
Question 2 : How often will the exclusion of hearsay evidence 
be cost-efficient and thus justifiable? 
It will only be warranted when the total cost exceeds the 
total benefit of receiving it, or, as has been demonstrated, 
when N + V > 2Q. 
i e v > 2Q - n. 
i e V - Q ~ Q - N. 
This means that the exclusion of hears~y evidence is only 
justifiable if the actual over-assessment of the evidence by 
the court (V- Q) exceeds its "nett probative value" (Q- N), 
or the difference between its probative value and the non-
hearsay cost of its reception. 
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What is the likelihood of this requirement being satisfied? 
It is convenient to consider separately the possible over-
assessment of hearsay evidence in jury and non-jury proceed-
ings respectively. 
I. Jury Trials : The capacity of a jury for properly 
assessing the value of hearsay has been the subject of much 
d i d b t N k 120 f . aca em c e a e : o es, or 1nstance, states that 
"[t] here can be little doubt that a lawyer experienced in 
litigation is more likely than a jury to arrive at a just 
estimate of the cogency of hearsay", while the basic assump-
tion underlying Wigmore's entire treatment of hearsay is a 
"judicial conviction that the jury must be protected from 
1 21 
testimony which it cannot evaluate", in that "the jury is 
likely to overvalue it by failing to distinguish it from tes-
timony given in open court under oath and subject to cross-
1 2 2 
examination". 
1 2 3 James, however, finds this contention to be "highly ques-
tionable", arguing that "this comparative evaluation of 
hearsay as against direct evidence is one of the things all 
124 
persons do in their common concerns". He adds: "The 
weakness of rumor, the possibility of error in repetition and 
the likelihood that persons subjected to no effective check 
will lie in their own interests are matters of common obser-
vation", and the assessment of such material "is in no sense 
peculiarly a judicial technique". 125 Brysh, 126 too, submits 
"that modern jurors are capable of recognizing the inherent 
unreliability of hearsay", arguing that "all people make 
decisions on the basis of such hearsay as what others tell 
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them, what they read in newspapers, and what they see and 
hear by means of television and radio", and they thereby 
"come to distinguish instinctively between that hearsay which 
comes from reliable sources and that which does not". 
II. Non-Jury Trials : The opposition to retaining the 
hearsay rule in non-jury trials is far more vociferous and 
persuasive. . 12'1 h f Dav1s, in a elp ul article on this ques-
tion, wrote that the "exclusion of relevant and reliable 
hearsay rests heavily on the jury system and may make little 
or no sense in a nonjury case, especially when the hearsay 
happens to be the best evidence obtainable on a question of 
1 2 8 fact that must be answered". He cites the views of the 
129 following writers in support of his contention: Thayer, 
who referred to the law of evidence as "a piece of illogical 
but by no means irrational patchwork; not at all to be ad-
mired, nor easily to be found intelligible, except as a 
130 product of the jury system" Wigmore, who said that "any 
attempt to apply strictly the jury-trial rules of Evidence 
to an administrative tribunal acting without a jury is a 
historical anomaly, predestined to probable futility and 
1 3 1 failure" ; and McCormick, who stated: "As rules they are 
absurdly inappropriate to any tribunal or proceeding where 
there is no jury" 132 
In jury trials, Davis argues, where hearsay may be prejudi-
cial, a ruling must be made as to its admissibility. In 
non-jury cases, however, where the judge is equally exposed 
to the hearsay whether he admits it or excludes it, he sub-
mits that admission without a ruling "does no harm and may 
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133 be more economical than making a ruling". This approach, 
he adds, is reflected in the practice of the federal courts 
in the United States, where "the most significant question 
about hearsay in nonjury cases accordingly is not admissi-
134 bility but evaluation". 
A strong statement of this view, Davis continues, is to be 
found in the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court in 
. 13 5 Builders Steel Co v Comm~ssioner, where the court ex-
pressed the following opinion: 
"In the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually 
impossible for a trial judge to commit rever-
sible error by receiving incompetent evidence, 
whether objected to or not •••• We think that 
experience has demonstrated that in a trial or 
hearing where no jury is present, more time is 
ordinarily lost in listening to arguments as to 
the admissibility of evidence and in consider-
ing offers of proof than would be consumed in 
taking the evidence proffered, and that, even if 
the trier of facts, by making close rulings upon 
the admissibility of evidence, does save himself 
some time, that saving will be more than offset 
by the time consumed by the reviewing court in 
considering the propriety of his rulings and by 
the consequent delay in the final determination 
of the controversy." 1 38 
The main direction of the federal case law, he concludes, is 
"toward the view that in nonjury trials a finding may be 
based on 'the kind of evidence on which responsible persons 
137 
are accustomed to rely in serious affairs,' whether or 
138 
not the evidence is technically admissible as hearsay". 
This criterion is enthusiastically endorsed by Levin and 
139 Cohen, who tender the following comment on this approach: 
"Candid recognition of a rule allowing such hear-
say to be admissible in the nonjury criminal case 
would be a substantial advance. Certainly it 
would contribute to simplicity and efficiency in 
the trial process, obviating the need for the 
judge constantly to be concerned with the latest 
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version of the exceptions and their technicali-
ties. It would not do so at the expense of 
reliability and trustworthiness, but rather by 
means of making these the tests and pursuing 
directly that which has always been viewed as 
the ultimate goal."140 
The inexorable inference that flows from these views is that 
the rule which excludes hearsay should be abolished, at 
least in non-jury trial procedure, and that the hearsay 
question should be one which concerns the issue of weight 
instead of admissibility. Thus, evidence that is considered 
excessively prejudicial or particularly difficult to assess 
because of the hearsay dangers it presents, may be received 
but considered as having very little or even no weight. 
This view has considerable merit, and would certainly serve 
to simplify and remedy many of the anomalies of the status 
quo. Nevertheless, at least in South Africa, it would be 
unlikely to enjoy enthusiastic acclaim for the following 
reasons: 
1. It would constitute too radical a departure from the 
traditional perspective of the hearsay problem, which 
has always concerned the question of admissibility 
before the assessment of the weight of the evidence. 
Even in the United States, where the treatment of the 
hearsay question has been far more liberal, neither 
the courts nor the legislature have espoused so funda-
141. 
mental a deviation from the traditional practice. 
2. The exclusion of some hearsay is always justifiable, 
even if the hearsay objection is the only cost factor 
considered (viz. when V- R ~ Q). The amount of hear-
say evidence that warrants exclusion, furthermore, is 
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greatly increased when the role of hearsay as a margi-
nal cost, or additional cost factor, is considered 
(i e when V- 0 ~ 0- N). To consider this evidence 
as being admissible, but as carrying zero weight, 
would not be cost-efficient, as this would entail the 
inconvenience and consumption of time caused by hear-
ing the evidence and all the side-issues concerning 
credibility which would arise from its reception. 
The optimum cost-efficient procedure would, therefore, 
be to exclude the evidence entirely from consideration. 
3. American academic appeals for the abolition of the ex-
clusionary rule should be treated with caution, as 
they are tendered against the background of the United 
States constitutional provisions which safeguard the 
accused's right to confrontation in criminal proceed-
142 
ings. As Levin and Cohen point out, the adoption 
of such steps in the United States would not obviate 
the need for compliance with this requirement, as "the 
Supreme Court has given ample notice that no redefini-
tion of hearsay doctrine will be permitted to subvert 
1 4 3 
that right". In South Africa, however, there are 
no such constitutional or statutory safeguards in cri-
minal trials, and it has fallen to the lot of the 
hearsay rule to preserve the accused's right of con-
frontation. The abolition of the hearsay rule would, 
therefore, entail a loss which could not adequately be 
reflected or measured in terms of the above analysis, 
and would strike at the very core of the values that 
our accusatorial process guards so jealously. 
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Conclusion to Section B 
The question that remained to be considered at the end of 
Section A was whether the preservation of the values which 
the hearsay rule served to protect warranted the existence 
of an exclusionary rule in one or other form. In answer 
to this question, the following contentions are submitted: 
(a) The exclusion of all hearsay is unjustifiable. 
(b) The reception of all hearsay, thus relegating the 
hearsay problem to a consideration of weight evalua-
tion only, instead of admissibility, is not altogether 
desirable and does not achieve optimum cost minimiza-
tion. 
(c) The most satisfactory solution would thus be the exclu-
sion of some hearsay and the reception of the rest -
subject always to an assessment of its weight - on the 
basis of some criterion that takes into account those 
values which lie at the heart of adversary trial proce-
dure. 
(d) The consensus of opinion is that the existing system 
of an exclusionary rule with rigidly-defined excep-
tions is unsatisfactory, and an unscientific method of 
144 
separating admissible from inadmissible hearsay. 
145 
In the words of Tregarthen, · the present rules "more 
often serve to hinder than to promote justice", and 
"the distinction in probative value between statements 
admissible under the particular exceptions and state-
ments that are not admissible is of the flimsiest de-
14 8 
scription". 
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(e) What satisfactory criterion may, therefore, be em-
ployed to resolve the problem? This question must 
await later attention, after the scope of the hearsay 
rule, and, particularly the meaning of hearsay and 
the question of implied hearsay assertions, have 
been considered. It will later be submitted that the 
only rational solution is to allow the court a discre-
tion to admit hearsay whenever the values of the ad-
14 7 
versary system would not be promoted by excluding it. 
(f) Is the argument for the abolition of the hearsay rule 
stronger in the case of non-jury trials than jury 
trials? This depends on what view is taken of the 
historical role of the hearsay rule: 148 if, as Thayer 
149 
and Wigmore argue, the rule is the child of the 
jury system, then a cogent argument can be made for 
such a distinction; if, however, as Morgan would have 
it, the rule is the product of the adversary system, 
then no such dichotomy is possible, as the values 
guarded by that system are threatened equally by the 
abolition of the hearsay rule in either type of trial. 
(g) The important point that emerges from the discussion 
in this chapter is, therefore, in the words of Prof. 
Stanley Schiff, that the exclusion of some hearsay 
"makes good sense in its place within that body of 
legal doctrine governing the working of the adversary 
15 0 
trial system". As a corollary to this proposition, 
however, he adds the following qualification - that 
the judicial officer be allowed a discretion to 
Page 82. 
"admit any item of hearsay evidence at a trial when 
the purposes of the hearsay rule within our litiga-
tion system would be served no more than barely under 
151 
the particular circumstances". 
NOTES TO CHAPTER III 
Baker The Hearsay Rule (1950) at 18-24. 
2 Id at 18. 
3 Ibid. 
4 (1837) 7 Ad & El 313 at 385. 
5 Phipson on Evidence 13ed (1982) 16-07 at 333. 
6 Op cit note 1 at 20. 
7 1958 (3) 285 (A) at 296. 
8 Op cit note 1 at 19. 
Page 83. 
9 See, for instance, R v Bedfordshire (1855) 4 El & Bl 535 at 541 
and The Berkeley Peerage Case (1811) 4 Camp. 415. 
10 L H Hoffmann and D T Zeffertt The South African Law of Evidence 
3ed (1981) at 18. 
11 In Omega v African Textile Distributors 1982 (1) SA 951 (T) at 
~55; ]see also Mood Music Publishing Co Ltd v De Wolfe Ltd 
L1976 1 AllER 763 (CA). 
12 7 Cranch. 295. 
13 10 Pet. 412 at 436. 
14 9 Cush. 40. 
15 Wigmore Evidence V 3ed (1940) para 1363. 
16 Op cit note 1 at 20. 
17 Id at 18. 
18 C T Me Cormick Handbook of the Law of Evidence 2ed (1972) at 
582-3; see further Gardner 11The Perception and Memory of Wit-
nesses" (1933) 18 Cornell LQ 391. 
19 R 0 Lempert and S A Saltzburg A Modern Approach to Evidence 
(1977) at 336-7. 
20 F C Bartlett Rememberin A Stud in E erimental and Social 
Psycholo,y, Cambr1dge Un1vers1ty Press 1932 ; paperback 
edition ~967). For a discussion of similar such experiments, 
see Research Paper 3 of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(1981) at 14-39. 
21 Id at 175. 
22 I Daniel Stewart Jr "Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism 
of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence" (1970) 
Utah LR 1 at 20. 
23 G Allport and L Postman The Psychology of Rumour (1947). 
24 Id at 80-1. 
I . 
!· 
" 
25 Id at 86. 
26 Id at 100. 
27 Id at 104. 
Page 84. 
28 Edmund M Morgan "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hear-
say Concept" (1948) 62 Harvard LR 177 at 177-9. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
Id at 178. 
Id at 179. 
Ibid. 
Laurence H Tribe 
Id at 958. 
Id at 959. 
Id at 959-61 . 
"Triangulating Hearsay" (1974) 87 Harvard LR 957. 
36 A report of this incident may be found in the Boston Globe Nov 5 
1971 at 16. 
37 Op cit note 19 at 336. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See p 20 ante. 
40 John S Strahorn Jr "A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and 
Admissions" (1937) 85 University of Pennsylvania LR 484. 
41 See Strahorn,op cit note 40 at 500 and especially note 22. 
42 Wigmore Evidence V 3ed (1940) para 1362. 
43 Sir Rupert Cross Evidence Sed (1979) 479. 
44 Edmund M Morgan "The Hearsay Rule" ( 1937) 12 Washington LR 1 
at 3-4. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Strahorn op 
Id at 484-8. 
Id at 484. 
Id at 486. 
Id at 500. 
Ibid. 
cit 40 at 500. 
51 Stanley Schiff "Hearsay and the Hearsay Rule: A Functional View" 
(1978) 56 Canadian Bar Review 674. 
52 Id at 679. 
53 Id at 678. 
54 Id at 678-9. 
55 Id at 679. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Id at 681. 
58 Morgan "Hearsay Dangers ••• "op cit note 28 at 184. 
59 380 u.s. 400 (1965). 
60 See California v Green 399 U.S. 149 (1976) at 155. 
61 See Dutton v Evans 400 U.S. 74 (1970) at 86. 
Page 85. 
62 These cases include Douglas v Alabama 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Barber 
v Pag) 390 U.S. 719 (1968); United States v Bruton 391 U.S. 123 
(1968 ; California v Green 399 U.S. 149 (1976); Dutton v Evans 
400 u.s. 74 (1970); Mancusi v Stubbs 408 u.s. 204 (1972); 
Chambers v Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 (1973); and Davis v Alaska 
415 u.s. 208 (1974). 
For academic commentary on the topic, see generally Thomas A. Mauet 
"Prior Identifications in Criminal Cases: Hearsay and Confronta-
tion Issues" (1982) 24 Arizona LR 29; Peter Westen "Confrontation 
and Compulsory Process: A Un1f1ed Theory of Evidence for Criminal 
Cases" (1978) 91 Harvard LR 567 and "The Future of Confrontation" 
( 1979) 77 Michigan LR 1185; Kenneth Graham "The Right of Confron-
tation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another 
One" ( 1972) 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99; -' "The Confrontation Clause, the 
Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness" (1978) 56 Texas LR 151; 
Baker "The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Pro-
cess, A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in 
Criminal Trials" (1974) 6 Connecticut LR 529; and William Worth-
ington "Hearsay ana Confrontation: Can the Criminal Defendant's 
Rights be Preserved under a Bifurcated Standard?" (1975) 32 
Washington & Lee LR 243. 
63 448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
64 Id at 63. 
65 Mattox v United States 156 U.S. 242 (1895) at 242-3, cited in 
Roberts (supra note 63) at 64. 
66 Ohio v Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980) at 64, quoting from Chambers v 
MISSiss1pp1 410 U.S. 284 (1973) at 295. 
67 400 u.s. 74 (1970). 
68 Ohio v Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980) at 65, quoting from Snyder v 
MiSSachusetts 291 U.S. 97 (1934). 
69 408 u.s. 204 (1972). 
70 Id at 213. 
71 Ohio v Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980) at 66, quoting from Mattox v 
united States 156 U.S. 242 (1895) at 244. 
72 Id at 66. 
73 Id at 73. 
74 Idat70-1. 
75 See United States v Payne 492 F. 2d 449 (1974) at 459. 
76 See p 28 ante. 
77 492 F. 2d 449 (1974). 
78 Id at 451 • 
Page 86. 
79 See United States v Mingoia 424 F. 2d 710 (1970) and United 
States v Insana 423 F. 2d 1165 (1970). 
80 United States v Payne 492 F. 2d 449 (1974) at 451-2. 
81 Id at 452. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 399 U.S. 149 (1976) at 174. 
85 United States v Payne 492 F. 2d 449 (1974) at 454. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Id at 455. 
88 William Worthington "Hearsay and Confrontation: Can the Crimi-
nal Defendant's Rights be Preserved under a Bifurcated Standard?" 
(1975) 32 Washington & Lee LR 243. 
89 Examples of cases where this "progressive approach" finds support 
are: Dallas County v Commercial Union Assurance Co 286 F. 2d 
388 (1961); Gelhaar v State 163 N.W. 2d 609 (1969); Jett v 
Commonwealth 436 S.W. 2d 788 (1969); United States v ~oia 424 
F. 2d 710 (1970); United States v Insana 423 F. 2d 1165 1970); 
United States v De Sisto 329 F. 2d 929 (1964); and People v 
Green 479 P. 2d 998 (1971). See further pp 385 to 389 post. 
90 Worthington, op cit note 88, at 256. 
91 Id at 258. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Id at 254, note 57. 
94 See United States v Payne 429 F. 2d 449 (1974) at 452. 
95 The relevant portions of Burrell's statement implicating the peti-
tioners are reproduced in Worthington's article, op cit note 88, 
at 245 note 12. 
96 Worthington, op cit note 88, at 257. 
97 Jack B Weinstein "Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules" 44 
F.R.D. 375. 
98 See particularly the discussion of implied hearsay assertions in 
Chapter V, VI and VII post. 
Page 87. 
99 Weinstein, op cit note 97, at 375. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Jack B Weinstein "Probative Force of Hearsay" (1961) 46 Iowa LR 
331 at 336. 
102 Weinstein "Alternatives ••• "op cit note 97, at 347. 
103 Id at 346. 
104 Edmund M Morgan "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
Hearsay Concept" (1948) 62 Harvard LR 177 at 179. 
105 (1980) 93 Harvard LR 1786. 
106 Id at 1790. 
107 See L H Hoffmann and D T Zeffertt South African Law of Evidence 
3ed (1981) at 18. 
108 (1980) 93 Harvard LR 1786 at 1796. 
109 See Jack B Weinstein "Probative Force of Hearsay", note 101 
supra. 
110 Idat331. 
111 Id at 331-2. 
112 See, for example, Laurence H Tribe "Trial by Mathematics: Preci-
sion and Ritual in the Legal Process" (1971) 84 Harvard LR 1329 
and the references cited therein, and Glanville williams 11The 
Mathematics of Proof" l1979] Crim LR 297 and 340. 
113 Tribe, op cit note 112, at 1393. 
114 Morgan "Hearsay Dangers 
p 28 ante. 
", op cit note 104, at 177-9. See 
115 Morgan, op cit note 104, at 186. 
116 Paul J Brysh "Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay" (1974) 35 Univer-
sity of Pittsburg LR 609. 
117 Id at 625. 
118 Id at 625-6. 
119 Id at 626-7, note 111 • 
120 G D Nokes "The English Jury and the Law of Evidence" (1956) 31 
Tulane W 153. 
121 Edmund M Morgan and John MacArthur Maguire "Looking Backward and 
Forward at Evidence" (1937) 50 Harvard LR 909 at 919. 
122 Ibid. 
Page 88. 
123 George F James "The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evi-
dence" (1940) 
124 Id at 794. 
125 Ibid. 
126 Brysh, op cit 
127 Kenneth Culp 
LR 1362. 
128 Id at 1365. 
129 Id at 1365-6. 
34 Illinois LR 788. 
note 116, at 624. 
Davis "Hearsay in Nonjury Cases" (1970) 83 Harvard 
130 James Bradley Thayer A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the 
Common Law (1898) 509. 
131 Wigmore Evidence I 3ed (1940) para 4b. 
132 C T Me Cormick Evidence in 5 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 637 
(1931), at 644. 
133 Davis, op cit note 127, at 1366. 
134 Id at 1368. 
135 179 F. 2d 377 (1950). 
136 179 F. 2d 377 (1950) at 379. See also Joseph A Bass Co v 
United States 340 F. 2d 842 (1965) at 845, and United States v 
United Shoe Machinery Corp 89 F. Supp.349 (1950 • 
137 In the words of Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v Remington Rand 94 
F. 2d 862 (1938) at 873. 
138 Davis, op cit note 127, at 1368. 
139 A Leo Levin and Harold K Cohen "The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury 
Criminal Cases" (1971) 119 University of Pennsylvania LR 905. 
140 Id at 928-9. 
141 See Brysh, op cit note 116, at 616-21 for a concise discussion 
of the treatment of hearsay in the Model Code of Evidence, the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Ev1dence. 
142 Levin and Cohen, op cit note 139, at 929. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Jack B Weinstein "Probative Force of Hearsay" (1961) 46 
Iowa LR 331 at 345-6 for an analysis of some of the major criti-
cisms of the status quo. 
145 Tregarthen Hearsay Evidence (1915) 138. 
146 Id at 140. 
147 See Chapter X post. 
148 Thayer op cit note 130. 
149 Wigmore op cit note 131. 
Page 89. 
150 Stanley Schiff "Hearsay and the Hearsay Rule: A Functional View" 
(1978) 56 Canadian Bar Review 674 at 674. 
151 Ibid. 
Page 90. 
Chapter IV 
THE SCOPE OF THE HEARSAY RULE THE MEANING OF HEARSAY 
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to investigate why 
the rule against hearsay arose to become one of the corner-
stones of the Anglo-American system of evidence. I considered 
the rationale of the hearsay rule, but I did not attempt to lay 
down a comprehensive definition of hearsay, or to formulate the 
so-called rule against hearsay, being content rather to indi-
cate the general nature and function of the hearsay rule. My 
reason for this approach is simple, and will become increasing-
ly evident in the course of this chapter - 1 hearsayL is one of 
the most elusive concepts in the law of evidence, that seems 
to defy all attempts to confine it within definable limits, 
and that remains tantalizingly out of reach of all attempts to 
establish its scope and ambit. 
Why, one may well ask, has a rule which no less an authority 
than Wigmore has called "the greatest and most distinctive con-
tribution of Anglo-American law (next after jury trial) to 
trial procedure", and which has exercised a formidable influ-
ence on the rules of trial procedure for over three centuries, 
continued to exist in such a nebulous state? 
2 Why, as Cross asks , is there such a "superstitious awe ••• 
about having any truck with evidence which involves A's tell-
ing the court what B said"? How did this bastion of Anglo-
American procedural law congeal into a "conglomeration of con-
3 flicting considerations modified by historical accident", or 
a "tissue of doctrine that seems to function best when it is 
4 
most transparent - that is, when it is essentially ignored" ? 
5 According to Phipson , the reasons for the misunderstandings 
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surrounding the meaning of hearsay and the scope of the hearsay 
rule are three-fold: 
(1) A general failure to appreciate that any attempt to de-
fine the meaning and scope of hearsay must encompass an 
examination of the purpose for which a statement is ten-
dered, not only its nature. 
(2) The absence of any comprehensive judicial formulation of 
the rule. 
(3) The multiplicity of formulations found in text books upon 
the subject. 
The first reason advanced by the learned author may seem self-
evident, but is nevertheless essential to any attempt to form-
ulate a satisfactory definition of hearsay : If W testifies 
that X told him that he (X) had seen Y shoot Z, it is tempting 
to classify W's evidence immediately as hearsay without any 
further consideration, but this would be quite wrong without an 
examination of the purpose for which W's evidence is tendered. 
If it is tendered to establish that Y did indeed shoot Z, then 
it is clearly hearsay, no matter which definition of hearsay we 
care to choose. But if the evidence is tendered to prove that 
X was capable of speech, then equally clearly, the evidence can-
not be considered hearsay. The point may seem trite, but it 
is worth bearing in mind throughout any study of the hearsay 
rule. 
The second reason is echoed in a statement by Lord Reid in Myers 
v DPP 6 , where the learned judge reflected the frustration and 
cynicism which surrounds this topic in the following words: 
"It is difficult to make any general statement about the 
law of hearsay which is entirely accurate." 
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This frank acknowledgement by his lordship of this difficulty 
points, it is submitted, to why the courts have been so reluc-
tant to provide a comprehensive definition of hearsay. It 
explains why the hearsay rule has been allowed to become a 
principle which the courts in practice apply on innumerable 
occasions despite the fact that its limits are shadowy, slip-
pery and ill-defined. 
The definitions which have been preferred by the courts have 
tended to be rather tentative, and have certainly not been en-
tirely satisfactory. In Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor 7 , 
the following definition was tendered: 
"Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person 
who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be 
hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the ob-
ject of the evidence is to establish the truth of what 
it contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and 
is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the 
evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact 
that it was made." 
Much the same approach is adopted by the South African courts, 
e gin Estate De Wet v De Wet 8 , Watermeyer J defined hearsay as 
"evidence of statements made by persons not called as 
witnesses which are tendered for the purpose of proving 
the truth of what is contained in the statement." 
The learned judge later elaborated a little on this formulation 
g 
in the case R v Miller, where he formulated the following 
principle: 
"Statements made by non-witne!;~ses ••. [:IJ f they are ten-
dered for their testimonial value (ie as evidence of the 
truth of what they assert) ... are hearsay and are ex-
cluded because their truth depends upon the credit of 
the asserter which can be tested only by his appearance 
in the witness-box. If, on the other hand, they are 
tendered for their circumstantial value to prove some-
thing other than the truth of what is asserted, then 
they are admissible ••• ". 
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In Canada, the USA and Australia, a similar trend has been fol-
lowed by the courts, namely ad hoc commentaries on whether the 
evidence in question in each case falls within the scope of 
the hearsay rule, without attempting a comprehensive definition 
of what hearsay actually is. The tentative definitions which 
have been offered are frequently unhelpful, and do not always 
square with known results. 
In the absence of clear judicial assistance, it has been left 
to academic opinion to establish a comprehensive definition of 
hearsay and to investigate its constraints. However, so plen-
tiful and so contradictory are these definitions, that, as 
10 
Maguire was moved to observe, we have become entangled in an 
"unintelligible thicket". To illustrate the density of this 
thicket, let us consider a few of these definitions: 
( 1 ) 11 Cross defines hearsay as "a statement other than one 
made by a person while giving oral evidence in the pro-
ceedings." 
(2) Phipson 12 states the rule as follows: "Former state-
ments of any person whether or not he is a witness in the 
proceedings, may not be given in evidence if the purpose 
is to tender them as evidence of the truth of the matters 
asserted in them, unless they were made by a party or in 
certain circumstances the agent of a party to those pro-
ceedings and constitute admissions of facts relevant to 
those proceedings." This definition is a departure from 
. 13 the view expressed in earlier ed~tions of Phipson , 
where hearsay was defined as "oral or written statements 
made by persons who are not parties and who are not 
' :l' e ' '•. 
called as witnesses (used) to prove the truth of the 
matters stated." 
(3) Stephen 14 "A statement oral or written made other-
( 4) 
( 5) 
wise than by a witness in giving evidence and a state-
ment contained or recorded in any book, document or re-
cord whatever ... are deemed to be irrelevant for the 
purpose of proving the truth of the matter stated." 
C . k 15 Me orm~c "Hearsay evidence is testimony in court, 
or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, 
the statement being offered as an assertion to show the 
truth of matters asserted therein and thus resting for 
its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court 
asserter." 
Jones 18 : "By 'hearsay' is meant that kind of evidence 
which does not derive its value solely from the credit 
to be attached to the witness himself, but rests also in 
part on the veracity and competency of some other person 
from whom the witness has received his information." 
(6) Tribe 17 defines hearsay by making use of his model 
which was examined in the previous chapter, the so-
called 'hearsay triangle'. According to this defini-
tion, a "traditional hearsay problem exists ... when 'A' 
is used to prove 'C' along the path through 'B'," or, put 
another way, an assertion is hearsay if, in order to 
reach the conclusion for which it is tendered, reliance 
has to be made on the belief of an actor who is not the 
witness testifying before the court. 
18 (7) Lempert and Saltzburg make use of the same model to 
derive their definition of hearsay : "An out-of-court 
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statement is hearsay if and only if the inference which 
the proponent seeks to establish depends upon affirmative 
answers to both right and left leg questions. 11 These ques-
tions to which the learned authors refer are the enquiries 
which accompany the mental 'trip' from A to B (the left 
leg) and from B to C (the right leg) of the hearsay tri-
angle, namely "Does the declarant believe the fact for the 
proof of which the assertion has been tendered?" and 
11 Does this belief accord with the reality of the situa-
tion?" 
Many other definitions have, of course, been provided, but it 
would serve little purpose to list any more, as those already 
referred to are among the most commonly employed. Moreover, 
the point will already have been proved, namely that the profu-
sion of different definitions has done little to solve the con-
fusion surrounding the meaning of hearsay. 
To illustrate the irreconcilability of these definitions, three 
examples will be considered: 
Example 1 : W testifies that X told him "I am alive .. in order 
to establish that X was in fact alive at the time. 
Clearly, in terms of the definitions adopted by Stephen, Phi~­
son (all editions) and Me Cormick, the statement will be con-
sidered hearsay and hence excluded, as it is being tendered to 
prove the truth of its contents. However, using the defini-
tions of Jones, Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg, the statement 
is equally clearly NOT hearsay, as, to use Jones' terminology, 
the evidence derives its value solely from the credit of the 
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witness himself; or, to use our triangle analogy, the trip from 
A (the statement of X to the effect that he was alive) to c 
(the fact that he was alive) does not necessitate passing 
through B (the belief of X that he was in fact alive), as the 
conclusion flows directly from the act itself. 
Example 2 : W testifies that in response to a question put to 
X as to whether he had been at the scene of the crime, X had 
nodded affirmatively. This is an example of assertive conduct, 
and although generally considered hearsay, this conclusion is 
not borne out by all the definitions above. For example, 
Stephen, Phipson and Me Cormick all define hearsay as 'state-
ments', which would not seem to include evidence of conduct; 
Stephen even goes as far as restricting the rule to "oral or 
written statements". Cross on the other hand defines 'state-
ments' to include "assertions by conduct", while the defini-
tions of Jones, Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg by their very 
nature necessarily include assertive conduct. 
Example 3 W testifies that he saw X, the captain of a ship, 
undertake a thorough investigation of his ship, after which he 
embarked on a voyage with his wife and children. The evidence 
is tendered to establish that X considered his vessel to be sea-
worthy. This is an implied assertion, which will be the focus 
of much closer attention in the following chapters, and which 
illustrates the full extent of the dilemma relating to the 
bounds of the hearsay rule. The first problem is that there 
are two types of implied assertions, viz statements which are 
offered, not for what they expressly assert, but what they 
impliedly assert, and physical conduct tendered for the same 
purpose. As we saw, most of the definitions are unhelpful even 
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when dealing with assertive conduct; in the case of non-
assertive conduct (and indeed statements), these definitions 
are in most cases entirely valueless. What merit is there in 
asking whether a 'statement' is being tendered to prove the 
truth of its content when it is in fact not being tendered to 
establish its content at all? Implied assertions are ten-
dered to establish something which is implied from the content 
of the statement, or physical act, something which the actor 
did not intend to convey at all. Accordingly, definitions 
such as those of Phipson, Stephen and Me Cormick are not com-
prehensive enough even to come to grips with the problem of 
implied assertions, let alone provide a solution. On the 
other hand, the definitions of Tribe, Jones and Lempert and 
Saltzburg are much more helpful, as they assist in pointing 
out the problems relating to hearsay assertions, such as the 
inherent hearsay dangers associated with conduct such as that 
of our sea captain above. But even these approaches, as will 
be seen later, are of limited value in solving the problem of 
implied assertions. 
Our three examples have made one point quite clear : in trying 
to find the exact scope of the hearsay rule, we are indeed 
dealing with an "unintelligible thicket". How can one hope 
to ascertain the exact scope of a rule when the definition of 
its central concept abounds with mystery, controversy and un-
certainty? The answer, it is submitted, is to examine the de-
finitions of hearsay which have been offered, analyse their 
meritsand shortcomings, and attempt to formulate a definition 
which is most in line with principle, logic and authority. 
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As R C Park has pointed out, most definitions of hearsay 
fall into one of two categories: 
(a) Assertion-oriented definitions, which focus on whether 
an out-of-court assertion will be used to prove the 
truth of what it asserts. 
(b) Declarant- oriented definitions, which focus on whether 
the use of the utterance will require reliance on the 
credibility of the out-of-court declarant. 
If we examine the assortment of definitions considered above, 
it is evident that the definitions of Stephen and Phip-
son belong to the former category, while those of Jones, 
Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg to the latter. Me Cormick's 
definition seems to be a curious hybrid, startin~ off as a 
classic assertion-oriented definition, but endin9 with a quali-
fication which smacks of the declarant-oriented definitions of 
Jones and Tribe. Me Cormick, in fact, seems to equate the 
two types of definitions, by qualifying his assertion-oriented 
definition with the words "and thus resting for its value upon 
the credibility of the out-of-court asserter." (My italics.) 
If, in fact, as Me Cormick intimates, the two types of defini-
tion are functionally equivalent , then our major problem 
would be solved, as all the definitions of hearsay could then 
be reconciled. But as was indicated above in Example 1, this 
is clearly not the case. In that example, the statement of 
the declarant was clearly tendered to prove the truth of its 
contents, and yet it equally clearly did NOT rest for its 
value upon the credibility of the out-of court assertor. The 
evidence is obviously not hearsay, and this result is reached 
without any difficulty with the aid of our declarant-oriented 
Page 99. 
definitions; but our assertion-oriented definitions would have 
us classify the evidence as hearsay, and, unless an appro-
priate exception could be found, reject the statement as inad-
missible - clearly an untenable state of affairs. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the above discussion? 
(a) Definitions of hearsay are generally either assertion-
oriented or declarant-oriented. 
(b) Depending on which definition we employ, different con-
clusions can be reached as to whether a statement is 
hearsay or non-hearsay. 
(c) Examples may be given to support the inference that 
declarant-oriented definitions are more effective in 
assessing the reliability of an extra-curial statement 
than are assertion-oriented definitions, and as such may 
be superior yardsticks in confronting the problem of im-
plied assertions. 
These conclusions would seem to suggest that the declarant-
oriented definitions of hearsay are preferable to the 
assertion-oriented definitions. To examine if this conclu-
sion can be supported, let us examine the nature and merit of 
the assertion-oriented definitions more closely. These 
definitions typically define hearsay as out-of-court state-
ments which are tendered to prove the truth of their contents. 
In other words, if X tells W something, say F, then W may not 
give evidence of F in order to prove that F is in fact true. 
Why is this so? Clearly because the truth or otherwise of F 
depends on the credibility of X, who is not before the court. 
Thus his sincerity, narrative ability, memory and powers of 
rag~ IVVo 
perception may not be tested by the curial safeguardSof the 
oath, cross-examination, opportunity to examine demeanour and 
contextual setting of his account. But is this always true? 
Consider the following separate situations: 
(i) Where the truth or otherwise of F does not depend upon 
X's credibility, eg in our example where X says, •I am 
alive", or "I can speak". In such cases there is obvi-
ously no reliance on X's credibility, and the truth ofF 
can be determined without the need to test X's sincerity, 
narrative ability, memory or perception. Here the con-
elusion (X is alive) can be reached without considering 
(to use Tribe's terminology) the belief of the absent 
declarant. 
(ii) Where the truth or otherwise of F is not in issue, but the 
conclusion for which F is tendered depends on the credi-
bility of X. For example, assume X were to say 
"I am Napoleon", and this were tendered to prove X's 
insanity; the truth of the statement is obviously not in 
issue, but clearly any conclusion concerning the sanity 
of the declarant would depend upon an examination of at 
least X's sincerity and narrative powers. 
In situation (i), the assertion-oriented definitions required 
the statement to be classified as hearsay where no basis for 
such classification existed; in situation (ii), they required 
the statement to be classified as non-hearsay where at least 
some of the hearsay dangers existed which required examination 
subject to the normal procedural safeguards. It is evident 
then that the assertion-oriented definitions are in some cases 
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too wide, and in others not wide enough. Why then are these 
definitions not satisfactory? The answer, it is submitted, 
is simple to state but difficult to give effect to : A sat-
isfactory definition of hearsay must correspond with the 
rationale for its exclusion. As we have seen in the last 
chapter, hearsay is excluded because the 'testamentary_ 
infirmities' cannot be tested by the standard adversary 
procedural devices. When an extra-curial statement is 
tendered to prove the truth of its contents, these 'infirmi-
ties' often but not always arise; furthermore, these 'in-
firmities' may be present in situations where an extra-curial 
statement is tendered for purposes other than to prove the 
truth of its content, although perhaps not as frequently. The 
assertion-oriented definitions are therefore inherently 
erroneous. 
The declarant-oriented definitions, on the other hand, by 
their very definition, preserve those values on which the 
hearing rule is based. Tribe's triangle, in particular, ex-
pressly incorporates the hearsay dangers (or testamentary 
infirmities) within the very structure of his schematic defi-
nition. In this way, the learned writer avoids the incon-
sistencies and insuperable problems faced by those who advo-
cate the assertion-oriented definitions. 
The merits of the declarant-oriented definitions and weak-
nesses of the assertion-oriented definitions are illustrated 
20 
at length by R c Park, who analyses and criticizes the 
approach to hearsay adopted in Me Cormick's Handbook on Evi-
21 dence. Park criticizes Me Cormick's confusing of the two 
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types of definition, illustrating how the choice of definition 
can lead to different results. The example which Park uses 22 
is the case where an extra-curial statement is tendered not to 
prove the truth of its content, but the falsity thereof, e g 
where the police question a suspect's wife, and she tells them 
her husband was with her at the time of the alleged crime, a 
fact which is demonstrably false. Although the statement is 
not tendered to prove the truth of its content - in fact quite 
the opposite - Park submits that it is clearly hearsay, as all 
the usual hearsay dangers are present (i ememory, perception, 
narrative ability). 
To illustrate the superiority of the declarant-oriented defini-
tions, Park analyses four situations where Me Cormick, by 
using the assertion-oriented definition, has reached incorrect 
conclusions: 
(1) Me Cormick deems certain utterances non-hearsay even 
though they depend upon the declarant's credibility, e g 
Me Cormick believes that the statement "Harold is the 
finest of my sons" is non-hearsay when tendered to prove 
23 
that the declarant was fond of Harold. The reason 
for this classification is that the statement is not 
offered to show the truth of its content. However, as 
24 Park submits, the statement rests for its value on 
the declarant's sincerity and narrative ability, and so 
is hearsay in terms of a declarant-oriented definition, 
a conclusion which seems, it is submitted, to be correct. 
(2) Me Cormick deems some assertions non-hearsay even though 
they are used to show the truth of their content and 
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rest on the declarant's credibility. Me Cormick regards the 
utterance "I believe that I am King Henry the Eighth", ten-
dered to show the declarant's insanity, to be non-hearsay, on 
the basis that it is "verbal conduct offered circumstantial-
1 " 25 y • This approach, warns Park, is highly misleading, as 
it suggests that the utterance is in some way non-assertive. 
It is, however, assertive, says Park, as there is an intent 
both to communicate an idea and to affirm a proposition which 
could be false. To say that it is being offered circumstan-
tially "is thus merely another way of saying that it is not 
26 being offered to show the truth of what it asserts." 
If evidence were led which established that the only words the 
declarant ever spoke were "I believe that I am King Henry the 
Eighth", then perhaps insanity could be inferred directly, 
without the need to consider the truth of the declarant's be-
lief. But in this case, the assertion is clearly hearsay, 
involving a 'mental trip' into the mind of the absent declar-
ant. 
To illustrate his argument, Park gives us the example of an 
utterance "I wrote a will", which is tendered in evidence to 
prove 'circumstantially' that the declarant believed he had 
made a will. If we accept Me Cormick's argument, it may be 
contended that the utterance is non-hearsay because an indi-
rect chain of inferences may be employed, inferring first that 
the declarant believed his utterance and second that such be-
lief was accurate. But this, as Park points out, has two 
serious flaws. 
First, it requires us to accept that "I wrote a will" is not 
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the equivalent of "I believe I wrote a will", so that 
asserting the former does not imply asserting the truth 
of the latter. This, says Park, is unjustifiable. 
Secondly, the argument makes use of the 'doctrine of the 
curative.initial inference', in terms of which an utter-
ance is not offered to show the truth of its content if 
the first inference in the line of proof is not the 
fact asserted, even though the final inference is that 
the fact asserted is true. Acceptance of this theory, 
says Park, would greatly reduce the power of the hear-
say rule. 
If one looks at the ease with which the hearsay rule can 
be side-stepped by labelling evidence 'circumstantial', 
one can hardly blame the courts for their frequent fail-
ure to recognize hearsay. Yet how much easier it is to 
recognize the hearsay nature of these utterances by 
using the declarant-oriented approaches of Jones, Tribe 
and Lempert and Saltzburg. Both "I believe I am King 
Henry the Eighth" and "I wrote a will" are clearly hear-
say, and Tribe's triangle makes this easily apparent. 
In both cases, one cannot travel from A to C directly 
without a detour via B; the belief of the declarant is 
vital in both cases, and the trier is required to enquire 
whether he entertained this belief, and whether his be-
lief was in fact accurate. 
(3) Me Cormick rescues some assertions which are offered to 
prove the truth of their content by saying they do not 
rely on the declarant's veracity. As an illustration 
27 Me Cormick discusses the case of Bridges v State, 
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where the accused was charged with molesting a young girl in 
his apartment after luring her there. Shortly afterwards, 
the girl made statements to her mother and the police 
describing the apartment. These statements were admitted 
by the trial judge, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
affirmed this on appeal, on the basis that the girl's 
utterances were not offered to prove the truth of their con-
tent (viz the features of the apartment) but only to show 
'circumstantially' that the girl had been in the apartment. 
Me Cormick disagrees with the 'circumstantial' theory ad-
vanced by the court, but nevertheless agrees with the deci-
sion of the court by relying on the declarant-oriented part 
of the hybrid definition of hearsay used in the book. The 
utterance is not hearsay, according to Me Cormick, because 
28 it "had value without regard to her veracity," in that 
it increased the likelihood of her having been in the apart-
ment. 
28 Park, however, disagrees with Me Cormick's approach; as 
he points out, "every hearsay declaration that is relevant 
to a fact in issue has some value without regard to the de-
clarant's propensity to be accurate". (My italics). The 
problem, however, is how much value it must have before it may 
be classified as non-hearsay : If an utterance escapes the 
hearsay rule whenever it has ANY value, regardless of the 
declarant's veracity, then the rule is of little value; if 
it escapes whenever its value is not diminished very much 
by negative information about the declarant's veracity, 
then all reliable utterances will be admissible; but if it 
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only escapes if its value is not diminished AT ALL by such 
information, then Me Cormick's analysis of Bridges v State 
is incorrect, as the value of the girl's utterances would 
be decreased by negative information about her memory, per-
ception, sincerity or narrative ability. 
The third of the above options is clearly embodied in 
Tribe's testamentary triangle, and is the purest applica-
tion of the declarant-oriented definition of hearsay. Yet 
Me Cormick, although he purports to rely on a declarant-
oriented definition, advocates the first of these options, 
thus distorting the true nature of the declarant-oriented 
definition. The correct approach, says Park, is not to 
evade the hearsay rule erroneously by misusing the concept 
of circumstantial evidence, as the court did, or by bending 
the declarant-oriented definition, as Me Cormick did, but 
to admit the utterance as a prior consistent statement of a 
witness. 
(4) Me Cormick evades the hearsay rule by labelling certain 
utterances either 'verbal acts' or 'verbal parts of acts.' 
These concepts, says Park, can, on a reading of Me Cormick, 
be defined as follows: 
(a) Verbal acts: Utterances to which the law attaches 
duties and liabilities, without the need for accom-
panying non-verbal conduct, eg the words constituting 
a defamation, or words of offer and acceptance. 
(b) Verbal parts of acts: Utterances which help explain 
the significance of contemporaneous nonverbal conduct, 
e gwords accompanying the transfer of money which de-
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signate the transaction as a loan, payment, debt, 
bribe or gift etc. 
This approach, adopted by Me Cormick, is confusing and incor-
rect, says Park. It has become a means of sidestepping the 
hearsay rule, and is without justification. To give force 
to his contentions, Park discusses a few examples put for-
ward by Me Cormick to illustrate this approach: 
(i) Defamatory words : It is not necessary to label these 
'verbal acts' says Park, as the hearsay rule is not in 
question. Even if we use the assertion-oriented def-
initions, the words are not offered to show the truth 
of their content. Alternatively, using the 
declarant-oriented approach, it is not necessary to 
rely on the veracity of the absent declarant. 
(ii) Words of acceptance, e g, "I accept your offer." Al-
though the words ~ tendered to prove the truth of 
their content, no reliance is placed on the veracity 
of the declarant, and thus the utterance is not hear-
say. Again, there is no need to classify this as a 
'verbal act.' 
(iii) Telephone calls intercepted by police while raiding a 
bookmaker (which will be considered again below) : 
These again are classified as 'verbal parts of acts', 
and considered by Me Cormick as being admissible. 
Under our declarant-oriented definitions, it will be 
submitted, they are clearly hearsay, and although an 
argument may be advanced that they are not hearsay 
under the assertion-oriented definitions, Park never-
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theless expresses difficulty in understanding why such 
30 
utterances should be 'verbal parts of acts.' 
All in all, says Park, this 'verbal act' classifica-
tion is without merit. Because most utterances in 
some way explain conduct, the approach adopted by 
Me Cormick provides a "discretionary hearsay escape 
that can be invoked without the necessity of explain-
ing why the evidence is trustworthy or meeting the 
other requirements of the residual hearsay excep-
31 tions." 
It would be tempting, in the light of these observations, to 
jettison assertion-oriented definitions of hearsay in favour 
of the declarant-oriented definitions along the lines of 
those advocated by Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg. But 
this, as Park warns, is "not consistent with majority doc-
32-trine". Therefore, before one may discard long-established 
definitions that have been frequently accepted by the courts -
however vulnerable they may be to doctrinal attack - cogent 
arguments would have to be advanced to show that they are un-
suitable in practice. Although it has already been illus-
trated that in many cases the assertion-oriented definitions 
are unworkable, to supply ourselves with even heavier ammuni-
tion against the orthodox approach, we have to penetrate a 
little deeper into the thicket, and examine the application 
of the traditional definitions to that most elusive of con-
cepts - implied hearsay assertions. 
It is not my intention at this stage to discuss at length the 
complex issue of implied assertions, which must await later 
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consideration. It is essential, at this preliminary stage, 
however, to consider the following question: Of the two 
types of definition of hearsay (viz assertion- and declarant-
oriented), which is better equipped to deal satisfactorily 
with the conceptual demands of implied assertions? It is 
necessary in this regard to consider separately three differ-
ent classes of implied assertions. 
(a) Non-assertive statements : These constitute statements 
of an absent declarant which were not intended by him 
to be assertive, for example the letters written by a 
deceased person in the famous English case of Wright v 
doe d Tatham 34 which were offered, not to prove the 
truth of their contents, but merely to show that the de-
clarant conducted himself in such a manner towards the 
recipient of the letter, as to suggest that he con-
sidered him sane and capable of acting in a rational 
manner. Clearly, in such a case, we are dealing with 
an utterance which contains some, if not all, of the 
'hearsay dangers', and in fact the court in that case 
excluded the evidence as hearsay. Yet our assertion-
oriented definitions are of no assistance, as the 
letters were not tendered to prove the 'truth of their 
contents'. Nor is it ever possible, moreover, to 
say that such an assertion is offered for such purpose, 
because every non-assertive statement is offered to 
show something other than what is asserted directly by 
its content. 
Non-assertive statements, therefore, by their very 
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nature, will never be hearsay according to the 
assertion-oriented definition, a conclusion which is 
reached by mechanical operation rather than sound 
logic. The presence of any number of hearsay dan-
gers in such evidence, therefore, can never affect 
its non-hearsay status in terms of this definition. 
(b) Non-assertive conduct : This constitutes conduct 
of an absent actor which was not intended to be 
assertive of the particular fact for which it is 
being tendered. An example of such non-assertive 
conduct is that mentioned above relating to a 
ship's captain who, after examining his ship, takes 
35 
his entire family on a journey; if this is offered 
to show that the captain believed his ship was sea-
worthy, then it is non-assertive. 
Without determining if this is hearsay or not (which 
will be attempted later), let us examine the rela-
tive merits of our hearsay definitions in classify-
ing non-assertive conduct : The declarant-oriented 
definitions immediately alert us to the dangers in-
volved in accepting this evidence, as it does rest 
for its value on the veracity of the sea captain -
was he staging a charade for the unsuspecting wit-
ness; did he perhaps not believe in the ship's 
seaworthiness despite his gesture of taking his fam-
ily aboard ( e g he may have had an urgent reason 
for taking his family somewhere); how great were 
his powers of perception or his skill in assessing 
Page 111. 
a ship's seaworthiness? These are questions which 
a court may well wish to ask the sea captain, who is 
unavailable for cross-examination and not subjected 
to any of the other procedural safeguards. 
Now let us consider the assertion-oriented defini-
tions. We have seen the difficulty of subjecting 
non-assertive statements to the orthodox test ofenquir-
ing whether they were offered to show the 'truth of 
their contents'; but it is even more difficult and 
meaningless to apply this test to non-assertive con-
duct. If an assertion consists not of words but 
physical conduct, and moreover conduct which was 
not intended to convey F, then it is futile to ask 
if that assertion is offered to prove the 'truth of 
its content'. We are dealing here with a chain of 
inferences drawn from the conduct of the actor; 
there is no convenient statement such as "Z told me 
he saw X shoot Y", which we can identify as hearsay 
if it is offered to show that X did shoot Y. The 
greater complexity of non-assertive conduct there-
fore renders the assertion-oriented definitions 
meaningless and unhelpful. 
(c) Non-assertive non-conduct or silence Assume that 
a shopkeeper were to assert that the merchandise he 
supplied to X could not have been of an inferior 
quality because he sold the same product to 20 
other people from the same batch and he did not re-
ceive a single complaint; would this evidence be 
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admissible? 
This is clearly a special instance of non-assertive 
conduct, which can be called non-assertive non-
38 
conduct. This type of implied assertion illustrates 
better than any other the futility of attempting to 
apply assertion-oriented definitions in such in-
stances; how can one speak of the 'truth of the 
content' of an assertion when there is in fact no 
'content' or 'statement' or 'assertion' at all? But 
whereas these definitions are of no assistance, the 
declarant-oriented definitions again indicate the 
dangers inherent in this evidence, and these dangers 
are conducive to a recognition of the 'hearsay-like' 
nature of these assertions. 
It is submitted that the following suggestions can, now, 
validly be made: 
(A) Assertion-oriented definitions of hearsay create 
paradox, confusion and imprecision, and must be re-
jected as being theoretically and practically inde-
fensible. 
(B) Declarant-oriented definitions, even though they 
have their faults, have the virtue of being better 
tools for getting to grips with the problem of im-
plied assertions and are, therefore, it is sub-
mitted, superior to their assertion-oriented counter-
parts. 
(C) The advantages of the declarant-oriented definitions 
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are as follows: 
(a) Such a definition takes into account the reason for 
excluding hearsay. 
{b) The definition alerts one to the 'hearsay dangers' 
or 'testamentary infirmities' against which one must 
guard. 
(c) The definition is simple and easy to operate in 
practice. 
(D) Although it goes against both tradition and the weight of 
authority to abandon the assertion-oriented definition, it 
may be argued with some force that such an approach is 
warranted by the confusion and uncertainty that the tradi-
tional approach has elicited. 
It is proposed now to take a closer look at the declarant-
oriented definition, in order to probe its possible weak-
nesses and to see whether it requires modification. 
Declarant-oriented definitions, as we have seen, typically re-
gard hearsay as being evidence which relies, to some extent, on 
the veracity and perceptive powers of someone other than the 
witness himself. This seems to be the 'lowest common denomina-
tor' of these definitions. Various writers have elaborated on 
this broad common denominator to embrace specific points of de-
tail. Questions which readily present themselves are, for in-
stance To what extent must such a reliance have been made be-
fore the evidence has to be excluded? What 'dangers' must be 
present in the evidence before it is excluded? 
In response to these questions, as we have seen, there is a 
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difference of opinion between Me Cormick and Park : Me Cor-
mick insinuates that an assertion is non-hearsay whenever 
it has any value that does not depend on the untested vera-
city of the declarant, whereas Park submits that assertions 
must be excluded if any reliance whatsoever is required on 
the veracity of the absent declarant. Jones' definition 
37 
accords with Park's view, as he suggests (as we saw above) 
that assertions are hearsay if they do not derive their 
value "solely from the credit to be attached to the witness 
himself •.. " (my italics). The definition used by Tribe 
and Lempert and Saltzburg also agrees with this proposition; 
according to the learned writers, an assertion is hearsay if 
it requires one to make a 'trip' into the mind of the absent 
declarant. If any reliance has to be made on the veracity 
of such declarant, then clearly such 'trip' would be neces-
sary, and the assertion would be deemed hearsay. 
Which of these approaches is preferable? In view of the pre-
sent rigid exclusionary principle, it could be argued that 
Me Cormick's approach, providing as it does a broader base 
for the admission of hearsay, makes more sense than Tribe's 
wider definition. Certainly, if we adopt Tribe's approach, 
we would be faced with the untenable situation of having to 
exclude much valuable evidence merely because it is hearsay-
like, despite various overwhelming grounds favouring its re-
ception. However, in view of the stance which I will later 
submit should be taken regarding the admissibility of hear-
say, Tribe's approach is more apposite. It will later be 
submitted that a court should have the discretion to admit or 
exclude hearsay, depending on the extent to which the values 
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of adversary trial procedure are prejudiced by its recep-
38 . 
tion. In the light of this flexible approach to the ad-
missibility of hearsay, the objections to Tribe's approach 
fall away, and its advantages become readily apparent : it 
is logically consistent, and it serves to alert the trier 
to any hearsay-type situation. Its greatest strength lies 
in the fact that it is based squarely on the reasons ad-
vanced for the justification of the hearsay rule, and 
therefore, unlike its assertion-oriented counterpart, cannot 
be attacked on the grounds of doctrinal inconsistency. 
Tribe's declarant-oriented model is therefore, at least in 
theory, useful for the identification of hearsay-type sit-
uations. But can it be used in practice as a comprehensive 
test for defining hearsay assertions? Park expresses doubts 
about its feasibility, and he advances three major reasons 
39 for his reservations: 
(a) Tribe's definition of hearsay is inconsistent with the 
majority view. This, however, is not a valid reason 
for rejecting it; although most definitions of hearsay 
are assertion-oriented, they, as we have seen, create 
problems. The long, confusing history of the hearsay 
rule and the lack of clarity with which we are faced 
today are a legacy of this 'majority doctrine'. As 
legal history has on many occasions illustrated, com-
munis opinio is no guarantee of correctness. 
(b) Tribe's definition can have no practical application 
in the United States, as the U S Federal Rules of Evi-
dence have expressly adopted an assertion-oriented 
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definition of hearsay. This criticism, however, has 
no relevance to countries such as South Africa, where 
hearsay has not yet been defined by statute, and where 
the definition of hearsay has to be deduced from intrac-
tible case law. It is submitted that, in countries where 
hearsay has not been defined by statute, an aid as ingen-
ious as that devised by Professor Tribe can be used not 
only to eradicate the confusion brought about by the com-
mon law, but as a guide to what ought to be included in 
legislation that is intended either to clarify or to im-
prove upon the common law. Furthermore, even in those 
countries where hearsay has been codified, the model de-
vised by Tribe can still be an invaluable aid in identi-
fying the dangers of hearsay. Even if an assertion es-
capes the ambit of a statutorily-defined hearsay defini-
tion, it may still constitute dangerous evidence which 
should be rejected, and the court ought to have a discre-
tion to exclude it. Or, even if it is not sufficiently 
unreliable to warrant exclusion, the model would still 
help the trier properly to assess the weight to be given 
to the evidence by identifying the dangers or infirmities 
inherent in the assertion. 
(c) Park asserts that Tribe's model in some instances yields 
results which conflict with solidly entrenched case law. 
He gives the following two examples. 
(A) Evidence of the declarant's state of mind. 
(B) Evidence of utterances which explain certain types 
of conduct. 
Because of the importance of these categories, and the opportun-
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ities each of them affords to assess the respective merits and 
functional efficacy of the assertion- and declarant-oriented 
definitions of hearsay, it is interesting and beneficial to 
consider both of these topics in greater depth. 
(A) Evidence of the Declarant's State of Mind 
Park points out that many cases have held circumstantial evi-
dence of a declarant's state of mind to be non-hearsay, whereas 
it would be hearsay according to Tribe's model. It is necessary, 
therefore, to study the nature of evidence of state of mind more 
closely, and it is submitted that such evidence may be considered 
as falling into three distinct categories. 
I. Evidence of Express Assertions of State of Mind 
A person's state of mind may be proved by evidence of his direct 
assertions if such assertions refer to matters substantially con-
41 
temporaneous with their making. To take an example, if the 
issue in question is whether X had acquired a domicile of choice 
in South Africa, then evidence may be led that X said, "I intend 
42 
to remain permanently in South Africa." It is not settled, how-
ever, whether such assertions are admitted as original evidence 
or by way of a hearsay exception. 43 Wigmore contends that ~uch 
declarations constitute an exception' to the hearsay rule, and I 
submit that this is correct for the following reason: The ad-
mission of the evidence above relating to domicile depends on 
the following set o·f inferences : 
(a) W testifies that X said "I intend to remain permanently 
in South Africa." 
• (b) X did actually say "I intend to remain permanently in 
South Africa." 
~ (c) X actually did intend to remain permanently in South 
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Africa. 
Therefore, if we refer to our 'hearsay ~riangle', it will be 
seen that the following hearsay dangers are present in the 
admission of W's testimony: 
(i) Honest error in transmittal. 
(ii) Dishonest distortions in transmittal. 
(iii) Ambiguity (or errors in narration). 
(iv) Insincerity on the part of the declarant X. 
It will be noticed, further, that the dangers of faulty memory 
or perception are not present, because the final inference in-
volved in normal hearsay assertions (viz that the declarant's 
belief reflects the reality of the situation) is not required 
t0 be drawn. This is because the conclusion, c, for which the 
evidence is tendered in such cases coincides with the belief of 
the declarant, B, ie the evidence is offered to show the be-
lief of the declarant, and not any fact related to such belief 
(such as the truth of the content of the assertion believed by 
the declarant). But is this sufficient reason for calling the 
evidence 'non-hearsay'? It is submitted that it is not, as 
the presence of the other hearsay dangers indicates that the re-
liability of the evidence is decidedly questionable. The 
'trip' into the mind of the declarant is still required, and the 
only way such evidence can be admitted is by way of an exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
II. Circumstantial Evidence of a Declarant's State of Mind 
A person's statements may be used 'inferentially' or 'circum-
stantially' to show his state of mind. That such evidence is 
admissible is incontrovertible, but the nature of such evidence 
and the grounds for its admissibility are somewhat more conten-
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tious. 
In this regard, consider the-approach of the court in the fol-
lowing cases: 
(a) 44 The South African case of Estate De Wet v De Wet : In 
this case, the issue before the court was whether a dis-
position by an insolvent constituted an undue preference. 
Evidence was tendered that the insolvent had at the time 
made a statement concerning the state of his assets and 
liabilities, indicating that he was in a precarious 
financial position. The court held that the evidence was 
admissible, not to show what his assets and liabilities 
were, but to show that he was aware of his precarious 
position. The basis for this decision was set out by 
45 Watermeyer J as follows: 
"I am not sure that statements made by an insolvent 
should be classified as hearsay in an action for 
undue preference against a third party. Hearsay 
evidence is evidence of statements made by persons 
not called as witnesses which are tendered for the 
purpose of proving the truth of what is contained 
in the statement; but when evidence of statements 
of non-witnesses is tendered to prove, not the 
truth of the statement, but the state of mind of 
the person making it, such state of mind being the 
issue before the Court, then I think that such evi-
dence is not hearsay, but original evidence." 
The reasoning of the learned judge is thus based firmly 
on an assertion-oriented definition of hearsay, the inad-
equacy of which was discussed above. In fact, even 
though the learned judge held such evidence to be original 
evidence, there are three indications in his judgment that 
seem to indicate a dissatisfaction with this conclusion, 
and a tentative inclination away from it~ 
(i) The learned judge stated that such evidence wasbten-
dered for the purpose of showing the insolvent's 
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knowledge at the time, and for the purpose of draw-
ing inferences from his statements to his state of 
i d 11 46 m n , (my italics). This inference coincides 
exactly with the 'mental trip' from A to B in our 
hearsay model, which is accompanied by the normal 
hearsay dangers of narration (or ambiguity) and in-
sincerity. This acknowledgment is inconsistent 
with a classification of such evidence as non-
hearsay. 
(ii) Watermeyer J added the important proviso that such 
evidence would only be admitted 
"so long as (it) is given at a time when there 
is no reason, or no probable reason, why lie 
should be attempting to give a misleading im-
pression as to his state of mind •.• I can 
see a good reason, for instance, for exclud-
ing statements which an insolvent makes at the 
time of his examination by the trustee in 
insolvency •.. because then a state of circum-
stances has arisen which may lead him to wish 
to give a false impression of his previous 
state of mind." 47 
Clearly the learned judge has here recognized the 
hearsay danger of insincerity latent in such evi-
dence, and would only envisage admitting such evi-
dence if such danger were not present. But what 
if the danger ~ present; on what basis should 
it be excluded? The learned judge tentatively 
48 
suggests "it might almost be termed irrelevant", 
but with respect it seems clear that the reason is 
that such evidence is unreliable, i e it is hearsay. 
The only logical basis for admitting such evidence, 
provided such dangers are found not to be present, 
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is by way of a hearsay exception. It is illogical 
to say that evidence is non-hearsay but only admis-
sible if hearsay dangers are not present. 
(iii) Support for this contention may be found in the fol-
lowing dictum of the learned judge: 
"Hearsay is excluded because of the doubt and 
suspicion which attaches to its accuracy. The 
reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence 
is well illustrated by the exceptions: state-
ments by deceased persons against their inter-
est, dying declarations, entries in public 
registers are all admissible, though hearsay. 
The reason why such statements are admitted is 
that they are made at a time and under such 
circumstances that they are very unlikely to 
be false. I think the same principle can be 
extended to statements made by an insolvent at 
a time when something has occurred which may 
have caused him to wish to give a false impres-
sion of his previous state of mind, even if 
such statement is tendered to prove state of 
mind only and not the truth of the statement." 49 
It is submitted, with respect, that although the 
learned judge attempted to reconcile the exclusion 
of unreliable evidence (subject to the hearsay 
danger of insincerity) with his theory that such 
evidence is original evidence according to his asser-
tion-oriented definition of hearsay, this dictum 
clearly suggests that the only logical way of ex-
plaining the reception of such assertions is by re-
garding them as being exceptionally admitted hearsay. 
(b) The decision of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan in ~ v 
Wysochan: 50 
In this case, the accused was charged with the murder of 
one Antenia Kropa, who was shot in circumstances in which 
the only possible suspects were the accused and the de-
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ceased's husband, Stanley Kropa. Evidence was tendered 
by the Crown that shortly after the shooting, Antenia 
Kropa had said to one Tony Sokolowski, "Tony where is my 
husband?", and that when her husband was near her, she had 
stretched out her hand to him and said "Stanley, help me 
out because there is a bullet in my body." Later, on her 
way to hospital, she had said, "Stanley, help me, I am too 
hot." 
The court a guo had held the evidence to be admissible, 
and this decision was contested on appeal. Haultain CJS, 
delivering the judgment of the court, observed that the 
statements in question came within the class of utterances 
described by Wigmore as follows: 
"Utterances as indicating Circumstantially the 
Speaker's Own State of Mind. The condition of a 
speaker's mind, as to knowledge, belief, rationality, 
emotion, or the like, may be evidenced by his utter-
ances, either used testimonially as assertions to be 
believed, or used circumstantially as affording in-
direct inferences. Utterances of the former sort 
may be received under the Exception for Statements 
of a Mental Condition •.• "51 
Haultain CJS was in no doubt that the evidence in question 
fell clearly within the latter category stated by Wigmore, 
on the basis that 
"(~he utterances in question contained no statement 
of facts necessary to be proved. They are only 
evidence .•. of a certain feeling or attitude of 
mind, and it was for the jury to necide what infer-
ences might be drawn from them." 52 
Professor S A Schiff, however, raises some highly pertinent 
. f h. d . 53 quest~ons concerning the basis o t ~s ecis~on: 
(i) Did not the purpose for which the Crown offered the 
testimony clearly demand the jury's trust in Mrs 
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Kropa's unexamined (and unexaminable) testimonial 
factors? 
(ii) Were there not several intensely strong hearsay 
dangers inherent in the testimony? 
(iii) Is it inappropriate then to regard the testimony as 
·evidence of Mrs Kropa's implied assertion that her 
husband did not shoot her? 
(iv) Should the testimony not therefore be characterized 
as hearsay? 
To answer these questions, let us again consider the set 
of inferences involved in Wysochan's case : 
1. The statements of Mrs Kropa as testified to by the 
witnesses (e g Tony Sokolowski) relating to her hus-
band. 
~ 2. 
~ 3. 
Mrs Kropa actually made these statements. 
Mrs Kropa believed her husband not to be implicated 
in her shooting. 
~ 4. Her husband was not involved in the shooting. 
Clearly the dangers relating to errors in transmittal in 
this case do not exceed those relating to any other testi-
mony, and so must be ignored. However, all the other 
hearsay dangers are certainly present. Did Mrs Kropa be-
lieve her husband to be innocent? She could well have 
taken pity on him and intentionally made an effort to ex-
culpate him by her approach to him after the shooting. 
Alternatively, she may have had no idea who shot her, and 
her request for her husband may merely have expressed her 
desperate need for comfort in her state of stress and 
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shock. In other words, the dangers of insincerity, narra-
tion, memory and perception are as prevalent as in any 
other hearsay assertion. 
This illustrates the point made earlier by Park, viz that 
the labelling of evidence as 'circumstantial' is often a 
device for side-stepping the hearsay rule and its inexor-
able consequences, but is nevertheless logically indefen-
sible. Schiff criticizes the decision in Wysochan's 
54 
case by arguing that it is one thing to admit evidence 
of a declarant's words or conduct to show his state of mind 
when that very state of mind, and not the external event 
causing it, is relevant; but it is quite a different thing 
to admit such evidence when the external event causing the 
state of mind is relevant and the proponent offers the evi-
dence to establish that event. Or, put in another way, 
Schiff beliefs that we must distinguish two situations: 
The first deals with evidence which is used to establish 
the absent declarant's state of mind, and nothing else,i e 
our enquiry goes only as far as B on our schematic model, 
and only involves the trip from A to B .. The pecond relates 
to evidence tendered to establish the event which caused 
the state of mind, ie our enquiry goes all the way to 
point C, involving both trips including the one from B to C. 
Is there any merit in distinguishing these two situ~­
tions? Clearly, whereas the first situation only pre-
sentea the ~earsay dangers of ipsincerity and ambiguity, 
the second situation brought into question the two 
additional dangers of memory and perception. However, 
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the fact remains that in both cases the evidence is sub-
stantially unreliable and tainted by the testimonial in-
firmities associated with hearsay. So, while Schiff's 
remarks and criticisms are certainly valid, they perhaps 
do not go far enough; evidence of a person's statements 
or acts, whether used to establish his state of mind 
alone or the external event causing his state of mind, is 
patently hearsay-like, and the only logical way to a&ait 
such evidence without violating the rationale underlying 
the hearsay rule, is by way of an exception to the rule, 
the first alternative set out by Wigmore in the passage 
quoted in Wysochan's case. 
Therefore, returning to the facts of the case, it should 
have made no difference whether the evidence of Mrs 
Kropa's statements were tendered to prove her state of 
mind (i eher belief that her husband was innocent) or the 
external event causing such belief (ie the fact of her 
husband's innocence); in both cases, the evidence con-
tains sufficient dangers to be labelled hearsay, the only 
avenue for admission being an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
(c) The decision of the Privy Council in Ratten v The Queen: 55 
The facts of this case are as follows. The accused was 
charged with the murder of his wife. He admitted having 
shot her, but contended that he had done so accidentally, 
while he was cleaning his gun. Evidence was led by the 
prosecution, in an attempt to rebut this defence, that the 
deceased had made a telephone call to the police at a time 
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shown to be just before the time of the shooting. The 
evidence, given by the telephonist at the local exchange, 
was analysed by the court and reduced to the following 
elements: 
1. At about 1.15 pro the number Echuca 1494 (the number 
of the accused and his wife) rang. 
that number. 
I connected 
2. I opened the speak key and said "Number please." 
3. A female voice answered. 
4. The voice was hysterical and sobbed. 
5. The voice said "Get me the police please." 
The defence objecteJ to this evidence on the ground that it 
infringed the rule against hearsay. The Full Court of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria held the evidence admissible, and 
the matter went on appeal to the Privy Council. Lord 
Willberforce considered the above five elements and came to 
the following conclusions : Items 1. to 3. were relevant 
to show that a call was made (contrary to the evidence of 
the appellant), only some 3- 5 minutes before the shooting, 
by a woman at the said address. As the deceased was the 
only woman at that address at the time, it could only have 
been she who had made the call. Items 4. and 5. were re-
levant as showing that the deceased was at the time in a 
state of hysteria or fear. The mere fact that evidence of 
a witness included evidence as to words spoken by another 
person who was not called was not considered a problem, the 
reason advanced by the court being that 
Page 127. 
"(w) ords spoken are facts just as much as any 
other action by a human being. If the speak-
ing of the words is a relevant fact, a witness 
may give evidence that they were spoken. A 
question of hearsay only arises when the words 
spoken are relied on 'testimonially', ie as es-
tablishing some fact narrated by the words 
• 0 0 II 56 
Thus the court adopted a very narrow assertion-oriented de-
finition of hearsay, according to which the evidence of the 
telephonist was allowed to escape the clutches of the hear-
say rule. 
The correctness of this approach is questioned once again 
57 by Schiff, who suggests that the court was once again 
required to accept the trustworthiness of the deceased 
wife's unexamined testimonial factors, and asks whether the 
same result would follow if we applied a hearsay-danger 
analysis to the facts of the case. Clearly the same re-
sult would not follow; the set of inferences which the 
court would have to make would necessarily invoke the 
normal hearsay dangers. In fact, Ratten's case is indis-
58 
tinguishable from the case of Wright v Tatham, which was 
relied on by counsel for the accused in support of the 
following contention 
"The statement in the present case is hearsay because 
of the use the jury were invited to make of it. It 
was tendered, if not to establish the truth of the 
statement, at least to establish the truth of what 
the jury were invited to infer from the words said 
by the witness to have been used. This is clearly 
akin to the purpose of establishing the truth of the 
statement." se 
The merit of this argument can be seen by examining the 
chain of inferences involved in Ratten's case : 
1. The telephonist's evidence that (i) The voice was 
hysterical and sobbed, and (ii) The voice said "Get 
* 2. 
=t 3. 
=> 4. 
~ 5. 
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me the police." 
The deceased was hysterical and asked for the 
police. 
The deceased believed she was in danger. 
The deceased was in danger. 
The shooting was not accidental. 
This set of inferences abounds with hearsay dangers. 
Whether evidence tendered in 1. is used to establish 2., 
4., or 5., there are these dangers present in varying de-
grees. If our enquiry ends at 3., the dangers of insin-
cerity and ambiguity present themselves, while if we go on 
to 4. or 5. then the dangers of faulty memory and percep-
tion must pe added. In both cases, the reception of the 
evidence involves reliance on the unexamined testimonial 
factors of the absent declarant, or to use Park's termin-
ology, the value of the evidence would be substantially 
diminished by negative information concerning the declar-
ant's veracity. 
type situation. 
We therefore unavoidably have a hearsay-
Conclusion: By this time it will have become apparent that it 
may be misleading and inaccurate to consider the 'circumstantial' 
use of a person's statements or acts to show 'inferentially' his 
state of mind as not involving "any breach of the hearsay rule 
because they are not used to prove the truth of anything that he 
eo 
says." This approach results from a strict adherence to an 
assertion-oriented conception of hearsay, a conception which, I 
have submitted, is inadequate and untenable. A declarant-
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oriented perspective of hearsay is required in order to appre-
ciate the values behind the hearsay rule, and to come to terms 
with implied assertions. If one bears this in mind and looks 
at the cases discussed above, which reflect the prevailing 
attitude of the courts towards the issue of the 'circurnstan-
tial' state of mind of the declarant, the following points may 
be made : 
(1) The declarant's state of mind may be used 'inferentially' 
in three ways : 
(a) Where his state of mind is not a fact in issue, and 
evidence is tendered that X believed a fact to be 
true to prove the existence of that fact, eq "I be-
lieve the brakes are bad." 
~ X actually believed the brakes are bad. 
~ The brakes are bad in fact. 
(b) Where his state of mind is not in issue, and evi-
dence is tendered of X's acts or statements to show 
that he entertained a certain state of mind, in 
order to establish an external event related to 
that state of mind (such as its cause), eg the 
81 
facts of Wysochan's case, where the deceased's 
statements were offered to show she believed her 
husband to be innocent,which would establish his 
innocence in fact. 
(c) Where his state of mind is in issue, and evidence 
is tendered of X's acts or statements solely toes-
tablish that state of mind,e g the facts in 
82 Ratten's case, where the deceased's statements were 
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offered to show that she was in a state of terror 
or hysteria. 
(2) These three uses of 'inferential' state of mind may be 
considered as follows 
(a) This is clearly a hearsay escape, or a device to 
avoid the hearsay rule. No matter which defini-
tion of hearsay we choose, the evidence is hearsay 
and inadmissible. 
(b) In this case, as with (c) below, different results 
are obtained depending on which definition of hear-
say is used. Under the assertion-oriented defini-
tions, the evidence is original, whereas the 
declarant-oriented approach classifies the evidence 
as hearsay; all the hearsay dangers are present in 
this case, as our 'trip' includes both sides of the 
'hearsay triangle'. This situation is analo-
gous to the facts and decision reached in Wright v 
63 Tatham, where the following chain of inferences 
was employed : 
(i) The letters of the declarant, addressed to 
the testator, containing normal commercial 
correspondence. 
~ (ii) The declarant believed that the testator was 
sane and in full possession of his faculties. 
~ (iii) The testator was competent to make a valid 
will. 
As was pointed out above, the court in this case held the 
evidence of the declarant's statements in the letters to 
., 
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be inadmissible on the basis that it was an implied 
hearsay assertion; ie although the letters were tendered 
in order to prove not the truth of the contents thereof, 
but the state of mind or belief entertained by the de-
clarant, such evidence could not escape the hearsay ban. 
For, as Parke B. stated 
"Proof of a relevant fact, which is not it-
self a matter in issue, but is relevant 
only as implying a statement or opinion of 
a third person on a matter in issue, is in-
admissible in all cases where such a state-
ment or opinion not on oath would itself be 
inadmissible." 64 
We are dealing here with implied hearsay assertions, al-
though this has not always been recognized by the courts; 
in practice the courts admit implied assertions in cases 
where express assertions to the same effect would be 
inadmissible, and yet the courts label this .evidence 
'original'. This is obviously incorrect, and the only 
way the reception of this evidence may be j~stified is 
by conceding their hearsay nature and allowing them by 
way of exception. 
(c) If we employ our declarant-oriented model, we see that 
these situations also encounter hearsay-type dangers. 
Even though our trip only involves the first leg of the 
triangle, there are still potentially two hearsay 
dangers which have to be tested and overcome. As we 
85 have seen from cases such as De Wet, we can only infer a 
state of mind from a person's acts or statements if 
there is no motive to misrepresent, i e in the absence of 
the hearsay danger labelled 'insincerity'. Therefore, 
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as was argued above, such evidence cannot be re-
ferred to as 'original'. Although fewer hearsay 
dangers are latent, we nevertheless are still deal-
ing with evidence which at the very least must be 
considered 'hearsay-like'. 
(3) What then must we do with 'circumstantial' evidence of 
state of mind? 
This question brings us to the focal point in the dilemma 
surrounding a search for the definition of hearsay : If 
we apply the assertion-oriented definition of hearsay, 
then highly unsatisfactory consequences follow; evidence 
such as that in class (b) above would be considered 
'original' and admitted without even alerting the court 
to the possibility of the hearsay dangers which poten-
tially lurk in these assertions. Similarly, the class 
(c)-type evidence would also be admitted without the nec-
essary scrutiny. However, if we apply the declarant-
oriented definition (along the lines of Professor Tribe's 
model), then all three classes of evidence above would be 
considered to be hearsay. 
This latter approach would have the virtue of alerting the 
court to the infirmities inherent in this type of evidence, 
but would have the following drawback - we are faced with 
decisions of the highest authority which require all hear-
say to be excluded unless it can be admitted under an ex-
ception that already exists, either by statute or under 
the common law. The common law exceptions are rigidly 
defined, and evidence which is regarded as hearsay accord-
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ing to Professor Tribe's approach, but as non-hearsay 
according to the traditional formulation, would, if it 
were to be received, have to satisfy stringent require-
ments that are almost absurd, at times, in their techni-
cality. Many cases involve the necessity of drawing 
inferences of state of mind from the declarant's acts or 
statements where there is very little possibility of 
insincerity or ambiguity, and it would be undesirable to 
require these assertions to comply with strictly-con-
trolled hearsay exceptions. Clearly a more flexible 
approach is needed, which would involve a complete re-
evaluation of the hearsay rule and our notion of hearsay. 
The reason for this reconsideration is simple : We have 
no satisfactory,comprehensive definitions of hearsay, yet 
we have a clearly defined and entrenched rule that all 
hearsay must be excluded (unless it can be rescued by one 
of the exceptions). The definitions that have been 
formulated by the courts do not always work, and at times 
may lead to undesirable results; the definitions that 
have been proposed by critical writers have their merits 
and may, as we have seen, be better than those of the 
courts, but they do not harmonize well with the case law. 
It is submitted, therefore, that there is a need to re-
think our whole hearsay doctrine. 
In attempting this re-consideration, it is important to 
settle that which we know to be true about hearsay. As 
we have seen, the only thing that can be said with any 
degree of confidence about hearsay is the reason why we 
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should have ~ hearsay rule at all. 'Hearsay' must 
be excluded because it is unreliable - it contains what 
we have conveniently called 'hearsay dangers', which have 
not been subjected to standard procedural evaluation. 
These hearsay dangers are present in varying numbers and 
varying degrees in various forms of evidence. This leads 
us then on to our second important truth about hearsay, 
namely that hearsay is not an absolute concept; it is 
something which on a scale between 0 and 10 may occupy 
any grade on that scale. The evidence of W that "X told 
me he Saw Y shoot Z" may occupy a grade approaching 10 
on the scale if used to establish that Y shot Z, and a 
grade approaching 0 if used to show that X was capable of 
speech. These are both clear-cut examples. But what 
of class (c)-type assertions above, which are used to es-
tablish 'inferentially' the declarant's state of mind? 
What grade would reflect the value of the telephonist's 
evidence in Ratten's case, used, as it was, to establish 
that the deceased was in a state of fear and hysteria? 
Clearly this is a border-line case, a situation which be-
longs in the twilight zone of hearsay. How can one be 
expected to devise an all-encompassing definition of 
hearsay which would satisfactorily classify all 'hearsay-
like' assertions, as well as a rule which would correctly 
exclude those assertions which are undesirable and admit 
those which should be admissible? 
Obviously this is impossible; hearsay is not a monolithic 
concept, but a variable one, a factor which is present in 
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many forms of evidence in varying degrees of significance. It 
is submitted, therefore, that it is incorrect to consider a 
statement or an assertion as being 'hearsay'; it is easier 
and more accurate to think of 'hearsay' as an adjective, and 
one which, like other adjectives, is subject to degrees of 
comparison. It is therefore sounder to view assertions as 
being 'hearsay-like', or containing varying numbers and de-
grees of hearsay dangers. 
If one looks at hearsay this way, devising a 'hearsay rule' 
follows more easily. It would naturally be arbitrary and 
artificial to decide on a 'cut-off point' on our hearsay scale, 
say at point 5, and exclude all assertions above that cut-off 
point. This is because hearsay, like relevance, should be a 
matter of experience and logic, and where the line should be 
drawn should depend on the circumstances of a particular case, 
on factors such as fairness, convenience and policy. The ex-
elusion of hearsay should therefore be a matter for the dis-
cretion of the judge, who, ideally, should be aided by a form-
ulation of hearsay which is both flexible and practical, a 
definition which points out the dangers inherent in hearsay-
like assertions, and the factors (which may or may not be 
present) which might reduce or even eliminate such dangers 
entirely. 
It is submitted therefore that the definition of hearsay 
should ideally take the form of a workable guide to assist the 
trier in the exercise of his discretion. The exact form that 
this guide should take will be considered at a later stage 
ee 
after a discussion of implied assertions. 
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This conception of hearsay is, however, very much an 
idealized suggestion, an approach which could only be in-
corporated into our law by way of legislation. For the 
moment, we must consider the law as it is according to 
our common law, a picture which although muddled reflects 
the present legal reality. How then does 'circumstan-
tial' evidence of state of mind fit into this picture? 
As we have seen, it is conceptually incorrect to consider 
such evidence 'original'; it must be recognized as being 
hearsay, and accordingly excluded unless it can be 
rescued by one of the exceptions to the rule. Such an 
67 
exception was mentioned by Wigmore above in the pas-
sage quoted in Wysochan's case, viz "Exception for State-
ments of a Mental Condition". This approach would 
achieve some form of consistency in our treatment of evi-
dence of state of mind, for just as evidence of express 
assertions of state of mind is hearsay and admissible by 
way of exception, in the same way implied assertions to 
the same effect (referred to erroneously as 'circumstan-
tial' evidence of state of mind) are also hearsay and 
admissible under this exception. This approach is also 
ea 
compatible with the decision in Wright v Tatham, which 
stipulated that implied assertions must be excluded in 
all cases in which express assertions to the same effect 
would be excluded. 
III. The Public's State of Mind - Public Survey Polls 
Are the results of public survey polls hearsay or non-
hearsay? If they are hearsay are they admissible in 
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terms of a hearsay exception or not? Before attempting 
to analyse the nature of these polls, let us look at the 
attitude of the courts towards this question. 
(a) The United Kingdom 
The approach of the Courts in the United Kingdom is 
singularly unhelpful : Whereas in earlier years the 
admissibility of such surveys was not originally 
accepted without qualification, 89 the more recent 
cases seem to accept the results of market surveys. 
70 However, as Cross points out, this evidence has 
been received "without consideration of the theo-
retical problems involved". For example, in the 
case of General Electric Co v General Electric Co 
the court had to consider the admissibility 
of the result of a market research poll conducted 
to investigate whether the trade mark of the Eng-
lish company (viz "G.E.C.") was likely to be con-
fused with that of the New York-based General 
Electric Company (viz "G.E."). The questionnaire 
was conducted by market research experts, who 
adduced evidence to interpret the answers. The 
trial judge rejected the evidence on the ground 
that the questions were misleading; the Court of 
Appeal held that the questions were not misleading; 
the House of Lords held that the questions were 
misleading to an extent, and the court (per Lord 
Cross) suggested an alternative procedure by way of 
interlocutory proceedings before trial. But no-
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where was it suggested that the evidence of public surveys 
should be excluded on the grounds that it infringes the 
rule against hearsay. 
(b) Canada 
The approach of the Canadian Courts, although case law on 
this point is scanty, can be determined by examining the 
decisions of three Canadian appellate courts, handed down 
within the space of three years : 
(i) Regina v Murphy 72 
In this case the New Brunswick Supreme Court, Appel-
late Division, had to consider the admissibility of 
a survey conducted by a professional sociologist, 
which took the form of standardized interviews with 
students to ascertain their reaction to an article 
which,it was alleged, was calculated to bring the 
~ew Brunswick Supreme Court into contempt, and which 
formed the subject of a contempt of court charge 
against the accused. This evidence was held to be 
73 
'clearly inadmissible', apparently, but not ex-
pressly, by invoking the rule against hearsay. 
(ii) Regina v Prairie Schooner News Ltd 74 
The accused in this case was convicted on charges of 
having obscene matter in its possession for the pur-
pose of publication, distribution or circulation. 
According to Canadian law, a publication is obscene 
if its dominant purpose is the 'undue' exploitation 
of sex, and the test for 'undueness' is whether it 
exceeds the 'standards of the community.• Evidence 
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was tendered on behalf of the accused of a survey 
conducted by a law graduate in the form of a ques-
tionnaire presented to an adult evening class at 
the University of Winnipeg and to 25 employees of 
the Canadian National Railways. The trial judge 
held the survey to be inadmissible on the ground 
that the said law graduate was not an expert and on 
the further ground that the survey would not assist 
the judge in determining the community standard, 
and this point was taken on appeal. 
The Court of Appeal for Manitoba confirmed the de-
cision of the trial judge, for the following reasons 
(expressed by Dickson JA): If the survey was in-
tended simply as a "non-scientific amalgam of the 
75 
views of a small number of unscientific people", 
then it clearly falls foul of the hearsay rule; if 
it was intended to reflect the fact that a certain 
opinion was held by the community, then the sample 
must be a "scientifically selected sample within an 
78 
acceptable universe". This was clearly not the 
case here, as the law graduate was not an expert, 
the survey was not scientific, and the "miniscule 
and parochial sample selected" did not constitute a 
"prototype of national tolerance to the particular 
publications" which formed the subject of the 
charges in this case. 
It would seem then that the court would have been 
content to allow evidence of a properly conducted 
survey which was "scientifically selected" within 
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an "acceptable universe". 
(iii) Regina v Times Square Cinema Ltd 77 
In this case, several judges of the Court of 
Appeal for Ontario in an obiter dictum approved 
the admissibility of a public opinion survey of 
a similar nature to that in the Prairie Schooner 
case, provided certain conditions were satisfied. 
According to Me Gillvray JA, these conditions 
were as follows 78 
1. The questions asked must demand factual infor-
mation, not subjective reactions. 
2. The survey must be conducted in a proper man-
ner (eg no leading questions) . 
3. The actual interviewers must testify at the 
trial. 
4. The persons interviewed must be representative 
of the appropriate 'universe'. 
According to Jessup JA, vital considerations in-
cluded : 78 
1. Whether public opinion polling is, in fact, a 
science. 
2. Whether approved statistical methods were 
used. 
3. Whether adequate social research techniques 
and interviews were employed. 
4. Whether the questions asked were scientifi-
cally evocative of a fair sampling of 
opinion. 
The Canadian courts, therefore, seem to favour the ad-
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mission of the results of public opinion polls subject to cer-
eo 
tain provisos or conditions. But this approach is not much 
more helpful than the approach of the English courts. No-
where has an analysis been attempted of the hearsay dangers 
involved in accepting the results of these surveys, or of 
whether these dangers are reduced by the 'conditions' proposed 
for their admissibility. 
Let us consider the chain of inferences which counsel for the 
appellant in the Prairie Schooner case required the court to 
draw from the evidence tendered : 
1. Evidence tendered by a law graduate of the results of 
a survey conducted by himself and another, that con-
sisted of questions relating to the attitude of those 
interviewed towards the publications in question, and 
answers expressing a belief that the publications 
were not obscene. 
:t 2. The people interviewed believed that the publications 
were not obscene. 
~ 3. The publications were in fact not obscene, as they did 
not exceed the "standards of the community". 
Acceptance of this chain of inferences would involve ignoring 
the usual hearsay dangers, illustrated by the following ques-
tions : 
1. Do the people interviewed really entertain this belief? 
Perhaps they do not, but they either 
(a) misunderstood the questions or expressed themselves 
incorrectly (errors in narration), or 
(b) intentionally misrepresented their state of mind (the 
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danger of insincerity.) 
2. Does this belief that the material was not obscene 
mean that the "standards of the community" were not 
exceeded? Perhaps not, as 
(a) the belief was not representative of the com-
munity, or 
(b) the belief was irrational (i e the declarant's 
powers of perception were impaired.) 
Do the safeguards or conditions envisaged by the Canadian 
courts adequately deal with these dangers? 
81 Prof. Schiff poses the following questions: 
In this regard, 
1. Which of these conditions relate to reducing hearsay 
dangers and which to the problem of accommodating 
probative value and prejudicial effect? 
2. Assuming that a particular survey satisfies the 
various prerequisites in the Prairie Schooner and 
Times Square cases, are the hearsay dangers suffi-
ciently reduced to justify the admission of the re-
sults of that survey? 
In answer to the first question, it seems that most of these 
prerequisites relate to the probative value of the survey, i e 
its relevance and weight, and that the only condition which 
relates to any of the hearsay dangers is the requirement that 
the persons interviewed must be representative of an appro-
priate universe. Compliance with this requirement would al-
low us to draw inference (3.) from inference (2.) above, ie it 
would eliminate the danger of faulty perception, because the 
mere fact that a properly selected, appropriate 'universe' 
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held a particular belief would entitle us to conclude that 
such belief reflected the view of that sector of which 
that 'universe' is representative. 
None of the requirements, however, reduced the other 
dangers, namely narrative ability and insincerity. Even 
if a survey is scientifically conducted among people re-
presentative of an appropriate universe, there is still 
nothing to entitle us to draw inference (2.) from the 
first step in the chain above. There is no adequate sub-
stitute for the curial procedural methods (such as cross-
examination, etc) to test the declarant's narrative 
abilities and sincerity, and the absence of the opportun-
ity to apply these methods illustrates the hearsay-like 
quality of this type of evidence. To give an example, 
even if the survey in the Prairie Schooner case had com-
plied with the conditions laid down by the court, could it 
not be possible that the people interviewed, when told of 
the purpose of the survey, felt sympathy with the accused 
and intentionally misrepresented their beliefs in the 
questionnaire so as to allow the accused to escape prose-
cution? 
The Canadian courts have thus not entirely solved the 
problem of public survey polls; although some guidelines 
have been laid down, the basic hearsay problem has not 
been tackled directly, and the courts have left unanswered 
the question of whether such evidence may (if the condi-
tions are satisfied) be admissible as original evidence or 
as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
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(c) The United States 
A review of the United States decisions was conducted by 
the courtsin the Canadian decisions of R v Prairie 
Schooner News Ltd 82 and R v Pipeline News. 83 In these 
decisions, the courts pointed out that no general state-
ment of principle has emerged from the United States 
courts. What has, however, clearly emerged is that "a 
marked, if reluctant, change of attitude has occurred over 
84 
the years." Whereas in the earlier cases 85 evidence 
of public survey polls was usually rejected as infringing 
the rule against hearsay, on the basis that it was an at-
tempt to show indirectly the unsworn opinions of persons 
not called as witnesses, the more recent trend has been to 
allow such evidence, particularly in cases of trade mark 
infringement and unfair competition. The reception of 
this evidence falls into three categories of cases : those 
88 
which hold that such evidence is not hearsay at all; 
those which hold that it falls within the exception to the 
87 hearsay rule of "statements of present state of mind"; 
and others which allow such evidence without comment. In 
the case People v Franklin National Bank, 88 for instance, 
the New York Supreme Court set out the principles of law 
on this subject as follows: 
"A party endeavouring to establish the public state of 
mind on a subject, which state of mind cannot be 
proved except by calling as witnesses so many of the 
public as to render the task impracticable, should be 
allowed to offer evidence concerning a poll which the 
party maintains reveals that state of mind. Not 
only does this fit the pattern of the 'state of mind 
exception' to the hearsay rule, but it is not hearsay 
at all, since it is the fact that such answers were 
given to which the witness swears, and not the truth 
or value of the facts contained in such answers." 
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This approach (ie labelling evidence of surveys as 'non-
hearsay') is totally unjustifiable, it is submitted, and 
illustrates the pernicious consequences of adhering to 
an assertion-oriented definition of hearsay. If we con-
sider the potential hearsay dangers involved, then the 
evidence must unavoidably be categorized as hearsay, and 
the only basis for admitting such evidence would be by way 
of exception to the rule, viz Wigmore's exception relating 
1 d . . 89 to menta con ~t~on. As was pointed out in a note in 
the Harvard Law Review, 90 this exception "seems to be 
based upon a factor which leads the courts in some cases 
not to classify the evidence as hearsay at all : the neces-
sity for the evidence outweighs the lack of opportunity for 
cross-examination." The courts have allowed the fact that 
it is impracticable to procure all the interviewees as wit-
nesses to obscure a clear vision of the nature of this type 
of evidence. While the need for a certain type of evi-
dence may justify its admission by way of exception, it 
does not justify a disregard of principle and logic by ig-
noring the hearsay dangers inherent in such evidence. 
91 In an article by R C and T C Sorensen, the authors ad-
vance the view that opinion research evidence may be sub-
92 ject to rejection on the grounds of hearsay, but add 
that this problem can be overcome if the following four 
requirements are satisfied : 
1. Such evidence is presented as proof of the fact that 
such opinions do exist and were offered, rather 
than to prove the truth of the statements that were 
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asserted therein. In short, the responses 'ob-
served' by the opinion researcher in determining the 
public state of mind are like the "conclusion of an 
occulist who peers into one's eye". 83 
2. The evidence is necessary and the best possible evi-
dence available to show such a state of public or 
mass opinion, preferable to an interminable parade of 
witnesses or any other substitute purporting to re-
present the public or mass. 
3. The opinions and feelings thus revealed do represent 
the active and actual state of mind of the public, 
rather than a momentary whim. 
4. The evidence was obtained by research scientifically 
conducted under circumstances where a sincere and 
accurate statement naturally would be uttered so that 
there exists at least a circumstantial probability of 
the reliability of such evidence. 
If these four conditions are satisfied, the authors con-
tend, then such evidence is admissible, either because it 
is not hearsay at all, or because it falls within the 
scope of the recognized exception relating to state of 
mind referred to by Wigmore above. 
is preferable? 
Which of these views 
Compliance with the first condition would eliminate the 
'right-leg' dangers of faulty perception and memory, as 
the court is only required to infer that the absent de-
clarant held a particular belief, not a fact to which 
that belief pointed. Compliance with the fourth re-
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quirement would eliminate the so-called 'left-leg' dangers 
of ambiguity (as the statements are 'accurate') and insin-
cerity (as the statements are 'sincere'). So theoreti-
cally, we are left with a situation where none of the re-
cognized hearsay dangers is present at all. Clearly a 
strong case for admissibility exists, but is it correct to 
label such evidence non-hearsay? If W were to testify 
that "X told me he saw Y shoot Z", in circumstances where 
X's sincerity, narrative ability and powers of memory and 
perception were without blemish and unquestionably sound, 
would a court allow W's testimony as 'original' evidence? 
Clearly not; what must be borne in mind is that evidence 
is not hearsay merely because of the presence of hearsay 
dangers, but because of the potential of such dangers in 
evidence which has not been subjected to the procedural 
safeguards of cross-examination, the oath, observation of 
demeanour, and testimonial contextual setting. There 
are no satisfactory substitutes for these devices for 
testing evidence for potential hearsay dangers. There-
fore no matter what assurances the court may be given as 
to the sincerity, narrative ability, memory and perception 
of an absent declarant, unless his evidence is subjected 
to these devices, it will be considered hearsay, and ex-
cluded unless it satisfies one of the recognized hearsay 
exceptions. 
For this reason, it is submitted, the view that evidence 
of public survey polls is hearsay but in certain circum-
stances admissible by way of exception to the rule, is 
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preferable. 
(d) New Zealand 
The question of the admissibility of public survey polls 
was faced by the New Zealand courts in the recent case 
94 
of Customglass Boats Ltd v Salthouse Brothers Ltd, 
where Mahon J examined the law on this subject in Canada, 
the United States and the United Kingdom and came to the 
conclusion that such evidence is admissible provided the 
cautionary procedures recommended by R c and T C Sorensen 95 
(referred to above) were followed. The admission of 
such evidence was necessary, because it was undesirable 
"in cases involving trade mark infringement or passing off 
where evidence of reputation is relevant •.. to compel a 
party to produce in the Courtroom an interminable parade 
of witnesses to depose individually as to their knowledge 
n 96 
and understanding •••• 
The learned judge's view of the law regarding the admis-
sion of public survey polls is succinctly expressed in the 
following dictum: 
"The evidence obtained by research survey is in my 
view legitimate proof of the fact that the opinions 
obtained had in fact existed, whether rightly held 
or not, and on that view of the matter it is my 
opinion that such evidence is not hearsay at all and 
that, even if it did fall within the technical con-
cept of hearsay or representing a collation of indi-
vidual statements made out of Court, then the evi-
dence would still be admissible by way of exception 
to the hearsay rule because it exhibits the existence 
of a state of mind shared in common by a designated 
class of persons." 97 
For the reasons already expressed above, it is submitted 
that the latter alternative expressed by the learned judge 
is preferable. 
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(e) South Africa 
The problem of public survey polls has recently come 
to the fore in South Africa in two conflicting cases. 
Both cases involvedapplications for interdicts to re-
strain competitors of the respective applicants from 
distributing their products in containers similar to 
those used by the applicants. In both cases, evi-
dence was tendered of the results of market research 
surveys which reflected the interviewees' opinions 
concerning the reputation of the applicants' products 
and the association formed between their products and 
their distinctive containers. Yet the courts, on 
the same facts, reached opposite conclusions regard-
ing the nature and admissibility of this evidence. 
In Rusmarc (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Herndon Enterprises (Pty) 
Ltd, 98 the co11rt held this evidence to be nonhearsay 
and admissible. If this were not so, Coetzee J 
argued, then the results would be "quite impractic-
able", and would necessitate calling all the inter-
viewees as witnesses. "The result", the learned 
judge added, "may well be to discourage litigants 
from presenting in suitable cases, this kind of evi-
dence which may aid greatly the Court in its search 
99 for truth." 
The reasons for the learned judge's conclusion are 
contained in the following dictum : 
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"What contributed to my decision to admit this evidence 
was possibly a natural reluctance to deprive myself of 
potentially valuable and reliable material of a scien-
tific nature which may assist in the solution of what 
could have been a tantalizing factual problem. From 
the strict admissibility point of view, however, I was 
nevertheless unpersuaded that this evidence fell within 
the scope of the hearsay rule. It is trite that it is 
not all statements by non-witnesses which fall within 
its scope ••• The interviewers' completed 'structured 
questionnaires' are really an integral part of this 
scientifically acceptable procedure which has been 
developed and refined to establish the truth as nearly 
as is statistically possible and it is in my view ad-
missible as part of the whole." 100 
In Die Bergkelder v Delheim Wines (Pty) Ltd, 101 the Cape Pro-
vincial Division held that such evidence was hearsay and in-
admissible. Counsel for the applicant contended that the 
answers of the interviewees were tendered, not as statements 
for the purpose of proving the truth of the contents thereof, 
but as facts from which the state of mind prevailing in the 
public could be inferred, and that they should therefore be 
admitted. Van Heerden J, however, rejected this argument on 
the ground that 
"the results of the market research in the present case 
are offered not merely as evidence of the existence of 
a public state of mind or opinion but as the truth of 
the facts contained in the unverified statements of 
persons not called as witnesses." 102 
The learned judge expressed total agreement with the conten-
tion that statements of non-witnesses may be admitted where 
the only issue is whether such statements had been made, and 
the veracity of the absent declarant is irrelevant, but added 
that the present case was not such a case. The evidence be-
fore the court clearly did depend for its value on the ver-
acity of the declarant, and Van Heerden J recognized the hear-
say dangers present in this evidence in the following observa-
tion: 
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"The method of adducing evidence in the present case by 
blanking out the names of the interviewees has apart 
from any other valid objections there may be made it 
quite impossible for counter-proof to be offered with-
out moreover any opportunity for cross-examination of 
the interviewees being available." 10 3 
The Rusmarc case was considered and Van Heerden J found him-
self in disagreement with the finding of Coetzee J: 
"Quite apart from an uncertainty in my mind as to the 
meaning to be ascribed as to the use of the words 
'scientifically acceptable procedure' (ie acceptable by 
modern industry and commerce or in a court of law?) it 
seems that even as part of the res gestae the learned 
judge erred with respect in accepting that the whole 
procedure established the truth as nearly as statisti-
cally possible ••. ". 104 
These two cases illustrate well the anomalous consequences of 
applying the traditional formulation of hearsay to this type 
of situation : Coetzee J used the assertion-oriented 'truth 
of its content' style definition, and came to the inexorable 
conclusion that public opinion polls are not used to prove 
the truth of the assertions made by the interviewees. In 
reaching this conclusion, the learned judge was clearly cor-
rect, for the surveys were tendered not to prove the truth 
of what the interviewees stated, but to prove the reputation 
of the product inferentially from the state of mind of the 
public as a whole. Coetzee J therefore concluded that the 
evidence was non-hearsay and admissible. 
Van Heerden J, on the other hand, recognized the hearsay-like 
quality of the evidence, and observed expressly that the pro-
cedural devices such as cross-examination were not available 
to test the dangers inherent in the statements of the inter-
viewees. However, the learned judge, faced with the tradi-
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tional definition of hearsay along assertion-oriented lines, 
then had the problem of making that definitioR fit the facts 
before him, and he concluded that the results of the market 
research were offered to prove the truth of the facts con-
tained in their statements, which were therefore hearsay and 
inadmissible. 
How much easier and less artificial it would have been to 
have employed the hearsay-danger approach along the lines of 
the declarant-oriented definitions. In fact, these two cases 
show clearly how dire is the need for the reform of the south 
African law of hearsay : The evidence of the results of pub-
lic opinion polls is clearly hearsay, yet our definition of 
hearsay does not make this unequivocally apparent; the evi-
dence nevertheless contains sufficient grounds for reception, 
yet our hearsay rule says it must be excluded, unless by 
chance there happens to be a recognized exception, by which 
the evidence may be "squeezed in through the back door." The 
fact that there is possibly an exception which could have 
been employed to admit the evidence (viz exceptions as to 
state of mind, or possibly the exception which allows evidence 
105 
of the use of scientific instruments or measuring devices), 
which was overlooked by the Courts on both occasions, bears 
further testimony to the unworkable and confusing state of our 
law on this topic. 
Conclusion on State of Mind as a whole 
The topic of "state of mind of the declarant" was introduced 
at this stage because of a criticism of Professor Tribe's 
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model levelled by R C Park. The criticism was that this 
model cannot unreservedly be used to tackle the hearsay 
dilemma because it does not reflect majority doctrine, 
being (inter alia), inconsistent with many cases which con-
sider "circumstantial evidence of a declarant's state of 
mind" ncnhearsay. As a result of this criticism, it was 
convenient to consider at length the whole topic of evidence 
of state of mind, and from this discussion the following 
points have, it is submitted, emerged: 
(1) The reservations expressed by Park are unfounded; 
where Tribe's model and decided cases have reached con-
flicting results, it is not the model which is at 
fault, but the decisions of the courts. The flaws in 
these decisions have their origin in one of the fol-
lowing sources: 
a. A failure on the part of the courts to identify a 
hearsay-situation or the presence of possible 
hearsay dangers. 
b. A recognition of such dangers, but an inflexible 
adherence to an assertion-oriented definition of 
hearsay, which may lead to anomalous and incorrect 
decisions because of the unsatisfactory formula-
tion of the term 'hearsay' by the courts. 
c. A recognition of the need to admit certain evidence, 
which overshadows the recognition of the hearsay 
dangers present in such evidence, and which wrongly 
causes the courts to classify this evidence as non-
hearsay for one of two reasons : 
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(i) the failure to recognize the existence of a re-
cognized hearsay exception which would allow 
for its admission; or 
(ii) the absence of a recognized hearsay exception, 
which forces the court to violate the tenets of 
logic and principle in order to admit valuable 
and reliable evidence. 
The discrepancies, therefore, between case law and Tribe's 
model can be ascribed to either erroneous application of 
the law by the courts, or deficiencies in the law of hear-
say evidence, which are notoriously profuse and ubiqui-
tous. The value of the model in identifying these de-
ficiencies and errors in fact underlines its worth and 
merit. 
(2) The discussion of evidence of state of mind, besides il-
lustrating the undoubted worth of Tribe's model, also 
served to raise some vital issues which will be encoun-
tered again in the discussion on implied assertions. 
These are : 
a. that the present law regarding hearsay is in need of 
drastic re-appraisal and reform; 
b. that the traditional assertion-oriented definitions 
of hearsay must be rejected in favour of the more 
workable declarant-oriented definitions; and 
c. that the rule that excludes all hearsay (unless it 
can be admitted via one of the established excep-
tions) is incompatible with the variable nature of 
hearsay as envisaged in b. above, and must also be 
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rejected in favour of a more flexible approach which 
allows for a judicial discretion in deciding on the 
admissibility of hearsay. 
Because these issues will form the subject of intensive 
107 
discussion at a later stage, consideration of these some-
what drastic conclusions will be left in temporary abey-
ance. 
(B) Utterances which Explain certain Txpes of Conduct 
Park's second objection to Tribe's model was that it was "in-
consistent with the judicial tendency to designate utterances 
that explain certain types of conduct (such as the transfer 
of money), as nonhearsay 'verbal acts' even when the legal 
effect of the conduct varies with the subjective state of mind 
108 
of the actor." This criticism, as with that concerning 
evidence of 'circumstantial' state of mind, affords us an op-
portunity to examine not only the validity of the criticism 
itself, but also the respective merits of the different hear-
say definitions in grappling with a topic which again lies in 
the twilight zone of hearsay, namely 'verbal acts' and 'verbal 
parts of acts'. 
As was stated above, Me Cormick, as well as many other authors, 
distinguish between verbal acts, which are utterances "to which 
109 
the law attaches duties and liabilities" without the need 
for any accompanying verbal conduct, and "verbal parts of acts", 
which are utterances that help to explain the significance of 
contemporaneous nonverbal conduct. 
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(a) Verbal Acts 
The hearsay problem is not encountered at all here; if X 
says "Y is a bad doctor" or "I accept your offei", then, in 
an action against X for defamation or breach of contract, w 
is entitled to relate X's utterance to the court in evi-
dence. As Me Cormick points out, 
"When a suit is brought for breach of a written con-
tract, it would not occur to anyone, when a writing 
is offered as evidence of the contract sued on, to 
suggest that it is hearsay." 11 0 
Why not? Clearly such evidence is not hearsay, but on what 
basis? It is not satisfactory to say that such evidence is 
not being offered to prove the truth of its content, because 
this is not always true. If W tells that X said "I accept 
your offer", then this is most certainly being tendered to 
establish that X did in fact accept the offer, the very fact 
asserted in X's utterance. The reason is that the credibil-
ity of the absent declarant (viz X) is not in issue, and the 
value of W's evidence is not diminished in the slightest de-
gree by adverse information about X's veracity. The evi-
dence is tendered merely to establish that X uttered cer-
tain words, viz "I accept your offer", and the mere utter-
ance of these words is legally relevant, because according 
to the rules of offer and acceptance in the Law of Contract, 
such words are deemed to signify acceptance of an offer by 
the offeree. In other words, because the mere utterance 
of certain words creates certain legal consequences, the 
proof of the utterance of those words is relevant (in the 
legal sense), and because the purpose for which such evi-
dence is tendered is merely to prove that such words were 
in fact spoken, the evidence is not hearsay. 
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Using Tribe's model, we can say that our conclusion c flows 
directly from the act A, without the need for a mental 'trip' 
via the belief B of our absent declarant X. 
(b) Verbal Parts of Acts 
According to McCormick, these constitute "explanatory words" 
111 
which accompany and give character to the transaction", 
and are non-hearsay. He provides the following examples: 
A conversation between the parties to an issue on whether a 
112 
cashier made a loan for the bank or for himself; on the 
issue of the validity of a mortgage, the mortgagor's state-
ments that he wanted the property "plastered" so that his 
113 
estranged wife could not "get her hooks into it" ; the 
statement of a depositor indicating lack of donative intent 
11 4 in establishing a joint bank account statements show-
ing that a conveyance was in trust. 115 
118 However, as Park points out, some of McCormick's examples 
rest on rather shaky ground; the statement of the mortgagor 
about wanting his property "plastered", for instance, has no 
independent legal significance and its value depends largely 
on the declarant's credibility. The problem, however, is 
that the difficulty of reconciling the nature of verbal acts 
and verbal parts of acts with hearsay theory has not usually 
been recognized. A notable exception to this tendency is 
the approach of Lempert and Saltzburg, who consider two sepa-
117 
rate examples in their analysis: 
(i) A depositor hands a teller $10 000, with a note that 
the money is to be placed in his child's trust account. 
This pote would clearly be admissible evidence to 
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ascertain the intention of the depositor and to ex-
plain the act of handing over the money to the 
teller. The reason for this is that the conclusion 
is not dependent on the depositor's subjective state 
of mind, and therefore does not rest for its value 
on the depositor's credibility; he would be bound 
by the objective indications stated in the note, ir-
respective of what he thought he was doing. 
(ii) X gives Y $20, and says, "Take this as a loan". The 
learned authors express the view that this evidence 
requires closer scrutiny: to conclude that X made a 
loan to Y, one needs to negate donative intent, and 
the only way one can do this by using X's statement 
is by relying on his credibility, i e, one has to 
rely on the belief of the absent declarant. However, 
because of the authors' definition of hearsay (viz. 
that an assertion is hearsay if and only if the in-
ference sought to be drawn depends on affirmative 
answers to both what may be termed right and left 
leg questions) they conclude that such evidence still 
escapes the hearsay ban because no reliance need be 
placed on the 'right leg' dangers of faulty memory 
and perception. 
What would then be our conclusion in relation to this type of 
evidence if we used Tribe's definition of hearsay, viz. that 
an assertion is hearsay if a trip from A to C necessitates a 
detour via B, or, put another way, evidence only escapes the 
hearsay ban if one can infer c directly from A? Would we be 
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forced to conclude therefore that evidence such as X's state-
ment to Y above must be classified as hearsay? It is sub-
mitted that we would not; even though the requisite intent 
would have to be proved to establish that X made a loan to Y, 
this is not the only element that has to be proved. The 
objective fact that X made an offer to Y, accompanying the 
delivery of the money, would also be an essential element to 
be proved, and such a conclusion is inferred directly from 
the evidence in question. In other words, the mere utter-
ance of the words 11 Take this as a loan .. , accompanying the act 
of handing over $20, objectively construed and independent of 
any subjective intent, has legal relevance to the issue be-
fore the court, and on that basis must be admissible as 
original evidence. 
118 
A similar problem is encountered by Park, who considers 
the case where the declarant hands over money to another and 
uses words characterizing the transfer as a bribe, and his 
. 
words are offered to show that he committed a crime. Park 
believes that this evidence should be classified as hearsay, 
as its value as evidence rests on the declarant's credibility 
because one element of the crime of bribery is subjective 
criminal intent. It is submitted, however, that to hold 
this view is to confuse the issues in question; it is not 
necessary that an extra-curial statement should, independent 
of the credibility of the declarant, support the very conclu-
sion which is the subject of the trial; it is sufficient if 
it supports an inference which is itself legally relevant to 
the main issue. Words which are the subject of a defama-
Page 160. 
tion action, for instance, are non-hearsay 'verbal acts'; 
yet one of the requirements for defamation in South African 
law is subjective intention to defame, or animu& injuriandi.119 
Nevertheless the words of the defendant are clearly non-
hearsay, because they are legally relevant to the issue in 
that they establish one of the essential elements of the 
action, namely the use by the defendant of prima facie de-
famatory words. Similarly, the use of words such as "Take 
this as a bribe" by the accused is itself legally relevant 
in a criminal trial for bribery, in that it establishes, 
without relying on the accused's credibility, one of the 
elements of the offence, viz. the actus reus or the criminal 
act. 
From the above discussion, it is submitted that some signifi-
cant conclusions can be drawn about the nature of 'verbal 
acts' and 'verbal parts of acts' and the relationship of such 
evidence to the hearsay rule: Take the instance where W says 
in evidence "X told me that he saw Y shoot Z". This evidence 
is capable of two uses: 
(i) To establish that X can speak, in which case it is 
non-hearsay, as it does not rest at all for its value 
on the veracity of X. 
(ii) To establish that X did in fact shoot Y, in which 
case it is hearsay, resting for its value on X's 
veracity. 
Is it therefore correct to say that if W's evidence is used 
for the first purpose, it is always admissible? Say, for 
example, that W was testifying at a murder trial, at which 
Y was charged with the murder of Z; would this evidence in 
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its first, non-hearsay guise, be admissible? Clearly, in 
the absence of the rather unusual event of the court's hav-
ing to inquire into X's powers of speech, such evidence 
would not be admissible, not because it is hearsay, but be-
cause it is not relevant. 
This leads us to an important conclusion: All extra-curial 
statements or assertions are capable of two functions, a 
non-hearsay one (being the mere fact that certain words 
were spoken or a certain assertion was made) and a hearsay 
one (relating to the belief of the actor about such asser-
tion, e g his belief in its truth, accuracy etc.). This 
would/seem to indicate that all extra-curial statements or 
assertions should therefore be admissible, in their non-
hearsay guise. Obviously this is not so, and the reason 
for this is that the rule excluding evidence which is not 
legally relevant would prevent the reception of at least 
~orne of these statements. Thus, for instance, it could be 
argued that the evidence excluded in Wright v doe d Tatham 120 
could have been properly excluded on the basis that the 
letters gave rise to an inference of such tenuous probative 
force that they should have been excluded as being irrele-
1 2 1 
vant. 
The hearsay rule, then, only makes sense when operating in 
conjunction with the rule relating to relevance, and no-
where is this more apparent than in the case of verbal acts 
and verbal parts of acts. Statements such as "X is a bad 
doctor" and "Take this as a bribe" (accompanying transfer 
of a sum of money), when tendered for the purposes mentioned 
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above, are non-hearsay and admissible as 'verbal acts' and 
•verbal parts of acts' respectively, for two reasons: 
1. They are tendered in their non-hearsay guise, their 
value being unaffected by any adverse information 
about the declarant's credibility or veracity; and 
2. they are legally relevant, i.e. they are considered 
in law as containing a sufficient degree of proba-
tive value with regard to one of the issues which 
the court has to determine. 
How then do we distinguish 'verbal acts' and 'verbal parts 
of acts' from other extra-curial assertions which in their 
non-hearsay guise are legally relevant and admissible? e g 
What is the difference between a statement such as "X is a 
bad doctor", tendered in a defamation action, and a state-
ment such as "X told me he saw Y shoot Z" tendered in pro-
ceedings where one of the issues is whether X is capable of 
speech? The answer, it would seem, lies in the reason for 
the relevance of the statements. The latter statement is 
legally relevant because of its high probative value on a 
common sense basis of logic and experience, the normal cri-
terion for determining legal relevance; the former, how-
ever, finds its legal relevance by virtue of the fact that 
it is 'legally operative' in terms of the rules of substan-
tive law. In this particular case, the law relating to 
defamation considers such words as constituting prima facie 
evidence of a defamation; in the example "I accept your 
offer", it is the rules of contract which give the evidence 
its ~legally operative• quality. 
Page 163. 
With these concepts in mind, it is interesting to consider 
the trend in recent cases concerning verbal acts and verbal 
parts of acts. Park, after conducting a methodical 
computer-aided search of recent cases, came to the conclu-
sion that the concepts 'verbal acts' and 'verbal parts of 
acts' are no longer applied to utterances which create 
gifts, loans, contracts, defamatory statements etc, appar-
ently because "the absurdity of excluding such utterances is 
so obvious that there has been no occasion for appellate 
courts to write opinions explaining that statements of this 
12 2 
kind are admissible." Instead, the trend seems to have 
been to apply these terms to "language that is not legally 
operative, but merely explains the declarant's contempora-
123 
neous nonverbal conduct." The problem is, says the 
learned author, that "[m) any of the utterances in these 
cases asserted the proposition to be proved, rested for 
value on the declarant's credibility, and did not fit under 
124 
any established hearsay exception." 
Consider, for instance, the following cases: 
United States v D'Amato 125 : In this case, X's statement 
that he was going to meet with his suppliers for purposes 
of obtaining heroin was admitted against Y to show that Y 
was one of the suppliers. The Court held that X's state-
ment was a 'verbal act', which was defined as "contempo-
raneous utterances explaining nonverbal conduct or its 
126 
tenor", and admitted it on the basis that it 'explained' 
both X's conduct in getting into a car withY andY's con-
duct in taking evasive action when it was noticed that 
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they were being observed. 
127 United States v Jackson : Here an utterance by an uniden-
tified declarant, who gave J heroin, that P would meet her to 
pick up quantities of heroin was held to be admissible 
against P as an utterance "contemporaneous with a nonverbal 
act, independently admissible, relating to that act and 
128 
throwing some light on it." 
United States v Manfredi 129 : The court in this case held that 
an utterance indicating that the declarant's uncle was the 
source of a certain supply of heroin was admissible against 
the uncle because it "shed light" on the declarant's conduct 
during his clandestine visit to his uncle. 130 
131 United States v Burke In this case the court invoked 
the concept 'verbal act' to admit a threat made by A that X 
would harm Y, where the utterance was offered against X to 
132 
show his participation in an extortion scheme. 
From these cases, it can be seen that there is considerable 
merit in Park's criticism; in none of these cases does the 
utterance in question have value independent of the credi-
bility of the .declarant. The fact that the utterances 
'explained' or 'shed light' on an act in question is no 
guarantee of reliability, for, as Park says, almost any 
utterance helps to explain some conduct or other. The re-
sult is that the expression 'verbal acts' has been used to 
give the courts, in effect, a discretionary means to avoid 
the exclusion of hearsay which they are able to employ 
without having to negotiate the dangers of hearsay or even 
having to search for an appropriate exception to the hear-
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say rule. 
A particular type of evidence which has given rise to much 
debate and controversy may conveniently be considered in 
this regard. These are statements made in connection with 
activities taking place on a certain premises, which are 
used to ascertain or prove the particular character of an 
activity carried on there. An example of such evidence 
has already been mentioned, viz where the police raid a 
suspected gambling house and intercept calls,during the 
course of which bets are placed and other gambling termino-
logy is used. McCormick labels such evidence non-hearsay 
133 
~verbal parts of acts', and indeed he finds support for 
this view in several cases, which will be discussed 
134 35 h tl Oth . 1 s or y. er wr~ters, most notably Weinberg, have 
categorized such evidence as implied hearsay assertions, 
again finding authority for this proposition. The confu-
sion surrounding the nature of this type of evidence is 
symptomatic of the malaise afflicting our law of hearsay, 
and merits a thorough and critical comparative study: 
1. Australia 
As a general rule, this type of evidence is generally ad-
mitted in Australian Courts. The basis for its admission 
is, however, controversial, and a brief review of the case 
law will illustrate the problem of reconciling this 
approach with hearsay doctrine. 
(a) 138 Marsson v O'Sullivan : 
In this case, pursuant to a police visit to a suspected 
gambling establishment, policeman X answered the telephone 
Page 166. 
and heard the following statement : "Joe. 60s each way 
Lord Tanti, Ss top-weight next race Gawler." For the next 
hour, at intervals of only a minute or two, similar calls 
were answered by the police at the premises in question. 
Ligertwood J held that the evidence of the messages re-
ceived by the police was admissible as "part of the res 
gestae as tending to establish the actual use to which the 
137 
premises were put". The learned judge found authority 
138 for this finding in the cases Bond v Berresford and 
139 Lenthall v Mitchell , yet at no stage did he investigate 
the hearsay dangers possibly present, or whether the evi-
dence should be admitted as original evidence or by way of 
a hearsay exception. 
140 (b) Me Gregor v Stokes 
In this case, Herring CJ considered Wigmore's distinction be-
tween the testimonial or assertive use of human utterances 
and their non-testimonial use, and concluded that the evi-
dence in question (viz of telephone calls intercepted by the 
police) fell into the latter category, in that they were non-
hearsay 'verbal parts of acts.' In the words of the learned 
judge: 
"Now in the present case there was no question 
of using what the policeman heard 'testimon-
ially' or 'assertively' ••. Suppose one of 
the callers said 'This is Tom Jones. I live 
in Birdwood Avenue, Oakleigh. I want 10/-
both ways on Roarer for the X.Y.Z. handicap' 
(a race run that day.). This statement would 
be put forward not to prove that the call was 
made by Tom Jones or that he lived in Bird-
wood Avenue, Oakleigh, but merely to explain 
the nature of the call and to prove that it 
was one that might properly be described as a 
'betting' call, the call of someone seeking 
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to bet with someone on the premises." (My 
italics.) 141 
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that this approach 
is erroneous : As was contended above, it serves no purpose 
to label an utterance a 'verbal part of an act' merely because 
that utterance 'explains the nature' of a particular act, be-
cause most statements in some way or other explain or shed 
light on some conduct which is relevant. The main consider-
ation is whether the utterance, together with the act in 
question, has sufficient legal relevance independent of the 
value derived from relying on the declarant's credibility or 
veracity, an enquiry which was not conducted by the learned 
judge. 
142 
According to Weinberg, the judgment of Herring CJ is de-
ficient in that it fails to recognize that such utterances 
are tendered, not merely because they explain the act of 
calling, but further "because of an implied assertion 
on the part of the caller that he believes he is talking to 
a person who takes bets on horses". Weinberg submits that 
"[wJ i thout that implied assertion the fact that the state-
14 3 
ment was made has no probative value". Clearly there is 
considerable merit in the learned author's criticism; even 
if we adopt an assertion-oriented definition of hearsay, 
and exclude hearsay only if the evidence is tendered to 
prove the 'truth of its content', there would be a strong 
argument for labelling such evidence hearsay. Although 
the evidence is not tendered to establish the truth of any 
express assertion contained in the statement, it certainly 
is tendered to establish the belief of the declarant that 
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he is speaking to a gambling operator, an assertion implied 
in and wholly underlying the other assertions such as the 
declarant's name, address and amount bet on the race. 
The need for this type of argument is, however, obviated if 
we employ a declarant-oriented definition of hearsay : The 
evidence in question requires the court to draw the follow-
ing set of inferences: 
I. The statement of the declarant such as the one re-
ferred to by the learned judge above. 
* II. 
=t III. 
The declarant believed that he was dealing with a 
gambling establishment. 
The premises are used for gambling. 
This is our standard hearsay-type situation, containing the 
normal hearsay dangers: 
(i) Insincerity: The calls may have been made intention-
ally by an enemy of the owner of the shop who, knowing 
the police suspected him of running a gambling estab-
lishment, wished to incriminate him falsely. 
(ii) Narrative ability: The words used by the declarant 
may not have reflected his true belief owing to, for 
instance, inadequacy of expression or, perhaps, his 
playing a joke. 
(iii) Faulty perception: Perhaps the declarant had dialled 
a wrong number, or had erroneously thought the pre-
mises housed a gambling operation. 
In the absence of the procedural devices to calculate the 
extent of these dangers and to minimize their effect, the 
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evidence must be considered hearsay. 
144 
Cross, commenting on McGregor v Stokes supports the de-
cision of the learned judge on the basis that "the callers 
were not seeking to convey information, but were uttering 
what are sometimes called 'operative words'; they were 
trying to make bets, not assertions." While this would be 
correct if the declarants were being charged with an 
offence such as 'attempted gambling' (if such offence were 
to exist), in which case the mere utterance of the words 
alone, without reference to the state of mind of the decla-
rants, would be 'legally operative', this is not the case 
where the evidence is tendered to show the nature or char-
acter of the premises where the calls were received. In 
this case the words rest for value on the credibility of 
the absent declarants and cannot hide behind the convenient 
label of 'verbal parts of acts•. 
14 5 (c) Marshall v Watt, Struthers and County 
This case is one of the most interesting on this topic be-
cause of the conflicting approaches which emerged in the 
court a guo and the appeal court. 
In the court a quo, Gibson J held that the evidence of the 
telephone calls should be categorized as hearsay and con-
sequently rejected unless a suitable exception could be 
found for its admission. In coming to this conclusion, 
the learned judge considered and disagreed with the deci-
sions in McGregor v Stokes and the New Zealand cases of 
146 147 Davidson v Quirke · and Quirke v Davidson. In re-
sponse to Herring CJ's view expressed in the passage above, 
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the learned judge stated the following 
"I am unable to take that view of the evidence 
with which I am now concerned. What the re-
spondent sought to establish against the 
appellants was that many people in a short 
period were trying to place bets with Watt. 
The truth of their statements that they wished 
to bet was a vital matter to the prosecution. 
It is true that the statement explained the 
purpose of the calls, but that does not trans-
mute their essentially hearsay character into 
a colourless statement the truth of which is 
irrelevant to the issue. In fact the appel-
lants' counsel complained vigorously that the 
reception of the evidence in this fashion pre-
cluded him from developing a defence based on 
the view that the alleged offers to bet were 
not genuine, but part of a plan to trap his 
clients." (My italics). 148 
With respect, it is submitted that this is one of the few 
judgments on this topic where the real issues, as they per-
tain to the essence of hearsay,have been clearly identified. 
As the learned judge points out, the fact that the state-
ments "explained the purpose of the calls" cannot be allowed 
to overshadow their intrinsically hearsay nature. Being 
constrained to conceptualize hearsay within the bounds of 
the traditional assertion-oriented framework, Gibson J held 
the assertions to be hearsay because the truth of an implied 
assertion, viz the belief of their makers that they were 
placing bets with a gambling operator, formed the central 
focus of their probative value. Again, it is submitted 
that this conclusion is more simply and conveniently reached 
by using the declarant-oriented definition suggested by 
Tribe and others. 
In the appeal to the Full Court, Crisp J (with Green A-CJ 
concurring) overruled the decision of Gibson J and held the 
evidence to be admissible and non-hearsay. The reasons 
for this decision were two-fold: 
\ 
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(i) Crisp J felt that the previous decisions on this 
(ii) 
topic, mentioned above, should be followed to pre-
vent "diversity in the common law", which the 
learned judge found to be "an evil" whose "avoidance 
is more desirable than a preservation here of what 
we regard as sounder principle." 149 (My italics.) 
150 
The learned judge held the statements of the 
callers to be 'verbal acts' which could be proved to 
explain "the quality and intention" of their acts of 
calling the premises in question. 
With the greatest respect, it is submitted that the view of 
Gibson J indeed represents "sounder principle", and it is 
difficult to appreciate what advantage is to be derived 
from the propagation of established law which is flawed and 
logically unjustifiable instead of allowing the law to 
develop along new avenues which are more in keeping with 
the dictates of reason, principle and logic. 
2. New Zealand 
The courts in New Zealand have taken a similar line to the 
Australian courts on this topic, and such evidence seems 
to be recognized as admissible. Whether it is allowed as 
original evidence or as an exception to the rule is, how-
ever, not clear. 
151 152 (a) Davidson v Quirke and Quirke v Davidson : 
In both cases, the evidence of thirteen telephone messages 
of a gambling nature was admitted, but the reason for its 
admission is a little obscure. In the former case, 
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Salmond J stated that 
"notwithstanding the general rule which excludes 
evidence of statements, the contents of those 
telephone messages as received and testified to 
by the police officers are legally admissible 
in evidence. This is an illustration of the 
principle that, notwithstanding the rule against 
hearsay, where the purpose or meaning of an act 
done is relevant, evidence of contemporaneous 
declarations accompanying and explaining the act 
is admissible in proof of such purpose or mean-
ing." 1 53 
From this it is not clear whether the learned judge regarded 
the evidence as non-hearsay or as a hearsay exception, but 
1 54 
Weinberg is of the opinion that the word "notwithstand-
ing" seems to suggest the latter, which substantiates the 
author's argument that non-assertive statements fall within 
the hearsay rule, but this is not completely clear from the 
learned judge's words. 
It is interesting, however, to take note of a passage of Reed 
J in the latter case: 
"If only one or two of such messages had been re-
ceived, the possibility that they had been sent 
owing to some error or mistake on the part of 
the sender would not be excluded, and therefore 
would have rendered evidence of such messages of 
little probative value: but where the evidence 
discloses that thirteen telephone messages were 
received within the space of under an hour and a 
half, each of such messages referring specifi~ 
cally to the same particular class of business, 
and couched in such terms as to show the utmost 
confidence that business would follow as of 
course upon the receipt of the message, error or 
mistake is not within the bounds of possibil-
ity • II 1 55 
In this statement the learned judge identified the reasons 
for allowing this evidence: In his opinion the fact that 
there were many telephone calls was a factor which made the 
evidence sufficiently reliable: a single call would not 
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eliminate the possibility of mistake (eg the declarant could 
have dialled the wrong number), but thirteen calls were suf-
ficient to eliminate this possibility. This observation is 
significant, as it shows an awareness by the court of the 
fact that hearsay dangers were present, and, although not 
thoroughly examined, there was an attempt to determine 
whether such dangers were reduced by the fact that not one 
but several calls to the same effect were made. 
An important and interesting question arises for considera-
tion from the tenor of the judgment in these two cases: what 
difference should the number of calls received make to the 
status of the evidence? Is it correct to say that evidence 
of, say, two calls is hearsay while evidence of, say, thirty 
calls is non-hearsay owing to the reduction of the hearsay 
dangers contained in that evidence? Certainly a cogent 
argument can be put forward for the reception of the latter 
class of evidence, where the hearsay dangers are so substan-
tially reduced as to be virtually negligible. On the other 
hand, it is submitted that to label such evidence as non-
hearsay would be misleading and incorrect. A distinction 
ought to be made between two types of admissible evidence: 
(i) out-of-court assertions which do not derive their value 
from the credibility of the absent declarant at all; and 
(ii) out-of-court assertions which do rest for value on the 
credibility of the absent declarant, but in respect of which 
there exist certain strong circumstantial guarantees of 
reliability. 
An example of the first type of evidence is the statement of 
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an absent declarant, X, that he, X, saw Y shoot Z with a re-
volver, where the statement is tendered by a witness, W, in 
order to establish that X was capable of speech, or had 
knowledge of the alleged shooting. In this case the evi-
dence does not depend on X's credibility for its value at 
all, as the relevant inference sought to be drawn is inde-
pendent of his subjective belief. 
therefore, do not arise at all. 
The hearsay dangers, 
An example of the second category would be where the same 
statement were tendered, but this time to prove that Y shot 
z. Assume further that it is satisfactorily established 
that X had no motive to misrepresent (say, for instance, he 
would be seriously prejudiced by Y's implication in the 
crime), that X quite clearly intended to communicate this 
fact (say, for instance, W cross-examined him extensively on 
what he saw), and that there was no question about X's powers 
of memory or perception. Would this warrant labelling the 
evidence non-hearsay? It is immediately apparent that this 
category differs from the previous one in an important 
respect; whereas the hearsay dangers did not arise at all in 
category (i), the same is not true of category (ii). In 
order to draw the required inference, we ~ required to in-
vestigate the belief of the absent declarant, and it is only 
after this investigation has been conducted, and the hearsay 
dangers found to be satisfactorily accounted for, that an 
argument for admissibility can be presented. To call this 
evidence original, however, would take no account of the fact 
that the investigation of the hearsay dangers was carried out 
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by looking purely at circumstantial evidence and not by using 
the recognized courtroom procedures such as cross-examination, 
the oath etc to which oral testimony would have been sub-
jected. The adversary, in other words, is denied his right 
of confrontation, which was identified earlier as one of the 
156 
major reasonsfor the existence of the hearsay rule. Cate-
gory (ii), therefore, is sufficiently hearsay-like to resist 
the label 'original evidence', but may contain sufficient 
guarantees of reliability to warrant admissibility. 
The fact, therefore, that thirty telephone calls were made, 
should not be allowed to detract from one's recognition of 
the hearsay-like quality of the evidence. On the other 
hand, it should also be realized that such evidence is less 
pregnant with hearsay-like dangers than evidence of two 
calls to the same effect, and the question of admissibility 
may well be resolved differently. This question, I submit, 
illustrates clearly the hazards of labelling evidence as 
either 'hearsay' or 'non-hearsay'. The identification of 
hearsay dangers merely states the problem of admissibility 
without solving it, and the factors which should be con-
sidered in determining admissibility will be considered 
later at greater length. 
(b) T.l:le decis.ions in the above cases have subsequently 
been followed by the New Zealand courts in the cases 
158 
Mathewson v Police 157 and Police v Machirus. What is 
significant about these cases is that, unlike the cases dis-
cussed in (a) above, the courts here considered the admis-
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sibility of only one or two telephone calls, and not several 
calls to the same effect. Yet in both cases the court con-
eluded that this made no difference to the admissibility of 
the evidence. The reasoning of the court is succinctly 
summarized by Woodhouse J in Machirus' case: 
"Reed J expressed the view that one telephone 
call of the sort under consideration might not 
be admissible because of the risk of mistake. 
With respect, I do not think that objection 
goes to admissibility but ••• simply to the 
probative value of the evidence." 159 
It is submitted that this illustrates the danger of using an 
assertion-oriented definition. Had the court employed a 
declarant-oriented definition, it would immediately have be-
come apparent that the question of the possibility of error 
on the part of the declarant is in fact one of the hearsay 
dangers which forms part of the enquiry relating to admissi-
bility. To relegate this enquiry to the question of the 
weight such evidence is to enjoy ~.s, it is respectfully sub-
mitted,to misconstrue the operation of the exclusionary rule. 
An interesting point to emerge from Machirus' case is the 
reasons advanced by the court for admitting the evidence: 
Richmond P admitted the evidence on the weight of authority 
without discussing the basis for such admission; Woodhouse 
J regarded the evidence to be non-hearsay, because the words 
used by the caller "were not tendered to prove the truth of 
any assertion but simply to indicate that there had been an 
1eo 
apparent attempt to bet". Cooke J, on the other hand, 
believed that the evidence should be allowed as an exception 
to the rule, saying: 
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"[A) person's declaration of his contemporaneous 
state of mind - and a statement of his present 
intention must be within that category - is ad-
missible as evidence of that state of mind. The 
principle is discussed in Cross on Evidence 
(2nd NZ ed), ••• the author treating it as an 
exception to the hearsay rule, associated with 
the doctrine of res gestae." 161 
Thus, while it is clear that evidence of intercepted gambling 
calls is certainly admissible in New Zealand, little else on 
the topic can be said with any conviction. The uncertainty 
surrounding this topic is yet another legacy of the confusion 
surrounding the meaning of hearsay and the scope of the hear-
say rule. 
3. The United States 
This topic has again received inconsistent treatment at the 
hands of the United States courts. The hearsay objection 
has, however, usually been unsuccessful, but the cases seem. 
to indicate generally two different reasons for this conclu-
sion. 
(a) 182 In People v Radley , the court held that such evi-
dence could be received "not for the purpose of establishing 
the truth of what was said over the telephone, but for the 
purpose of establishing that the room was being occupied for 
placing bets on horse races." 
This statement, which forms the basis of the approach in 
163 
many other cases in the United States, is of little 
assistance. 184 As Weinberg observes, "this rather neat 
statement over-simplifies many complex issues", and it seems 
clear that the court admitted the evidence as 'circumstan-
tial evidence' which did not fall within the scope of the 
hearsay ban because it was not used to show the truth of 
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that which was asserted. 
The flaws inherent in this type of reasoning have already 
been considered, and flow directly from reliance on the 
traditional assertion-oriented definition of hearsay. 
(b) 165 In State v Tolisano, the court again admitted the 
evidence as non-hearsay, but adopted a different view of the 
nature of the evidence. According to Jennings J, the utter-
ance "This is Al, Charlie; the Doc wants a $10.00 number 
hitch on eight races at Saratoga" was admissible, "not to es-
tablish the truth of the facts related in the telephone calls 
but to establish the calls as verbal acts to show that the 
defendant was engaged in the activities described in the in-
166 formation" • 
As regards the nature of this testimony, the learned judge 
held that "[tJ he evidence is admitted, not as an exception to 
167 
the hearsay rule, but because it is not within the rule". 
What merit is there in the approaches laid down in Radley's 
and Tolisano's cases? Very little, it is submitted. As 
168 Weinberg says, "[tjhe problem with this approach is that 
the court fails to develop its inquiry into the reason for 
the attempt by the prosecution to introduce this evidence 
beyond very superficial analysis". The question which must 
be asked, and which the courts have seldom asked, is: 
Where does the evidence derive its probative value? The 
only probative value of such a telephone conversation is the 
inferred belief on the part of the caller that he was speak-
ing to a betting house. At this stage, it is useful to 
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consider separately the results which flow from the two dif-
ferent definitions of hearsay: 
(i) If one uses a declarant-oriented definition, it be-
comes readily apparent that such evidence is hearsay-
like in character because of the need to investigate 
the belief of the declarant in order to reach the 
conclusion that the establishment is used for gamb-
ling. 
(ii) If one uses an assertion-oriented definition, the re-
sult is less simple; because of the limitations of 
such definition, it makes little sense to talk of the 
"truth of the content" of the express assertion, when 
the express assertion, standing by itself, is irrele-
vant; the probative value of the statement lies in a 
derived 'implied assertion'. If one applies this 
definition instead to the implied assertion, then one 
reaches the conclusion that the evide~ce is hearsay. 
This method, however, is cumbersome, artificial and 
complex. 
Some American cases have taken cognizance of the presence of 
the dangers in this type of testimony, although they are cer-
tainly in the minority. 
168 
I. In State v De Vincenti, the court recognized that 
the probative value of such telephone calls lay in the be-
lief of the caller. Although no clear analysis of the 
question was conducted, at least the court examined the pur-
pose for which the evidence was tendered, and recognized the 
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hearsay-like quality of the evidence. The court accord-
ingly classified the evidence as hearsay, and allowed it to 
be received by virtue of an exception relating to the res 
gestae doctrine. 
II. The case of People v Barnhart 170 is significant for 
a dictum of Doran J in which the learned judge presented a 
dissenting view on the admissibility of this type of evi-
dence. In one of the few instances where this topic has 
received the full judicial attention it deserves, the learned 
judge gave his opinion on the law in the following terms: 
"I know of no rule or principle of law that 
authorizes or justifies a relaxation of the 
hearsay rule for expediency. The evidence of 
the telephone conversations was pure hearsay. 
Evidence of the fact that a conversation was 
received would be admissible for the purpose of 
proving that the telephone was in order and 
functioning, but for no other purpose; the sub-
stance of the conversation is unnecessary for 
this purpose. The argument in People v Joffe 
..• namely that such evidence is admissible be-
cause 'it tended t0 establish the fact that the 
premises were occupied for the purpose of re-
cording wagers on horse races', clearly permits 
a consideration of hearsay for the purpose of 
proving the very offense charged. And the 
same inaccurate reasoning appears in People v 
Reifenstuhl ••. where the court declared, re-
ferring to such evidence, that 'It was not sub-
ject to the hearsay rule. The conversation was 
not admitted for the purpose of proving its own 
contents •.. but to prove the use to which the 
telephone was subjected by the public and to de-
monstrate the reaction of the defendant at the 
time. The use of the room occupied by defen-
dant was in issue and the nature of the telephone 
call was a circumstance to establish the truth 
It is futile to argue that such evidence is not 
hearsay. In my judgment the preservation of 
the hearsay rule is not only important but vital 
in the administration of justice. To relax the 
rule just to uphold the conviction of a book-
maker, or for any other purpose, is nothing short 
of judicial stupidity." 111 
'I ' 
li 
'I 
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While this dictum perhaps goes a little too far - evidence 
of what the declarant said would be admissible where it does 
not rest for its value on the declarant's credibility - it 
nevertheless has considerable value in its plea for logical 
thought. At the same time, this passage reveals the full 
extent of the hearsay dilemma, viz, that doctrinal and logi-
cal soundness can only be achieved at great cost to pragma-
tism and the fluidity of the rules of evidence. If all 
evidence which was in effect hearsay-like were to be given 
the hearsay label, then the court would have to exclude what 
at times is the most reliable and valuable evidence at its 
disposal. The fault, as has been suggested before, lies 
not with a wide declarant-oriented definition of hearsay 
(which is necessary to alert the court to the possible dangers 
built into such evidence), but with the rule excluding all 
evidence bearing this label. To adhere rigidly to the rule 
and at the same time require practical decisions on admissi-
bility can only result in the inexorable erosion of the de-
finition of hearsay, and the widening of the gulf between 
hearsay doctrine and the tenets of logic and reason. 
4. Canada 
The attitude of the Canadian courts is represented by the 
decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in the case of 
172 
,S v Fialkow, where McLennan J.A. stated the law as 
follows: 
"The evidence of the telephone calls is not hear-
say. It is evidence of conduct or acts in the 
form of words. Those facts are carried out 
through the medium of the telephone which the 
appellant made available to those who performed 
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them ••. In this case the evidence is admissible 
to show the character of the business and not to 
prove the truth of what was said." 1 7 3 
This is, in effect, a paraphrase of the views expressed by 
the Australian and United States courts, and is again· sub-
ject to the criticisms expressed above. 
5. South Africa 
The position in South Africa is reflected by the decision in 
174 the case of Lenssen v Rex, the only case in our law deal-
ing with this topic. This case differs slightly from those 
which we have encountered above in that it deals with the 
utterances of people made, not by telephone, but in the 
course of their conversations as they were entering and leav-
ing the premises in question. These utterances were re-
corded by the police, who were watching the premises from a 
position near the entrance where they remained concealed. 
The statements of these people were presumably to the effect 
that gambling had taken place or was about to take place, 
(although the contents of the statements do not appear in the 
case report), and were tendered to establish that the pre-
mises were being illegally used for gambling purposes. In 
admitting this evidence, Smith J held as follows: 
"The expressions of people who went in and the 
expressions of those who came out seem to me 
to be applicable as part of the res gestae. 
Apart from that, it seems to me the evidence 
would be admissible on another ground, namely 
as to the intention with which the act of go-
ing in was done." 175 
It is difficult to ascertain, from the learned judge's re-
marks, whether the evidence was considered non-hearsay or 
admissible by virtue of an exception to the rule. Hoffmann 
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and Zeffertt submit that it is possible that such state-
ments may be regarded as implied assertions, which the 
authors consider should,in the circumstances of Lenssen's 
case,be admissible for reasons which will be considered 
177 
later. This view seems to suggest that the learned authors 
regard the evidence in Lenssen's case as hearsay but admis-
sible by way of exception. With respect, and for reasons 
already expressed above, it is submitted that this is the 
better view. 
Academic Commentary 
Academic opinion on this point, although prolific, is no more 
consistent than the judicial authority, as can be seen by the 
following cursory examination. 
(a) Morgan 178 emphasizes the fact that such evidence pos-
esses distinct hearsay dangers. For instance, as the learned 
author points out, 
"It is quite possible, though perhaps highly im-
probable, that the speaker was using a code in 
some secret transaction other than gambling on 
the races ••• and the remainder of the language 
may have been used for the express purpose of 
conveying a totally wrong impression to all 
interceptors."17i 
Even though such occurrences would perhaps be unlikely, the 
point the learned author makes is that without the opportun-
ity for cross-examination it is not open for the accused to 
raise any arguments of this type. In the words of the 
learned author, 
"the fact remains that without the opportunity to 
examine the unknown speaker, the opponent had no 
way of exposing any artificialities or idiosyn-
cracies in his use of words. Yet it would be 
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an extremely rare case where either counsel or 
court would even notice, much less discuss, 
such a problem." 180 
(b) Maguire 1 81 also points out the dangers inherent in 
this type of evidence. If twelve callers telephone an 
establishment to place bets, and these calls are inter-
cepted by a policeman, according to the learned author "it 
is conceivable that the voices he heard were those of 
twelve Sunday school superintendents, informed of the raid 
and consciously seeking to express the proposition: 'This 
182 telephone is regularly used for gambling purposes.'" 
Because this proposition is so unlikely, however, Maguire 
expresses his approval of the courts' general tendency to 
admit this evidence. Thus, despite the hearsay-like 
nature of the evidence, its intrinsic reliability renders 
it "fortunate" in the author's opinion that the courts 
have regarded this evidence as non-hearsay. 
1 8 3 (c) Weinstein links the general admission of this type 
of evidence with the current tendency towards much freer 
admissibility of hearsay. This tendency has manifested 
itself in three ways, viz a tendency to narrow down the de-
finition of hearsay, an expansion of the hearsay exceptions 
(especially by statute), and by a growing tendency "to ad-
mit hearsay where there can be no serious doubt of the ere-
dibility of the extra-judicial declarant - i e where proba-
184 
tive force is high." It is in the light of the latter 
tendency that Weinstein construes the decision in S v Toli-
185 
sane and other such cases. Although there were clearly 
'!"·, ., 
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hearsay dangers in receiving this evidence, nevertheless, 
"in the light of the number of calls involved there was 
186 
ample guaranty of trustworthiness." 
Although these tendencies are in his view generally neces-
sary to escape the clutches of the over-rigid hearsay rule, 
the learned author does add a valuable warning, viz that 
"without frank recognition of the rapid change in our atti-
tude towards the exclusionary rules, we abandon the possi-
187 bility of providing reasonable procedural protections." 
This warning warrants serious deliberation, and will be 
considered at length at a later stage. 
(d) Falkner 188 also recognizes the hearsay-like quality 
of the evidence in these "betting cases". Remarking on 
the fact that the hearsay objection, although often raised 
in these cases, is invariably "brushed aside without ade-
quate analysis of the problem", the learned author makes 
the important observation that the relevancy or probative 
value of such·evidence depends "upon inferences from the 
conduct to the belief of the actor, to the truth of the 
fact believed - in other words, upon its use as an 'implied 
188 
assertion' of the fact it was offered to prove". This 
attitude is in keeping with the declarant-oriented 
approaches of Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg, and, as has 
been submitted already on several occasions, reflects the 
superior view of the hearsay concept. 
(e) 180 Weinberg , as we have seen, also refers to the 
term "implied assertion" in his analysis of the ·evidence in 
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question. According to him, the courts have generally 
failed to appreciate the fact that the only value such evi-
dence has is by way of an implied assertion, relating to 
the belief of the caller. In the process, the courts 
have "adopted a distorted analysis which involves labelling 
such statements as original evidence without considering 
191 
whether the hearsay rule should be extended to them." 
Once this fact is realized, says the learned author, it does 
not necessarily follow that the evidence must be excluded or 
even classified as hearsay, because this is an entirely dis-
tinct problem. What he objects to, however, is the fact 
that the courts have conducted the classification without a 
proper investigation or appreciation of the values and con-
cepts involved. 
192 At a later stage in his article, the learned author, how-
ever, does commit himself as to the proper classification of 
implied assertions generally, and tenders the proposition 
that such evidence should be considered hearsay, but not nee-
essarily excluded. A full consideration of this theory will 
19 3 be undertaken at a later stage of the discussion. 
J!l As opposed to the writers we have thus far considered, 
Ladd 194 fully endorses the view expressed by the court in 
Tolisano's case, saying that the court admitted the evidence 
"not to establish the truth of the facts heard over the tele-
phone, but as evidence to show that the defendant was en-
195 gaged in the activities described in the information." 
And further: 
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"While the telephone conversations might have 
been regarded as hearsay if the defendant 
had been charged with making bets, it was not 
hearsay on the issue of maintaining a place 
with apparatus for the purpose of making 
bets. The conversations were relevant to 
show that the room which the defendant occu-
pied contained a device, namely the telephone, 
which was used, or kept for the purpose of 
use, in registering bets on horse races. The 
conversations provided first-hand information 
as to the use of the telephone and the other 
equipment in .the room. " 1 8 e 
It is interesting to note that Ladd would have considered 
the evidence hearsay if it were offered to prove that the 
defendant had been making bets, but non-hearsay for proving 
that he used a telephone for the purposes of registering 
bets on horse races. With respect, it is submitted that 
this distinction is artificial and illusory. The only 
basis for holding the evidence to be hearsay in the former 
case is by making use of a declarant-oriented definition or 
the device of "implied assertions", because it is the im-
plied belief of the callers which points to the fact that 
bets are being placed at the premises of the defendant. 
However, using this chain of reasoning, it follows that the 
evidence in the latter case must also be hearsay, for its 
value is similarly dependent on the belief (or credibility) 
of the callers. 
(g) 187 McCormick, as we have seen, is another proponent 
of the non-hearsay status of this class of evidence, classi-
fying such utterances as 'verbal parts of acts' in that they 
indicate the character of an establishment, being "[e) xplana-
tory words which accompany and give character to the transac-
ti 11 188 on • 
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(h) Park, ,gg however, comes out in strong criticism of 
McCormick's treatment of this category of evidence, adding 
that the learned author's approach is "questionable" and 
that "the basis for deeming these utterances nonhearsay is 
unexplained in McCormick and seems unjustifiable." 200 The 
reasons which Park advances for this criticism are as fol-
lows: 
(i) Unlike the usual examples (which McCormick cites) 
of verbal parts of acts, the bookmaker calls "do 
not seem to be 'part' of an independently relevant 
201 
'act'". 
(ii) The utterances were not being used for what they 
(iii) 
did (i e subject the declarant to criminal liabil-
ity), but to show what they expressly or impliedly 
said (i e that the addressee was a bookmaker). In 
other words, the utterances_ alone do not have any 
legal relevance and are not "legally operative". 
If we admit this type of evidence as non-hearsay 
then, Park submits: 
"The category is broad enough to include con-
versations between customers in a tavern 
about prostitution on the premises, or gossip 
among guests at a party about the host's cache 
of drugs. Admission of this evidence in a 
prosecution of the tavern owner or the host 
would involve both use of utterances to show 
the truth of their assertions and reliance on 
the declarant's credibility." 202 
In other words, the admission of such evidence as non-hearsay 
would infringe both assertion- and declarant-oriented defini-
tions of hearsay. In the bookmaker examples, however, 
although the 'verbal parts of acts' label is inap-
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propriate, nevertheless a "respectable argument can be made 
that they are not hearsay under the assertion-oriented defi-
203 
nition", in that the statements are not offered toes-
tablish the truth of any assertion contained therein. (The 
learned author hastens to mention, however, the fact that 
such statements may still fall foul of an assertion-oriented 
definition by virtue of their being implied assertions.) In 
fact, says Park, there are good reasons why such calls should 
be admitted, because they are usually reliable, being corro-
borated normally by each other and by circumstantial evidence 
found on the premises. On the other hand, an equally strong 
argument can be made out that they ~ hearsay under the 
declarant-oriented definition, in that they depend for value 
on the declarant's credibility. Whereas the credibility 
dangers may be said to be reduced by the corroboration men-
tioned above, they are certainly not eliminated. 
A vital point emerges from Park's discussion of bookmaker 
cases, a point which the learned writer emphasizes throughout 
the course of his very valuable article: It is an exercise 
in futility to attempt to categorize any type of evidence as 
hearsay or non-hearsay without first deciding which defini-
tion of hearsay you are to employ. Although in several in-
stances the result will be the same for either definition, 
in many cases the results will differ. The evidence which 
we are at present considering. viz telephone calls to book-
makers, is one such example where the choice of definition 
is vital. Furthermore, on comparing the results of the two 
definitions in this instance, it is submitted that the 
declarant-oriented definition is greatly superior, alerting 
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the court to dangers which would otherwise go entirely un-
noticed. It may appear that this would lead to unsatisfac-
tory results, because of certain guarantees of reliability 
in some instances: this, however, is argument in favour of 
reform of the rule excluding hearsay, not argument on the 
definition of hearsay. The fact remains that the evidence 
in question rests for its value on the credibility of 
absent declarants, and thus, in terms of the rationale for 
excluding hearsay, falls squarely into the hearsay niche. 
Yet in the light of the massive weight of judicial authority 
to the contrary, the tentative criticisms of academic 
writers and the isolated dissents of judges such as Gibson J 
and Doran J seem like mere flickers of light in the gloom of 
the hearsay thicket. 
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Chapter V 
STATEMENT AND ORIGIN OF THE PROBLEM OF IMPLIED ASSERTIONS: 
WRIGHT v DOE d TATHAM 
In the course of the previous chapter, an attempt was made 
to define 'hearsay', and to confine the concept within fixed 
and ascertainable parameters. This attempt, as has been il-
lustrated, met with major obstacles: First, the term hear-
say has nowhere received comprehensive judicial attention as 
regards its definition and ambit. Out of the various propo-
sals to define the concept, two main approaches are discern-
ible, viz the assertion- and declarant-oriented definitions. 
The assertion-oriented approach, while offering the question-
able advantage of limiting the impact of the hearsay rule 
within fixed and fairly rigid confines, is unsound, it is 
submitted, in principle and logic, and may lead to anomaly 
and, sometimes, to irreconcilable consequences. The declar-
ant-oriented definition, while it may be theoretically 
appealing because of its intrinsic doctrinal elegance, poses 
practical problems in that it renders the ambit of hearsay 
very wide. Acceptance of the latter theory would necessi-
tate a reformulation of the hearsay rule, an ineluctable 
conclusion from any probing of topics such as, for instance, 
'circumstantial evidence of state of mind' or 'verbal acts' 
and 'verbal parts of acts'. These topics lie in the twi-
light zone of hearsay, and, in classifying such evidence, 
different results ensue depending on which of the two 
approaches is employed. These topics were examined in some 
depth, and out of this examination the following conclusions 
may be drawn: 
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(1) The declarant-oriented definition is a superior tool 
for analysing the hearsay concept, largely because the 
scope of such definition is congruent with the ratio-
nale underlying the hearsay rule. 
(2) The results derived from employing this type of defini-
tion do not always correspond with the decisionsof the 
majority of the courts~ however, where there is such 
disparity, it can be shown that it is not the fault of 
the definition, but rather the justifiable reluctance 
of the courts to exclude all hearsay-like evidence. It 
is therefore the rule requiring the exclusion of all 
hearsay which causes this disharmony. 
(3) The acceptance of a declarant-oriented definition would 
therefore require the re-appraisal and reform of the 
hearsay rule, a proposition which will be considered at 
length later. 
(4) If it is accepted that the declarant-oriented definition 
is better equipped to deal with topics on the border of 
hearsay, then the following definition of hearsay may 
tentatively be put forward: an extra-curial assertion 
that derives its probative value from the credibility of 
its maker. 
(5) However, one further question remains to be answered~ 
what is meant by an 'assertion'? Does this include 
conduct or non-conduct (silence)? Furthermore, what 
about statements or conduct which are not intended by 
their maker to communicate any idea or message - do 
these fall within the ambit of these 'assertions'? 
(6) This latter problem brings us on to the topic of implied 
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assertions, a question which has vexed and challenged 
commentators on the law of evidence since the seminal 
and far-reaching decision in Wright v Doe d Tatham 1 
in 1837. However, before embarking on an analysis of 
this concept, it is worth making a note of the context 
in which this problem has arisen; it requires special 
attention in relation to one particular element of our 
hearsay definition and that element alone, viz 'asser-
tion'. Thus,throughout the rest of the discussion, 
it must be remembered that the remainder of the defini-
tion remains unaltered. Put in another way, the aim 
of what follows is to answer a single question: Must 
the term 'hearsay' be defined to include or to exclude 
implied assertions that rest for their value on the 
credibility of an absent declarant? To omit the itali-
cized portion of the enquiry would be to mis-state the 
problem, for if the circumstances are such that an im-
plied assertion does not rest on the credibility of 
the declarant for its evidential value, then the 
evidence is clearly non-hearsay. But then an express 
assertion to the same effect would also be non-hearsay, 
and we have not progressed in our analysis at all. 
The Origin of the Problem: Wright v Doe d Tatham 
This famous case concerned the testamentary capacity of a 
certain John Marsden, who had in his will bequeathed a sub-
stantial part of his considerable estate to his steward, 
Wright. The background of this memorable case is pictu-
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resquely and amusingly set out by Maguire in the following 
manner: 
"[Marsde~ was a mild, polite, shrinking, short-
ish man, not bad-looking and with 'fresh colour,' 
rather afraid of dogs, big or little, at ground 
level and of horses when he attained the eleva-
tion of the saddle. Although friendly and hos-
pitable, he did not carve well enough to meet the 
demands of a table at which many were habitually 
served. So myopic that he could not recognize 
people even a few yards away, he had a habit of 
contracting his brows and distorting his face to 
overcome the visual difficulty. He was quite un-
educated, entirely unmarried, and sometimes 
bumbling in the presence of ladies. The ringing 
of bells fascinated him; so did check aprons worn 
by the servant maids. He took an interest in 
music, but the variety of his performance and 
tastes was too limited to give others much joy. 
He did become well-informed and competent as a 
genealogist, having a tenacious memory; and was 
also something of a drum-and-trumpet military 
historian. His religion and politics were con-
servative. 
Riding grandly by carriage, he led his freemen to 
the polls on election days. Indecisive, slow of 
perception, submissive, and indolent, he relied 
much upon his steward Wright, a positive and un-
lovable man who, as a principal testamentary 
beneficiary, became a target of attack in the 
court proceedings. Since, by the early death of 
his elder brother, Mr. Marsden inherited substan-
tial properties, in one way or another he was 
drawn into many acquisitive dealings. All in 
all, it was not too surprising that his cousin 
and sole heir-at-law Admiral Tatham should prompt-
ly, vigorously, and tenaciously have attacked the 
validity of the testamentary dispositions." 2 
In attacking Marsden's capacity, evidence was admitted 
"that Marsden was treated as a child by his own 
menial servants; that, in his youth, he was 
called, in the village where he lived, 'Silly 
Jack' and 'Silly Marsden' ••• ; that a witness 
had seen boys shouting at him, 'There goes crazy 
Marsden', and throwing dirt at him, and had per-
suaded a person passing by to see him home." 3 
This evidence was received without complaint. However, 
evidence was also adduced of three letters addressed and sent 
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to Marsden, all from persons since dead, which had been dis-
covered after Marsden's death in a cupboard under a book-case 
in the library at Marsden's residence. The seals of the 
letters had been broken, and the envelopes had apparently 
been opened. The contents of these letters were as follows: 
I. From CHARLES TATHAM, Mr. Marsden's cousin, who, at 
the time of writing, was in America. 4 
"My Dear Cousin. - You should have been the first 
person in the world I would have wrote to had nt. 
my time been Imployd by affairs that called for my 
more imeadeate atention in the first place I am 
calld upon by my Buseness it being the first con-
sideration must by no means be neglected. As for 
my Brother his goodness is Such that I know he will 
Excuse me till I am more disengaged was I to write 
to him in my present Embarased situation I might 
perhaps only do justice to my own feelings & he 
might construe it deceit (so different an opinion 
have I of him to Mankind in Genl. who above all 
things are fond of Flattery. I shall now proceed 
to give you a small Idea of what has passd. since 
my Departiure from Whitehaven as I supose Harry 
long ere now has told you the rest. We saild the 
14th. July & had Good Weather the Chief of the Way 
[31~ but as you know nothing of Sea fareing mat-
ters it is not worth While to Dwell upon the Sub-
ject. We Reachd. the Cape of Verginia the ~3tt. 
Septr. but did not get heare till the begining of 
the present Month so we were about twenty Days in 
coming 350 Miles. When I arivd. I was no little 
consirned to find the Town in a Most Shocking Con-
dition the People Dieing from 5 to 10 per day & 
scarsely a Single House in Town cleare of Descease 
which proves to be the Putrid Fevour - I am going 
to Philadilphia in a few days if God Spares my Life 
and permits me my Health & their I intend to stay 
till Affairs here bare a more friendly Aspect & so 
the Next time you here from me will be I expect 
from that Place tho' Youl Please to direct to me 
heare as usual. God Bless You my Dear Cousin and 
may You still be Blessd with health which is one of 
the greatest Blessings we require hear is the sin-
seare wish of Dr Cosn. Your Affect. Kinsman & 
verry Humble Servt. 
Cha. Tatham. 
P.S. Pray give my kind Love to my Aunt My Brother 
& My Cousin Betty allso my Complements to all the 
rest of the Family and all others my former 
Aquintances, &c. 
Alexandria, 12th Octr. 1784." 
Addressed 'John Marsden Esquire Wennington Hall, 
Lancaster. ' 
II. 
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5 From the Rev. OLIVER MARTON, Vicar of Lancaster. 
"Dear Sir, - I beg that you will Order your Attorney 
to Wait on Mr. Atkinson, or Mr. Watkinson, & propose 
some Terms of Agreement between You and the Parish 
or Township or disagreeable things must unavoidably 
happen. I recommend that a Case should be settled 
[31i) by Your and their Attorneys, and laid before 
Councillto whose Opinion both Sides should submit 
otherwise it will be attended with much Trouble and 
Expence to both Parties. - I am, Sr. with compli-
ments to Mrs. Coockson, Your Humble Servant, &c. 
"Oliver Marton. 
"May ye 20th 1786 
"I beg the favour of an Answer to this. 
"John Marsden, Esq. Wennington." 
III. From the Rev. HENRY ELLERSHAW, on resigning the 
perpetual curacy of Hornby, to which Mr. Marsden 
had appointed him. e 
"Dear Sir, - I should ill discharge the obligation I 
feel myself under, if, in relinquishing Hornby, I 
did not offer you my most grateful acknowledgements 
for the abundant favours of your Hospitality and 
Beneficence. Gratitude is all that I am able to 
give you, and I am happily confident that it is all 
that you expect~ I have only therefore to assure 
you, that no Circumstances in this World will ever 
obliterate from my Heart and Soul the remembrance of 
your benevolent Politeness. May the good Almighty 
long bless you with Health and Happiness, and when 
his Providence shall terminate your Xtian Warfare 
upon Earth, may the Angels of the Lord welcome you 
into Blessedness everlasting. It will afford me 
pleasure to continue my Services during the Vacancy, 
if agreeable to you. With every sentiment of 
Respect and Affection to yourself and the worthy 
family at the Castle, I hope you will ever find me, 
Your grateful, faithful & obliged Servt. 
"Henry Ellershaw. 
"Chapel le dale. 
"3d Oct: 1799 - Please to deliver the Inclosed to 
Mr Wright." 
All these letters were thus related to subject matters and 
written in language appropriate to communicati.ons with a ~son 
having reasonable intelligence. The letters were tendered, 
not to prove the truth of any portion of their actual express 
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contents, but to show the belief of the writers that Marsden 
possessed adequate understanding, and therefore that he did 
in fact enjoy such understanding. The controversy surround-
ing the admissibility of this evidence raged for many years, 
and in the process elicited opinions from 17 judges. The 
King's Bench finally decided that the admission of this evi-
dence was error, and a new trial was ordered. At the new 
trial, the evidence was rejected, and the verdict was against 
the validity of the will. On error to the Exchequer Chamber, 
the ruling of exclusion was affirmed, after the question had 
been argued twice by most learned counsel. Because this de-
cision represents one of the very few instances where the 
courts have investigated the problem of implied hearsay asser-
tions at any length without evading the issue, this case war-
rants intensive examination. 
It is interesting first to look at the arguments of counsel 
before the Exchequer Chamber, especially in view of the jus-
tifiable reputations of such counsel, described by Maguire as 
7 
a 'glittering array'. 
1. Sir F Pollock (arguing in favour of admission of the 
letters) : Three main arguments were advanced in favour of 
admissibility: 
(a) The question being as to the mental capacity of the tes-
tator, all letters addressed to him by persons proved to 
have known him were evidence as showing the treatment of 
him in society. To support this argument, the follow-
ing illustrations were given: 
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"Suppose a testator were proved to have received a 
great number of letters from learned and intelli-
gent persons, consulting him on points of science 
or policy; that those persons were shewn to have 
been well acquainted with him, and, in some in-
stances, to have written to him repeatedly on the 
same subjects; can it be said that the sending of 
such letters, even though not proved to have been 
acknowledged or acted upon, would, in the ordinary 
course of life, produce no effect on a reasonable 
mind? If letters had been written to him in 
a foreign language, with an apparent view to corres-
pondence, by a person who knew him, would no infer-
ence arise as to his knowledge of the language? 
The present evidence is precisely the same in 
character, though perhaps not calculated to produce 
so strong an effect." 8 
(b) The second letter, written by Oliver Marton, requesting 
Marsden to direct his attorney to propose terms of 
agreement with the parish, is an act done and part of 
the res gestae in the case. This is similar, argued 
Pollock, to the type of case where to establish the 
price of certain goods at an auction sale, an auction-
eer may testify as to the amount bid. Similarly, 
also, if an eminent lawyer had written to Marsden to 
become a trustee, then the letter would be admissible. 
(c) In terms of the judgment of the King's Bench, it was 
admitted that "without dispute, any, the least, act 
done by the testator with reference to the letters 
would have made them evidence." Pollock argued that 
such acts were in fact done by the testator in this 
case: the letters had been found in a repository with 
the seals broken, together with other letters which he 
had in fact answered; the reasonable conclusion must 
therefore be that Marsden had opened and read the 
letters. The hearsay objection cannot apply to 
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letters acted upon, and thus the letters should be re-
ceived in evidence. 
2. Cresswell (arguing against admission) : Cresswell's 
argument revolved largely around two central themes: 
(a) The letters cannot be admitted because they ·represent 
the opinions of persons who cannot be called as wit-
nesses, whose statements cannot be verified by oath 
and subjected to the test of cross-examination. The 
reception of this evidence is thus dangerous, in that 
the statements made to Marsden may have been made 
ironically or insincerely, and even if this may not be 
presumed in the present case, the point is that the 
motives of the writers cannot be ascertained by cross-
examination, whereas if they had testified personally 
they could. 
Cresswell criticized the examples given b~ Pollock 
concerning letters from scientists etc., remarking 
that the mere fact that a scientist sends a letter in 
scientific terminology to X does not prove that X un-
derstood the most abstruse points in it, or even that 
he was conversant with science. The scientist would 
be required to testify on oath and subject to the 
test of cross-examination as to the basis of his 
opinions. The same criticisms apply to establishing 
that the authors believed Marsden to be sane. 
(b) The letters cannot be considered part of the res gestae, 
Page 207. 
said Cresswell, because "the fact which it is attempted 
to prove, however disguised in argument, is not a thing 
done, but that Charles Tatham, Marton, and Ellershaw 
thought Marsden capable of understanding their letters; 
and that is not a conclusion legally drawn and estab-
lished by competent means." 9 
3. Starkie (also arguing against admission of the letters): 
(a) The evidence in question is one of opinion and judgment, 
and the author must therefore be cross-examined as to 
the means he had of forming a judgment, and the dili-
gence and good faith with which they were applied. Here 
no such test can be applied. Although it is argued 
that in the present case the writers knew Marsden, this 
is not sufficient, as the admissibility of hearsay evi-
dence is decided by "general tests, not by particular 
10 
and casual ones arising in the individual case." 
(b) To argue that the letters could be used to prove the 
fact that Marsden was treated by the authors as being 
sane and capable of reasoned thought is also not help-
ful; they prove at most that the authors thought him 
so capable, not that he was so capable. Similarly, 
letters to a testator on scientific subjects could have 
proved only that the writers thought him able to under-
stand them. 
(c) It was argued for the plaintiff in error that the 
letters could be admitted as explaining acts gone by 
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the testator, viz the opening and reading and compre-
hension of the letters, together with the probable dis-
patch of Marson's letter to Barrow (as indicated by 
Barrow's endorsement thereon). However, this argument 
'turns in a circle', as it rests upon the assumption 
that the testator read and understood the letters - the 
ordinary reactions of a reasonably intelligent man - in 
order to prove the very fact that Marsden was reason-
ably sensible. This argument must accordingly be 
rejected. 
The judges of the Exchequer Chamber were divided in their opin-
ion, and it is worthwhile to examine individually their judg-
ments on the admissibility of the letters: 
1. Coltman J held that the evidence should be rejected. He 
divided the enquiry into two stages: 
(a) Would such letters be admissible if never received (and 
thus never reacted to) by the addressee? The answer to 
this, said the learned judge, must be in the negative, 
for the following reasons: 
(i) The letters contain expressions of opinion and 
judgment, and this may only be proved by the exam-
!nation of witnesses on oath. The oath fur-
nishes some guarantee of sincerity, while cross-
exanination allows one to test the foundation and 
value of the opinion. 
(ii) It cannot be argued that the writing of the let-
ters, being an act done, renders admissible the 
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contents thereof as a declaration accompanying an 
act, as: 
"I am not aware of any case, where the act 
done is, in its own nature, irrelevant to the 
issue, and where the declaration per se is in-
admissible, in which it has been held that 
the union of the two has rendered them admis-
sible." 11 
Therefore, the act of writing a letter to Marsden being irre-
levant to the issue of his capacity to make a will, the con-
tents of the letter must also be inadmissible. 
(b) Is there sufficient evidence to show that the testator 
had done any act with respect to the letters, thus mak-
ing the letters admissible to explain the nature of the 
act done and thus his mental capacity? The learned 
judge found that there was not; it would be arguing in 
a circle to accept plaintiff's argument that the let-
ters, having been found with the seals broken, must be 
assumed to have been read. 
2. Bosanquet J carne to the same conclusion as Coltman J, 
expressing similar views on the requirements of the oath and 
cross-examination to test the possible hearsay dangers latent 
in the evidence. These dangers were recognized and described 
in the following passage: 
"It is obvious that the contents of the letters 
may be dictated by various motives, according to 
the dispositions and circumstances of the writers. 
Language of affection, of respect, of rational or 
amusing information, may be addressed from the 
best of motives to persons in a state of consider-
able imbecility, or labouring under the strangest 
delusions. The habitual treatment of deranged 
persons as rational is one mode of promoting their 
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recovery. A tone of insult or derision may be 
employed in a moment of irritation in writing to 
a person in full possession of his reason; what 
judgment can be formed of the intention of the 
writers, without an endless examination into the 
circumstances which may have influenced them?" 12 
3. Parke B, in perhaps the most memorable judgment on the 
question of implied assertions, was also of the opinion that 
the evidence should be excluded. 
The learned judge considered separately the two main grounds 
advanced for the admission of the three letters: 
(a) That there was sufficient evidence of an act done by 
the testator to render the contents of the letters ad-
missible by way of explaining that act. This argument 
was quickly disposed of, for the same reasons as those 
laid down by Coltman J: 
"[Ilt assumes the testator to be competent, in 
order to raise the inference that he was cogni-
sant of the contents of the letters, and then 
makes use of the presumed cognisance of the con-
tents of the letters to prove that he was compe-
tent." 1 3 
(b) That the letters were evidence of the treatment of the 
testator as a competent person by individuals ac-
quainted with his habits and personal character: No 
doubt, said Parke B, the letters indicate that in the 
opinion of the writers Marsden was a rational person, 
and if those writers had been living and had testified 
as to this opinion, then such testimony would have 
been admissible. However, this was not the case, 
with the result that 
"those letters may be considered in this respect 
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to be on the same footing as if they had contained 
a direct and positive statement that he was compe-
tent. For this purpose they are mere hearsay 
evidence, statements of the writers, not on oath, 
of the truth of the matter in question, with this 
addition, that they have acted upon the statements 
on the faith of their being true, by their sending 
the letters to the testator." 14 
To allow the admission of such evidence, said the learned 
judge, would lead to the "indiscriminate admission of hearsay 
evidence of all manner of facts". As a result, a large cate-
gory of evidence which appears to be evidence of mere fact is 
in fact inadmissible hearsay evidence, open to the same objec-
tions as the present evidence. Examples of this class, he 
continued, are as follows: The conduct of the family of a 
testator in taking the same precautions in his absence as if 
he were a lunatic; his election, in his absence, to some high 
and responsible position; the conduct of a doctor who per-
mitted a will to be executed by a sick testator; on a ques-
tion of seaworthiness of a vessel, the conduct of a deceased 
captain, who, after examining every part of the vessel, em-
barked on it with his family. 
The learned judge's concluding statement is now one of the 
most oft-quoted on this topic: 
"The conclusion at which I have arrived is that 
proof of a particular fact which is not of itself 
a matter in issue, but which is relevant only as 
implying a statement or opinion of a third person 
on the matter in issue, is inadmissible in all 
cases where such a statement or opinion not on 
oath would be of itself inadmissible; and, there-
fore, in this case the letters which are offered 
only to prove the competence of the testator, that 
is the truth of the implied statements therein 
contained, were properly rejected, as the mere 
statement or opinion of the writer would certainly 
have been inadmissible." 15 
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4. Tindal CJ, on the point of whether the letters were 
admissible as regards the proof of their contents, shared 
similar sentiments. Such contents, said the learned Chief 
Justice, 
"can amount to no more than an expression of the 
opinion of the speaker, or the writer, or the 
actor, and ••• such opinion, not having been 
given upon oath, and not being subject to cross-
examination as to the grounds upon which it was 
originally formed or continued, cannot, upon 18 that account, be deemed admissible in evidence." 
However, the learned Chief Justice held that one of the 
letters, viz that sent by Marton, should be admissible, not 
to establish the fact that Marton treated Marsden as having 
reasonable mental capacity, but to explain the subsequent 
conduct of Marsden after receipt of the letter. In the opin-
ion of Tindal CJ, there was sufficient evidence to show that 
the letter had come to the testator's knowledge, and that he 
had "exercised so much understanding upon it as was sufficient 
to have authorised its admission to the jury". 17 There was 
insufficient evidence of such acts as regards the other two 
letters, which were held to be inadmissible. 
S. Gurney B held that all three letters should be admitted, 
applying largely the same argument as that employed by Tindal 
CJ, but extending it to all the letters. In the learned 
judge's opinion, there was sufficient evidence of acts done by 
Marsden in respect of all three letters to warrant their re-
ception. Rejecting the contention that such argument turns 
in a circle, he said that he did not see "that it is forming 
any presumption of his competency to assume that the seals 
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18 
had been broken, and the letters read by him". 
6. Park J, agreeing that all three letters should be ad-
mitted, employed the following tentative argument, admitting 
nevertheless "great doubt about the validity of my own opin-
ion": 
"It seems to me impossible to suppose that persons 
of character and intelligence, who were well 
acquainted with him, wrote such letters to him as 
they would not have addressed to any but a person 
whom they supposed to be of sound mind, and this 
covering the period in which he is said to be un-
fit for associating with the general class of men 
witt. whom his station in l:l.fe would otherwise en-
title him to associate". 1 a 
In respect of Ellershaw's letter, he remarked: 
"I will not believe that any man of that sacred 
function could write such a letter, expressive of 
such sentiments of piety and benevolence of the 
person to whom it was addressed, by one who for 
years had been his spiritual pastor and guide, 
and who being about to quit, or having actually 
quitted, his charge, must have been the vilest 
hypocrite to write such a letter, without one sec-
ular motive to serve in doing so." 20 
Referring to Rev Marton's letter, he added: 
"He was vicar of Lancaster; the last man in the 
world to write, we should suppose, to an idiot; 
and he writes a letter and sends it to Mr Marsden 
upon business, and upon business merely ••• "21 
Furthermore, said the learned judge, there was sufficient evi-
dence of acts done by the testator to justify the admission of 
the letters to explain such acts. The inescapable inference 
is that the letters had been "read and laid by"; an idiot 
would not have done this, but would instead have "thrown them 
22 
aside". 
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Academic Commentary on Wright v Tatham 
Academic commentary on this famous old case has been fairly 
profuse. One of the most ardent opponents of the decision 
is John M Maguire, who lamented the waste of "what might have 
been an almost miraculously appointed opportunity for author-
itative determination of the claim that where there is no in-
tentional communication of the proposition at issue, where 
that proposition is come at only by inference, there can be 
23 
no hearsay." The time, submits the learned author, 
seemed apt to restrict the scope of the exclusionary rule, 
but the prevailing legal climate was to prove too rigid for 
such change, the case being decided in "an era of somewhat 
pompous professional satisfaction as to the technical English 
24 
rules of proof at common law." Another stumbling block 
was the fact that the evidence in question involved the opin-
ions of the authors of the three letters, and when "hearsay 
ge~s compounded with opinion, its admissibility is doubly un-
likely". 
25 The ultimate result, says Maguire, was a "con-
fused miscellany of opinions, doing little to clarify the 
concept of hearsay or helpfully to free any broad category of 
28 
evidence from its shackles." 
Despite this strong criticism of the case, Maguire neverthe-
less makes what he calls "useful commentary" on several as-
pects of the decision: 
1. He points out that while the three letters in question 
were excluded, many letters which were sent to Marsden and 
upon which he acted in the course of a "voluminous corres-
pondence" were admitted without question. The letters to 
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Marsden were correctly received as constituting the stimuli 
which caused the reaction by Marsden, and were thus clearly 
admissible, not to prove the truth of their contents, but 
in determining whether or not the response to each letter 
was that which may be expected from a capable person. For 
this purpose, their value clearly did not depend on the ver-
acity, credibility or any subjective quality of their 
authors, and so no hearsay dangers are in question. The 
question which Maguire poses is whether the court was correct 
in receiving as non-hearsay the respective responsive behav-
iour of Marsden to each of these letters in order to prove 
his testamentary capacity. This question the learned 
author answers affirmatively, on the ground that no hearsay 
dangers are in question here either. With respect, this 
conclusion seems correct: the mere fact that Marsden 
answered the letters and reacted to the letters in the manner 
that he did supports in itself the conclusion that he was 
sufficiently capable of doing so. No question of credibil-
ity or veracity arises, and, reverting to our triangle, the 
trip from A to C does not necessitate a detour via B, the 
belief of the testator. 
2. Maguire then turns to the three letters in question and 
examines the hearsay dangers involved: 
(a) Insincerity: Although some of the judges pointed out 
that the writers may deliberately have disguised their belief 
for any of a number of reasons, "from affectionate considera-
tion to contemptuous derision", he submits that the likeli-
hood of such conscious duplicity in these particular letters 
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was "inconsiderable", and that in fact "no thought of mani-
festing any belief as to Marsden's mental capacities 
27 
occurred to the writers". As a result, Wright's case is 
"definite authority against any doctrine of escaping the 
hearsay label solely by getting away from the kind of con-
28 
scious assertion which gives rise to a sincerity problem." 
While on the topic of insincerity as a hearsay danger, it is 
convenient to consider two commonly held perspectives which, 
it is submitted, may create problems: 
(i) The first is the premiss that in the case of implied 
assertions the danger of insincerity is not in ques-
tion. This contention is often put forward on the 
ground that because the actor/declarant did not ex-
pres sly communicate the idea or concept which is being 
adduced in evidence, he is not likely to have misrepre-
sented intentionally his belief or state of mind. 
While this is often the case, it may certainly not be 
stated as a universal rule. It is quite conceivable 
that the actor/declarant may have staged a charade, or 
a subtle stratagem to disguise his true beliefs, and, 
in an attempt to lend credibility to his misrepresen-
tation, deliberately refrained from resorting to an 
express formulation of his supposed belief. To take 
an example: If X wished to sell a ship to Y, and he 
wished to convince Y of its seaworthiness, how much 
more convincing it would be to take his whole family 
on a cruise rather than to tell Y expressly that the 
ship is seaworthy. This illustrates the first type of 
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insincerity - danger possible in such evidence, viz 
that some assertions which may appear clearly non-
assertive may in fact be assertive, in that the actor/ 
declarant may deliberately assert a belief and disguise 
it in a non-assertive form. 
However, even if we accept that an item of evidence is 
in fact non-assertive, the danger of insincerity is 
still not eliminated. In Wright's case, even if we 
accept that the writers of the three letters had no in-
tention whatsoever to make any assertion on the issue 
of Marsden's sanity or competence, the possibility 
still exists that they may have written the type of 
letter which could be expected to be sent to a compe-
tent person, even though they believed Marsden to be 
incompetent. This could occur for one of many reasons, 
e gout of respect for Marsden, out of sympathy for his 
debility, out of servility in the expectation of some 
benefit from his will, out of fear of annoying someone 
near to Marsden etc. 
(ii) The second problem concerns Maguire's examination of the 
specific facts of the case in order to evaluate the ex-
tent to which the hearsay dangers were present. As 
has been demonstrated above, once it has been shown 
that an item of evidence presents the traditional hear-
say dangers, the hearsay status of such evidence cannot 
be lost by showing that such dangers can in fact be 
satisfactorily reduced by certain circumstantial indi-
cations of reliability. Certainly a strong argument 
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can be made out for the reception of such evidence, but 
to call it non-hearsay would be incorrect. This, in 
any event, is the position regarding express hearsay 
assertions, and there would seem to be no sound basis 
for applying a different principle to implied asser-
tions. 
(b) Perception: Maguire next examines the danger of inade-
quate perception, and, although conceding that the type of 
evidence in issue does bring into question this danger in 
that it "must for real probative value be based upon adequate 
28 perception and appreciation of relevant facts", · and that 
"[c) ross-examination becomes on many occasions very useful to 
30 
test possible existence of such a defect", he argues that 
this is only so "at large and in the abstract". He argues 
that one should not ask generally whether such danger could 
be present, but that one should examine the facts to see 
whether in fact it is present. For, he argues, the "conunon 
law does not shape its principles through abstract processes. 
It shapes them by continuous integration of perfectly con-
crete cases." 
31 
Turning to the facts of Wright's case, the learned author 
points out that all three writers of the letters had plenti-
ful opportunity to observe Marsden's mental capacity, one 
being his nearest relative and associate, and the other two 
being clergymen who lived and carried out their duties in 
the vicinity of Marsden's home. Therefore, he concludes, 
"Successful objection to the specific evidence for 
risk of inadequate perception is absurd unless-
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the reality of the actual situation is to be re-
morselessly sacrificed to an inapplicable gener-
ality - certainly an evil paradox in the search 
for truth. " l2 
It is readily conceded that to ignore the concrete facts of a 
case and to lable an item of evidence "hearsay" and subse-
quently to exclude it in spite of certain and indusputable 
guarantees of reliability, merely on the ground that the 
hearsay dangers in abstract are brought into question and have 
to be examined, is indeed an "evil paradox". But it is beyond 
question that express assertions cannot evade the hearsay label 
merely because there are indications as to their reliability, 
and, as has been submitted, there is no logical basis for dis-
tinguishing between express and implied assertions in this re-
gard. Furthermore, this "evil paradox" would be eliminated if 
the courts were allowed a discretion to admit hearsay in re-
spect of which there existed strong indications of reliability; 
for what harm would there be in labelling all assertions that 
raised the traditional dangers as hearsay, thereby compelling 
the courts to treat the evidence with the utmost caution, and 
then allowing the evidence to be received if the dangers can be 
satisfactorily accounted for? 
It may be argued that, in the absence of reform, it is better 
to broaden the grounds of admissibility of at least some hear-
say, and that, in respect of implied assertions, one should 
adopt Maguire's approach. However, there is no basis for this 
dichotomy, either in logic or by way of legal authority (part-
icularly in view of Parke B.'s dictum in Wright's case). To 
depart from the traditional formulation of the hearsay rule in 
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respect of implied assertions alone would therefore be in 
conflict with such authority, and would further fragment the 
already confusing and irreconcilable concepts which _make up 
our hearsay doctrine. 
Reform is certainly desirable, if not essential. But once-so 
bold a step is taken, it must create a uniform, logical and 
harmonious hearsay framework which would simplify the prob-
lem, not add yet another branch to the thicket. 
(c) Memory: Maguire criticizes the judges in Wright's 
case for omitting to examine this hearsay danger, which, he 
points out, is often critical in that cross-examination and 
other courtroom techniques often reveal weaknesses in memory 
which are not initially apparent. However, he adds that in 
any event such risk in this particular case was "slight", as 
it was unlikely that the passing of time could have blurred 
the memory of the letter writers as regards Marsden's compe-
tence. For this reason he concludes that this risk, again, 
is no justification for the exclusion of the letters, a con-
elusion which is subject to the same criticisms and comments 
as those in (a) and (b) above. 
(d) Ambiguity or the Risk of Misinterpretation: The learned 
author is quick to point out that this is one risk which is in 
fact more prevalent in implied than express assertions, be-
cause "[w]ith substitution of inferences for assertions ••. 
33 
real interpretative difficulties often arise." Clearly an 
implied assertion is more likely to be misinterpreted than an 
express one; if an act or statement is used for a non-asser-
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tive purpose to establish a fact or idea which the actor/ 
declarant did not intend to convey, then the risk of misin-
terpreting such act or statement is obviously substantially 
greater than if such act or statement were intended to be 
assertive. This danger was not considered at any length in 
the Tatham case, and the letters were generally construed as 
conveying a series of communications of such a kind as 
would be sent to a person who was sane and fully competent. 
3. Maguire points out that while the three letters were 
excluded as being hearsay, the judges were "pleasantly acqui-
escent with respect to other rowdy evidence in the same 
34 
case" which exhibited glaringly the risks of insincerity 
and faulty perception. The evidence referred to was the 
testimony that people contemptuously called Marsden "Silly 
Jack" and "Silly Marsden", and that young boys had shouted 
"There goes crazy Marsden" and threw dirt at him. This, 
says Maguire, is "blatant intentional assertion, reeking with 
doubt as to adequate basis of observation, and also reeking 
with the possibility of cruel immature distortion of the 
35 truth". With respect, it is submitted that the learned 
author is quite correct; there is no basis for excluding the 
letters yet admitting the evidence of the young boys. Both 
sets of evidence require the trier to examine the belief of 
the out-of-court declarant, necessitating the figurative trip 
via point B on our illustrative triangle, and both contain, 
in varying degrees, the standard hearsay dangers. The fact 
that the letters were non-assertive of Marsden's sanity 
whereas the boys' remarks were assertive is not per se a basis 
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for distinction, and both can be said to be "hearsay-like". 
To conclude that implied assertions contain fewer dangers and 
are thus less "hearsay-like" would be to pre-judge the issue 
without proper evaluation. 
Professor Edmund Morgan also examined the case of Wright v 
Tatham in his famous article "Hearsay Dangers and the Appli-
36 
cation of the Hearsay Concept". The learned author cor-
rectly makes the important observation that the case involved 
not only hearsay but also opinion. The assertion implied 
from the letters written to Marsden was that the authors held 
the opinion that Marsden was sane or competent. We are 
therefore dealing with hearsay opinion, and as Morgan adds, 
we are confronted with an additional testamentary danger 
which the trier has to evaluate, viz the ability of the decla-
rant to draw a valid inference from the facts which he has 
perceived. This would necessitate the disclosure of all the 
data upon which his opinion was based. 
The learned author contends that while the case may perhaps 
have turned on the opinion rule, the hearsay objection alone 
would nevertheless have proved insurmountable. To support 
this conclusion, he mentions that,of the examples of implied 
assertions set out by the judges in the Exchequer Chamber, 
only some contain opinion. Yet the court seemed to treat 
all of these examples as falling foul of the hearsay rule, 
and, therefore, warranting exclusion. 
Two points are perhaps worth mentioning as regards the conten-
tions of Professor Morgan: 
1. It is respectfully submitted that to say the case turned 
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on the opinion rule may be an overstatement. Baron Parke, 
for instance, was of the opinion that 
"if any one of those writers had been living, his 
evidence, founded on personal observation, that 
the testator possessed the qualities which justi-
fied the opinion expressed or implied in his 
letters, would be admissible on this issue. 37 
This, it may be argued, would seem to suggest that the opinion 
rule alone would not have been sufficient to exclude the 
letters, but that the additional obstacle presented by the 
hearsay rule finally scuttled the evidence. 
2. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that in many 
cases the question of implied assertions will involve consid-
eration of the opinion rule. An implied assertion, as its 
name indicates, concerns an idea or belief which is implied 
or inferred from an express assertion. This idea or belief 
will often constitute an opinion, or an inference which the 
actor/declarant has drawn from a set of facts. So we are 
in fact dealing with two different inferential dimensions, 
viz the inference which the court draws from the express 
assertion to arrive at the implied assertion concerning the 
actor/declarant's opinion, and the inference which the actor/ 
declarant has drawn from the facts on which his opinion is 
based. In Wright's case, for example, the court drew the 
inference from the letters that the writers believed Marsden 
to be sane, while the writers drew the inference of Marsden's 
sanity from their knowledge of Marsden's habits. 
The first inference is present in all implied assertions, 
and, as we have seen, raises the danger of ambiguity or risk 
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of misinterpretation. The second inference, however, is an 
additional danger, and because of its high frequency in im-
plied assertions, warrants incorporation into our model. 
Clearly the danger which faces the trier is the risk that the 
actor/declarant may not be sufficiently capable of drawing a 
valid inference from the facts. This can be depicted as an 
additional danger inherent in the trip from B to c, viz the 
enquiry as to whether the actor's belief corresponds with ob-
jective reality. Clearly there will be no congruence if the 
actor is not sufficiently capable of drawing a valid infer-
ence from the facts within his perception. 
Weinberg 38 also examined the decision in Wright's case, and 
in particular the reasons for Baron Parke's extension of the 
ambit of the hearsay rule to implied assertions. These 
reasons, he concludes, were not expressly stated, but seem 
to be based on a conception that the rule excluding hearsay 
is a device designed to remedy the defect of evidence not 
38 
subjected to judicial oath. This rationale, says 
Weinberg, is deficient, and not in accord with the modern 
rationalizations of the rule, which tend to focus rather on 
the lack of opportunity to cross-examine or a combination of 
several factors (such as those discussed earlier). As the 
learned author points out, the requirement of an oath is a 
safeguard against only one of the hearsay dangers, viz insin-
cerity or non-veracity. This, he argues, leads to an 
anomaly, for this is the very danger which is minimized in the 
case of implied assertions, for, as he puts it, "One is 
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scarcely likely to tell untruths if one does not intend spe-
40 
cifically to communicate with another person." 
Although this argument may be challenged on the ground that, 
as has been shown above, the danger of insincerity is not 
always eliminated in the case of implied assertions, it is 
nevertheless submitted that the remainder of the argument is 
valid, and that the exclusionary rule must be seen to operate 
so as to remedy not only the absence of judicial oath, but 
all the factors which have already been considered above, in-
cluding cross-examination, contextual setting of the testi-
mony, opportunity to observe demeanour etc. However, as 
Weinberg hastens to add, this deficiency does not mean that 
Baron Parke's decision was incorrect. On a more detailed 
analysis, he adds, it may be quite correct to consider implied 
assertions as hearsay. But the learned judge erred, says 
Weinberg, in saying that the implied assertions contained in 
the letters written to the testator "may be considered in this 
respect to be on the same footing as if they had contained a 
41 direct and positive statement that he was competent." 
With respect, it is submitted that this point is valid and 
identifies the real problem, viz whether there exist any rea-
sons for treating implied assertions any differently from ex-
press assertions. The only justification for such a dis-
tinction would be that implied assertions inherently contain 
different hearsay dangers, and that some of the normal 
dangers are removed by the non-assertive quality of the words 
or conduct. As Weinberg puts it, "The question which really 
has to be decided is whether the differences in the dangers 
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inherent in implied assertions still warrant their coming 
42 
within the ambit of the hearsay rule". 
It is this crucial question which the court in Wright v Doe 
d Tatham left unanswered, and which will demand much atten-
tion in my subsequent analysis. 
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can this be admitted as evidence of X's guilt when offered on 
behalf of Y who is charged with committing that crime? 
If X in such a case fled with the express intention of cast-
ing suspicion on himself in an attempt to draw suspicion 
away from the accused, then his conduct clearly falls foul 
of the hearsay rule as it is assertive conduc~ indisting-
uishable from a nod of the head to indicate consent. If, how-
ever, X's intention was not to exonerate Y but to escape from 
the scene of the crime, then we are dealing with non-assertive 
conduct, from which a reasonable inference of X's guilt and 
Y's innocence may be drawn. Does such evidence infringe the 
rule against hearsay? 
The approach of the United States courts is reflected in the 
following decisions: 
(i) In OWensby v State, 4 the evidence was held to be 
hearsay. In the words of Clopton J: 
"It is also said that hearsay is not confined in 
the legal sense to what is said, that acts or 
concuct, as well as words, may be hearsay." 5 
The reason for the approach of the court appears to be that 
conduct of this nature is equivocal and unreliable, and that 
it is desirable to cross-examine the person who fled on the 
reasons for his flight. In the absence of such cross-
examination, the court was of the opinion that the unprobed 
implied assertion of his guilt should be inadmissible. 
(ii) e In People v Mendez, the evidence was rejected for 
the same reason, the court concluding that "&Jircumstances 
of flight are in the nature of confessions by such third 
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7 persons and are, therefore, in the nature of hearsay evidence." 
(iii) 8 State v Minella: In this case the Iowa Supreme 
Court was faced with the following two items of evidence 
offered by the accused: (1) the flight of one Lovrea; (2) 
the possession by Lov.rea of a revolver, and the fact that 
Lovrea had concealed it and denied its possession. The court 
admitted the second item as·being relevant and proper on the 
issue as to who had fired the shot in question, but rejected 
the first item as being nothing more than a confession by a 
third party, and therefore inadmissible hearsay. 
These three cases reflect the trend in the United States to re-
8 gard such evidence as hearsay, and it can be said that this 
is one of the few areas where the question of implied asser-
tions has received some uniformity of treatment by the courts, 
and where the hearsay objection in this regard can be con-
sidered as having a reasonably high probability of being up-
held. 
An Australian case to have raised this question is Holloway v 
10 11 
McFeeters, a case which Cross describes as being an in-
stance where "the temptation to equate non-assertive conduct 
with assertive words proved too much for the High Court of 
Australia." In this case the plaintiff sued the Nominal 
Defendant for damages arising out of the death of her husband, 
who had been run down by a vehicle driven by an unidentified 
motorist. The question facing the court was as follows: 
"Is the fact that a motorist does not stop after running some-
one down admissible evidence of negligence on his part in pro-
1 2 
ceedings to which he is not a party?" 
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In the Supreme Court of Victoria (Full Bench), O'Bryan J held 
that the jury might infer that the driver knew that he had 
run down the man and severely injured him and had yet left 
him where he lay. The learned judge added that the jury 
might regard this behaviour as implying a consciousness of 
guilt and as being of the nature of an admission. On appeal, 
however, Dixon CJ and Kitto J held that the evidence was inad-
missible (Williams, Webb and Taylor JJ expressing no final 
opinion on this point.) In the words of Kitto J: 
"It has been contended for the plaintiff that the 
various possibilities of the case should be con-
sidered in the light of the fact that after the 
accident the motorist disappeared and has not been 
discovered. Even if in all the circumstances the 
disappearance of the motorist were fairly open to 
be interpreted as an admission by conduct that 
some carelessness of his had been wholly or partly 
the cause of the collision, it would not be per-
missible to treat it as such in this action. In 
an action against the motorist an admission of 
negligence made by him in any form would be re-
ceivable as evidence against him; but in the pre-
sent action no admission by the motorist can be 
receivable as such for the motorist is not the 
defendant and an admission forms no part of the 
facts which constitute the plaintiff's title to 
recover against the motorist. I express no 
opinion as to whether the flight of the motorist 
could properly be treated in an action against 
him as importing an admission, but in the prese:1t 
action it appears to me to add nothing of any 
significance to the case." 13 
To conclude, therefore, it would seem as if the courts in 
these cases have been "content, without very much discussion, 
to assimilate this conduct to an extra-judicial confession of 
14 the third party and thus to exclude it as 'pure hearsay'." 
It is interesting, however, before leaving the 'flight cases', 
to examine the academic reaction to this judicial trend. 
15 According to Morgan, such evidence is not hearsay within 
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the bounds of the traditional assertion-oriented formulation 
favoured by the courts, and he poses the question as to 
whether the definition of hearsay should be framed so as to 
include it. He examines the hearsay dangers involved and 
concludes that as X's conduct is non-assertive, in that he 
did not express his belief in his guilt, his veracity is not 
in any way involved. In addition, as he did not use words, 
there is no danger of a "peculiar use of language". How-
ever, there is a danger that an improper deduction will be 
drawn from his conduct, in that his flight may have been for 
a purpose unrelated to the crime in question. This, adds 
the learned writer, is not serious, as there is no more 
danger of a wrong deduction here than in other cases of cir-
cumstantial evidence. However, Morgan points out, the 
dangers relating to perception and possibly memory are of 
primary concern, as X's belief "is necessarily dependant 
16 
upon the accuracy of his observation." 
Falkner is of the view that "flight evidence has considerably 
17 
more to be said for it than the out-of-court confession"; 
whereas such confession is assertive and intended by the de-
clarant to convey the idea of his guilt, thereby making the 
trustworthiness of the evidence dependant on his veracity, 
flight evidence, says the learned author, does not raise 
this danger. In such cases, it may "safely be assumed that 
the actor fled, not to express or convey the idea of his 
18 guilt, but to escape detection and punishment," if nothing 
to the contrary appears. 
19 Maguire, on the other hand, stresses that flight evidence 
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raises two serious problems: First, he points out, it is 
clear that the relevant inference which the trier is re-
quired to draw from the flight relates to the motive of the 
person fleeing - was it because of pure panic, an urgent 
need to escape interference with performance of some essen-
tial or innocent task, a sense of guilt as to some other 
matter, or some other reason out of a host of possibilities? 
This "ambiguity of inference", says Maguire, is equivalent 
to the problem of "properly interpreting obscure or equivo-
20 
cal testimonial language." This, he says, brings into 
play the recognized principle that the desired conclusion be 
either "a natural or plausible one among the various con-
ceivable ones" or alternatively the "more plausible or more 
21 
natural out of the various ones that are conceivable." 
Modern case law, says the learned writer, inclines towards 
22 the second, more stringent of these principles, and 
accordingly it is necessary for the party adducing evi-
dence of X's flight to convince the trier that his proposed 
conclusion as to X's motive is both acceptable and, in addi-
tion, more acceptable than the conclusion which his adversary 
seeks to attach thereto. This exercise, he argues, "does 
not demand specialized intelligence or learning, and may, 
23 
properly be left to the mine run of jurors." 
In the words of the learned writer: 
"Everybody, also, must constantly exercise his wits 
in determinations as to intelligibility and proper 
interpretation of human actions. More often than 
not, we all manage this sort of problem quite well 
when action takes the form of declaratory speech 
or writing. While its handling much more fre-
quently demands conscious deliberation when the 
protlem is presented by choice of inferences which 
Page 235. 
spring unintended from non-verbal human behaviour, 
results in that connection may be of even superior 
reliability, since here we can escape such confu-
sion as resides in individualized vocabularies and 
foreign tongues. Manifestation through gesture, 
whether calculated or not, is a kind of lingua 
franca." 24 
In conclusion, therefore, Maguire submits that the problem of 
ambiguity of inference is not an "uncompromising stone wall 
25 barrier to admissibility". 
The second problem raised by the learned writer is that of 
sincerity - the fear that "admission of evidence of another's 
flight would encourage falsely trumped up semblances of 
26 guilt." This danger, says Maguire, is also not insur-
mountable; "[e]ven where underworld risks lurk, why should 
it be hopelessly assumed that reliability of opposing counsel 
and common sense perceptiveness of jurors will lack adequate 
27 power to expose and appraise them?" It is this "absolu-
tism" in the application of the hearsay rule which has de-
prived judges of the preliminary fact-finding authority to 
determine whether hearsay does actually confront them or not. 
28 
It is the assumption "that all hearsay is somehow very bad", 
says Maguire, which has led to this undesirable state of 
affairs, an assumption which lies at the very heart of tradi-
tional hearsay theory. 
(C). The Medical Treatment Cases 
The type of problem which arises in these cases is as follows: 
W observes a medical practitioner, X, treating his patient, Y, 
in a particular manner; is this evidence admissible to estab-
lish that Y was suffering from a specific disease or ailment? 
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In the United States, this type of evidence has generally 
been excluded as hearsay: 
(i) 28 In Thompson v Manhattan Railway Co, T sued the 
Railway Company for damages arising from personal injuries 
incurred as a result of a collision. It was alleged that 
the plaintiff had sustained spinal injuries, and evidence 
was tendered that the plaintiff had been treated for a 
spinal injury by a physician, who did not testify. The 
court held the evidence to be inadmissible, stating: 
(ii) 
"We think such proof was in the nature of hearsay. 
The treatment of the plaintiff for a particular 
disease was no more than a declaration of the 
physician that she was suffering from such a 
disease. As the declaration would not be compe-
tent, we think proof of the treatment was not 
competent." 30 
31 In the case In re Louck's Estate, the court was 
faced with a question of survivorship as between two people 
killed in the sa~e train accident. A witness was asked if 
he knew why one of the decedents was placed on a stretcher 
and the other decedent not, but the question had been ruled 
out. On appeal, it was held that ruling out the question 
was no error, as (inter alia): 
(iii) 
"The only purpose of such a question would be to 
elicit a statement from the witness that those 
placing the body on the stretcher believed Mr 
Loucks was alive. Their belief was not perti-
nent but only a statement of the physical facts 
supporting such belief was admissible in evi-
dence." 32 
33 In People v ~' in order to prove that a prosecu-
tion witness did not have venereal disease, evidence was 
tendered that she was placed in a venereal disease-free ward 
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after she had undergone a Wasserman's test for the detection 
of syphilis. Clearly the action of placing her in such a 
ward was not intended to communicate anything about her con-
dition to anyone, but was a medical decision based on the 
results of the test. Nevertheless the court excluded the 
evidence as inadmissible hearsay. 
As with all categories of implied assertions, the academic 
reaction to these cases has been diverse: 
34 Morgan argues that such evidence, being evidence of an 
actor/declarant's state of mind and offered as a basis for 
an inference to the objective facts that created it, is no 
less hearsay than an assertion offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted and made by an actor/declarant who is not 
subject to the conditions imposed upon witnesses. In such 
cases, says Morgan, the physician is, in effect, making an 
assertion to himself, and his conduct is used as if it were 
such an assertion; "if he were to put his thought into 
words, they would express the proposition that the symptoms 
35 
of the patient at least indicate that ailment". Even if 
the doctor did not translate his mental impulses into words, 
such impulses thus translated would read something like this: 
"This patient's symptoms show that he probably has ailment 
38 
X." Therefore the trier is in much the same position as 
if the doctor had made such an entry in his diary or uttered 
an express assertion to that effect. Thus, Morgan argues, 
all the normal hearsay dangers are encountered, especially 
those relating to his powers of perception and memory. In 
addition, the problem is further complicated by elements of 
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37 
opinion, raising the additional dangers associated with 
hearsay opinion. 38 
38 
Falknor, on the other hand, while recognizing the hearsay 
nature of such evidence, argues that "these cases seem to 
typify the very sort of non-assertive conduct which, strong-
ly vouching the actor's belief so as to give 'reasonable 
assurance of trustworthiness', is entitled rationally to 
40 
more sympathetic treatment than a hearsay assertion". 
As the learned writer points out, the conduct of the physi-
cian in Thompson's case in treating his patient for a spinal 
injury would "seem to amount to a sufficient avouchment of 
the physician's belief to admit evidence of the treatment as 
41 
proof of the existence of a spinal injury." 
42 Finman, however, argues that implied assertions such as 
those dealing with inferences resulting from medical treat-
ment raise problems additional to the recognized hearsay 
dangers, which are not recognized by the courts. To illus-
trate his point, Finman refers to the facts of People v 
43 Harrison: The defendant in this case had escaped from 
the police when they had attempted to arrest him on suspi-
cion of homicide, and was found the next day in a field after 
having slashed his throat and wrists. The following day he 
made a confession while in hospital, but objection was taken 
thereto on the ground that it had not been made while the 
defendant was in a mental and physical condition to make a 
rational and coherent statement. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held that the confession was admissible, emphasizing 
that "he was questioned only with the permission of the 
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44 
hospital attendants". The purpose of this evidence, says 
45 
Finman, is clearly to indicate that the doctor believed 
that the defendant was in a fit state to be questioned. The 
problem, however, is whether the doctor, by consenting to 
the interrogation, intended to communicate any belief as to 
the defendant's condition. Because the doctor is not be-
fore the court, says Finman, the only way his intent may be 
ascertained is by inference from his conduct as an implied 
assertion. We are therefore asked to draw two discrete in-
ferences from the same conduct: 
1. whether the doctor intended to convey a belief as to 
the condition of his patient; and 
2. whether he believed that the patient was in a fit con-
dition to be questioned. 
The facts of a case, however, will often not make it clear 
whether the conduct was or was not intended as an assertion, 
in that one inference will be no more probable than another. 
Therefore, concludes the learned writer, even before the 
problem of what to do with implied assertions is answered, a 
court is first faced with the not inconsiderable task of de-
termining whether an assertion is in fact assertive or non-
assertive. This exercise in itself, says Finman, presents 
the court with the same type of problem as assessing the 
worth of an implied assertion because in effect we are deal-
ing with another species of implied assertion. Accordingly, 
the court again will have to "consider the extent to which 
reliance on the evidence entails dangers eliminable through 
48 
cross-examination", a decision "based on a complex exercise 
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of judgment." 47 
Any decision to limit the scope of the hearsay rule by legis-
lation to cover only express assertions would therefore not 
solve the question of admissibility, but merely re-state it. 
(D). The Treatment as Evidence of Relationship Cases 
Under this broad heading, Weinberg seems to deal with two 
distinct types of cases: 
(a) Cases where the actor's conduct is tendered to prove 
that a testator possessed full testamentary capacity 
Cases falling within this category are: 
48 ~<~i~) ____ ~w_r.i~g-h_t v Doe d Tatham, which was discussed at length 
4& 
above. 
50 (ii) In re Hine, where evidence that the children of the 
neighbourhood made fun of the testatrix was tendered as proof 
of her insanity, the court held that the evidence was hearsay 
and inadmissible. 
51 In Estate of Laveaga, the court again had to con-
sider the admissibility of evidence that the testatrix' fam-
ily treated her as incompetent to manage her affairs, and 
concluded (per Judge Angellotti) that "the manner in which a 
person whose sanity is in question was treated by his family 
is not, taken alone, competent substantive evidence tending to 
prove insanity, for it is a mere extra-judicial expression of 
52 
opinion on the part of the family". 
It is interesting to note that evidence of the type rejected 
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in Hine's case was admitted by the court in Wright's case. 
In the latter case, evidence was received that people con-
temptuously called the testator "Silly Jack" and "Silly 
Marsden", and that young boys shouted "There goes crazy 
Marsden" and threw dirt at him. As Maguire points out: 
54 
"Here is blatant intentional assertion, reeking 
with doubt as to adequate basis of observation, 
and also reeking with the possibility of cruel 
immature distortion of truth."53 
Falknor also points out that the hearsay dangers in this 
type of evidence are just as great as in the case of express 
assertions. In addition, he contends, the belief of the 
actor in this case "lacks the strong avouchment which, for 
example, is so apparent in 'the conduct of a deceased cap-
tain on a question of seaworthiness, who, after examining 
55 
every part of the vessel, embarked in it with his family'". 
Therefore, he adds, there is nothing in the evidence which 
gives any "reasonable assurance of trustworthiness", which 
56 McCormick suggests as a safeguard so as to exclude evidence 
57 
of "mere casual, unimportant or frivolous conduct." The 
best safeguard, according to McCormick, is the importance of 
the conduct to the actor; it is only when the conduct is 
of some genuine significance or importance to the actor that 
the learned author is prepared to conclude that there is a 
likelihood of greater trustworthiness than in the case of an 
express assertion. In cases such as those considered above, 
this safeguard is absent. 
58 
Finman, on the other hand, argues that cases such as In re 
Hine illustrate that only in some isolated cases will the 
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actor's conduct be "sufficiently important to justify reli-
59 
ance on his uncross-examined memory and perception." Thus 
he concludes, the importance of conduct in itself does not 
provide a rational basis for classifying implied assertions. 
A number of factors may affect the reliability of an implied 
assertion, which the learned author discusses in depth and 
which will be considered at a later stage. 
(b) Cases where an actor's conduct is tendered to prove 
the existence of a relationship between the actor and 
another 
eo According to Cross, "there is a considerable body of auth-
ority to the effect that treatment is admissible evidence of 
relationship." This "authority" includes inter alia the 
following cases: 
(i) The Dysart Peerage Case: 81 In this case, the issue 
was whether Lvrd Huntingtower and a certain woman had con-
tracted an informal marriage according to the laws of Scot-
land. Evidence was tendered of certain letters and state-
ments of the parties which tended to establish their matri-
menial status, but this evidence was held by the court to be 
inadmissible. According to Lord Blackburn, 
"the statements of Lord Huntingtower, though not 
a party to the cause, yet being one of the 
alleged marrying parties, would, whether he was 
alive or dead ••• be admissible whenever they 
were part of the res gestae, and part of what 
would tend to shew that his conduct before or 
after, was such as to affirm, or disaffirm, the 
alleged contract that was said to constitute a 
mariiage in Scotland." 82 
However, the learned judge added, because Lord H later mar-
Page 243. 
ried a lady in England, which was "the most positive asser-
tion that a man could make that he was an unmarried per-
83 
son", no such statement as to whether he had been married 
before could "be received as part of the res ~stae, tending 
to prove or disprove, affirm or disaffirm, the previous evi-
84 dence of a marriage in Scotland." The learned judge was 
clearly of the opinion that the statements of Lord H were 
hearsay, a conclusion borne out by his finding that even if 
65 the English law of evidence were applicable, the evidence 
would not be rescued by the exception relating to pedigree 
declarations of deceased persons, as the statements in ques-
tion were made post litem motam, after he had married 
another lady in England. In any event, Lord Blackburn con-
eluded, according to Scottish law it was required that the 
declarant be a competent witness if called to testify, a re-
quirement which in this case was not satisfied, as no person 
could give evidence which would render his issue illegiti-
88 
mate. Therefore, because "he could not have given 
evidence when alive, it cannot possibly be competent to give 
secondary evidence of what he would have said if his death 
87 had not prevented him. 11 
(ii) 88 The Aylesford Peerage Case: The issue here was 
whether the father of Lady Aylesford's child was her husband, 
the seventh Earl of Aylesford, or the Marquis of Blandford. 
Letters were produced which had been written by Lady Ayles-
ford and Lord Blandford in which certain arrangements were 
made for the child. It appeared from these letters that 
their authors considered Lord Blandford to be the father of 
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the child, and the court admitted the evidence to corroborate 
other evidence of Lord Blandford's paternity. However, the 
court was at pains to point out that the letters could not be 
admitted "as evidence as to the truth of their contents, but 
as part of the res gestae, in that they threw light on the 
conduct of the mother at the material time." 69 This view 
is borne out by the following passages: 
70 Lord Blackburn: 
71 
Lord Bramwell: 
72 Earle of Selborne: 
"I must first observe that these 
letters are not and could not be 
received as being statements by 
Lady Aylesford in themselves. If 
Lady Aylesford were ever so admis-
sible a witness for these purposes 
her letters would not be evidence. 
She must be called and cross-
examined, supposing that she were 
admissible as a witness." 
"As mere declarations by Lady 
Aylesford, of course [the letters] 
would not be admissible; they are 
only admissible as part of the 
conduct - part of the res gestae 
II 
"[IJ t is said that a declaration 
bearing directly upon the point, 
if occurring in such a letter, 
ought not to be received. I 
agree that it should not be re-
ceived as direct evidence of the 
fact ••. But I cannot hold that 
a letter otherwise admissible, 
which is an important act of con-
duct done by the mother, is to be 
excluded in whole or in part (if 
it were possible to divide one 
part from the other) because it 
may contain such declarations. 
These declarations are facts as 
well as statements. It is a 
fact that for some purpose or 
other the mother wrote a letter 
containing such statements at 
such a time. Your Lordships 
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will not take them as proving 
the fact; but the fact that the 
mother did write such a letter, 
at such a time and for such a 
purpose, as it appears to me, 
is a thing which ••• ought not 
to be excluded from considera-
tion." 
( ~i~) B b B '11' 73 ~·~·~--~u-r_n_.a~y v a~ ~e: · The issue in this case was 
very similar to that before the court in the Aylesford 
Peerage Case, and in order to establish the paternity of 
Mrs Burnaby's child, a certain H was called as a witness 
to testify to a conversation between herself and W, who 
was Mrs Burnaby's paramour. This conversation related to 
certain arrangements for the expected confinement of Mrs 
Burnaby, and objection was taken to the admissibility of 
the evidence. The court, however, found that the evi-
dence was admissible, North J stating the reasons of the 
court as follows: 
(iv) 
"I think this evidence is admissible. I cannot 
distinguish these statements made in conversa-
tion from the letter of Lord Blandford, which 
was deliberately admitted by the House of 
Lords in The Aylesford Peerage Case. It seems 
to me that the verbal statements of Mr Wil-
loughby are just as admissible as if he had 
put them into writing. I do not treat the 
statements as evidence of the truth of the 
matters stated, but I think they are admissible 
as shewing that he was making arrangements for 
the expected confinement of the lady whom he 
was then living with, and representing as his 
wife." 74 
75 Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd: In a 
claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act 
1906 by a posthumous illegitimate child as a dependent of 
its putative father, the following evidence was led to es-
tablish paternity: 
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1. Alice Lloyd, the mother of the child, testified that 
on the Sunday before the death of her lover, w, she went 
for a walk with him. During the walk, she started crying, 
as she knew that she was pregnant. However, she testi-
fied, 
"[h] e told me not to worry because we would be 
married in plenty of time. He had wanted to 
marry me before I got into that condition. I 
told him the child would be born in May. It 
was born on the 15th of May."76 
2. Mrs Matilda Evans, at whose house W had lodged, stated 
that in a conversation which she had had with W the night be-
fore the accident, he had said that Alice Lloyd had told him 
soroe things that troubled him very much, but that it did not 
matter because he would marry her soon enough. She then 
asked him whether he meant it, and he replied that he would 
marry her before May. He looked, said Mrs Evans, to be 
vexed. 
3. William Jones, a room-mate of W, testified as follows: 
"Whittall was my bedmate. He was away from lodg-
ings from Octccer 7-10. After he came back I had 
a conversation with him. He said he was afraid 
Mis~ Lloyd was in trouble - it was a case of 
getting married. He asked if I knew where he 
could get a house as I was working on the cot-
tages ••• He wanted to work as much as he could 
now to provide a home for himself and Miss 
Lloyd." 77 
Objection was taken to this evidence, but the county court 
judge held the evidence to be admissible as being statements 
made by the deceased against his interest. The Court of 
Appeal, however, Ret aside the decision on the ground that 
the statements were not shown to be against interest. The 
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House of Lords finally held the evidence to be admissible. 
In so doing, it was stated that the Court of Appeal had not 
erred, as the only issue before it was whether the evidence 
was admissible as a statement against interest, and in re-
jecting the evidence on this ground it had not erred. The 
evidence was, however, admissible on another ground. In 
the words of Lord Atkinson: 
"The proposal to marry and the acceptance of it 
may, of course, be made by word of mouth; but 
the making and the acceptance of it are acts, 
matters of conduct, and strong pieces of evi-
dence on the issue of paternity, inasmuch as 
they shew the character in which the parties 
regarded the child en ventre sa m~re, and de-
sired to treat it ... - 78 
The issue in this case, said the learned judge, was indis-
tinguishable from that in the Aylesford Peerage Case, where 
the letters were "given in evidence as proofs of matters of 
'78 
conduct." Lord Atkinson added that 
" (tJ o treat the statements made by the deceased 
as statements made by a deceased person against 
his pecuniary interest, and therefore, though 
hearsay, proof of the facts stated, is wholly 
to mistake their true character and significance. 
This significance consists in the improbability 
that any man would make these statements, true or 
false, unless he believed himself to be the 
father of the child of whom Alice Lloyd was preg-
nant." 80 
Lord Shaw of Dunfermline was of the view that the statements 
of W should be admitted because 
"such statements, proved to have been made at the 
time and in the circumstances such as occurred 
in the present case, are part of the res gestae 
equally with actual contracts entered into by 
the deceased or conduct apart from words, both 
of which contracts and conduct could undoubtedly 
have been proved. " 81 
Lord Moulton, on the other hand, felt that 
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"the state of mind of the deceased, so far as it 
bore on his acceptance of his position as the 
father of the child and his intention to fulfil 
his duties as such, was relevant to the issue of 
dependency, and that the evidence in question 
was admissible as being proper to determine his 
state of mind." 82 
He also added that 
"(t]he connection between the conversation and the 
information as to paternity is so close that it 
is probable that the evidence would be admissible 
under the head of the res gestae, but its admis-
sibility, on the grounds I have just mentioned, 
is so clear that it is not necessary to examine 
this further question." 83 
Earl Loreburn held the evidence to be admissible, but did not 
mention the hearsay problem at all, arguing that it was 
highly relevant to the issue of dependency. 
It is evident, therefore, that no single common principle can 
be gleaned from Lloyd's case. Morgan, 84 in fact, complains 
that "[nJot one of the opinions of the lords states the tes-
timony accurately or attempts a searching analysis." He 
dismisses Earl Loreburn's opinion as unhelpful, adding some-
what deprecatingly that "it did not require an appeal to the 
House of Lords to demonstrate that the testimony was rele-
vant." 
85 He also criticizes the view that the evidence be 
admitted as proving state of mind, arguing that "Whittal's 
state of mind was,of itself, of no importance on the issue of 
paternity; its sole relevance was as the foundation for an 
inference to his conduct which caused him to have that in-
88 
tention." Such evidence, the learned author points out, 
only falls within an exception to the hearsay rule if used 
only to prove a presently existing state of mind. 
Morgan next considers the view of Lord Atkinson that W's de-
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clarations of intent to marry Alice Lloyd could not be hear-
say because, whether true or false, they showed that w be-
lieved himself to be the father of the child, and intended to 
support it. This argument is, according to Morgan, falla-
cious; if W's declarations were false, he argues, they could 
be no basis for an inference that he intended to support the 
child. Instead, they might tend to show that, although he 
did not believe himself to be the father, he nevertheless 
stated his intent to marry her in an attempt to prevent "dis-
87 
agreeable measures" being employed by Miss Lloyd or her 
friends. "It seems somewhat farfetched", he adds, "to con-
tend that making possibly false statements of intention in 
88 these circumstances indicated a consciousness of guilt." 
With respect, it is difficult to disagree. 
Nor does the reasoning of Lord Moulton escape the whip: the 
learned judge could not see how testimony as to a declarant's 
words could be distinguished from testimony concerning his 
other relevant acts, adding that "[s] peaking is as much an 
89 
act as doing." But, says Morgan, 
"whether or not a person's conduct which is not 
in any way intended by him as an assertion may 
be non-hearsay evidence of his subjective con-
dition, assertions made by words or otherwise 
by a person not under oath and not subject to 
cross-examination are certainly no less hearsay 
when the matter asserted is a subjective condi-
tion than when it is an objective condition or 
event." eo 
Finally, Morgan directs his attention to the argument of 
Lord Moulton and Lord Shaw of Dunfermline that the statements 
should be admissible for the truth of what they asserted on 
the ground that they were part of the res gestae. This con-
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tention is cursorily discussed as being "nonsense", as "there 
is no rule which incorporates as part of a contract a later 
81 
statement of intention to carry it out." 
One of the most lamentable and, perhaps, significant aspects 
of Lloyd's case was the omission on the part of the House of 
Lords to mention, let alone discuss, the case of Wright v doe 
d Tatham. 82 As Morgan observes, it may well be that "the 
venerated, but far from venerable, fiction that the House of 
Lords never overrules one of its own decisions" may have con-
strained the court from raising the issue. It may have been 
93 
true that John Marsden was "a dull dog at best", but his 
ghost was nevertheless destined to haunt the corridors of 
justice with a tenacity that was to ensure him immortality. 
What general trend may be discerned from these cases? It ap-
pears that the courts are prepared to admit evidence of state-
ments which do not expressly assert the fact of paternity, but 
which impliedly give rise to an inference to that effect. The 
reason for this approach is neatly summarized in Lloyd v 
Powell Diffryn Steam Coal Co Ltd as follows: 
"It must be borne in mind that there is nothing in 
the admission of such evidence which clashes with 
the rooted objection in our jurisprudence to the 
admission of hearsay evidence. The testimony of 
the witnesses is to the act, ie to the deceased 
speaking these words, and it is the speaking of 
the words which is the matter that is put in evi-
dence and which possesses evidential value. The 
evidence is, therefore, not in any respect open 
to the objection that it is secondary or hearsay 
evidence. " 8 4 
However, does the mere "speaking of the words" have any real 
"evidential value" divorced from its value as an implied asser-
Page 251. 
tion? Surely the trier is required to rely on the truth of 
the assertion in order to draw an inference that the declar-
ant regarded himself as being the father of the child. If 
W were to testify that X had told him in a conversation that 
he was making arrangements for the birth, maintenance and 
upbringing of the child, would this statement have any testi-
monial value if one were to disregard the following assump-
tions: 
1. X was sincere in making the statement; 
2. X's narrative ability was such that there was no real pos-
sibility of ambiguity of expression; 
3. X was in a position to form an opinion as to his pater-
nity; and 
4. X's powers of memory and perception were reliable? 
15 
In Re Jenion, Jenion v Wynne, Jenkins CJ was of the opin-
ion 18 that "[s] tatements evidencing (for example) a course of 
conduct in ~elation to the arrangements made for the birth, 
maintenance and upbringing of the child, or to the treatment 
of the child in later years, are obviously in a quite differ-
ent category" from express assertions of paternity. The 
latter assertions the learned judge was not prepared to admit 
as part of the res gestae on the ground that to do so "would 
have amounted to nothing less than doing indirectly the very 
thing the rule forbade, that is, admitting the woman's state-
ment by a circuitous route as evidence tending to bastardise 
17 her children born in wedlock." (Italics added). If a 
statement is not admissible to prove the truth of its con-
tents, how, the learned judge asked, "could it advance the 
matter to admit the same evidence, not as proof of the truth 
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of the statement, but as proof of the fact that, true or false, 
the woman did make it?" 88 (Italics added). 
As regards express assertions, it is submitted, the learned 
judge's logic is flawless: if a statement is inadmissible to 
prove the truth of its subject-matter, it can surely in such 
cases be of no evidential value as proof of the fact that, true 
or false, the declarant did make it. Is it, however, correct 
to say that statements evidencing conduct of the kind des-
cribed are in a different category? Clearly, as the courts 
have been at pains to emphasize, these statements are not ad-
missible to prove the truth of what they assert. Is it then 
correct to admit them "by a circuitous route" to establish the 
same fact? Do they have evidential value as proof of the 
fact that, true or false, the declarant did make it? The only 
evidential value such statements may have, is as evidence of 
the declarant's belief, which is of no real value unless the 
trier relies on the truth or accuracy of the belief. In other 
words, the evidence is only of value if the belief of the de-
clarant is of itself an issue before the court. In this re-
spect, there is no difference between express and implied 
assertions of paternity. In answer to the argument that 
express assertions of paternity be received as part of the res 
gestae, Jenkins LJ stated that 
" (aJ s to Rooney • s statements treated as part of 
the res gestae ••• they can, in my view, carry 
the matter no further than this, that Rooney ••• 
(rightly or wrongly) believed himself to be their 
father, a circumstance which in my view, can add 
virtually nothing to the other evidence in the 
case." 89 
It 'is submitted that there is no logical basis for treating 
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implied assertions any differently. As Schiff points out: 
"On the issue of paternity in Lloyd, the House of 
Lords adopted an argument translating the de-
clarant's belief based on his assumed previous 
perception and memory of disputed facts into a 
state of mind whose verbal expression was immune 
to the hearsay rule." 100 
This argument, the learned author adds, was rejected by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Shepard v United 
101 States. In that case, evidence was tendered that the de-
ceased had said "Dr Shepard has poisoned me", and it was ar-
gued that the evidence was receivable, not as evidence of the 
truth of the matter asserted, but as tending to prove that 
the deceased had a state of mind inconsistent with an attempt 
to commit suicide. The court, however, in the words of Mr 
Justice Cardozo, held as follows: 
"It will not do to say that the jury might accept 
the declarations for any light that they cast 
upon the existence of a vital urge, and yet re-
ject them to the extent that they charge the 
death to someone else. Discrimination so 
subtle is a feat beyond the compass of ordinary 
minds. The reverberating clang of those accu-
satory words would drown all weaker sounds. It 
is for ordinary minds, and not for psycho-
analysts, that our rules of evidence are 
framed." 102 
(E). The Silence Cases 
The categories of implied assertions considered thus far have 
all dealt with non-assertive conduct of a positive nature. 
The question which arises here is whether non-assertive non-
conduct should ever fall within the scope of the hearsay 
rule, ie whether the fact that no speech or conduct has 
occur~ed, if tendered as evidence of the truth of an implied 
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assertion, would infringe the rule against hearsay. This 
problem has been analysed with admirable perceptiveness and 
inexorable logic by Prof Falkner in an article entitled 
"Silence as Hearsay", 103 to which constant reference will 
be made during the course of this discussion. 
As with the other categories of implied assertions, this 
question has elicited a diverse spectrum of views from judi-
cial and academic sources alike. However, before attempt-
ing an analysis of the case law on this topic, it is instruc-
tive to bear in mind the following caveat: 
"Preliminarily, it ought to be said that in 
none of the cases do we find anything like an 
adequate discussion of the problem presented. 
In none is apt authority cited, and in nearly 
all, the problem rests on nothing more than 
the ipse dixit of the court that the evidence 
is or is not hearsay. In a very few of the 
cases the court has extended itself to the 
point of assimilating the failure to speak to 
an assertion of the belief evidenced thereby. 
And as has already been said, in no case has 
a court noticed the quality of non-assertive-
ness and its significance." 104 
With this warning in mind, it is interesting to look at how 
the courts have approached the problem. Falknor points 
out that the "silence" cases fall into two easily identifi-
able groups: 
Group I: Those cases "concerned with the admissibility of 
evidence of the failure of the buyer of goods to complain, 
on an issue of quality; or of the failure of one who 
might have been injured in an alleged accident to give 
notice of or make any claim for injury, on an issue as to 
105 the occurrence or severity of the accident." 
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Included in this category are the following cases: 
108 In the English case of Manchester Brewery Co Ltd v Coombs, 
the issue before the court was whether bad beer had been sup-
plied to a pub by the plaintiff company. At the trial, 
counsel representing the licensee sought to ask a witness the 
following question: "Have you received complaints from cus-
tomers?" Objection was taken to this question, but the 
trial judge held it to be permissible on the following 
grounds: 
"According to my recollection, this question has 
always been allowed in actions of this nature, 
and I think for this reason. Counsel can cer-
tainly ask as to facts - Did the customer order 
beer? Did he finish it? What did he do with 
it? If the matter is left there with the 
answer that he tasted and left it or threw it 
away, the judge cannot avoid drawing an infer-
ence, and the cross-examining counsel is driven 
to ask for some explanation. It is simpler, 
therefore, to allow the statement of the cus-
tomer of the reason of his conduct to be given 
in chief." 10 7 
108 
In St Louis S W Railway v Arkansas & T Grain Co, a claim 
was brought by the grain company against the railway company 
for the conversion of a quantity of corn of "No. 2" quality. 
Evidence was tendered that the corn in question was a part 
of a 60 000 pound supply which had been sold to retail 
dealers in that region as No. 2 corn, and that no complaint 
had ever been made by any of the purchasers. The Texas 
court held the evidence admissible as: 
"The witness simply stated a fact within his 
own knowledge; that he did sell it in the 
course of trade as No. 2 corn, not at retail, 
but to retail dealers, and no complaint was 
ever made. These are facts and not declara-
tions of third persons." 
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A Texan court, eight years later, however, came to the oppo-
site conclusion. In George W Saunders Live Stock Commis-
109 
sion Co v Kincaid, an action was brought by a purchaser 
of hogs to recover for the seller's misrepresentation that 
the hogs were sound. Evidence that no complaint had been 
made by the packing companies,who had purchased hogs from 
the same shipment,was rejected without even referring to the 
St Louis S W Railway case. In support of its ruling, the 
court said: 
"We do not think it would be permissible merely 
to show that no complaint as to diseases 
among the hogs had been made by the packing 
houses purchasing them. That complaint was 
or was not made would appear to be pure hear-
say. It perhaps would be permissible to 
show by witnesses who knew the facts that other 
hogs contained in the shipment with those in 
controversy were or were not affected with 
disease, but this is altogether another ques-
tion." 
The New York court in Altkrug v William Whitman Co 110 
reached the same conclusion in excluding evidence that goods 
rejected by the plaintiff, who was suing for breach of war-
ranty concerning the quality of woolens sold, had subse-
quently been sold to other customers who had made no com-
plaint. This evidence, said the court, was 
"clearly hearsay evidence as to the opinions of 
other customers upon these goods. This evi-
dence was most mischievous evidence, and might 
well have been a controlling factor in the 
minds of the jury in determining that the 
goods in question were up to sample." 
Similarly, in James K Thompson Co v International Composi-
tions Co, 111 another New York decision, evidence that no 
other ~ustomers had complained of the quality of oil from 
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the same lot was excluded, as: 
"The fact that other customers had made no com-
plaint as to the quality of the goods sold to 
them was pure hearsay evidence upon the ques-
tion of the quality of these goods." 
112 The court in Sullivan v Minneapolis Street Railway Co, a 
Minnesota case, did not identify the hearsay problem at all. 
In deciding whether the plaintiff's statement was true that 
all standing passengers in a street car had been thrown to 
the floor, evidence was admitted that no other claims had 
been made against the defendant company. The court seemed 
to assume that the only question was one of relevance, hold-
ing that the evidence was admissible because "it had a 
direct tendency to show that the statements of a witness on 
one side were more reasonable and therefore more credible 
than the statements of a witness on the other side." The 
court did add the warning, however, that such evidence must 
be received with caution. 
113 
In ~ v Oregon Short Line R R, the plaintiff sued for 
compensation in respect of injuries to his knee sustained 
in an accident. The defendant alleged that the injury had 
been sustained in a previous accident, and, to rebut evi-
dence to that effect, the plaintiff's wife gave evidence 
that the plaintiff had made no complaint of any injury to 
his knee pursuant to the prior accident. This evidence was 
admitted on the following grounds: 
"It seems to be well recognized that declara-
tions of present pain and suffering are ad-
missible as original evidence in all inqui-
ries, where pain and suffering constitute the 
question involved. " 114 
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This reasoning, says Falkner, seems to be sound, "because if 
a statement of presently existing pain, which by hypothesis, 
is assertive, is able to qualify against the hearsay rule, 
then conduct (i e failure to complain) which presumably is 
non-assertive and thus somewhat more trustworthy, ought like-
115 
wise to be admitted." It is respectfully submitted, 
however, that Falkner's comments on this case may be ques-
tioned on two grounds: Firstly, the learned author states 
that the court in Fogg's case was of the view that "even 
though the failure to complain be treated as hearsay, still 
evidence thereof will come in under the exception for de-
clarations of a presently existing mental or physical condi-
118 
tion"; this conclusion is not borne out by the court's 
finding that the evidence should be "admissible as original 
evidence", i e as non-hearsay evidence. Secondly, it is 
submitted that it may be debated whether a failure to com-
plain of an injury is necessarily more trustworthy than a 
positive assertion of pain; one may have cogent reasons for 
not divulging information to one's wife about injuries sus-
tained, such as a desire to avoid causing her anxiety. 
One of the most interesting decisions, and indeed one of the 
few cases to have considered the hearsay dangers at any 
117 length,is that of Silver v New York Central Railway Co. 
The plaintiff, who was suffering from a circulatory ailment, 
had suffered ill effects after the temperature in one of 
defendant's railway cars in which she was travelling had 
dropped, owing to a four-hour wait in a railway yard for 
connection with another train. She accordingly brought an 
action against the railway company, and one of the questions 
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which arose was whether the porter in the plaintiff's car 
should be permitted to testify that none of the other eleven 
passengers in the car had complained to him of the tempera-
ture. 
(i) 
The court considered first the following cases: 
118 
Menard v Cashman, a delictual action arising out 
of a fall on a defective stairway in a business block, where 
the court excluded evidence of a tenant that none of her cus-
tomers had ever complained of any such defects. This evi-
dence, said the court, had the characteristics of hearsay. 
(ii) 119 Landfield v Albiani Lunch Co, where the plaintiff 
had alleged that he had fallen ill after eating beans pur-
chased at the defendant's restaurant. Evidence was admitted 
that no other complaints as to the beans had been made, the 
court adding the proviso that there was "evidence of circum-
stances indicating that others similarly situated ate and had 
120 
opportunity for complaining." 
After considering these cases, Wilkins J concluded as follows: 
"It has often been said that where collateral 
issues may be opened, much must rest in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge ••• In the case at 
bar, should the circumstances of the plaintiff 
and of the other passengers as to exposure to 
the cold be shown to be substantially the same, 
the negative evidence that none of the others 
spoke of it to the porter might properly be ad-
mitted. The evidence would not be equivocal, 
and would then be offered on the basis of a 
common condition which all in the car en-
countered. The porter's duties should be 
shown to include the receipt of that sort of 
complaints from those passengers. It should 
appear that he was present and available to be 
spoken to, and that it was not likely that com-
plaints were made by those passengers to other 
employees of the railroad or the sleeping car 
company. This would not seem to be a situa-
tion where one might prefer to remain silent 
rather than to make any statement. Indeed, if 
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the car was too cold, ordinary prudence might 
seem to require that one speak out. There would 
be no ambiguity of inference. There would be at 
least as strong a case for admissibility as in 
the food cases, and a far stronger one than those 
relating to the sale of allegedly defective goods 
in which little may be known of the terms of sale 
to the non-complaininq buyers. Unlike the un-
known users of a stairway in a business block, 
the uniform result of silence in the cases of a 
large number of passengers, here apparently 
eleven, would not be inconclusive." 12 1 
The interesting aspect of this decision is that the court ana-
lysed the evidence in question and assessed its reliability. 
In so doing, an attempt was made to lay down conditions for 
admissibility which would eliminate at least one of the hear-
say dangers, viz ambiguity of inference. The other hearsay 
dangers would also seem to be greatly reduced in this instance, 
for, as Weinstein 122 remarks, "[i]t was highly unlikely that 
all the other passengers were Eskimos or stockholders of the 
company or masochists". 123 And, as Maguire observes, the 
danger concerning defective memory does not arise, as "the in-
dicative behaviour exactly synchronized with sensation". As 
has been stated before, this fact, although it may not be an 
argument for labelling the evidence non-hearsay, is a powerful 
consideration on the issue of admissibility, and reinforces 
Weinberg's argument that labels are mere conceptual tools and 
should not be used exclusively to answer the question of ad-
12• 
missibility. 
One of the most unequivocal judicial statements that evidence 
of this nature is non-hearsay is to be found in Cain v 
Georg~ 125 where, on the issue of whether a gas heater in a 
motel room was defective, absence of complaints from other 
I 
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occupiers of the room was admitted. The reasons of the court 
appear from the following passage: 
"This testimony was relevant on the issue ••• 
that carbon monoxide came from the smoldering 
chair and clothing and not from the gas heater 
••• Such testimony merely related the know-
ledge of the motel owner as to whether anyone 
was ever harmed by the heater. It was not 
hearsay as it derived its value solely from the 
credit to be given to the witnesses themselves 
and it was not dependant upon the veracity or 
competency of other persons ••• We think it was 
admissible to show how the heater had acted in 
the past. " 1 2 6 
Although it could validly be argued that the hearsay dangers 
in this case were reduced, it is, with respect, difficult to 
see how the evidence could have any testimonial value unless 
the competency and veracity of the other occupiers is relied 
upon. What if the other occupiers had not used the heater 
since the defect manifested itself; what if they had noticed 
the defect, but forgotten to report it, or simply had not 
t;ared? It has often been said, moreover, that non-asser-
tive conduct leads to greater ambiguity of inference than 
assertive conduct. Is this not at least equally true, if 
not more so, of non-assertive non-conduct or silence? The 
possible reasons for a person not speaking or taking action 
may be many, and to draw one inference from the realm of 
possibility is a hazardous undertaking and one fraught with 
risk. This fact is well illustrated by the way South 
African courts have treated the question of admissions: ad-
missions are admissible by way of exception to the rule agrlnst 
127 hearsay, and may consist of any statement or conduct 
which is damaging to a party's case. However, in the case 
of non-conduct or silence, the courts exercise more care, as 
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"(s]ilence might in certain circumstances indicate conscious-
ness of guilt, but it could also mean that the party con-
cerned did not think the imputation worth answering, or that 
he considered it tactically advisable to say nothing and re-
128 
serve his defence." If the courts exercise caution in 
cases of admissions, where silence or non-conduct is detri-
mental to a party's interests, how much more necessary is it 
to be cautious in cases where silence is not damaging, or 
where the party's inaction was of no importance to him at all 
in the conducting of his affairs? 
Group II: These cases concern "the admissibility of evi-
dence of the failure of one alleged to have made an agreement, 
executed an instrument or to have been served with process, to 
mention the disputed act or event to his family or associates, 
128 
on an issue as to the occurrence of that act or event." 
Examples of cases which fall into this category are: 
(i) 130 Lake Drainage Commissioners v Spencer: The issue 
before the court was whether the defendants' mother had been 
served with a summons, and the trial court allowed the defen-
dants to testify "that they never heard their mother say any-
thing to anybody about the summons having been served upon 
her". The North Carolina court, however, held this to be 
error, saying: 
"In the first place, if the witnesses had testi-
fied affirmatively that Mrs Spencer had said 
that the summons had not been served upon her, 
it would have been incompetent as hearsay. It 
is all the more incompetent in this negative 
form that they-had heard her say nothing abou~ 
it, which proves nothing, and if it proved any-
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thing, would tend to show that she had been 
served." 131 
(ii) Sloan v Sloan, 132 where evidence that a witness heard 
no remarks by the deceased at a dinner party that the deceased 
and the plaintiff were married was held admissible on the 
issue of marriage. The hearsay problem was not raised, the 
court deciding the issue as follows: 
(iii) 
"The statement is negative in character, but that 
goes only to its probative force. We see no 
reason why the witness' failure to hear a remark 
inquired about may not be testified to when the 
circumstances are such as to properly lead to 
the inference that the remark would have been 
heard had it actually been made, in opposition 
to affirmative statements that such a remark or 
declaration was made." 133 
134 In People v Layman, where the issue was whether 
the defendant had been involved in an accident, which he 
alleged took place while he was pushing his automobile off 
the railway tracks, evidence was admitted by the California 
court that no report of any accident had been received by the 
train dispatchers. The defendant's objection that such evi-
dence was hearsay was met with the following reply: 
"Appellant complains that it was error, in vio-
lation of the hearsay rule, to permit the train 
dispatchers to testify that they had received 
no report of an accident. It was not hearsay, 
but direct proof, of course, of a fact; the 
fact being that no report had been turned in. 
This fact was material because of the presump-
tion that the ordinary course of business had 
been followed ••• that is, that if there had 
been an accident it would have been reported to 
the dispatchers." 135 
Falkner expresses doubt as to the correctness of this deci-
sion, and finds it difficult to see how the statutory pre-
' sumption "which merely goes to the extent of recognizing-that 
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in the ordinary course of business an accident will be re-
13& ported, disposes of the hearsay question." 
137 (iv) The issue in Sherling v Continental Trust Co was 
whether the testator, T, had concluded an oral agreement 
with the plaintiffs, in terms of which he would give them 
half of all his property on his death. A witness for the 
defendant was permitted by the trial court to give evidence 
that the testator had never said anything to her about such 
an agreement. The Georgia court held this to be error, say-
ing that." [i] f he had denied to the witness making such a 
contract it would have been objectionable as hearsay testi-
mony." Similarly, the evidence tendered was "in the 
nature of hearsay" and irrelevant. 
(v) On facts of a similar nature, the Texas court in 
138 Latham v Houston Land & Trust Co held to be admissible 
evidence that a testator had never mentioned the creation or 
existence of a trust to his wife or attorney: 
(vi) 
"Certainly this testimony is cogent and mater-
ial. It is not hearsay testimony. It is a 
statement of fact and very cogent and material 
and so far as appellants are concerned, damn-
ing, in that this trust fund was never men-
tioned by themselves in their close family 
conversations • • • " 138 
140 Again, in Segars v City of Cornelia, the issue 
arose as to whether a person's failure to mention the exe-
cution of an easement agreement could be used to show that 
such agreement had not been concluded. The Georgia court 
upheld 'the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence, 
stating: 
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"Even if Mrs Segars had then denied giving the 
easement, such denial would not be admissible 
because it would be hearsay, and might also be 
a self-serving declaration." 141 
Having thus categorized the "silence" cases into these two 
groups, Falkner conducts an analysis of the hearsay dangers 
inherent in each. His comments and observations may be sum-
marized as follows: 
(1) He first compares the respective testimonial value of 
non-assertive conduct (i e positive implied assertions) and 
non-assertive non-conduct (i e negative implied assertions, 
or silence): Falknor, following the views expressed by Me 
142 Cormick, is of the view that implied assertions generally 
should only be admitted if there is a preliminary finding 
that "the action so vouched the belief as to give reasonable 
143 
assurance of trustworthiness." This requirement, says 
Falkner, is most commonly satisfied if it is shown that the 
conduct was important or significant to the actor in his 
affairs. If positive and negative conduct are compared, it 
is clear, he adds, that this avouchment is far stronger in 
respect of the former than the latter; the fact that a cus-
tomer used a particular product in a particular way that was 
important to him is of far more probative value than the 
fact that he failed to lodge a complaint as to its quality. 
Some other safeguard must therefore be found to guarantee 
the trustworthiness of non-assertive non-conduct. 
(2) -He then compares the two groups of cases, and points 
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out that although both groups involve the same chain of infer-
ences (viz from the failure to speak, to belief, to the fact 
to which the belief points), there are nevertheless important 
differences between them as regards their trustworthiness: 
(i) The danger of the assertive intent (i e that the con-
duct was intended to be assertive) is weaker in the first 
group than the second, as a result of the detrimental quality 
of the non-conduct in the first group. The fact that a cus-
tomer failed to complain about the quality of goods purchased, 
or that a passenger failed to mention that he had sustained 
injuries, is of a disserving nature; on the other hand, the 
failure to mention that one had been served with a summons or 
had made an agreement does not possess this quality. In the 
latter instance, the failure to speak might quite possibly be 
intended to be assertive, especially if a controversy has al-
ready begun. 
(ii) Similarly, flowing from the same point concerning the 
detrimental nature of the inaction, the first group of cases 
is more trustworthy in respect of the dangers relating to de-
fective memory and perception. 
Accordingly, Falknor concludes, the argument for admissibil-
ity is stronger in respect of the first group of cases than 
the second. For, he adds, "(nJo more than unimportant or 
trivial affirmative conduct, does mere silence, when not 
palpably detrimental or disserving to the silent individual, 
appear to represent sufficient avouchment of the actor's 
apparent belief to warrant more favourable treatment than 
144 
that given the ordinary hearsay assertion." The 
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learned author's full argument concerning the status of im-
plied assertions generally, and silence particularly, will 
145 be discussed at a later stage. It suffices at this point 
merely to take note of his view that the "silence" cases 
raise the same problems as the other instances of positive 
148 implied assertions, encounter the same hearsay dangers, 
and pose the same questions concerning trustworthiness and 
admissibility. 
F. The Identity Cases 
147 
There remains a series of cases which Weinberg calls 
"identity" cases which do not fall into the categories al-
ready discussed. 148 In R v Gibson, the accused was 
charged with assaulting the complainant in the following 
circumstances: After a quarrel with the son of the local 
prosecutor at a public house, the accused walked towards his 
home along a street in which the prosecutor's house was sit-
uated. Meanwhile the prosecutor had also left the public 
house and was on his way home. On arriving at the entrance 
to his house, the prosecutor was struck on the head by a 
stone and severely injured. The accused was seen to enter 
his house immediately after the stone had been thrown, and, 
shortly before the stone had been thrown, he was seen to 
have come up behind the prosecutor and to have passed on the 
opposite side of the street. In his evidence, the prosecu-
tor also said, "Immediately after I was struck by the said 
stone, a lady going past, pointing to the prisoner's door, 
said, 'The person who threw the stone went in there'." 
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The trial court admitted this evidence as tending to show 
identification, but on appeal the evidence was held to be 
patently inadmissible. 
148 In Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law, the following sub-
mission appears in respect of Gibson's case: 
"If, however, the woman had been heard to say, 
as a man approached her, 'Halle Mr Gibson, 
where are you going' it would clearly have 
been permissible for the witness to have re-
peated this remark, just as he could have de-
posed that he heard the woman scream, or 
shout 'shame' or saw her run away or the 
like." ) 
This passage meets with the following criticism by Cross: 
"I have no quarrel with the argument so far as 
the scream, the cry of shame and the flight 
are concerned, although I would like to know 
what fact is sought to be proved by them be-
fore finally pronouncing on their admissibil-
ity; but I think that the 'Halle Mr Gibson' 
must be treated as an infringement of the 
-hearsay rule if tendered on the issue whether 
Mr Gibson was present. 'Halle Mr Gibson' 
means 'I recognize you Mr Gibson'. There-
mark is intended to be assertive to the same 
extent as, though less obviously than, 'The 
man who threw the stone went in there•.n150 
It is submitted that the exclusion of the evidence in Gib-
son's case was clearly correct. The statement was obviously 
intended to be assertive as to the identity of the stone-
thrower and must be considered to be hearsay no matter which 
definition is employed. The case is nevertheless of inter-
est in respect of the ensuing comments concerning the state-
ment "Hallo Mr Gibson". Kenny's editor regards such state-
ment as non-hearsay non-assertive conduct, much like a 
scream or flight. Cross on the other hand (correctly, it 
is submitted) considers the statement to be hearsay. How-
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ever, the learned author concludes that the statement should 
be regarded as the functional equivalent of the express 
assertion "I recognize you Mr Gibson." With respect, it 
seems as if this argument is erroneous. The declarant did 
not say expressly "I recognize you Mr Gibson", nor did he 
necessarily intend to make such an assertion. The only way 
such identification can be ascribed to the declarant is by 
implication. He did not intend to identify Mr Gibson, but 
merely to greet him, just as the writers in Wright's case 
did not intend to vouch for Marsden's sanity, but merely to 
communicate with him. Any objections, therefore, which 
Cross has to the reception of the statement "Halle Mr Gibson" 
must therefore, it is submitted, add fuel to the argument 
that implied assertions be regarded as hearsay. 
The leading case on the topic of implied assertions of iden-
151 
tity is that of Teper v R. On a charge of arson of his 
shop, T raised the defence of an alibi. The only evidence 
to contradict this was that of a policeman who testified that 
on approaching the shop about twenty-five minutes after the 
fire began, he overheard a woman in the crowd shout out to 
the driver of a passing car (who bore a resemblance toT), 
"Your place burning and you going away from the fire." This 
evidence was admitted by the trial court, but the Privy Coun-
cil held that it had been wrongly received as it infringed 
the rule against hearsay. 152 [J As Cross points out, " t he 
woman did not intend to tell anyone that Teper was present, 
but the Crown relied on her statement as equivalent to the 
assertion of that fact." This quality of non-assertive-
ness, although reducing considerably the dangers concerning 
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sincerity, leaves intact the dangers relating to the accuracy 
153 
of the woman's powers of perception, which, as ~Jeinberg 
suggests, is surely a matter for cross-examination. 
Conclusion: The judicial melange that has followed upon 
154 
the decision in Wright v Doe d Tatham has done little to 
resolve the conceptual problems surrounding the hearsay rule. 
15 5 Finrnan puts the matter well: after considering Baron 
Parke's example of the sea captain who, after examining his 
h . b k 'th h' 'f and ch~ldren, 156 s ~p ern ar s on a voyage w~ . ~s w~ e • he 
looks at the subsequent case authority and concludes as fol-
lows: 
"The judicial opinions contain little critical 
analysis and less indication of the factors 
motivating decision.... As a result those 
faced with the implied assertion problem find 
themselves, like our hypothetical sea captain, 
adrift in an unsettled sea." 157 
Page 271. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 
Mark Weinberg "Implied Assertions and the Scope of the Hearsay 
Rule" (1973) 9 Helbourne Univfiuity LR 268 at 273. 
2 Ibid. 
3 See pp 165 to 190 ante. 
4 2 So. 764 (1887). 
5 At 765. 
6 223 P. 65 (1924). 
7 Ibid. 
8 158 N.W. 570 (1916). 
9 See also, for instance, Goodlet v State 33 So.892 (1903); Kemp 
v State 7 So,413 (1890); Lindsey v State 93 So.331 (1922); and 
State v Piernot 149 N.W. 446 (1914). 
10 (1956) 94 CLR 470. 
11 Rupert Cross "The Periphery of Hearsay" (1969) 7 Melbourne Uni-
versity LR 1 at 13. 
12 Id at 13-14. 
13 Supra note 10 at 487-8. 
14 Judson F Falknor "Silence as Hearsay" (1940) 89 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 192 at 195. 
15 Edmund M Morgan "The Hearsay Rule" (1937) 12 Washington LR 1 at 
7-8. 
16 Id at 8. 
17 Falknor, op cit note 14, at 195. 
18 Ibid. 
19 John M Maguire "The Hearsay System: Around and Through the 
Thicket" (1961) 14 Vanderbilt LR 741 at 760. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. Maguire quotes from Wigmore Evidence I 3ed (1940) paras 
32 and 38. 
22 See the cases cited by Maguire, op cit note 19, at 760 note 59. 
23 Id at 762. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Id at 763. 
26 Id af 766. 
27 Id at 767. 
28 Ibid. 
29 42 NY (Sup) 896 (1896). 
30 At 897. 
31 117 P. 673 (1911). 
32 At 676. 
33 133 N. E. 201 ( 1921) • 
Page 272. 
34 Edmund M Morgan "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
Hearsay Concept" (1948) 62 Harvard LR 177. 
35 Id at 215. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Id at 191. 
38 These dangers are discussed at pp 223-4 ante. 
39 Falkner, op cit note 14. 
40 Id at 207. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ted Finman "Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence" (1962) 14 Stanford LR 682. 
43 258 P. 2d 1016 (1953); see also Judson F Falknor in 1953 
Annual Survey of American Law at 770-1. 
44 258 P.2d 1016 (1953) at 1017. 
45 Finman, op cit note 42, at 696. 
46 Id at 697. 
47 Ibid. 
48 (1837) 7 Ad & El 313; 112 ER 488. 
49 See Chapter V. 
50 37 A. 384 (1897). 
51 133 P. 307 (1913). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Maguire, op cit note 19, at 757. 
54 Falknor, op cit note 14, at 206. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Charles T Me Cormick "The Borderland of Hearsay" (1930) 39 
Yale LJ 489 at 504. 
57 Falknor at 206. 
58 Finman, op cit note 42, at 692-3. 
59 Id at 693. 
Page 273. 
60 Sir Rupert Cross Evidence Sed (1979) 472; see the cases cited by 
the learned author in note 15. 
61 (1881) 6 App Cas 489. 
62 At 502. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 The court was sitting as a Scottish court. 
66 See Russell v Russell (192~ AC 687. 
67 At 505. 
68 (1885) 11 App Cas 1. 
69 Per Willmer J in B v Attorney General 0 965) P. 278; [t 965] 1 
All ER 62 at 69. 
70 Supra note 68, at 10. 
71 At 11 . 
72 At 9-10. 
73 (1889) 42 Ch.D. 282. 
74 At 291. 
75 (1914] A.C. 733. 
76 At 734. 
77 Ibid. 
78 At 740. 
79 At 741. 
80 Ibid. 
81 At 748. 
82 At 751. 
83 At 752. 
84 Edmund M Morgan "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hear-
say Concept" (1948) 62 Harvard LR 177 at 210. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Id at 211. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Supra note 75 at 752. 
90 Morga~, op cit note 84, at 211 • 
Page 274. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Id at 212. 
93 Maguire, op cit note 19, at 777. 
94 Per Lord Moulton at 752; quoted with approval in the Australian 
case of Nash v Commissioner for Railways [1963] S.R. (NSW) 357 
at 360. 
95 (1952] Ch 454; D 952) 1 All ER 1228. 
96 V952] Ch 454 at 478; D952] 1 AllER 1228 at 1242. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Stanley A Schiff Evidence in the Litigation Process I (1978) 
275. 
101 (1933) 290 u.s. 96. 
102 At 104. 
103 Judson F Falknor "Silence as Hearsay" (1940) 89 University of 
Pennsylvania LR 192. 
104 Id at 209. 
105 Ibid. 
106 (1900) 82 L.T. 347. 
107 Per Farwell J at 349. 
108 95 s.w. 656 (1906). 
109 168 s.w. 977 (1914). 
110 173 N.Y. Supp. 669 (1919). 
111 181 N.Y. Supp. 637 (1920). 
112 200 N.W. 922 (1924). 
113 1 P. 2d 954 (1931). 
1 14 At 95 7. 
115 Falknor, op cit note 103, at 212. 
116 Id at 211-2. 
117 105 N.E. 2d 923 (1952). 
118 55 A.2d 156 (1947) 
119 168 N.E. 160 
120 At 160. 
121 105 N.E.2d 923 (1952) at 926-7. 
122 Jack B Weinstein "Probative Force of Hearsay" (1961) 46 Iowa 
LR 331 at 343. 
123 Maguire, op cit note 19, at 765. 
124 Weinberg, op cit note 1, at 281. 
125 411 F. 2d 572 (1969). 
126 At 573. 
Page 275. 
127 L H Hoffmann and D T Zeffertt South African Law of Evidence 3ed 
(1981) 152. See, for instance, Slatterie v Pooley (1840) 
M & W 664, 151 ER 579. 
128 Hoffmann and Zeffertt, op cit note 127, at 154-5. 
129 Falkner, op cit note 103, at 209. 
130 93 S.E. 435 (1917). See also Hinson v Morgan 36 S.E. 2d 266 
(1945), a later North Carolina case which adopted the same 
approach. This latter case is discussed by Wallace C Murchin-
son in a note entitled "Negative Testimony - Silence as Hearsay" 
(1946) 24 North Carolina LR 274. 
131 At 435. 
132 32 s.w. 2d 513 (1930). 
133 At 518. 
134 4 P. 2d 244 (1931). 
135 At 245-6. 
136 Falkner, op cit note 103, at 213. 
137 165 S.E. 560 (1932). 
138 62 s.w. 2d 519 (1933). 
139 At 522. 
140 4 S.E. 2d 60 (1939). 
141 Ibid. 
142 Charles T Me Cormick "The Borderland of Hearsay" (1930) 39 
Yale LJ 489. 
143 Id at 504. 
144 Falkner, op cit note 103, at 216. 
145 See pp 333-8 post. 
146 See Morgan "Hearsay Dangers ••. ", op cit note 84, at 213, where 
the learned writer identifies the dangers inherent in this type 
of evidence. 
147 Weinberg, op cit note 1, at 284. 
148 (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 537. 
149 19ed (1966) 500. 
Page 276. 
150 Rupert Cross "The Periphery of Hearsay" (1969) 7 Melbourne Univer-
sity LR 1 at 12. 
151 (.1952] AC 480. 
152 Rupert Cross "The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay" (1956) LQR 
91 at 94. 
153 Weinberg, op cit at note 1, at 284. 
154 1837 7 Ad & El 313, 112 ER 488. 
155 Finman, op cit note 42. 
156 1837 7 Ad & El 313 at 388. 
157 Finman, op cit note 42, at 683. 
Page 277. 
Chapter VII 
SOUTH AFRICAN CASES ON IMPLIED ASSERTIONS 
The only South African case where the question of implied 
assertions has been considered at any length is ~ v Van Nie-
1 
kerk. The facts of this case were as follows: The 
appellant had been convicted of theft by the court a quo on 
the ground that he, in his capacity as magistrate, had dis-
posed of a gun belonging to X. The gun had been taken away 
from X by the police and handed to the appellant for safe-
keeping. A month or two later, he had sold the gun to a fire-
arms dealer. The defence raised by the appellant was that 
X, who was a good friend of his, had authorized him to sell 
it, and later told him to keep the proceeds. X subse-
quently died, but, in order to rebut this defence, the 
prosecution tendered two letters written by X to his brother, 
one a month before and the other two months after the sale of 
the gun by the appellant. The material portions of these 
letters read as follows: 
"Hallo James, 
Man en moenie vergeet om my haelgeweertjie by 
die Polisie stasie te gaan haal nie hoor ••• 
2 
Mike." 
"Hullo Jamsie, . . . . . 
James hoor hier, daardie haelgeweertjie wat by 
die magistraat is, saam met n box patrone, het 
ek vir hom ges~ moet hy aan jou oorhandig. Nou 
ja ou broer kry dit asseblief by hom en hou dit 
by jou totdat ek eendag weer terug kom. Ek wil 
nie my enkele ou besittings wat ek nog oor het, 
wyd en suid versprei sien nie, .•••• 
Van Mike." 3 
No objection was raised to the admission of these letters at 
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the trial, and they were admitted. On appeal, however, it 
was contended that they were of the nature of hearsay and 
should have been excluded. The court considered the state-
ments of the hearsay rule set out in Phipson 4 and in R v 
Miller, 5 and concluded as follows: 
"In the present case the enquiry was whether or 
not the accused had authority to sell the gun 
and the two letters were tendered to prove that 
he did not. Had the letters contained a 
direct assertion that the accused had no such 
authority there could have been no doubt that 
they would have been inadmissible, but they do 
not do so. In the first letter the deceased 
merely requests his brother to fetch his gun at 
the police station, and the second letter con-
tains a request to collect it from the accused 
and also a statement that he, the deceased, had 
told the accused to hand it over to him. In 
other words, it is only by way of implication 
that the deceased says that he did not give the 
accused authority to sell the gun. Does this 
make any difference to the admissibility of the 
statements? In principle I can see no reason 
why it should, save possibly for the fact that 
a person who wishes to mislead by making a wil-
fully false statement about a particular matter 
is less likely to do so in an indirect way than 
in a direct way. We are dealing here with the 
type of statement classified by Cross in his 
book on Evidence at p. 353 as: 
'Statements which were not primarily inten-
ded by their maker to be assertive of the 
fact they are tendered to prove.' 
Such statements are, in his opinion, inadmis-
sible because they offend against the hearsay 
rule just as much as those which are intended 
by the maker to be assertive of the fact they 
are tendered to prove. The case of Teper v. 
R., 1952 A.C. 480, is, I think, authority for 
this view. n • 
The court then considered the views of Hoffmann 7 in this 
regard, observing that while the learned author appeared to 
take the same view concerning non-assertive statements, he 
seemed to be more doubtful as regards non-assertive conduct, 
a topic on which the court declined to comment. The fol-
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lowing passage was however quoted with approval: 
"If someone goes to his attorney and says 'Please 
issue a summons against X claiming RSOO', he is 
not expressly stating any facts. The statement 
is an item of conduct from which one can draw 
the inference that he thinks that X owes him 
RSOO. If his state of mind on this subject is 
a fact in issue, for example, if the question is 
whether he knew he was insolvent, his statement 
would be admissible to prove that he thought he 
was entitled to the money. But there is no 
doubt that the statement could not be used to 
prove that the RSOO was actually owing. Phip-
son would say that the evidence would be ex-
cluded because it is irrelevant, but there is 
authority for the view that its use for this 
purpose would infringe the rule against hear-
say." e 
It was further contended for the prosecution that the letters 
should be received as original evidence to show the deceased's 
state of mind, i e his belief that he had not authorized the 
accused to sell the gun, and that this state of mind should be 
used as inferential proof that no authority had in fact been 
given. This argument was, however, rejected, the court in-
8 
voking the views of Wigmore that to permit the conduct or 
utterances of a person to be used as a second step of infer-
ence to some other fact, which forms the ultimate object of 
proof, would amount to an evasion of the hearsay rule. As 
regards those cases where this process of double inference has 
10 
been permitted by the courts, it was held that these were 
"specially recognised exceptions of long standing". These 
exceptions related to "marriage as evidenced by conduct or 
habit, legitimacy as evidenced by parents' conduct, identity 
as evidenced by belief of family history, and testamentary 
execution as evidenced by the testator's belief and declara-
11 
tions." 
Academic response to Van Niekerk's case has been mixed: 
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1 2 Schmidt expresses unequivocal opposition and dissatisfac-
tion with the decision, giving the following reasons for his 
opinion: 
(i) Implied assertions, he argues, do not contain the same 
degree of potential danger as express assertions. Referring 
13 to Cross, he submits that just as people do not say 
'Hello X' in order to deceive passers-by into thinking that X 
is there, in the same way a person does not write to his 
brother asking him to collect his gun so as to deceive people 
into thinking that he has not given it to another. 
(ii) Sufficient safeguards are present in the form of the 
opinion rule and the general requirement of relevance. 14 
(iii) The hearsay rule, in principle, should be restricted 
as far as possible, as it limits the sources of information 
open to the court; in those areas where uncertainty prevails 
concerning the scope of the rule, the courts should incline 
towards admissibility. 
(iv) An extension of the exclusionary rule to cover im-
plied assertions would create greater inconsistencies than a 
curtailing of its scope, resulting in the exclusion of evi-
dence such as that considered in the categories discussed in 
the preceding chapter ( e g flight cases, treatment cases etc). 
(v) There are very few precedents for extending the hear-
say ban in this manner, and those cases which do support it 
are unconvincing and may be explained on the grounds of rele-
vance and the opinion rule. Furthermore, the paucity of case 
law on this subject would seem to indicate that such evidence 
is received without objection. In addition, the case of S v 
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15 Qolo, he argues, must be seen as Appellate Division auth-
ority against so extending the hearsay rule. He does con-
cede, however, that Qolo's case is not strong authority for 
this contention, as the court did not expressly apply its 
mind to the question of implied assertions. 
(vi) The letters in Van Niekerk's case should have been 
received on the basis that they contained an order to the 
deceased's brother, and this instruction, the learned author 
16 
argues, was a relevant fact. 
(vii) Schmidt concludes, therefore, that the exclusion of 
. 
implied assertions as hearsay is not part of South African 
law. In support of this contention, he cites several cases 
in which, he submits, evidence of a similar nature has been 
admitted on the basis that it constituted relevant circum-
stantial evidence. These decisions include R v Alexander 11 
18 19 20 Lenssen v R , R v Steyn , ~ v Boardman , and Van der 
21 Harst v Viljoen On the strength of cases suet as these, 
he adds, implied assertions in South Africa will be received 
or rejected depending on their relevance. 
It is respectfully submitted that the following criticism may 
be levelled at Prof. Schmidt's argument, taking each of his 
seven points in turn: 
Ad (i) This observation is not always true. As has been 
pointed out, the danger of insincerity may sometimes be re-
duced in the case of an implied assertion, but this is not 
necessarily so. Furthermore, the dangers relating to mem-
cry and perception remain normally unaffected, while the 
" possibility of ambiguity or misinterpretation may often be 
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greater than in the case of express assertions. Implied 
assertions may also raise additional dangers that are not in 
question when considering express assertions. 
Ad (ii) The opinion rule alone is not sufficient for deter-
mining the admissibility of such evidence, as the opinion 
rule and the hearsay rule operate on different levels. The 
opinion rule is related to the principle of relevance (at 
least according to Wigmore 22 and the South African Appellate 
Division in R v 23 that it serves to exclude Vilbro ) in super-
erogatory opinion that is unable to assist the court. The 
hearsay rule, on the other hand, is related to the principle 
of reliability. An implied assertion concerning the opinion 
of an absent actor or declarant may, therefore, in the ab-
stract, be sufficiently relevant to assist the court, but, 
nevertheless, be insufficiently reliable as regards its latent 
hearsay dangers to warrant admissibility. A distinction of 
this kind, however, may be rather artificial, and it is only 
when the two exclusionary rules are working in harness that a 
satisfactory answer may be found to the question of admissi-
bility. 
What about the learned author's contention that the problem of 
implied assertions may be adequately handled by recourse to 
the normal criteria of relevance? The answer to this ques-
tion depends on the meaning to be attributed to the word 
'relevance'. If, by 'relevance', Prof. Schmidt means logical 
relevance or probative force of the evidence, i e its natural 
and ordinary sense, then the contention must be rejected, as 
such a criterion takes no account of the hearsay dangers or 
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prejudice caused to the adversary by the absence of the oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the declarant or to avail himself of 
the other standard procedural safeguards. If, however, he 
intends the word to encompass 'legal relevance', a term which 
24 
Hoffmann and Zeffertt consider to be a function of both pro-
bative force and the extent to which the evidence is, for one 
reason or another, undesirable, then the point made by Prof. 
Schmidt is arguable. In the latter case, it could be argued, 
the concept of 'legal relevance' is sufficiently wide to in-
elude an enquiry into the hearsay dangers and the prejudice 
caused to the adversary as part of the investigation into 
whether the disadvantages of receiving the evidence exceed its 
probative value. This approach, however, although theoreti-
cally valid, would have the undesirable effect of confusing 
the two exclusionary rules. What merit is there in shifting 
this enquiry out of the province of the hearsay rule, where it 
really belongs, into the field of relevance, where it fits 
somewhat artifically, when the basic enquiry under either rule 
remains essentially the same? 
Ad (iii) and (iv) It is readily conceded that on the 
present state of the law these suggestions have some merit in 
that they would in some cases curb the excesses of the over-
rigid hearsay rule. These arguments would, however, fall 
away if our law were to recognize that labelling an item of 
evidence as hearsay does not solve the question of admissibil-
ity, but merely states it. If, moreover, our hearsay law 
is to be reformed - a step which seems inevitable - it would 
be better to reform the law along the uniform lines already 
I 
suggested rather than establishing dual principles of admis-
Page 284. 
sibility for express and implied assertions. 
Ad (v) The paucity of case law on this topic, it is sub-
mitted, reflects nothing more than a failure on the part of 
our courts to identify properly the problem of implied asser-
tions. 
25 Qolo's case (which is discussed at length below) is 
of little assistance, as at no stage did the court even re-
cognize the true nature of the problem, let alone conduct an 
analysis of the hearsay question. Van Niekerk's case, on 
the other hand, represents the only instance where our courts 
have at any length investigated the problem, and to regard 
this decision as "unconvincing" or as explainable on the 
basis of the rules concerning opinion and relevance is, it is 
submitted, unjustifiable. 
Since the publication of the second edition of Schmidt's 
book, moreover, our courts have again considered the question 
of implied assertions, and seem to have regarded it as almost 
trite law that implied assertions do fall within the scope of 
the hearsay rule. This was the decision of the Eastern Cape 
28 
Division in Kroon v J L Clark Cotton Co (Pty) Ltd , where 
the facts were as follows: 
The defendant, a company dealing with the production and pro-
cessing of cotton, had recommended to the plaintiff a product 
called 'Treflan' for the control of certain types of weeds 
when planting cotton. The plaintiff applied this product 
according to the manufacturer's specifications, but found it 
to be ineffective. On complaining to one of the company's 
employees, M, who had originally recommended the product, the 
I 
plaintiff was referred to one B, an employee and technical 
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representative of the manufacturers of 'Treflan'. In an 
action for damages resulting from alleged damage t? the 
plaintiff's crop, B was not called upon to testify. The 
plaintiff himself, however, gave the following evidence: 
After he had lodged· a complaint, · B came .to inspect the . 
crop. He was taken to the cotton fields by the plaintiff 
and his wife, and expressed surprise at the lack of control 
that he saw. He accepted that the weeds should have been 
controlled by 'Treflan•, and did not suggest that the plain-
tiff's weed problem was due to weeds which 'Treflan• was not 
supposed to control. Nor did he claim that the weeds which 
'Treflan' was supposed to control were within normal, accept-
able limits. At no stage did B accuse the plaintiff of the 
incorrect application of the product, and, in an apparent 
attempt to appease the plaintiff, he even offered to apply 
'Treflan' to the plaintiff's lands the following season with-
out charge. 
The admissibility of this evidence was challenged on the 
ground that it amounted to hearsay. The form of the objec-
tion, in the words of Smalberger J, was as follows: 
"The defendant contends that the evidence of the 
statements made by Bennie was tendered as proof 
of the fact that Treflan did not work, and 
therefore hearsay and inadmissible. At the 
very least it was claimed, the statements by 
Bennie amount to an implied assertion that 
Treflan did not work, and that the purpose of 
such evidence was to prove that Bennie's views 
were correct in this regard. Relying, inter 
alia, on Hoffmann and Zeffertt South African Law 
~vidence 3rd ed at 101, it was argued that 
such statements on this basis too were hearsay 
and inadmissible." 27 
In response to this objection, the learned judge held as fol-
lows: 
Page 286. 
"Prima facie the evidence of the plaintiff ••• 
concerning Bennie's statements amounts to hear-
say and should therefore be excluded unless 
there is some other evidential basis on which 
such statements can be admitted in evidence. 
To my mind the basis for such admissibility is 
to be found, having regard to the facts of the 
present matter, in the principle that 
'when a party refers to a third person for 
information or an opinion on a given sub-
ject, the information or opinion so given 
is receivable against the referer as an 
admission'. 
(Phipson on Evidence 12th ed para 745.) This 
appears to be an accepted principle of our 
law (Van Rooyen v Humphrey 1953 (3) SA 392 (A) 
at 397-8: Hoffmann and Zeffertt (supra at 
165); Schmidt Bewysreg at 380). See also in 
this regard Cross on Evidence 5th ed at 524 
and Halsbury's Laws of England 4th ed vol 17 
para 74." 28 
The evidence was, therefore, held to be hearsay but neverthe-
less admissible by way of an exception to the rule, in that 
the words and conduct of B constituted a vicarious admission 
made by a referee which may be proved against the referer. 
What conclusions may be drawn from this decision about the 
status of implied assertions in South African law? The 
court, unfortunately, did not analyse the question at any 
length, but it is submitted nevertheless that the conclusion 
of the learned judge was correct. The significant aspect of 
the decision was that all the evidence of the plaintiff con-
cerning B's statements was labelled hearsay, despite the fact 
that such evidence comprised three distinct components: 
(a) The evidence that B "was surprised at the lack of con-
trol he saw, and accepted the weeds should have been 
controlled by 'Treflan'". Although it is not entirely 
clear from the-judgment exactly how B expressed his 
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surprise and acceptance of this lack of control, it 
would seem that this evidence probably constitutes an 
express assertion, i e B's statements were probably 
tendered to prove the truth of their content, although 
it is possible that his reaction was inferred from his 
general attitude and facial expressions, in which case 
the evidence would constitute an implied assertion. 
(b) The fact that B neither suggested that the plaintiff's 
weed problem was due to weeds which 'Treflan' was not 
supposed to control, nor claimed that the weeds which 
'Treflan' should have controlled were within normal 
limits, nor accused the plaintiff of the incorrect ap-
plication of 'Treflan•. This is a classic example of 
hearsay by silence or non-assertive non-conduct, simi-
28 lar in nature to those discussed in Chapter VI above. 
(c) The offer by B to apply 'Treflan' to the plaintiff's 
lands the following season without charge. This is 
an implied assertion or non-assertive positive conduct, 
as the evidence is not tendered to establish the truth 
of what B asserted, but rather to support an inference 
that B accepted that 'Treflan 1 had not successfully 
controlled the plaintiff's weed problem. 
Despite these differences in form, the court, without ques-
tion, held the evidence in toto to be hearsay. Nor may it be 
alleged that the court did not identify the question of im-
plied assertions, as the learned judge expressly raised the 
question at 206 F, above. The only inference that can be 
drawn, therefore, is that the learned judge considered it to 
be almost self-evident that implied assertions, whether in 
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the form of non-assertive positive or negative conduct, are, 
in our law, within the scope of the hearsay rule. The fact 
that no authority was cited should not be allowed to detract 
from what is, logically, a faultless conclusion. 
Of further interest in Kroon's case is the assessment by the 
learned judge of the weight to be attached to the evidence, 
where it was emphasized that it must be borne in mind that 
B's statements "although against the interests of his company 
and therefore presumably guardedly made, have not been tested 
30 
under cross-examination". This appreciation and evalua-
tion of the hearsay dangers presented by the evidence is con-
sonant with the more flexible approach that characterizes 
much of the American academic writing on implied assertions, 
and, as will be submitted 1ater, forms the cornerstone of the 
broader perspective of hearsay that is required to extricate 
our law from its present untenable position. 
Kroon's case, therefore, represents a strong rebuttal of 
Schmidt's view that implied assertions are not hearsay in 
South African law but are received or rejected according to 
their probative value. It would have been easy, if the 
court had felt constrained by Qolo's case, for the learned 
judge to have distinguished between the express and implied 
assertions in B's conduct, and to have held that the inadmis-
sible verbal conduct in (a) had been substantially repeated 
in admissible non-verbal form in (b) and (c). 
31 32 This distinction was made in S v Qolo, a case which Schmidt 
submits is Appellate Division authority - albeit not strong 
authority - for the proposition that the exclusion of implied 
assertions as hearsay does not form part of our law. The facts 
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of this case were as follows: V, a certain mine detective, 
noticed a man in front of the gate next door to his house. 
He saw that the man was covered in blood, and ran to his aid. 
On seeing that the man was seriously injured, he asked him 
what was the matter, whereupon he pointed with his finger to-
wards a tree about 10 yards away and said "lo tsotsi". In 
the foliage, V saw the accused, and he instructed his son to 
bring the accused to him. His son did this, whereupon the 
injured man slapped the accused in the face. He subsequent-
ly died from stab wounds, and the accused was convicted of 
murder. On appeal, the question arose as to whether the 
evidence of the deceased's utterance and pointing out were 
admissible. 
Williamson JA (with whom Steyn CJ and Wessels JA concurred) 
held that the pointing out, coupled with the remark "lo tsotsi" 
constituted hearsay evidence as regards the identification of 
the accused. He also found that there was no apposite excep-
tion to the rule which would render the evidence admissible. 
He nevertheless found that there was sufficient admissible 
evidence to uphold the conviction, stating: 
"In this case a somewhat unusual factor appeared. 
The inadmissible verbal exclamation, and its 
setting, was in reality thereafter repeated in a 
different form; I refer to the deceased's physi-
cal act of slapping the face of the appellant. 
That act, evidence of which was admissible, 
carried in fact the same evidentiary weight as 
the previous exclamation. In those circumstances 
it is very difficult to see how any possible pre-
judice could have been caused to the appellant in 
his trial by the irregularity. The body of evi-
dence against him, apart from the inadmissible 
hearsay piece of evidence, was then just as strong 
as the body of evidence which included that hear-
say." 3 3 
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The court was prepared, therefore, without question and as if 
no doubt existed as to the correctness of its decision, to 
admit the evidence of the slap, while holding the pointing 
out and accompanying exclamation inadmissible. On what 
basis? Unfortunately the court did not give any reasons for 
this distinction, and seemed, with respect, oblivious of any 
hearsay qualities the former evidence might possess. If it 
were to be argued that the former evidence be received as be-
ing non-assertive conduct, while the latter be rejected as be-
ing assertive conduct and statement, then the following 
counter-arguments could be raised: 
(a.) How can it be determined whether the deceased's conduct 
was intended to be assertive or non-assertive? The 
act of slapping the accused's face may have been moti-
vated by any number of reasons: vengeance, anger, con-
tempt, a desire to convince V of the firmness of his 
conviction that he was indeed his assailant. Is it 
not more realistic to recognize that human conduct is 
sparked off by a number of responses and stimuli, and 
that there may be many reasons for an act or statement, 
some motivated by a desire to assert and some purely 
personal? 
It is submitted that a division of human conduct into 
two categories, viz assertive and non-assertive, apart 
from the difficulties of proof, may in many cases be 
impossible. 
(b.) If, the testimonial dangers inherent in the two types of 
evidence are compared, is there any substantial dif-
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ference? If the deceased was insincere in his point-
ing out of the accused and in naming him as the assail-
ant, would not the same insincere motive have coloured 
his act of slapping? Even if it is assumed that the 
act of slapping was completely non-assertive, and was 
motivated purely by personal reasons (such as anger, 
contempt, frustration) as opposed to a desire to commun-
icate, would not the same dangers relating to the qual-
ity of his memory and perception still render the evi-
dence suspect? If the express assertions must be re-
jected on the ground that the deceased may erroneously 
have believed the accused to have been his assailant, 
must not the implied assertion also be rejected on the 
same ground? Is not the need for and utility of cross-
examination not equally great in such a case? 
In the light of these strong objections, and the failure of 
the court to consider the matter at any length or to cite any 
authority on the question, it may be argued, and even Schmidt 
34 himself has conceded, that Qolo is a rather defective 
base on which to rest the general proposition that implied 
assertions are non-hearsay. On the other hand , the unques-
tioned acceptance by the Appellate Division seems to indicate 
that in South Africa the matter may be regarded as so clear 
35 in our practice as not to merit consideration. If that 
be so, then, it is submitted, South African practice has 
failed to identify the hearsay problem, and, consequently, the 
possible hearsay dangers that sometimes arise out of this un-
questioned acceptance. 
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Ad (vi) Schmidt's sixth contention warrants close exami-
nation, as it brings into question the tenuous distinction 
between implied assertions and original circumstantial evi-
dence. His argument is that the letters in Van Niekerk's 
case should have been received as they contained an order to 
the deceased's brother, which order constituted a relevant 
fact. Is it not arguable, then, that this is relevant cir-
cumstantial evidence of the fact that the deceased had not 
authorized the accused to sell the gun? 36 Prof. D T Zeffertt, 
commenting on the exclusion of implied assertions in Wright v 
Tatham and ~ v Van Niekerk, stated that he found it "almost 
impossible to distinguish those statements that are excluded 
on this basis and those that are admitted as circumstantial 
facts for non-hearsay purposes". 
It is submitted that, as the learned writer intimates, this 
distinction is in many instances difficult to draw, in that 
the courts in practice admit many implied assertions in the 
guise of 'circumstantial evidence'. A case that illustrates 
37 this problem is Levin v Barclays Bank D.C.O. The defen-
dant had signed a deed of suretyship securing the indebtedness 
of A & H trading in partnership under the name of Andave 
Estate. The plaintiff Bank sued him for the amount owing in 
terms of this deed, whereupon the defendant raised the defence 
that a partnership did not exist between A and H as alleged by 
the plaintiff. Evidence was tendered by the manager of the 
plaintiff which showed the following: that an account was 
opened with authority to A and H or both to sign cheques on 
I 
behalf of the partnership; that they operated on that account 
in the name of the partnership; that they submitted state-
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ments of affairs and balance sheets of the partnership; and 
that they arranged for overdraft facilities for the partner-
ship. In the court a quo, judgment was awarded to the 
plaintiff, the court holding that there were sufficient facts 
to support the contention that A and H were trading in part-
nership. On appeal, the defendant argued that the above 
evidence was hearsay and should have been excluded. 
The court held, however, that the evidence had been prop~rly 
admitted and did not infringe the hearsay rule. The reason-
ing of Potgieter JA (in whose judgment Beyers, Botha, 
Williamson and Wessels JJA concurred), may be summarized as 
follows: The evidence of the conduct of A and H was not re-
lied upon as conduct equivalent to an assertion that they 
were trading in partnership; if such were the case, it may 
well be inadmissible. It was merely relied on to establish 
that A and H had opened a partnership account with the Bank, 
that they had operated on the partnership account on behalf 
of the partnership for some years, that financial statements 
reflecting the partnership's activities had been submitted, 
and that overdraft facilities had been arranged for the 
partnership. To establish these facts, the evidence, it 
was held, is clearly non-hearsay and receivable as the best 
evidence of those facts. From these 'independent facts', 
the court held, a proper inference may be drawn by the 
court that the parties were in fact trading in co-partner-
ship. 
This reasoning has, however, been criticized by Jean 
I 
38 Davids as being "open to doubt". She submits that 
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many examples of indirect hearsay can be viewed merely as a 
species of circumstantial evidence thereby evading the rule 
against hearsay. However, she adds, 
"to treat ••. the joint conduct of financial 
affairs in Levin's case as merely an evidential 
fact from which an inference can be drawn, does 
not meet the objection. The hearsay rule must 
surely be regarded as constituting a limitation 
on the admissibility of circumstantial evidence 
0 0 0 
II 39 
The learned writer further considers that it may have been 
argued that the fact that the two persons conducted business 
as partners was the very fact in issue, and the evidence of 
the bank manager was direct evidence of that fact. However, 
she again rejects this argument on the ground that 
"partnership is a contract, express or tacit, and 
the behaviour of the parties only provides the 
material from which the existence or otherwise of 
the agreement can be deduced. Since their direct 
assertion that they had entered into such an 
agreement was clearly hearsay, it would seem to 
follow that their conduct would also be." 4 0 
She concludes therefore that the evidence was hearsay, and 
that the only way it could be admitted was by way of an ex-
ception to the rule (e g statements accompanying and explain-
ing a relevant act). 
It is submitted that these remarks have considerable merit : 
Certainly it would seem that the hearsay rule constitutes a 
limitation on the admissibility of circumstantial evidence, 
just as it does with regard to direct evidence. The clas-
sification of evidence as 'circumstantial' is no logical 
basis for considering it to be non-hearsay. To give an 
example cited by Jean Davids, the placing of X's body in a 
I 
mortuary van by a doctor, if testified to by W, is circum-
stantial evidence of the fact that X was dead at the time, 
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but, being equivalent to an assertion by the doctor to that 
effect, must be considered hearsay. To argue that the 
state of mind of the doctor be used as an independent fact 
serving as inferential proof that X was in fact dead, would 
be to render nugatory the effect of the hearsay rule (see 
41 42 
and S v Van Niekerk supra). It is never-Wigmore 
theless submitted, however, that there is one important 
feature which distinguishes Levin's case from Van Niekerk's 
case and the example cited by Jean Davids, and this lies in 
the fact that the enquiry in Levin's case concerned the ex-
istence of a contract. The question facing the court was 
simply : was there a partnership agreement between A and H? 
In this regard, our law employs an objective approach, 43 
which has been stated by the Appellate Division thus: 
"The law does not concern itself with the working 
of the minds of parties to a contract, but with 
the external manifestation of their minds. Even 
therefore if from a philosophical standpoint the 
minds of the parties do not meet, yet, if by 
their acts their minds seem to have met, the law 
will, where fraud is not alleged, look to their 
acts and assume that their minds did meet and 
that they contracted in accordance with what the 
parties purport to accept as a record of their 
agreement. This is the only practical way in 
which Courts of law can determine the terms of a 
contract." 44 
In Levin's case, therefore, the conduct of A and His rele-
vant to the enquiry irrespective of the working of their 
minds, or, to use Tribe's formulation, the 'trip' from A to 
C on the testimonial triangle may be completed without the 
need of a detour via B, the belief of the absent declarant. 
The evidence is, therefore, it is submitted, non-hearsay, 
and was correctly admitted in Levin's case. 
As regards the relationship between circumstantial evidence 
Page 296. 
and the hearsay rule, therefore, it is submitted that the 
following principle should be applicable: Extra-curial 
statements or conduct from which a fact is inferred, whether 
they were intended by their author to assert that fact or 
not, should not be considered original circumstantial evi-
dence of that fact unless that statement or conduct enjoys a 
sufficient degree of relevance regardless of the actor's! 
declarant's state of mind or belief. 
The solution to the problem of distinguishing between im-
plied hearsay assertions and non-hearsay circumstantial 
evidence, therefore, lies in the recognition of the follow-
ing two facts: 
i. A distinction should be drawn between two types of cir-
cumstantial evidence, viz evidence where the inference 
drawn rests for its validity on the belief or credibility of 
the absent actor/declarant, and evidence where the inference 
may be drawn without regard to these facturs. If, for in-
stance, a witness were to testify that he saw the captain of 
a ship conducting a thorough investigation of his vessel be-
fore embarking on a voyage with his family, then, in order 
to draw the inference that the captain considered the ship 
to be seaworthy, reliance would have to be placed on the 
captain's untested belief to that effect. If, however, a 
witness in a criminal trial for murder were to testify that 
he saw the accused coming out of the victim's house with a 
bloodstained dagger, then the inference that the accused 
stabbed the victim could be drawn without considering the 
accused's belief. The first item of evidence would there-
fore be hearsay circumstantial evidence of the inference 
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drawn, whereas the second item would be non-hearsay circum-
stantial evidence. Put another way, where circumstantial 
evidence of verbal or non-verbal conduct derives its eviden-
tial value from the untested belief of the absent actor or 
declarant, then it is incorrect to speak of a "non-hearsay 
circumstantial use" of that evidence. The problem identi-
fied by Prof. Zeffertt seems to have arisen out of a tendency 
on the part of the courts to regard the term 'circumstantial' 
as antithetical to the term 'hearsay' instead of 'direct'. The 
fact that evidence is circumstantial, as opposed to direct, 
and therefore relies for its evidential value on the drawing 
of an inference, does not in any way render it immune to the 
hearsay ban. It must be recognized that circumstantial evi-
dence, in the same way as direct evidence, may be construed in 
either a hearsay or a non-hearsay sense, depending on whether 
the inference drawn brings into question the untested credi-
bility of an absent actor or declarant. 
ii. As has already been mentioned, the recognition of the 
hearsay nature of an item of circumstantial evidence should 
not be regarded as solving the problem of admissibility, but 
merely as stating it. If this were not the case, the courts 
would be forced to reject much reliable and valuable evidence 
on the ground that it was 'hearsay-like' despite strong cir-
cumstantial guarantees of reliability. 
Returning to Schmidt's contentions in respect of Van Niekerk's 
case under point (vi), it is submitted that the following com-
ments may be made: 
, 
a. The letters written by the deceased to his brother do 
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constitute relevant circumstantial evidence on the issue 
of whether the deceased had authorized the accused to 
sell his gun. 
b. The letters do not, however, possess any evidential 
value unless reliance is placed on the deceased's un-
tested belief. 
c. The evidence is, therefore, hearsay circumstantial evi-
dence. 
d. Despite its relevance, it must, therefore, on the pre-
sent state of our law, be excluded unless an appropriate 
exception to the hearsay rule may be found to rescue it. 
e. The evidence would seem to possess sufficient circum-
stantial guarantees of reliability to warrant its 
45 
admissibility; as Schmidt observes, one does not 
write to one's brother asking him to look after one's 
gun in order to create the false impression that one had 
not donated the gun to a third p~rty. 
f. Yet, on the present state of our law, the judicial 
officer, after correctly labelling the evidence as hear-
say, would not be entitled to receive the evidence on 
this basis (unless, of course, an exception to the rule 
is found). 
g. This fact has forced the courts to label implied asser-
tions of this kind as non-hearsay circumstantial evi-
dence, so as to receive what in many cases is valuable 
testimony. 
h. This has resulted in a further blurring of the distinc-
tion between circumstantial evidence and implied 
assertions, and further confusion on what constitutes 
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hearsay. 
i. Our law has therefore reached the point where the need 
for reform can no longer be ignored. 
Ad (vii) Schmidt, finally, cites several cases where, he 
submits, evidence of a kind similar to that excluded in Van 
Niekerk's case has been admitted as relevant circumstantial 
evidence. These cases merit closer examination in order to 
investigate what impact, if any, they make on the law regard-
ing implied assertions: 
( 1 ) 46 R v Alexander: The accused was charged with illi-
cit sale of liquor, and the evidence showed that certain de-
tectives, when they entered a room where the alleged sale took 
place, heard the accused's wife giving a warning that there 
were detectives about. This evidence was admitted, as the 
suspicious circumstances which the detectives found on enter-
ing the room, such as the fact that the premises were closed 
and that four men were being served with liquor, were suffi-
cient to "render the evidence with reference to the wife's 
statement admissible." 4 7 It was held that the evidence was 
not hearsay. This conclusion is criticized by Lansdown and 
48 Campbell, a criticism with which, it is submitted with respect, 
it is difficult to disagree, especially in the light of the 
following mis-statement of the hearsay rule: 
"Hearsay evidence is where a person states something 
which he has heard from someone else with regard to 
something which has occurred elsewhere. The point 
in this case is not that the detectives stated that 
Mrs Alexander told them something which had 
occurred elsewhere, but that they stated that she, 
in their hearing, made a statement warning the 
accused of their presence." 49 
According to this definition, even an express assertion by the 
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accused's wife to the effect that scouts had been posted to 
warn the offenders would be non-hearsay and admissible. It 
seems, anyway, that Bristowe J considered the statements ad-
50 
missible as being vicarious admissions by an agent. 
( 2) 51 Lenssen v R: The accused was charged with illegally 
keeping a gaming house, and evidence was tendered of certain 
conversations which had been overheard by police constables. 
These remarks and observations were made by people as they 
were entering and leaving the house, and the court held that 
they were admissible, either as part of the res gestae or as 
statements of intention relating to their acts of going into 
the house. 
To regard this case, as Schmidt does, as authority against ex-
tending the hearsay rule to cover implied assertions would, it 
is submitted, be somewhat dangerous. The question of implied 
assertions was not even raised, let alone examined, and the 
52 
resort to the res gestae, which Wigmore calls a "vicious 
element in our legal phraseology" which, by its ambiguity 
"invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus 
creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both", does 
little to resolve the hearsay issue. Was the evidence re-
ceived as original evidence or as an exception to the hearsay 
rule? The answer is certainly not clear, but the reference 
to statements of future intention, which are possibly a hear-
53 
say exception, would certainly militate against a firm 
view one way or the other. 
(3) 54 R v Steyn The accused was charged with fraudulent 
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insolvency, and one of the issues to be determined was 
whether a certain A had, under a hire-purchase agreement, sold 
a motor-car to the accused or to B. Evidence was tendered 
of an agreement between A and C in terms of which A was to 
hand over the car to the accused upon payment of the balance 
of the purchase price together with certain other accounts. 
Evidence of this agreement was held to be admissible, but only 
to prove that there was a contract in those terms, not to 
prove any facts inferred from its terms. In the words of 
Gutsche J: 
"Supposing the evidence now tendered were to amount 
to this: That Kirkup contracted to surrender his 
rights to the car provided the accused or his es-
tate would pay the balance of the purchase price 
together with what was due for spare parts and 
also for work done on the car; in such a case 
evidence of that fact would be admissible to prove 
that there was a contract in these terms, but it 
would not be admissible to prove, for instance, 
that the purchase price was in arrear or that 
spare parts had been sold and had not been paid 
for or that work had been done on the car and not 
been paid for. The whole purpose is not to prove 
the contents of the contract but that the contract 
in particular terms was made, and so far I think 
the evidence is admissible." 55 
This conclusion, far from conflicting with the principle in 
Van Niekerk's case, would seem to support it. Thus, irre-
spective of A's state of mind, the evidence of the agreement, 
containing a term whereby A was to hand over the car to the 
accused in return for certain consideration, was sufficiently 
relevant on the question of the identity of the buyer to 
warrant its reception as original circumstantial evidence. 
( 4) 56 R v Boardman: The instructions which a police de-
tective had given to certain traps were held not to be hear-
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say, a fact which Schmidt submits supports his contention 
regarding implied assertions. However, the basis of this 
decision was that a statement made by a person who is a wit-
ness in the proceedings cannot be hearsay, 57 a view that 
has not been received with universal acclaim. 58 In an 
obiter dictum, however, Marais J added 59 that the evidence, 
moreover, could not be hearsay, as it was not tendered to 
prove the contents of the instructions, but merely to prove 
the fact'that an instruction was given with a specific object. 
In order to assess the validity of this dictum, it is neces-
sary to consider the factual background of the case. The 
accused had been convicted in a magistrate's court of buying 
two uncut diamonds from two police traps for £100. It was 
common cause that one of the traps was found with the 
accused's money in his possession and that the diamonds at 
that stage were still in the possession of the other trap. 
Two versions we~e presented to the court, however, as to how 
this state of affairs was reached; one by the trap, to the 
effect that the accused had given over the money voluntarily 
by way of the purchase price, and one by the accused, to the 
effect that the trap had forcibly taken the money from him. 
At this stage, the police detective was asked by accused's 
counsel what instructions he had given the traps. The 
magistrate disallowed the question on the ground that the 
answer would be hearsay. 
It is clear that the purpose for asking this question was to 
elicit an answer that would tend to confirm the accused's 
version of the facts. The fact that instructions X were 
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given instead of instructions Y would perhaps make the ac-
cused's story more probable. For this purpose, the evidence 
is not hearsay, as it does not depend for its evidential 
value on the credibility of the police detective. There is 
therefore nothing in this decision that conflicts with the 
principles enunciated in ~ v Van Niekerk. 
( 5) . 80 Van der Harst v Vil)oen: In a paternity action, 
evidence of a letter written by the mother of the child to X 
was admitted as tending to show that she genuinely believed 
X to be the father of the child. In the words of Watermeyer 
81 
J , "(iJ t is not the type of letter that one would have 
expected a woman to write who was trying to father her child 
upon an incorrect third party". This letter was received 
without question, and the hearsay problem was not even con-
sidered, despite the fact that the letter clearly rests for 
its evidential value on the credibility of its writer. It 
is clearly, therefore, an implied assertion which falls 
squarely within the borders of the rule laid down in Van 
Niekerk's case. A basis for admissibility can, however, be 
found: 82 as has been pointed out above, the courts seem 
to regard implied assertions concerning marriage, paternity 
and testamentary documents as being admissible by way of an 
83 
exception to the hearsay rule. This question will be 
considered further, and at this stage it suffices to make the 
following observations concerning Van der Harst v Viljoen: 
1. The court did not identify the hearsay problem at all, 
' 
and it is therefore dangerous to rely on this case as 
authority for any contention, either in favour of the 
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admission of implied assertions or against it. 
2. The evidence in this case, it is submitted, was hear-
say, but nevertheless correctly admitted by way of an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that Prof. Schmidt's 
contentions are not strongly supported by the authority he 
cites. It would seem, moreover, that. the learned author has 
conceded the point, for, in the second edition of Bewysreg, 64 
he concedes that the problems in connection with implied 
assertions necessitate a modification of the definition of 
65 hearsay laid down in Estate De Wet v De Wet, where 
Watermeyer J defined hearsay as "evidence of statements made 
by persons not called as witnesses which are tendered for the 
purpose of proving the truth of what is contained in the 
statement". Schmidt's modified definition is as follows: 
"getuienis van ~ mededeling deur ~ nie-getuie wat aangebied 
word om dit wat die nie-getuie wou meedeel as waarheid te 
bewys." 
Van Niekerk's case, however, has drawn criticism from other 
86 South African writers, including A J van Wyk and J c 
Ferreira. 
87 Both writers espouse the strictly assertion-
oriented definition of hearsay laid down by Watermeyer J in 
De Wet's case, and both express their approval of the fol-
lowing dictum of Botha J in Lornadawn Investments (Pty) Ltd 
v Minister van Landbou: 
"As o~nskynlike hoors~-getuienis aangebied word vir 
~ ander doel as om die waarheid van die inhoud 
daarvan te bewys, dan word dit nie getref deur die 
hoors~-re~l nie, en dan is sulke getuienis toelaat-
baar indien die ander doel waarvoor dit aangebied 
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word relevant is tot die geskilpunte in die 
saak." 68 
And further: 
"die hof (moe~ die aard van die getuienis oorweeg 
in die samehang van die saak as geheel en tot n 
beslissing kom of die getuienis, objektief ge-
sproke, relevant is tot enige van die geskilpunte 
in die saak, op n grondslag anders as dat die in-
houd daarvan die waarheid is. As die antwoord 
op hierdie ondersoek bevestigend is, dan is die 
getuienis toelaatbaar vir die besondere doel wat 
dit relevant maak afgesien of dit die waarheid is 
of nie, en die blote feit dat dit terselfdertyd 
op n ander grondslag ook ter sake sou wees indien 
dit as die waarheid beskou word, kan dit nie on-
toelaatbaar maak nie." 69 
In line with this approach, they argue, the letters in Van 
Niekerk's case should have been admitted, not in order to 
prove their contents, but as mere circumstantial evidence to 
support a relevant inference in conjunction with the other 
evidential material before the court. The shortcomings of 
the assertion-oriented definition, and the flaws in the argu-
ment concerning 'circumstantial evidence' have been dis-
cussed at length already, and need not be repeated here. It 
is submitted that the views of Van Wyk and Ferreira, although 
they find substantial judicial authority, reflect a somewhat 
over-simplified perspective of the hearsay dilemma. Van 
Wyk's view, moreover, that evidence is hearsay if it is re-
levant only when offered to prove the truth of its contents, 
and non-hearsay if it is relevant for another purpose, may 
lead to confusion and an incorrect application of the asser-
tion-oriented formulation. Every hearsay statement, as has 
been pointed out above, enjoys a degree of relevance apart 
. 
from that derived from its use to prove its contents. This 
lies in proving the declarant's state of mind, which is 
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sometimes used as the basis for drawing a further relevant 
inference, viz. a fact to which that state of mind points. 
70 This approach, as Wigmore observes, would lead to a cir-
cumvention of the hearsay rule which is logically unjusti-
fiable. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Van Niekerk's case finds 
71 implied approval in the views of Prof. G L Peiris, who 
makes the following comments: 
"Modern law makes no distinction ••• between state-
ments which are intended by their maker to be ex-
pressly assertive, and those intended to be asser-
tive by implication, of the fact they are tendered 
to prove. The only difference in principle be-
tween these categories of statement is that 'a 
person who wishes to mislead by making a wilfully 
false statement about a particular matter is less 
likely to do so in an indirect way than in a 
direct way.' [state v Van Niekerk 1964 1 SA 729 
at 733 per Watermeyer jJ. This is, however, a 
question of degree, and it is clear that both 
categories of statements are generally excluded 
on the ground that they infringe the rule against 
hearsay." 72 
This view is certainly more in line with the subsequent de-
cision in Kroon's case, and, it is submitted, reflects the 
sounder theoretical view. The objection that this view 
could lead to an unwarranted rejection of valuable and re-
liable evidence is met by the learned writer's qualification 
that an assessment of such reliability is "a question of de-
gree". If a court were to find sufficient guarantees of 
trustworthiness in respect of the possible hearsay dangers, 
then it should have a discretion to admit the evidence as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. 
In cont~ast with Prof. Schmidt's unqualified condemnation of 
the decision in Van Niekerk's case, the views of L H 
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Hoffmann reflect a mixture of guarded approval and cau-
tious criticism. While remarking that the ruling was cor-
rect as a general proposition, and was in accordance with 
the decision in "the great case of Wright v Doe d Tatham", 74 
he submits that several exceptions to this proposition have 
been developed by the courts. These exceptions, such as 
implied assertions of paternity, marriage or the making of a 
will, he submits, should have been examined by the courts to 
ascertain whether they represent isolated exceptions or 
whether they may be connected by some underlying principle 
to distinguish them from Wright's case. Hoffmann himself 
suggests that there is in fact a unifying feature about these 
exceptions, viz. that they "all involve implied assertions 
about what the maker of the statement himself has done or not 
75 done." One is seldom mistaken, he argues, about 
whether one was married, had intercourse with the mother of 
an illegitimate child, or made a will, whereas an implied 
assertion about someone else's sanity (as in Wright's case) 
is more susceptible to error and thus less reliable. The 
evidence in Van Niekerk's case concerned an implied asser-
tion relating to the writer's own affairs, and should, he 
argues, have been admitted. Instead the court adopted the 
approach of Wigmore, and treated the exceptions as a closed 
78 
category of "traditionally accepted instances". 
It is respectfully submitted that criticism may be levelled 
at this argument on two separate levels: First, as a de-
scriptive observation, Hoffmann's views may account for the 
cases concerning paternity, legitimacy and wills, but they 
are not in accordance with the only two South African cases 
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that have expressly raised the question of implied asser-
tions. In both Van Niekerk and Kroon the courts have 
seemed to indicate that all implied assertions infringe the 
rule against hearsay, whether they relate to the declarant's 
(or actor's) own affairs or not. In the former case, the 
letters in question concerned the writer's own conduct; in 
the latter case, the conduct and non-conduct were tendered 
to establish a fact not connected with the actor's own 
affairs. Yet in both cases the evidence was considered 
hearsay and inadmissible in the absence of a recognized ex-
ception allowing for its reception. In neither case did 
the court distinguish between the classes of conduct identi-
fied by Hoffmann. 
Secondly, as a prescriptive norm, it is submitted that this 
is a defective criterion for admissibility. The reasons 
the learned author advances for admitting implied asser-
~ions relating to the actor's own conduct are as follows: 
(i) The danger of insincerity is reduced, as in the case 
in all implied assertions; in order to deceive, the 
actor/declarant would have had to stage a charade. 
(ii) The danger of honest mistake is reduced; one is un-
likely to be mistaken about whether one was married, 
fathered a child or made a will. 
The first of these observations has already been assessed in 
the above discussion of Prof. Schmidt's views. The second 
point remains, therefore, to be considered. Is it accurate 
to stat~ that an actor is always unlikely to be mistaken 
about his own affairs? Surely this is only the case if the 
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conduct is of importance to the actor? The examples cited 
by Hoffmann, relating to paternity, marriage and the making 
of a will, all concern acts which are of great importance to 
the actor, thereby providing substantial guarantees that the 
actor was not mistaken about the event to which his conduct 
points. Such guarantees are, however, not present in the 
case of conduct which is insignificant or trivial in the eyes 
of the actor. One is not less likely to be mistaken in the 
case of unimportant conduct concerning one's own affairs than 
in the case of important conduct concerning the affairs of 
another. In Kroon's case, for instance, the implied asser-
tion in question concerned the state of a third party's 
crops, and yet it was of considerable importance to the 
actor. It was highly unlikely, therefore, that the actor 
in that case would be mistaken about the facts to which his 
conduct (and non-conduct) pointed. 
Hoffmann's suggestions, therefore, are not helpful in pro-
viding a rational framework for determining the admissibil-
ity of implied assertions: conduct sustaining an inference 
concerning the affairs of the actor himself may only be con-
sidered less susceptible to honest error if that conduct is 
of importance to the actor. Yet, if the conduct is of im-
portance to him, then he will have a greater motive to mis-
represent his state of mind - i e it is more susceptible to 
dishonest error, or insincerity. 
A more scientific criterion for admissibility could, it is 
submitt~d, be laid down along the following lines: Implied 
assertions, although hearsay, may be received by_way of an 
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exception to the rule, provided there are sufficient indica-
tions of their reliability. These indications must provide 
sufficient guarantees against the possibility of both honest 
and dishonest error on the part of the actor, and, without 
attempting to lay down a closed list of factors, may include 
77 
the following: 
A Factors rebutting honest error: The importance of the 
conduct, whether it concerned the actor's own affairs, 
whether the facts were within the actor's own personal know-
ledge and experience, whether he had a proper opportunity to 
perceive the fact to which his conduct points, whether he 
was properly qualified to evaluate that event, and the 
length of time between that event and the conduct in ques-
tion. 
B Factors rebutting dishonest error: The non-assertive-
ness of the conduct, whether it was against the actor's own 
interests, and whether there is any special motive to mis-
represent. 
A proper assessment of these factors must await later con-
sideration, but the important point to be made at this 
stage is that it is dangerous and misleading to attempt to 
distinguish between classes of implied assertions on the 
basis of one or two arbitrary factors. The nature of the 
problem is such that it demands investigation on the basis 
of a broad perspective, taking into account all the factors 
and values that lie at the core of hearsay theory. 
It is necessary next to consider a group of cases where our 
courts have admitted evidence of implied assertions - a 
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group of cases described as reflecting "specially recog-
nised exceptions of long standing". These cases, some of 
which have been encountered already, concern statements or 
conduct which carry an implied assertion that the declar-
ant or actor had contracted a marriage (Dysart Peerage 
Case 7g ) , fathered a child (Aylesford Peerage Case 80 ) , 
81 Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam Co Ltd ) , or made a will. 
As the first two categories have already been discussed, 
attention will now be focussed on the third group concern-
ing the making of a will. 
82 
In Kuntz v Swart, the issue was whether a will had been 
forged, and evidence was admitted of statements made by the 
testator both before and after the date of the alleged will 
in order to show that he had not made the will in question. 
No objection was raised to the reception of this evidence, 
which circumstantially tended to show that the testator had 
not executed tte will, and the hearsay problem was not can-
vas sed. 83 A similar case is that of De Lange v Rudman. 
84 In R v Foreman (1), however, the court considered the 
matter in greater depth: Beadle J reviewed the authorities 
on this topic and concluded that in deciding whether a will 
was a forgery, evidence of statements made by the testator, 
which tended to show that his state of mind was such as to 
indicate that another and different will was in fact his 
valid will at the time of his death, was admissible. As 
regards the basis for admissibility, the learned judge 
85 
seemed to rely on the view of Scoble 
' 
that this consti-
tuted an exception to the rule against hearsay. 
Page 312. 
The decision in Foreman's case was approved and applied in 
88 R v Basson, where Ogilvie Thompson J was asked to give 
a ruling on the admissibility of two classes of statements. 
The accused were charged with forging a will dated 3 June 
1952, the testatrix having executed a valid will on 12 Aug-
ust 1950, and the prosecution tendered evidence of state-
ments (a) made by the testatrix before 3 June 1952 to the 
effect that she had declined to make a joint will with her 
husband (who was one of the accused), and (b) statements by 
her after 3 June 1952 to the effect that she wished action 
to be taken in terms of the will of 12 August 1950. As re-
gards the first category, the learned judge held that the 
evidence should be received as establishing the state of 
mind of the testatrix. Reliance was placed on the views of 
Wigmore, 87 who considered such evidence admissible by way 
of exception to the hearsay rule. The second category was 
also held admissible, "as being indicative of the state of 
mind of the testatrix in relation to the question of whether 
the second will had been made, thereby revoking the earlier 
will." 88 
CONCLUSION ON THE TREATMENT OF IMPLIED ASSERTIONS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
The state of the law on this topic in South Africa is well 
described by Lansdown and Campbell: 
"As the authorities now stand, ..• it cannot 
be stated with any confidence whether the rule 
against hearsay does not apply to conduct not 
intended to be assertive, or whether it does 
apply and is received in certain cases, such as 
to show relationship, under an exception to the 
rule." 8 9 
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Nevertheless, it is submitted that the following comments may 
be made in this regard: 
(I) Whatever the position is regarding conduct and oral 
statements, the position is clear in respect of written 
statements contained in a document. Sec 34(1) of the 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 and s 222 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which are de-
rived from the English Evidence Act 1938, provide that 
subject to certain conditions, 
"where direct oral evidence of a fact would be ad-
missible, any statement made by a person in a 
document and tending to establish that fact shall 
on production of the original document be admis-
sible evidence of that fact .•• " 90 
A "statement" is defined to mean any representation of fact, 
91 
whether made in words or otherwise, and thus would in-
elude representations made by way of either express or implied 
92 
assertions. The letters which were excluded in Wright's 
case would now be rendered admissible as representations made 
by the writer concerning the fact of the testator's sanity 
(provided of course such opinion were sufficiently relevant) . 
(II) As regards other implied assertions, which are not ren-
dered admissible by these statutory provisions, the least that 
can be said is that there exists a special category of cases 
which reflect exceptions of long standing and which allow 
evidence of implied assertions of paternity, marriage and cer-
tain testamentary declarations to be received by way of excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. 
(III) This leaves a large residual class of implied asser-
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tions whose status is shrouded in uncertainty. The case law 
is not conclusive. Certainly there is no case which states 
specifically that implied assertions are non-hearsay. On 
the other hand, the cases which hold the contrary are not 
93 
totally convincing either: Wright v Doe d Tatham and TeEer v 
94 
R do not seem to have been applied with any measure of 
tenacity in subsequent English decisions, while ~ v Van 
95 96 
Niekerk and Kroon v J L Clark Cotton Co (Pty) Ltd are the 
only South African cases to have held that implied assertions 
do fall within the scope of the hearsay rule. Such asser-
tions, have, furthermore, on several occasions been receiv~d 
(most notably inS v Qolo), although the point was not speci-
fically raised and analysed in any of these decisions. 
Strictly speaking, therefore, our courts are bound by the de-
cisions in Wright and TeEer, and unless these decisions are 
expressly overruled by the Appellate Division, they must be 
regarded as reflecting the applicabl~ law. 
(IV) The safest view to adopt in the light of the above, 
is that the matter awaits either clarification by the Appel-
late Division or reform at the hands of the Legislature. In 
the light of the uncertainty this topic has elicited in the 
courts, it would seem that the latter alternative is more 
probable. What follows in the next chapter is a brief re-
view of the leading academic commentary on the question, 
with a view to shaping the most suitable and satisfactory 
reform of this vexing issue. 
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Chapter VIII 
ACADEMIC COMMENT : A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Weinberg has described academic attempts to solve the prob-
1 
lem as "a history of failure", perhaps not a very generous 
appraisal of some valiant and ingenious proposals put for-
ward by various eminent writers. It is true to say, how-
ever, that these views are no less daunting in their 
variety and irreconcilability than the judicial authority 
considered above. What follows is a survey of some of the 
more distinguished contributions, together with a critical 
evaluation of their respective merits. In the course of 
this discussion, I shall make use of Weinberg's classifica-
tion 2 , according to which the bulk of academic commentary 
may conveniently be divided into four categories: 
Group I: Those writers who hold the view that all implied 
assertions, whether they are non-assertive statements or non-
assertive conduct, are hearsay, and ought to be excluded 
unless they fall within a recognized existing exception to 
the hearsay rule. 
Group II: Those who believe that all implied assertions 
are hearsay, but who nevertheless argue that this does not 
necessarily answer the question of whether or not they ought 
to be admitted in evidence: as existing hearsay exceptions 
are geared to express assertions, they are not appropriate in 
dealing with implied assertions, and new 'reliability factors' 
must be laid down to render certain implied assertions admis-
sible. 
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Group III: Those writers who advocate that a distinction 
should be drawn between non-assertive statements, which are 
hearsay, and non-assertive conduct, which does not fall 
within the scope of the hearsay rule. 
Group IV: Those writers who would confine the hearsay 
rule to assertive statements and conduct, and who opine that 
implied assertions are not within the scope of the hearsay 
rule at all. 
Group I: All implied assertions are hearsay and must be 
excluded unless they fall within a recognized 
existing exception to the rule: 
One of the strongest proponents of this view is Baker, who, 
in his monograph "The Hearsay Rule" (1950), made the follow-
3 ing submissions: 
(1) Conduct such as that in Wright v Tatham is "equiva-
lent to a direct and positive statement". 4 
(2) As such, it offends the hearsay rule and must be ex-
eluded. Authority for this principle may be found 
in Wright's case and in the American decision of 
5 Thompson v Manhattan Railway (dealt with above 
under cases of medical treatment). 
(3) The result in Wright v Tatham cannot be justified by 
basing it, as Phipson does, on the opinion rule, be-
aause the majority of the judges in the House of 
Lords "undoubtedly dealt with it as hearsay", and, 
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in fact, from the comments of Coleridge J and Alder-
son B, it is even possible that such evidence does 
not offend the opinion rule. 
(4) Therefore, despite the "absence of consideration of 
the point in other English cases and the difference 
of opinion amongst text-book writers", when conduct 
is tendered in evidence to show the actor's belief 
and hence the truth of that belief, it is hearsay and 
inadmissible. 
Other writers who have subscribed to this view are Chamber-
8 layne, 7 Tregarthen, 8 and Gulson. Gulson distinguished 
between what he termed 'immediate' and 'transmitted' evi-
dence, the latter being evidence which depends on the ver-
acity or sincerity of another. He classified 'conduct', 
when offered to found an inference as to the actor's belief 
and thus to the act believed, as 'transmitted', citing as 
examples the conduct of the ship's captain discussed previ-
ously and the conduct of one who takes flight from a situa-
tion as evidence of the fact feared. It is impossible, he 
concluded, to draw a line between those cases of conduct 
where the circumstances furnish a reliable guarantee of 
sincerity, and those cases where they do not. Therefore, 
he submits, they should be treated alike and excluded unless 
they fall within the scope of a recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule. 
As Weinberg points out, this view of implied assertions is 
' based on the premise that while the danger of insincerity 
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may be substantially reduced, (the conduct being non-
assertive), the danger of defective memory or perception 
is not. The perception factor, moreover, is regarded as 
being more important than the veracity factor in the 
assessment of the reliability of the evidence, and the 
utility of the curial devices, such as cross-examination, 
is considered to be greater in revealing honest errors in 
perception than intentional misrepresentation of fact. 
This approach is, however, according to Weinberg, too sim-
plistic. Although it recognizes that implied assertions 
contain many similar unreliability factors to express 
assertions, he submits that "too little weight is given to 
the very real differences between them". The existing 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, moreover, are designed to 
admit certain reliable express assertions, but are not de-
signed to deal with implied assertions, which means that 
many reliable implied assertions would have to be excluded 
if this view were adopted. Furthermore, he argues, the 
existing exceptions have justifiably been criticized as 
being inadequate in that they do not cover all reliable 
express assertions~ why, therefore, should we "extend 
unsatiafactory criteria even further to attempt to solve a 
quite different problem?" 10 
With respect, it is submitted that, while there is much 
merit in the learned author's approach, it is not entirely 
correct to regard the question of implied assertions as "a 
quite different problem"~ instead it is a different as-
pect of'the same problem, and the challenge facing the 
courts and the legislature is to devise a comprehensive 
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solution to the whole hearsay problem, of which implied 
assertions represent but one complex facet. 
Group II: Implied assertions are, analytically speak-
ing, hearsay, but this merely states the 
problem without solving it; to determine 
whether they are admissible, the existing 
exceptions are inappropriate, and new cri-
teria that take into account the aspect of 
reliability in a more satisfactory manner, 
must be sought. 
This view represents the traditional United States acade-
mic approach to the problem, 11 and has many illustrious 
adherents. As a general observation, most of these 
writers are in agreement that while implied assertions pre-
sent many similar unreliability dangers to express asser-
tions, the composite strength of these dangers may differ 
substantially, thereby warranting different treatment in 
looking for reliability factors to overcome or, at least, 
minimize them. 
The following represents a cross-section of this school of 
thought, the popularity of which is borne out by the num-
ber of its proponents. 
( 1 ) EDMUND MORGAN: One of the most significant con-
tributions to the literature on implied assertions is sup-
plied by Prof. Morgan, who wrote three leading articles on 
the topic over a period of 13 years. Over those years, a 
progression and subtle change of approach is discernible, 
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and it is of considerable interest and value to compare the 
changing views of the learned author. 
(i) 12 1935 : "Hearsay and Non-Hearsay". In this article, 
Morgan adopts a "hearsay-danger" analysis to the question of 
implied assertions, and comes to the inexorable conclusion 
that there is no logical basis for distinguishing between ex-
press and implied assertions as regards the scope of the 
hearsay rule. . 13 Accordingly, he subm~ts that a "comprehen-
sive definition of hearsay" must include: 
"(1) all conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, 
intended by him to operate as an assertion when 
offered either to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted or to prove that the asserter believed 
the matter asserted to be true, and 
(2) all conduct of a person, verbal or nonverbal, 
not intended by him to operate as an assertion, 
when offered either to prove his state of mind 
and the external event or condition which caused 
him to have that state of mind, or to prove that 
his state of mind was truly reflected by that 
conduct." 
The extremely wide compass of this definition was recognized by 
Morgan, who argues, nevertheless, that its adoption would not 
result in increasing "the already too great volume of relevant 
evidence now within the ban of the exclusionary rules", pro-
vided it is intelligently applied. The courts already, he 
argues, take judicial notice of the reliability of a large 
category of evidence (such as the reading of a weighing-
machine, an almanac, a timepiece etc). This evidence is re-
ceived despite its hearsay character, and Morgan contends that 
similar treatment should be afforded to other classes of 
hearsay in respect of which there exists some satisfactory 
guarantee of reliability. As he puts it: 
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"A frank recognition by the courts that in situ-
ations such as these they are dealing funda-
mentally with hearsay may lead to a more sen-
sible answer to many questions. It will 
emphasize the truth that an analysis which 
demonstrates evidence to be hearsay merely 
states the problem of admissibility but does 
not solve it." 14 
Implied assertions, therefore, should be admitted, even if 
they are hearsay, where they are found to be sufficiently 
reliable. They should only be excluded if "the dangers of 
deception or error in the proffered evidence which cross-
examination would tend to eliminate" are "sufficient to out-
15 
weigh its probative value". The question is, however, 
what are the limits of this exception, and what factors 
should the court look at to assess the reliability of an im-
plied assertion? 18 Morgan submits that the exception 
should render admissible 
"evidence of nonassertive hearsay conduct of a 
person when offered to prove immediately his 
belief in the happening of an event or the 
existence of a condition and ultimately that 
the event did happen or the condition did 
exist, if the trial judge first finds 
(1) that the event or condition consisted of 
the person's own behaviour or condition of 
which he was then conscious, or 
(2) that 
(a) the event or condition was within the 
person's knowledge, and 
(b) his conduct offered to evidence the 
event or condition was a detriment to 
him, and 
(c) it would have been useless for him to 
undergo that detriment if the event 
had not happened or the condition had 
not existed." 
In addition to this test, he adds, the courts must also take 
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cognizance of the fact that many implied assertions relate to 
the opinion of the absent actor/declarant. In Wright's case, 
for instance, the implied assertion was to the effect that 
the writers of the letters were of the opinion that Marsden 
was sane. This complication adds another danger to the list 
of recognized testimonial infirmities, viz. the danger that 
the actor/declarant may not have been sufficiently competent 
or qualified to draw that inference from the relevant facts. 
To counter this danger, Morgan adds the following constraint 
to his proposed 'exception': Evidence of non-assertive 
hearsay conduct of a person, when offered to prove his opinion 
or the objective facts from which it was deduced, or both, 
should be admitted if the trial judge first finds: 
"(1) that such person was an expert both in ob-
serving such facts and in drawing accurate de-
ductions therefrom, and 
(2) that such person did observe the facts 
which the evidence is offered to prove, and 
(3) that the nonassertive conduct either was a 
substantial detriment to him which it would 
have been unreasonable for him to undergo un-
less it reflected his honest opinion, or would, 
to his knowledge, have needlessly imposed a 
substantial detriment upon him unless it re-
flected his honest opinion." 17 
18 (ii) 1937 : The Hearsay Rule". In this article, Morgan 
re-states his definition of hearsay but now suggests an 
alternative approach as regards the reception of implied 
assertions which fall within its scope. The court, he sub-
mits, should first examine all the recognized exceptions to 
the hearsay rule, in order to ascertain whether any is 
applicabl~ to the evidence in question. If no apt excep-
tion exists, the court "ought then to ascertain whether the 
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dangers of error in perception or memory which might be 
eliminated by cross-examination are so substantial as to 
call for its exclusion. If not, the evidence should be 
received, for by hypothesis neither veracity nor narration 
19 is involved." 
This represents a far less conservative view than the test 
laid down previously, and gives the court far greater dis-
cretion in evaluating the reliability of the evidence. 
However, it is submitted, it is difficult to justify the 
exclusion from consideration of the dangers of veracity and 
narration, as both may present very real obstacles to the 
reception of the evidence. As Morgan himself later con-
20 
ceded, some implied assertions raise the risk of narra-
tion - for instance, the cases of the gambling raids, where 
the police intercept a telephone call of a would-be gambler. 
It is quite possible, says Morgan, that the speaker was 
using a code in some secret transaction other than gambling 
on the races. "The dangers of misinterpretation of this 
non-narrative language seem", he adds, "frequently not to be 
21 perceived." The learned author's own previous omission 
in this regard would seem to bear out this view. 
The same applies to the danger of insincerity, and Morgan 
was also to recognize a decade later that this risk could 
certainly not be disregarded merely because the actor/ 
declarant did not possess assertive intent. As Morgan him-
self pointed out, the declarant's conduct "cannot be evi-
dence of his state of mind unless reliance is placed upon 
' 22 his sincerity." Where, for instance, a woman tells her 
friends "I am the Pope", and this is tendered as evidence of 
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an insane delusion that she believed herself to be the Pope, 
Morgan argues as follows: 
"[I] t will be totally without probative value 
unless she believed her declaration to be 
true. If she knew it was false, she might 
have been abnormal or she might have been 
trying to create a community opinion that she 
was abnormal, but she would not have been 
laboring under the delusion that she was the 
Pope. If she was sincere, she was trying to 
convey the idea that she was the Pope - not 
the idea that she believed herself to be 
so." 2 3 
However, the learned author concludes, "even in cases where 
the relevance of the Declarant's conduct turns on his sin-
cerity, few, if any, judicial discussions pay serious atten-
tion to this aspect of the evidence. In most of them it is 
. 24 
not even not~ced", (again a rather ironical observation 
in the light of Morgan's own views expressed a decade before). 
This omission, he continues, is 
"somewhat remarkable in view of the emphasis on 
sincerity which is found in decision after de-
cision when evidence is of conduct assertive 
of a proposition to be proved, and also in 
view of the orthodox justification for the 
recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule, 
namely, the existence of a guaranty of sincer-
ity in the circumstances of the utterance." 25 
In conclusion then, it would seem, by the author's own con-
fession, that the views expressed in 1937 constituted too 
radical a relaxation of the hearsay shackles. 
(iii) 1948 : "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
28 Hearsay Concept". In one of the most scientific and search-
ing analyses of the nature of the hearsay concept yet 
attempted, Morgan considers the traditional hearsay dangers 
I 
raised by implied assertions, and concludes by setting out 
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a two-tier programme for the reform of hearsay theory. The 
first proposal assumes that one could start anew and re-
formulate the law, while the second "more realistic" proposal 
takes account of the practices which have become too estab-
lished to dislodge, attempting nevertheless to salvage some 
semblance of logic and consistency. 
PLAN I: 
1. Within the category of hearsay must be included "all 
evidence which requires the trier to rely upon the use 
of language or the sincerity or the memory or the ob-
servation of a person not present and not subject to 
27 
all the conditions imposed upon a witness." 
2. But this does not mean that all hearsay must necessar-
ily be excluded, for Morgan foresees "as the basis of 
the system the principle that all relevant evidence 
28 
is admissible", with the hearsay rule only oper-
ating to exclude evidence'(which does not fall within 
one of the existing exceptions) if the declarant is 
available but not present for cross-examination. 
3. The trial judge should, however, have an "almost un-
limited discretion to reject relevant evidence of 
such slight probative value as to be outweighed by the 
risk that the admission would require undue consump-
tion of time or substantial danger of confusing or 
misleading the trier or of unfairly surprising the 
29 
adversary." 
PLAN II: .. 
1. So long as 'hearsay' is a prima facie bar to admissi-
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bility, we should "recognize that it would be foolish 
to include in hearsay all evidence that raises any 
30 
one of the hearsay risks". But, on the other 
hand, we should recognize that "the rational basis 
for the hearsay classification is not the formula, 
'assertions offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted', but rather the presence of substantial 
risks of insincerity and faulty narration, memory and 
31 perception." 
2. We should therefore exclude from the hearsay rule the 
prior statements of a witness subject to oath and 
cross-examination, as in fact these assertions do not 
involve the traditional hearsay dangers. 
3. The classification of evidence as hearsay should not 
result in its automatic exclusion. Much of the evi-
dence which the courts already admit falls analyti-
cally within the hearsay concept, and some of the 
evidence which is customarily labelled hearsay in 
fact raises the hearsay dangers to no greater extent 
than evidence now admitted under the hearsay excep-
tions. 
Both proposals, then, advocate a judicial discretion to ex-
elude hearsay in certain instances and reject the present 
automatic exclusion of hearsay merely because it carries 
that label. The difference between the two proposals lies 
in the definition of the hearsay concept and the nature of 
the discretion. The first proposal defines hearsay as evi-
dence presenting any ONE of the traditional hearsay risks, 
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and advocates a general rule of admissibility subject to the 
normal test for legal relevance; the second proposal sees 
hearsay as evidence in which the traditional dangers are sub-
stantially present, and allows a trier a general discretion 
to admit such evidence despite its hearsay label if the 
facts of the case provide sufficient guarantee of its relia-
bility. It is submitted that the second theory, being more 
in line with traditional thought, is a more satisfactory 
model for law reform, although it also has its faults: no 
criteria are put forward to guide the court in the exercise 
of its discretion, and no factors are mentioned which may be 
looked at to measure and minimize the hearsay dangers con-
tained in any individual item of evidence. 
The writing of Prof. Morgan has thus provided an invaluable 
and ingenious source of original thought, and his views have 
provided both inspiration and ammunition for many of the 
authors who followed him. Much of what follows is thu~ in-
evitably foreshadowed by the views of the learned author, 
whose succinct, scientific and elegant writing has richly 
embellished the Law of Evidence in general,and hearsay theory 
in particular. 
(2) CHARLES T McCORMICK: Another writer to identify the 
problem of implied assertions at an early stage was McCormick. 
As early as 1930, he wrote an article entitled "The Border-
32 land of Hearsay", in which he expressed the view that im-
plied assertions are as much hearsay as express assertions to 
the same effect. The result, he adds, is that "evidence 
which has the strongest circumstantial guarantees of relia-
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bility may be banned. Evidence that a doctor, since de-
ceased, has operated upon a man for appendicitis, would be in-
admissible as evidence that the patient actually had that 
33 disease." The fault, he said, lies in the formulation of 
the hearsay rule, adding: "Would it not have been wiser to 
set up the hearsay rule in (the following) form: 'Hearsay is 
inadmissible except where the judge in his discretion finds 
34 it needed and trustworthy'". 
McCormick added, however, that on the other hand "much of 
such conduct-evidence if admitted would be of trivial value 
and probably a general inclusionary rule .•• would be only 
one degree better than wholesale exclusion", and therefore 
that non-assertive conduct should only be admitted in evidence 
when "the trial judge in his discretion finds that the action 
so vouched the belief as to give reasonable assurance of 
35 
trustworthiness." He did not elaborate on this conclu-
sion, nor did he explain what kind of "action" would "give 
reasonable assurance of trustworthiness", but Falknor, writing 
in 1940, 36 submits that the tenor of McCormick's argument 
seems to justify the following interpretation: To give an 
assurance of trustworthiness, the action necessarily "must be 
of significance to the actor". Therefore, "if the actor was 
sufficiently satisfied with his observation and recollection 
of the relevant event or condition to predicate action impor-
tant to himself upon his belief in that event or condition, 
there is enough to be said for the trustworthiness of his be-
lief, though uncross-examined, to permit it to be presented 
to the tribunal as a basis of a possible inference to the 
37 
event or condition." 
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Furthermore, Falkner submits, "McCormick undoubtedly assumed 
that, before evidence of any instance of conduct would be 
admitted, it must appear that the actor either observed or 
had the opportunity to observe the relevant event or condi-
tion, and further, that nothing affirmatively appears cast-
ing substantial doubt upon the quality of his recollec-
. 38 tl.on." 
It is interesting to note that the authors of the most 
recent edition of McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evi-
dence 39 reject this notion out of hand in the following 
manner: 
"While the suggestion has been advanced that con-
duct evidence ought to be admitted only when the 
actor's behaviour has an element of significant 
reliance as an assurance of trustworthiness, a 
sufficient response ... is that the factor is 
one of evaluation, not a ground for exclusion. 
Undue complication ought to be avoined in the 
interest of ease of application."40 
The learned authors express the view that the risks of narra-
tion and sincerity are substantially reduced in the case of 
implied assertions, while the risks of memory and perception, 
arising from the chance of honest mistake, "seem to be fac-
tors useful in evaluating weight and credibility rather than 
grounds for exclusion." 41 
( 3) JUDSON F FALKNOR: Falkner is another writer whose 
views on the topic changed materially over the span of two 
decades: 
( i) 1940 : "Silence as Hearsay". 42 In this article 
Falkner compares the views of Morgan and McCormick (as set 
out above), and comes to the followinn conclusions: 
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(A) The views expressed by Morgan in 1935 are not entire-
ly satisfactory, as 
1. To admit all implied assertions which relate to the 
actor's own conduct is to open the gates to a flood 
of potentially unreliable evidence. The actor, says 
Morgan, "is not likely to make innocent mistakes in 
the perception of his own behaviour or in his memory 
43 
of it"; but this, says Falkner, is only true if 
"the conduct is consequential enough to the actor to 
44 
reliably evidence his belief". 
2. In any event, most non-assertive conduct does not re-
late to the actor's own behaviour, so we must look to 
Morgan's alternative ground for receiving implied as-
sertions, viz. if the act/condition was within the 
person's knowledge, if it was detrimental to the 
actor and if it would have been useless for him to 
undergo that detriment if the act had not happened. 
3. This requirement, according to Falkner, is (in con-
trast to the first requirement which is too wide) too 
restrictive. The requirement relating to detriment, 
he says, is unnecessarily stringent, and it should 
suffice that the conduct was of importance to the 
actor. A detrimental quality would, he adds, "potent-
45 
ly negative untrustworthiness due to untruthfulness", 
but this is not necessary in his view, as the evi-
dence, being non-assertive, will not founder on the 
~anger of insincerity. 
(B) The solution proposed by McCormick (and as exterpolated 
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by Falkner himself) provides a middle path between these two 
. 48 parameters, and "represents the most desirable solut~on". 
While non-assertive conduct must be classified as hearsay 
(as it presents some of the dangers traditionally associated 
with hearsay), they should be admitted by way of an excep-
tion, but only if the trial judge first finds that 
"(a) the actor had personal knowledge of the fact ..• 
to the proof pf which the evidence is offered; more 
precisely that it fairly appears that the actor ob-
served or had the opportunity to observe such event or 
condition and that nothing appears to cast substantial 
doubt upon the quality of his recollection at the time 
of the conduct; and 
(b) that the conduct was important or significant to 
the actor in his affairs and so vouched his belief 'as 
to give reasonable assurance of trustworthiness'." 47 
As regards silence, or non-assertive non-conduct, because of 
the greater danger of insincerity inherent in such evidence 
(see Silence Cases above), a third requirement is proposed: 
"(c) in the case of negative conduct (i e inaction) 
or silence, that such negative conduct or silence was 
a detriment to the actor." 48 
(C) The views expressed by Morgan in 1937 are also not en-
tirely satisfactory, as they constitute too broad a ground 
for admissibility. Taking Morgan's "1937 views" at their 
face value, he argues, a trial judge may well feel justified, 
on an issue involving the mental competency of a testatrix, 
in admitting evidence that certain boys in the neighbourhood 
48 
used to make fun of her, if it appeared that the boys had 
personal knowledge of her behaviour. However, he argues, 
"it seems clear that there is just as much 
danger of deficiency in observation and recol-
lection in the use of trivial conduct of this 
character as in the case of a hearsay assertion. 
The belief of the actor lacks that strong avouch-
ment which, for example, is so apparent in ~he 
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conduct of a deceased captain on a question of 
seaworthiness, who, after examining every part 
of the vessel, embarked in it with his 
family I o 11 50 
This criticism is difficult to comprehend; if in fact the 
evidence of the boys' "making fun" of the testatrix raised 
any substantial risk of defective memory or perception, then 
the evidence would be inadmissible in terms of Morgan's 1937 
formulation. As already stated,the 1937 formulation is in-
complete in that it takes no account of errors in narration 
or insincerity, but that is an entirely different issue. 
(ii) 1 954 : "The Hearsay Rule and its Exceptions". 51 In 
a substantial departure from his previous views, Falkner 
welcomes as a "commonsensible advance" the proposed provi-
sion in the Uniform Rules of Evidence which would "settle 
this troublesome matter by removing the hearsay stigma from 
52 
all evidence of non-assertive conduct". He did not 
elaborate on this remark, but this statement formed the 
nucleus of his views expressed seven years later. 
(iii) 1961 : "The 'Hear-Say' Rule as a 'See-Do' Rule : 
Evidence of Conduct". 53 Here Falkner recanted entirely his 
previous views, saying: 
"it has sometimes been suggested that the admis-
sibility of non-assertive conduct should de-
pend on a preliminary finding by the judge that 
the conduct was of a sort 'as to give reasonable 
assurance of trustworthiness', that is to say, 
that it was of substantial importance to the 
actor in his own affairs. But for application 
in the 'heat and hurry' of the trial, such a 
solution leaves a good deal to be desired. As 
Thayer 54 observed, 'we should have a system of 
evidence, simple, aiming straight at the sub-
stance of justice, not nice or refined in its 
details, not too rigid, easily grasped and 
easily applied' • " 55 
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Accordingly, he put forward the following suggestions: 
a. The hearsay stigma should be eliminated completely 
from evidence of non-assertive conduct. The basis 
for this proposition is that such conduct is "evi-
56 
dently more dependable than an assertion" because 
of the absence of the danger of intentional misrepre-
sentation. (He does concede, however, that this 
does not mean that implied assertions are completely 
free of hearsay infirmities, or that cross-examina-
tion of the actor would not be helpful.) Another 
57 
"cogent practical argument" for such a rule, he 
argues, is that "experience has shown that very 
often, probably more often than not, and understand-
ably the hearsay objection is overlooked in practice 
with the result that the present doctrine operates 
very unevenly". 
b. He therefore welcomes the provisions of Rule 62 of 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, which, for the pur-
poses of the hearsay rule defines a "statement" as 
including only "non-verbal conduct of a person in-
tended by him as a substitute for words in expres-
sing the matter stated". 
c. This does not, however, mean that all non-assertive 
conduct would be received, as there remains still 
the question of relevance. In terms of Rule 45, 
such evidence would be excluded if the judge were 
of the opinion that its probative value was "sub-
stantially outweighed" by certain listed "counter-
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factors": that reception of the evidence would take more 
time than it was worth, that it would confuse the issues, 
mislead the jury, create undue prejudice or unfairly sur-
prise the opponent. 
It is interesting to note that these factors, which are taken 
into account by our common law in determining whether any 
item of evidence is "legally relevant", overlap substantially 
with the traditional hearsay dangers. Is it too fanciful to 
suggest that perhaps the Uniform Rules in effect, if not in 
form, place upon the trier the same obligations as does the 
test put forward by Morgan in 1948? If, therefore, implied 
assertions are "legislated out" of the scope of the hearsay 
rule, would this not be a mere re-phrasing of the same basic 
question of admissibility under a separate category? Would 
not the court, in determining the legal relevance of the 
evidence, be compelled to take into account the same cri-
teria that Morgan has advocated in his proposals to reform 
the hearsay rule? At least one writer who has expressed 
this belief is Ted Finman. 
( 4) TED FINMAN: In an article published in 1962 en-
titled "Implied Assertions as Hearsay : Some Criticisms of 
58 
the Uniform Rules of Evidence", Finman criticizes the 
traditional argument put forward to justify excluding im-
plied assertions from the scope of the hearsay ban. This 
argument runs along the following lines: With express asser-
tions, we have four hearsay dangers, whereas with implied 
assertions we only have two, as the dangers of ambiguity and 
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insincerity are eliminated; thus implied assertions are not 
within the sphere of the exclusionary rule. This argument, 
he argues, is based, however, on two "questionable assump-
tions": 59 
(i) That the four traditional hearsay dangers are the 
only ones that need be considered in assessing the need for 
cross-examination. In fact, Finman points out, reliance 
on implied assertions involves two additional dangers: 
(a) The danger of wrongly classifying the actor's conduct 
as either assertive or non-assertive. As this 
"assertive intent" can only be inferred from the 
actor's conduct or words, the admissibility of which 
is in question, the need for cross-examination in 
this regard is at least as great as in the case of 
the traditional hearsay dangers. 
(b) The danger of drawing a correct inference as to the 
actor's belief from his conduct. In the case of 
express assertions, the declarant's belief is ex-
pressly stated; in the case of implied assertions, 
however, the trier is required to infer this belief 
from a set of possible beliefs, normally resorting 
to that belief which would be shared by a reasonable 
man in the position of the actor. This in turn 
presents further dangers: What if there are several 
possible beliefs, each equally reasonable or plaus-
ible? What if the actor's actual belief does not 
coincide with that of the reasonable man - for in-
stance, if he entertains an illogical belief, or is 
Page 340. 
motivated by abnormal impulses? In such cases, clear-
ly the danger of wrongly inferring a belief would be 
considerable. 
(ii) That the utility of cross-examination is the same in 
respect of each of the four hearsay dangers. This, again, 
60 
is highly questionable. As Morgan attests, the most im-
portant service of cross-examination is in exposing faults 
in perception and memory, its utility being considerably less 
in revealing defects in sincerity and use of language. The 
fact that these latter dangers are substantially reduced in 
the case of implied assertions would therefore seem to be no 
justification for classifying them as non-hearsay. 
The next question, says Finman, is whether there is anything 
in the nature of implied assertions which would provide pro-
tection against the risks of receiving them, and thus serve 
as a substitute for cross-examination. In this enquiry, he 
considers particularly the approach of writers such as 
McCormick who suggested that the importance of the conduct 
to the actor would constitute adequate protection. The 
weakness of this approach, he argues, is that a number of 
factors can affect the reliability of an implied assertion, 
and the importance of the act by itself is no rational basis 
for a comprehensive and satisfactory classification. 
Finrnan then considers the approach adopted in the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (set out above), and comes to the conclu-
sion that to define the hearsay rule as applying only to 
assertive statements and conduct is an unsatisfactory way of 
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resolving the problem. A court would still have to decide 
whether the conduct in question was intended to be assertive 
(and thus hearsay) or non-assertive (and thus non-hearsay), 
an enquiry which would necessitate examining all the usual 
hearsay dangers in drawing an inference as to assertive in-
tent, which dangers could have been materially reduced with 
the aid of cross-examination. And further, even if the 
court were to conclude that the conduct was non-assertive, 
and thus fell outside the scope of the hearsay rule, the 
court would still have to decide whether it was legally re-
levant, using the guidelines set out in Rule 45. This 
would entail balancing the probative value of the evidence 
against the risks of receiving it, which would involve once 
more a consideration of the hearsay dangers. Thus, whether 
the trier considers these risks in terms of the hearsay rule 
or in terms of relevance, the fact remains that the enquiry 
is the same, and instead of ignoring the problem by defining 
hearsay to exclude implied assertions, there is a need for a 
system which (a) helps the court to identify the problem and 
(b) indicates factors which may guide a court in assessing 
the dangers and evaluating their effect. 
81 
The solution which Finman proposes, then, is as follows: 
1. To promote clear perception of the problem, implied 
assertions should be classified as hearsay. 
2. This would not end the matter, however, as they would 
nevertheless be admissible either i. if they fell within 
any presently existing exception to the hearsay rule or 
ii. if they fell within the ambit of a newly-created 
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exception, specifically designed to meet the problem. 
3. The formulation of this new exception could be approached 
in one of two ways: 
i. One could provide that an implied assertion is ad-
missible ONLY under certain specified conditions, 
e g "if the actor, by the conduct constituting the 
assertion, has relied to his detriment on the fact 
that the assertion is offered to prove", or 
ii. one could point out certain factors which could 
guide the court in the exercise of a general discre-
tion to admit such evidence, provided 
a. the declarant is unavailable as a witness and 
b. the court finds that he had an opportunity to 
perceive the matter the evidence is offered to 
prove. Furthermore, the court should satisfy 
itself that cross-examination of the declarant 
would be of no substantial value in revealing 
errors or defects in: 
(A) sincerity or assertive intent - the court 
should consider whether the declarant was as-
sociated with any of the litigants, and 
whether the act or statement preceded the con-
troversy between the parties; 
(B) narrative ability - the court should look 
at whether the conduct might have been moti-
vated by a belief in some other matter; 
(C) memory or perception - the court should 
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consider whether the conduct was an act of the 
declarant himself, whether a long time had 
elapsed between the perception and the act, and 
whether reliance was placed on his powers of 
memory and perception; and 
(D) forming an opinion based on underlying in-
ferences - the court should keep in mind the 
fact that it will be impossible to cross-
examine the declarant on the data on which 
these inferences are based. 
( 5) JACK B WEINSTEIN: An eminent American judge and 
scholar of evidence law, Judge Weinstein is another leading 
writer to suggest that the approach taken in formulating 
the Uniform Rules is not entirely satisfactory in this re-
gard. As the learned author submits, 
"No judge or lawyer should be misled by the 
Uniform Rules' narrow definition of hearsay; 
the argument of hearsay danger should be made 
to the trier in helping him evaluate evidence 
which requires reliance on the credibility of 
an extra-judicial declarant." 82 
Furthermore, he adds, "(tJ here is considerable danger .•• 
that the indirect technique of weakening the hearsay rule 
by narrowing its definition and expanding exceptions will 
83 prevent development of advance warning techniques", 
thereby reducing the control of the court over hearsay of 
limited value. Another fault of the Uniform Rules' ap-
preach, is that they "fail to provide any growth principle 
for the admission of hearsay which is needed and has a 
high probative force but which does not come within one of 
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the exceptions". These considerations prompted the learned 
writer to advocate "a broad new exception that permits hear-
say to come in whenever there is, first, a substantial 
guarantee of trustworthiness and, second, some good reason 
why the hearsay declaration cannot be satisfactorily dupli-
65 
cated by present testimony." This would necessitate 
vesting in the trier a much wider discretion to admit hearsay 
of high and assessable probative force, taking into account 
factors such as surprise, possible prejudice through over-
estimation of force, and the availability of other evidence 
more easily assessed. 
This approach is in use in a number of American federal 
66 
courts, and is well illustrated by the decision in Dallas 
67 County v Commercial Union Assurance Co. In this case 
the appropriately-named Wisdom J admitted in evidence an old 
newspaper account to prove that the courthouse in Selma, 
Alabama, had been damaged by fire fifty years previously. 
The basis for allowing the evidence was not because it was 
"a readily identifiable and happily tagged species of hear-
say exception, but because it is necessary and trustworthy, 
relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial 
judge's exercise of discretion in holding the hearing within 
68 
reasonable bounds". 
In a comment on this case, Judge Weinstein states: "Were 
this general principle adopted explicitly as the main hear-
say rule, it would, in effect, make the present twenty or 
thirty exceptions - depending on how you count them -
examples rather than rigid and limiting categories". 69 
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Some writers object to a general discretionary rule on the 
ground that it leads to uncertainty and adds to the already 
onerous duties of the trial judge. In reply, Weinstein re-
marks that "[s]ome lawyers prefer a precise bad rule to a 
70 
discretionary good one". Moreover, to counter the "uncer-
tainty objection", he suggests that notice in advance should 
be required when hearsay is relied on by a party to litiga-
tion. In addition, the discretion to admit hearsay should 
be exercised in advance of the trial to enable an adversary 
to "investigate and produce evidence in derogation of part-
71 icular hearsay". 
(6) JOHN M MAGUIRE: In contrast with Judge Weinstein's 
72 proposed all-encompassing judicial discretion, Maguire 
proposes a strict and rigidly-defined formulation of hear-
say. While by his own concession his definition is both 
"overwordy and filthily technical", he believes that "only 
precise guidance can lead to escape from the present hearsay 
73 
entanglement". In terms of this definition, Maguire 
submits that evidence of conduct (defined to include both 
action and inaction), whether assertive or non-assertive, 
should fall within the hearsay ban and be excluded (provided 
no suitable exception exists to rescue it), IF it is so 
offered as to call for reliance upon untested perception or 
memory by its maker. Such reliance, he adds, is not called 
for if the judge finds that the conduct occurred 
"(1) when the person was currently perceiving 
the matter, or when he had recently perceived 
the matter and while his recollection of it 
was clear, or (2) under such circumstances 
that the person was subject to the sanctions 
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of cross-examination with respect to the con-
duct (behaviour) and the matter. A finding 
by the judge that the person had adequate 
opportunity to perceive the matter shall raise 
a presumption that he did adequately perceive 
it • II 74 
This test is certainly not, as the learned author himself 
readily concedes, one hundred per cent satisfactory. What 
if the person who had the opportunity to cross-examine the 
actor were not the same person as the party against whom the 
evidence is offered? 75 As Maguire points out, it then 
"becomes debatable whether he should be subjected to the 
risk of evidence originally developed against only the 
other's opposition". Maguire assumes, moreover, that non-
assertive conduct "presents no issue of sincerity, only per-
76 
ception or memory or both being at issue", an assumption 
which, as has been argued above, is highly debatable. 
There is, however, an even more serious flaw in this argu-
ment, a flaw which is, moreover, common to many of the 
arguments presented above, most notably those of Finman. 
Both Finrnan and Maguire seem to model their arguments around 
the conventional theory that hearsay is to be excluded on 
the ground that the actor/declarant was not subject to cross-
examination when he acted or spoke, was not under oath, thus 
rendering his evidence 'untested' and liable to mislead the 
trier of fact. This "conventional wisdom", however, is 
challenged by Schiff as being "functionally inadequate" and 
77 
"far from the whole story". 
7. STANLEY SCHIFF: A leading Canadian authority on 
the law of evidence, Schiff has recently published an 
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article entitled "Hearsay and the Hearsay Rule : A Functional 
78 
View" in which he challenges many traditional and conven-
tional notions surrounding the hearsay rule. The learned 
author offers two propositions which he describes as seem-
ingly "heretical to many lawyers and would-be law reform-
ers": 79 First that the hearsay rule "makes good sense in 
its place within that body of legal doctrine governing the 
working of the adversary trial system", and second that 
"without benefit of statutory backing, judges should admit 
any item of hearsay evidence at a trial when the purposes of 
the hearsay rule within our litigation system would be 
served no more than barely under the particular circum-
so 
stances". 
(I) To substantiate his first proposition, he examines 
carefully the demands which the adversary trial system puts 
on a person who comes to testify at a trial about some part-
icular relevant matter. Such witness is subject to at 
least eight procedural constraints, all of which were con-
sidered in some depth at an earlier stage when the rationale 
81 
of the hearsay rule was examined. It was mentioned there 
that, because none of these procedural demands is satisfied 
in the case of the hearsay declarant, whereas all the re-
quirements have to be satisfied when a witness gives oral, 
original evidence, Schiff sees the function of the hearsay 
rule as barring "evidence of words offered to prove the 
matter they assert when none of the standard demands imposed 
82 
upon testimonial evidence has been satisfied". 
In the light of this perspective of the rationale of the 
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hearsay rule, he submits that the traditional formulation of 
its scope is too narrow; an adequate definition should 
cover both express and implied assertions, which include 
both non-assertive statements and non-assertive conduct. To 
illustrate the inaccuracy of the traditional approach, he 
discusses the case of R v Wysochan 83 (discussed above) , 84 
where W testified that the deceased had reached out her hand 
to her husband, after she had been shot, and had hugged him 
tightly, saying, "I love you, dear." This evidence was ad-
mitted by the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan as tending to 
prove that the husband had not shot her. However, Schiff 
submits, the same difficulties are raised here as in the 
case of an express assertion to the same effect, viz. that 
"the wife was not subject to any of the witness conditions 
at any time before or while she acted in the way described 
and, were the evidence admitted, the opponent and the trier 
85 of fact would suffer exactly the same disadvantages." 
Therefore, the learned author adds, in the light of the 
abovementioned reasons for the hearsay rule, all those deci-
sions which take the view that implied assertions fall out-
side the hearsay ban (such as Lloyd v Powell Duffryn Steam 
Coal Co 86 and Ratten v The Queen 87 and Wysochan's case 
itself) must be considered incorrect and counter to the cor-
rect view expressed in Wright v Tatham. This misconception 
of the hearsay concept, Schiff continues, has also been 
adopted by the Law Reform Commission of Canada, as reflected 
by the definition of hearsay set out ins 27(2) of the (then) 
88 proposed Evidence Code. In this section, 'hearsay' is de-
fined to mean "a statement, other than one made by a person 
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while testifying at a proceeding, that is offered in evidence 
to prove the truth of the statement", while 'statement' is 
defined as "an oral or written assertion or non-verbal con-
duct of a person intended by him as an assertion". This 
definition excludes implied assertions from the scope of the 
hearsay rule, and is thus subject to the objections already 
discussed. 
(II) Schiff then proceeds to consider his second proposi-
tion, viz. that the courts, even without the benefit of sta-
tutory backing, should admit hearsay evidence, in the form of 
both express and implied assertions, when the purposes of the 
rule in the adversary trial system would not be substantially 
served in the circumstances of the particular case. If a 
declarant is available to give oral evidence, he argues, then 
there is no good reason for waiving the standard procedural 
demands. But where he is unavailable, through no fault of 
the proponent, then the judge should allow the evidence "if 
the introduction would not at that time at that trial sub-
stantially harm any of the interests our system's demands 
89 
upon witnesses protect". 
This approach, he suggests, is not quite as heretical in 
Canada as it would at first seem. In the case of Ares v 
90 yenner, for instance, the Supreme Court of Canada threw 
aside the shackles of Myers v DPP 91 and admitted in evidence 
certain hospital records even though no existing exception 
could be invoked to allow their reception. The court unani-
mously adopted the minority view expressed in Myers' case, 
especially the views of Lord Pearce, thus creating an ad hoc 
Page 350. 
exception to the hearsay rule. In the words of Hall J, in 
whose judgment the other judges concurred, 
"I am of the opinion that this Court should 
adopt and follow the minority view rather than 
resort to saying in effect: 'This judge-made 
law needs to be restated to meet modern condi-
tions, but we must leave it to Parliament and 
the ten legislatures to do the job.'" 92 
Such judicial frankness and boldness is a welcome relief 
from the over-conservative, tenacious adherence to dogma 
which has entrenched many debatable premisses so solidly and 
inflexibly into our hearsay law. Regrettably, it is highly 
unlikely that the South African Appellate Division will fol-
low suit, particularly in the light of the decision in Vul-
can Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v South African Railways and Har-
93 bours. In this case the court refused to recognize 
"the principle of necessity as a basis for relaxing the rule 
against hearsay beyond the well-established exceptions", 94 
indicating the reluctance of our courts to depart from the 
95 
traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
What then of the merits of Schiff's approach? It is re-
spectfully submitted that this approach represents the most 
scientific and logical solution to the problem that has yet 
been proffered. Its appeal lies in its rational explora-
tion of the rationale, not only of the hearsay rule, but of 
the entire accusatorial and adversary procedural models 
which the rule is designed to serve. It has a flexibility 
and pristine logic which render it academically sound, while 
never i9noring the practical and functional features of our 
trial procedure. The only objection, it is submitted, is 
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that the model is perhaps incomplete, in that no guidelines 
are suggested to assist the court in evaluating the preju-
dice caused to the protected interests, or in identifying 
any safeguards inherent in the evidence or the circumstances 
of the case which could serve to mitigate this harm. In 
88 
this regard, the factors suggested by Finman (supra) could 
assist the court, but, whereas Finman's comments were con-
fined to the potency of cross-examination, the court would 
be required to conduct a similar inquiry in respect of any 
of the procedural demands which, on the facts of the case, 
require consideration. 
Group III: A distinction should be drawn between non-
assertive statements, which are hearsay, and 
non-assertive conduct, which is not: 
This "compromise solution", says Weinberg, represents one of 
the "three distinct views which Professor Cross has pro-
pounded in this 87 area". Certainly Cross has changed his 
mind more than once on this subject, a charge to which the 
learned author himself pleads guilty, maintaining, however, 
88 
that he is "unashamed". It is interesting, therefore, 
to follow chronologically this changing perspective. 
( 1 ) 88 1956 : "The Scope of the Rule Against Hearsay". 
In this article, Cross asked whether there is any logical 
basis for distinguishing between 'apparent belief translated 
into action' and 'apparent belief translated into words'. 
He seemed to accept without question that non-assertive 
100 
statements of the type considered in Teper v ~ are hear-
say and inadmissible, but suggested that conduct should be 
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divided into two categories: 
(i) "Conduct which is relied on as equivalent to an 
assertion of the actor's perception of or belief 
101 
in a particular fact", such as the conduct of a 
doctor who examines an accident victim and places 
him in a mortuary van, which is relied on as equi-
valent to an assertion by him that he believes the 
victim to be dead. Such conduct, Cross said, 
should be rejected as evidence of the existence of 
the fact believed, unless it can be admitted by 
way of exception to the hearsay rule. 
(ii) Conduct relied on solely as the "basis of an infer-
ence to the actor's contemporaneous state of mind 
102 
or physical sensation", such as a wife's treat-
ment of her child as illegitimate, relied on to 
support an inference of her belief in its illegiti-
macy and thence to the fact of her adultery. Such 
conduct, he argued, is not within the scope of the 
hearsay rule; it derives its probative value from 
the behaviour, not the mere assertion of the person 
whose mental state or physical sensation is in ques-
tion, and the evidence is thus 'circumstantial'. 
It is possible, he conceded, that such an actor 
"may have been guilty of simulation", but contended 
that "this is less common than lying, and more 
likely to be discerned by the witness who deposes 
103 
to the conduct." 
With respect, I find it difficult to justify this distinc-
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tion: if the conduct of the doctor may be regarded as the 
equivalent of an assertion such as, "I believe the victim 
to be dead", then surely the conduct of the wife may simi-
larly be regarded as the equivalent of an assertion such 
as, "I believe my child to be illegitimate". Furthermore, 
the same untested hearsay dangers are present in both sets 
of conduct, and the labelling of the second category as 
'circumstantial evidence' does nothing to solve the problem. 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that at this stage 
Cross would include within his definition of hearsay all 
non-assertive statements and certain, although not all, non-
assertive conduct. 
104 (2) 1969 : "The Periphery of Hearsay". By now, the 
learned author had formed a consistent view of the nature 
of non-assertive conduct. He considered the conduct of the 
sea cap+-.ain who embarked on a ship with his family after 
thoroughly examining it - one of the examples cited by Baron 
Parke in Wright's case - and concluded as follows: 
"With respect, I doubt the propriety of treat-
ing conduct which was not intended to be 
assertive as something to which the rule 
against hearsay applies. Admittedly many of 
the dangers against which the rule provides 
are present if the evidence of the behaviour 
of the deceased captain is received. He is 
not available for cross-examination, he may 
have been a very incompetent captain, or he 
may have had reasons for going aboard which 
were sufficiently pressing to make him take 
the risk attendant on the defects in the ship 
which he observed. On the other hand, one 
can say that the fact that deeds generally 
speak louder than words is sufficient justifi-
cation for treating that which was not intended 
by the agent to be assertive as falling outside 
the ban on hearsay. To my mind, however, 
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there is a far more cogent reason for adopting 
this course; if such conduct is to be treated 
as hearsay whenever it is proved as equivalent 
to an assertion by someone other than the wit-
ness who is testifying there will be no end to 
the situations to which the hearsay rule will 
apply." 105 
By 1975, Cross was even more adamant about drawing this dis-
tinction between non-assertive statements and conduct, say-
ing that it "has even been suggested that the rule against 
hearsay applies to conduct which was not intended to be 
assertive if reliance is placed on the conduct as an implied 
106 
assertion". He rejects this seemingly preposterous sug-
gestion - despite the fact that he himself was one of its 
proponents 19 years before- on the ground that" ~]f the 
rule were to be held to extend to assertions implied from 
conduct not intended to be assertive, as distinct from ver-
bal utterances not intended to be assertive, its scope 
107 
would be unduly wide." 
Weinberg, correctly, it is submitted, rejects this distinc-
108 
tion as being unjustifiable. It is based, he says, on 
the assumption that once a piece of evidence has been 
labelled hearsay, it should summarily be rejected. We 
should not distort the scope of the hearsay rule merely be-
cause the labelling of non-assertive conduct as hearsay 
would force us to create more exceptions to the exclusionary 
rule, and, he submits, if we had "recognized all along that 
implied assertions logically must be classified as hearsay, 
it is probable that the current unsatisfactory rigid hearsay 
rule with its inflexible exceptions would never have 
emerged in its present form, and we would not now be faced 
108 
with the urgent need to modify it." 
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Moreover, it is submitted, it is difficult to understand 
why deeds should "speak louder than words". Implicit in 
the nature of both non-assertive statements and conduct is 
the fact that the declarant/actor did not intend to commun-
icate his belief. The danger of insincerity is thus 
materially reduced. What other dangers, however, can be 
said to be reduced by the fact that a person unintention-
ally conveys his belief by way of conduct instead of words? 
I submit none. Admittedly it is less likely that a person 
would stage a charade to misrepresent his belief by conduct 
than by words, but this relates only to the danger of as-
sertive intent, which must be eliminated before the evi-
dence may be labelled "non-assertive". Once it is so 
labelled, all the other dangers remain intact. The 
distinction advanced by Cross is, therefore, it is re-
spectfully submitted, of no assistance. 
(3) 110 1979: Cross on Evidence (5th ed). In his 
last pronouncement of the law on this topic, the learned 
author was somewhat more ambivalent in his treatment of 
implied assertions, stating that "on the present state of 
the authorities more than one view can justifiably be 
111 
taken on the question". He concluded, however, with 
112 
the following "highly tentative" submissions: 
(i) The hearsay rule only applies to statements in-
tended by their makers to be assertive. 
(ii) Statements of the form "Hello X", however, in 
the context of one person greeting another, must 
be considered as being assertive, expressing not 
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merely greeting but also recognition. They 
must therefore be considered hearsay if ten-
dered as evidence of the presence of X at the 
place in question, in accordance with the deci-
. i 113 
s1on n Teper v ~· 
(iii) On the other hand, verbal and non-verbal conduct 
not intended to be assertive falls outside the 
ban of the hearsay rule even when the conduct is 
only relevant because it points to the fact that 
the actor entertains a particular belief (e g 
the ship's captain example discussed above). 
It is respectfully submitted that these statements are 
confusing and contradictory. If "Hello X" is to be re-
garded as assertive of the fact of X's presence, then 
there is no logical reason for withholding the same status 
from all non-assertive statements or verbal conduct. This 
conclusion, of course, conflicts with submission (iii). 
Then, if non-assertive statements are considered to be 
hearsay, in line with what was said above, there is no 
logical basis for treating non-assertive conduct any dif-
ferently. 
Cross's last submissions on this question would therefore 
seem to be a final, valiant but unsuccessful attempt to 
strike a balance between the authority of cases such as 
Wright and Teper on the one hand, and the accepted limi-
tations and inflexibility of the exclusionary rule on the 
other. 
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Group IV: Implied assertions, whether non-assertive 
statements or non-assertive conduct, are 
not within the scope of the hearsay rule 
at all. 
(1) WIGMORE: Few discussions of evidentiary topics 
are complete without a consideration of the views of Wig-
more. On the question of implied assertions, however, the 
learned author, somewhat uncharacteristically, does not 
seem to adopt a clear stance. In fact, two directly con-
flicting views are to be found in different passages of his 
114 
Treatise: 
(i) Para 459: The learned author asks us to consider 
the case of an observer who looks out of the win-
dow of a comfortable home and sees that the per-
sons on the highway are shuddering and turning up 
their collars. From this, he argues, the natural 
inference is that it is extremely cold outside. 
If this evidence is tendered to establish the 
latter inference, he asks, is this an infringement 
of the hearsay rule? The answer, he says, is no, 
for the following reason: 
"The Hearsay rule excludes extra-judicial 
assertions only, i e deliberate utterances in 
terms affirming a fact; and, although in 
effect an inference from conduct may be the 
same in result as an inference from assertion, 
nevertheless the two are distinct. Nor does 
the policy or spirit of the Hearsay rule 
apply; for that policy is to test the asser-
tions of persons regarded as witnesses, by 
learning the source of their knowledge and by 
exposing its elements of weakness and error, 
if possible; so that where the evidence is 
not dealing with a person's assertion as de-
(ii) 
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riving force from his personal character, 
knowledge, or experience, it is not within 
the scope of the policy of the Hearsay 
rule." (Italics added). 
Para 267: Wigmore here considers the example 
of the conduct of parents, who always treated a 
child as their own, which is offered to estab-
lish legitimacy. The belief of the parents, he 
submits, is "of service only evidentially, i e 
as forming a second step of inference to some 
other fact which forms the ultimate object of 
proof", and concludes that such "double infer-
ence" is "practically equivalent to accepting ••. 
the parents' conduct in a purely assertive and 
testimonial fashion". If such evidence were to 
be received as circumstantial, he argues, "could 
not any and every hearsay statement be brought 
in upon the same plea, by resolving it into a 
double inference, namely, by translating A's 
assertion, that he saw M strike N, into an infer-
ence from his utterance to his belief and from 
his belief to the fact asserted?" There is, 
therefore, he submits, a strong argument "that 
the pretended double inference of a circumstan-
tial sort is equivalent to giving credit to a 
testimonial assertion, and involves therefore a 
danger of evasion of the Hearsay rule". 
Imbued with that "instinct of compromise which has 
affected so many British institutions", the common law, 
Wigmore submits, conceded something to both principles, 
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viz. the rule against hearsay and the concept of circurnstan-
tial evidence. In a few cases, it yielded to the theory of 
circumstantial evidence (e g the cases concerning marriage, 
paternity, testamentary belief etc); in others it allowed 
the implied assertion to be admitted by way of an exception 
to the hearsay rule; and in all remaining instances, along 
the lines of the judgment in Wright v Tatham, "it denied 
the propriety of the circumstantial inference and insisted 
on the application of the Hearsay rule to conduct which was 
115 
equivalent to an extra-judicial assertion". 
Wigmore's views, it is submitted, reflect well the confused 
and inconsistent state of the law on this topic, but do 
little towards clarifying matters or providing a satisfac-
tory framework for reform. 
( 2) EUSTACE SELIGl-tAN: ------~----------- In an article entitled."An 
116 
Exception to the Hearsay Rule", Seligman expressed the 
117 
view that "only conduct apparently intended to convey 
thought can come under the ban of the hearsay rule". His 
reasons for this conclusion were as follows: 
"When there is no intention to conununicate to 
any one there is very much less chance that 
the act was done in order to deceive, and 
hence the third and fundamental danger in 
admitting hearsay does not here exist, or at 
least not so strongly. Furthermore, as a 
rule the fact believed in this latter class 
of cases is a simple one, and hence the 
first and second dangers [i e inaccurate per-
ception and faulty memor~ are decreased." 118 
This arg.ument represents the traditional case for receiv-
ing implied assertions as non-hearsay, and rests, as has 
already been seen, on two misconceptions. First, whereas 
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the hearsay dangers may sometimes be reduced in any given 
implied assertion, it is rare that they will all be en-
tirely eliminated. And secondly, in those instances 
where the dangers are eliminated or considered suffi-
ciently reduced as to guarantee the reliability of the 
evidence, the position is indistinguishable from that of 
an express hearsay assertion, the reliability of which is 
vouchsafed by circumstantial evidence. In the latter in-
stance, a strong case can be put forward for admissibility, 
but the fact that the evidence relies for its value on the 
credibility of an absent actor or declarant, and that none 
of the accepted courtroom devices are available to the 
adversary of the party tendering the evidence, point 
strongly to the hearsay-like quality of the evidence. In 
appropriate cases, it is submitted, such evidence should 
certainly be admitted. But to deprive it of its hearsay 
label would be logically untenable and could lead to a dis-
regard of both the dangers inherent in the evidence, and 
of the safeguards which should be looked at to ensure that 
such dangers are minimized. This approach, in short, re-
presents a flagrant disregard of the values on which the 
hearsay rule is based. 
(3) PHIPSON: As author of one of the most authori~ 
tative English texts on evidence, Phipson is perhaps the 
most influential opponent to the inclusion of implied 
assertions within the hearsay label. He submitted that 
the evidence in Wright's case was excluded not as hearsay 
but as opinion, and rejected the labelling of such evidence 
as hearsay. 
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In any event, he added, 
"the doctrine of Wright v Tatham, on this point, 
has apparently never been followed, acts of 
treatment being admitted or excluded on grounds 
of relevancy only and not of hearsay." 11 i 
120 This observation has been criticized by Cross and, signi-
ficantly, the authors of the most recent edition of Phipson 
On Evidence. In the 13th edition of that text book, the 
following passage appears: 
"It is submitted that the better view is to re-
gard the admissibility of certain instances of 
'conduct' either as being within the 'res 
gestae' rule or as particular exceptions to 
the doctrine in Wright v Tatham. There appears 
to be no decision of the courts which supports 
Phipson's rejection of the doctrine." 1 2 1 
Although Phipson's views have made a substantial impact on 
the way in which our courts regard hearsay, it would be 
anomalous to rely on a view which has been rejected in the 
latest edition of his book, particularly in the absence of 
any authority supporting the original contention. 
Conclusion 
Out of this discordant mass of conflicting views it is, as 
122 
Weinberg intimates, difficult to find consensus on any 
particular approach. What does emerge, however, is a 
general feeling of dissatisfaction about the somewhat ran-
dom treatment of implied assertions at the hands of the 
courts. Of the various proposals to remedy this problem, 
it is submitted that the solution espoused by the modern 
American writers on this subject is the most scientific. 
The appeal of this approach lies in the achievement of a 
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logical, holistic image of the hearsay concept. The in-
elusion of implied assertions within the hearsay fold is 
in harmony with the theoretical foundations of the rule 
discussed in Chapter III. It does, however, necessitate 
a re-examination of the criteria governing admissibility, 
as the present structure of exceptions is ill-suited to 
the peculiar demands of implied assertions, and the exclu-
sian of implied assertions falling outside these excep-
tions will often deprive the court of probative, valuable 
evidence. The immediate need, therefore, is for a system 
of 'reliability factors' to determine the admissibility of 
implied assertions. However, because of the general dis-
satisfaction with the law relating to express assertions, 
it is equally important to extend the enquiry to such 
assertions and investigate how our hearsay law, as a whole, 
may be improved. During the course of this chapter, 
123 
attention was focussed on the views of Prof. Schiff, 
who advocated predicating the admissibility of hearsay on 
the fundamental dictates of the adversary trial system. 
In this approach, it is submitted, lies the key to the 
problem, and, in the remaining chapters, suggestions will 
be made as to how this model may be employed as an instru-
ment in reforming South African hearsay law. 
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Chapter IX 
CODIFICATION A WAY OUT OF THE HEARSAY THICKET? 
It was submitted in Chapter III that the abolition of the 
hearsay rule in its entirety was unjustifiable, and that 
the exclusion of some hearsay was economically cost-
efficient. In the ensuing discussion, two major en-
quiries presented themselves: 
( 1 ) How should hearsay be defined? If some hearsay 
warrants exclusion, we should know with some degree 
of accuracy which evidence falls within the hearsay 
concept, thus demanding further scrutiny as regards 
its admissibility. 
(2) What criteria may be used to separate that hearsay 
-
which should be received from that which should be 
excluded? 
Our common law, riddled as it is with irreconcilable deci-
sions and intractible dogma, would seem to be incapable of 
yielding satisfactory answers to these questions, and the 
only solution is to codify our hearsay law. To argue, as 
some no doubt would, that such a step is unnecessary, be-
cause the hearsay rule "works in practice", would seem to 
be an evasion of the problem. What merit is there in a 
rule that operates best when it is ignored? The rigours 
of our hearsay law are mitigated in practice by a seem-
ingly tacit agreement that the full import of the rule is 
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not to be taken seriously, thus creating a licence for ig-
norance and abuse. It is submitted that this balm of 
forgetfulness cannot seriously be advanced as a counter to 
a scientific codification that would allow the realities 
of legal practice to square with sound theoretical norms. 
In resorting to legislation, we would, in any event, be 
following the pattern set by other Anglo-American juris-
dictions, where the reform of the hearsay rule has been 
the subject of thorough examination by Law Reform Cornrnis-
sions, resulting, in many cases, in codification. Our 
tardiness in following this precedent may, however, work 
to our advantage, as we find ourselves in the enviable 
position of being able to draw on the experience of these 
countries, as well as the cases and literature which the 
evidence codes have spawned. To legislate on so thorny 
an issue as hearsay is certainly hazardous, and, in many 
cases, proposed codes have ended ignominiously on the 
scrapheap. It would be in our interests to learn from 
such experiences, for it would be regrettable to repeat 
these errors. 
It would no doubt be instructive, therefore, to examine 
and compare the reform of hearsay law in all the Anglo-
American countries, viz. England, Scotland, the United 
States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This, how-
ever, would be a formidable task, the adequate perform-
, 
ance of which would require a dissertation of its own. 
For the purposes of the present dissertation, however, 
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attention will be focussed on only two countries apart 
from South Africa, viz. the United States and Australia. 
My reasons for this choice are as follows: 
(A) The United States: 
(a) Being the largest of the "hearsay jurisdictions", 
the United States reform programme has affected 
more people than any other, and has yielded by far 
the greatest volume of academic comment on the 
question. 
(b) The time span of this reform programme covers over 
forty years and three major Evidence Codes, com-
piled by some of the leading writers on the Law of 
Evidence. 
(c) Of these three codes, only the most recent has 
found recognition, the first two having been re-
jected out of hand. The reasons for the negative 
response of legal practitioners may profitably be 
investigated by any body intent on reform. 
(d) The fact that the reform programme in the United 
States is, for practical purposes, virtually com-
plete, affords us an excellent opportunity to ex-
amine the working of these measures in the prac-
tice of the courts. 
(e) The nature of these reforms is also of great 
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interest: The Federal Rules of Evidence, the most 
recent of the codes, adopts a hybrid solution to 
the hearsay problem, setting out detailed, speci-
fic exceptions to the rule, but supplementing them 
with residual exceptions based on a judicial dis-
cretion. Because the desirability and ambit of 
such a discretion will inevitably lie at the ful-
crum of any debate concerning reform of our hear-
say law, the United States solution is of great 
interest and significance. 
(B) Australia: 
(a) Unlike the United States, where the reform pro-
gramme has already been completed and implemented, 
Australian attempts to reform the law are still in 
embryonic form. Although many of the individual 
states have legislated in this regard, plans are 
afoot to draft a comprehensive Uniform Evidence 
Act, entailing a codification of hearsay law. 
Australia, therefore, in much the same way as 
South Africa, finds itself in a position to choose 
from the various approaches adopted by the other 
jurisdictions. 
(b) As a preliminary step to such reform, the Austra-
lian Law Reform Commission has drafted research 
papers on the hearsay rule, containing various re-
commendations and setting out the choices con-
fronting the legislature. Two aspects of these 
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proposals are of particular interest: 
(i) the Commission's choice of definition so as to 
include implied assertions - both verbal and 
2 
nonverbal - within the hearsay concept; and 
(ii) the decision to minimize the judicial discre-
3 
tion, a recommendation which is, in a later 
4 
paper, reconsidered and left open after a 
discussion of the relative merits and faults 
of such an approach. 
The reform measures - both enacted and proposed - in the 
United States and Australia have therefore, in different 
ways, much to offer us. In what follows, I intend to 
examine these programmes separately, paying particular 
attention to two aspects of the reforms: 
(i.) the choice of hearsay definition and 
(ii.) the employment and scope of a judicial dis-
cretion. 
(A) THE UNITED STATES 
Writing in 1959, a leading Canadian commentator on evi-
dence law was forced to concede the following: 
"As a Canadian, I hesitate to admit it, but it 
is very clear to me, that in the field of 
evidence law, a combination of scholarship, 
determination, good common sense and genius 
has been at work in the United States for the 
past half century or more to reform the law, 
and the fruits of that sustained and combined 
effort of the bench, bar and teaching profes-
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sion in that country are now available in con-
venient form and are now being plucked by more 
than one legally advanced state of the Union." 5 
The American harvest has indeed been rich, and, as the 
learned writer predicted, the fruits of this laudable ef-
fort have been gleaned by an increasing number of states 
and territories. Largely responsible for this process 
has been the ••convenient form" in which this scientific 
thought has been wrapped, viz. three evidentiary codes 
compiled over a period of approximately thirty years. The 
impact of these codes on hearsay law has been substantial, 
providing us in South Africa with a solid foundation on 
which to embark on a programme of reform. 
Plans to codify the Law of Evidence, including hearsay, 
may be traced back to 1942. In that year, the American 
e Law Institute drafted its Model Code of Evidence, the 
provisions of which, it was envisaged, would supplant the 
common law and all statutes inconsistent with the Code. 
These aspirations, however, were doomed to failure. The 
reception of the Code by the profession, according to one 
7 
learned commentator, 11Varied between chilliness and 
heated antagonism", and it failed to find acceptance in a 
single state. Largely responsible for this unanimous re-
pudiation, was the erosion of the exclusionary rule on 
two fronts: First, a narrowing of the definition of hear-
say to exclude non-assertive conduct; in terms of Rule 
501 (1), a statement is not hearsay unless it is either in-
tended to be an assertion, or is offered for a purpose re-
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quiring an assumption that it was so intended. Secondly, 
and more significently, a widening of the exceptions to 
the rule to such a degree, that the Code "substantially 
. 8 
read the hearsay rule out of ex1stence". Apart from a 
general liberalization of the traditional exceptions, the 
Model Code created two new far-reaching exceptions which 
particularly aroused the ire of the conservative legal 
profession. These are contained in Rule 503, which pro-
vides: 
"Evidence of a hearsay declaration is admissible 
if the judge finds that the declarant (a) is 
unavailable as a witness, or (b) is present and 
subject to cross-examination". 
Undaunted by the hostile"reaction to the .Code, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
prepared and published the Uniform Rules of Evidence in 
1953. Rule 63 defines "hearsay" as "evidence of a state-
ment which is made other than by a witness while testify-
ing at the hearing offered to prove the truth of the 
matter stated", while "statement" is defined in Rule 62(1) 
to include "not only an oral or written expression but 
also nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as a 
substitute for words in expressing the matter stated". The 
Uniform Rules, therefore, retain and further entrench the 
narrow assertion-oriented definition of hearsay set out in 
the Model Code, a definition which has not been univer-
8 
sally acclaimed. As regards the exceptions to the rule, 
however, the Uniform Rules are somewhat more conservative 
than their much-maligned predecessor. The general excep-
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tion relating to statements of unavailable declarants, in 
particular, is substantially watered down, admissibility 
now being made conditional upon the judge's finding them 
to be "made by the declarant at a time when the matter 
had been recently perceived by him and while his recollec-
tion was clear, and made in good faith prior to the com-
10 
mencement of the action". 
Despite this concession to traditionalism and conservatism, 
the Uniform Rules were only marginally more successful 
than the Model Code, and were adopted, in whole or in part, 
11 
in only a handful of states or territories. In stark 
contrast, however, the recently enacted Federal Rules of 
Evidence have been highly successful. As of the begin-
ning of 1982, twenty-one states had adopted versions of 
12 
the Federal Rules, prompting one writer to remark that 
"before long states without a similar evidence code will 
13 be exceptional". 
larity be ascribed? 
To what may this unprecedented popu-
Wellborn submits that the major rea-
son is the orthodox, traditional approach which the 
drafters chose to follow, flavouring the Rules with an 
14 
"intrinsic characteristic of proven market value". 
Professors Wright and Graham, in fact, in their treatise 
15 
on federal procedure, call the Rules "not a true codi-
fication but simply an authoritative compilation of the 
caselaw", maintaining that "it is difficult to see how 
adoption of the Federal Rules will improve the law of any 
state". 
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Before adopting this approach, the Advisory Committee con-
sidered three possible solutions to the hearsay question: 18 
(1) Abolish the rule against hearsay and admit all hear-
say. This, the Committee conceded, would be the 
simplest solution", but one which would require some qual-
ification. It should not be allowed to abolish automati-
cally "the giving of testimony under ideal conditions"; 
if the declarant were available, then compliance with these 
ideal conditions should be made optional with either party. 
What, however, if the declarant were unavailable? The 
Committee considered Rule 503 of the Model Code, which made 
"no distinctions in terms of degrees of noncompliance with 
the ideal conditions" and which exacted "no quid pro quo in 
the form of assurances of trustworthiness", and concluded 
that it was "unconvinced of the wisdom of abandoning the 
traditional requirement of some particular assurance of 
credibility as a condition precedent to admitting the hear-
say declaration of an unavailable declarant". Further-
more, the Committee added, if the hearsay rule were 
abolished, the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment 
would, in criminal cases, still operate to exclude much 
hearsay evidence. This would create a split between 
civil and criminal evidence which the Committee felt to be 
an "undesirable development". 
In reje9ting this solution, the Advisory Committee was no 
doubt greatly influenced by the hostile reception 
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of the ill-fated Model Code. In this regard, we in South 
Africa would do well to learn from the American experience. 
The legal profession is notoriously conservative and would 
not welcome the demise of so well-established a bastion of 
evidentiary law. Even if legislation were enacted to 
abolish the rule, it is unlikely that judges, inured to 
the system of excluding hearsay, would attach much, if any, 
weight to such evidence. Furthermore, as the Advisory 
Committee observed, the abolition of the hearsay rule would 
require some qualification, particularly where the declar-
ant is available to be called as a witness. 
The Committee's comments concerning the confrontation clause 
in the Sixth Amendment should not be regarded as being 
totally inapplicable to us in South Africa. The fact that 
we do not have such a clause, and that the abolition of the 
hearsay rule would not create a "split" between civil and 
criminal evidence, does not reduce the need for such a 
principle in criminal cases. At present, this need is 
served - albeit inadequately - by the hearsay rule, and the 
abolition of this rule would serve to exacerbate the prob-
lem instead of remedying it. 
(2) Admit hearsay possessing sufficient probative force, 
but with procedural safeguards. This approach entails 
abandonment of the existing system of class exceptions in 
favour of individual treatment of each item of evidence in 
a particular case, an approach which,the Committee pointed 
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out, has been "impressively advocated" by leading academic 
17 
commentators. Admissibility would be determined by 
"weighing the probative force of the evidence against the 
possibility of prejudice, waste of time, and the avail-
ability of more satisfactory evidence", and the tradi-
tional hearsay exceptions would merely be factors to be 
considered in assessing probative force. This approach 
would, the Committee opined, require some procedural safe-
guards, such as "notice of intention to use hearsay, free 
comment by the judge on the weight of the evidence, and a 
greater measure of authority in both trial and appellate 
judges to deal with evidence on the basis of weight". 
Despite the obvious merits of this solution, the Advisory 
Committee rejected it on the grounds that it was unsuit-
able, "involving too great a measure of judicial discre-
tion, minimizing the predictability of rulings, enhancing 
the difficulties of preparation for trial, adding a fur-
ther element to the already over-complicated congeries of 
pre-trial procedures, and requiring substantially dif-
ferent rules for civil and criminal cases". Furthermore, 
the Committee added, the probative value of hearsay only 
differed from the probative value of original evidence in 
one respect, viz. the absence of the oath, cross-examina-
tion and demeanour as aids in determining credibility; to 
exclude evidence on this ground, merely because the judge 
does not believe it,would be "altogether atypical" and 
18 
"extraordinary". 
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The last-mentioned comment of the Committee is particularly 
difficult to comprehend in the light of its adoption of 
solution (3) (below). To reject a discretionary power to 
exclude hearsay on the grounds mentioned above in favour of 
a general exclusionary rule accompanied by a series of de-
fined exceptions would seem to be irreconcilable with this 
view of hearsay theory. If the absence of the standard 
procedural safeguards is insufficient to justify the exclu-
sion of hearsay in respect of solution (2), then it is 
surely an even less adequate justification for expounding a 
general exclusionary rule as laid down in solution (3). 
The exclusion of at least some hearsay is either justifi-
able or unjustifiable, and the machinery effecting this 
exclusion - whether it be a judicial discretion or a 
general exclusionary rule - can have no bearing on this 
preliminary issue. 
The other reasons furnished by the Committee for re-
jecting this solution are, it is submitted, either similar-
ly unconvincing or inapplicable to South Africa. Consider 
these objections individually: 
(a) This solution involves too great a measure of judi-
cial discretion and minimizes the predictability of rul-
ings: Judge Weinstein once commented, rather wryly, that 
"[s]ome lawyers prefer a precise bad rule to a discretion-
1a 
ary goo~ one", and, while the learned writer expresses 
some sympathy with the objections such lawyers had towards 
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a discretionary power, he finds himself unable to share 
their mistrust of its fairness and certainty. The force 
of their objection, he adds, can moreover be reduced by 
requiring 11 notice in advance when hearsay intended to be 
20 
used does not fall within one of the standard exceptions ... 
Where the need for such hearsay only becomes apparent at 
the trial itself, however, the court should again have a 
discretion to dispense with the requirement of notice in 
appropriate cases. While this approach is not, as the 
learned writer himself concedes, without its faults, its 
inherent flexibility would seem to be far more conducive 
to the attainment of justice than the 11Victorian rigid-
't II 21 1 y of the traditional ap?roach, which at times seems 
to resemble a game of Russian roulette in the arbitrary 
and capricious way it separates admissible and inadrnis-
sible hearsay. 
(b) It enhances the difficulties of preparation for 
trial and adds a further element to the already over-
complicated pre-trial procedures: No doubt the require-
ment of notice of intention to tender hearsay evidence 
will increase the pre-trial burden of counsel, but this 
would not seem to be an insuperable obstacle. Where a 
party wishes to call an expert to express an opinion, our 
rules of court in South Africa require that he give his 
opponent at least fourteen days notice of his intention 
to do so, and, in addition, deliver to his opponent a 
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summary of the expert's testimony at least ten days before 
22 
the hearing. Our courts have held, however, that 
these rules do not preclude an expert, in appropriate 
cases, from testifying where notice has not been given. 23 
Similar rules could be devised for dealing with hearsay 
evidence, and, as in the case of expert testimony, they 
would not be likely to cause much difficulty. Any in-
crease in counsel's pre-trial burden would be more than 
offset by the increased facility with which he could prove 
his case. 
(c) It would create different rules for criminal and 
civil cases: Because of the absence of a constitutional 
confrontation clause, this objection is inapplicable to 
South Africa. 
The reasons of the Advisory Committee for rejecting solu-
tion (2) would therefore seem to be somewhat questionable. 
Perhaps the most important reason for their decision, how-
ever, was one not expressly stated in their notes to 
Article VIII, viz. a reluctance to risk arousing again the 
ire and mistrust of the legal profession. The failure of 
the Model Code and the Uniform Rules to win acceptance can 
never have been far from the drafters' minds while draft-
ing the Federal Rules, and many choices between conven-
tionalism and innovation must surely have been resolved in 
favour of the former through haunted memories of these two 
lingering ghosts of American evidentiary law reform. 
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(3) Retain the common law approach but revise the pre-
sent system of class exceptions. As intimated above, 
this was the solution adopted by the Advisory Committee: 
the traditional hearsay exceptions were collected under 
two rules, one (Rule 803) dealing with situations where 
the availability of the declarant is regarded as imma-
terial, and the other (Rule 804) with situations where 
the reception of hearsay is made conditional on the un-
availability of the declarant. Each of these rules 
ends, however, with a residual exception providing for 
the admission of hearsay which does not fall within one 
24 
of the specified exceptions, but in respect of which 
there exist "equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" provided (a) that the proffered asser-
tion tends to establish a material fact; (b) that it 
is more probative on the question at issue than other 
reasonably obtainable evidence; and (c) that its admis-
sion serves the "purposes of the rules" and the "inter-
ests of justice". It is further provided that these 
residual exceptions may only be used to receive such evi-
dence if the adversary is given notice sufficiently in 
advance of the hearing to provide him with "a fair op-
portunity to prepare to meet it". 
Two aspects of the Federal Rules call for specific at-
tention and closer scrutiny, viz. the residual provi-
sions contained in Rules 803(24) and 804(b) (5) and the 
definition of hearsay in Rule 801. 
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(I) The Residual Hearsay Exceptions 
The history of these exceptions makes interesting reading, 25 
and demonstrates clearly the strength of the forces of con-
servatism and traditionalism. In the preliminary draft of 
28 
the Rules in 1969, it was provided that all hearsay 
statements having assurances of accuracy "not likely to be 
enhanced by calling the declarant as a witness" would be 
admissible, and the present exceptions were merely enumer-
ated as illustrative examples of this general principle. 
When the final text of the proposed Rules was drafted in 
1971, however, it was decided to revert to the traditional 
approach, and the illustrations became specific exceptions. 
Residual exceptions were added to Rules 803 and 804, how-
ever, which provided for the admission of other hearsay 
statements "having comparable circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness". In this Jiberal -although slightly 
watered-down-form, the Supreme Court adopted the Rules and 
submitted them to Congress. 
The two residual exceptions found little favour with the 
House Judiciary Committee, however, and both were deleted 
entirely as injecting too much uncertainty into the law of 
evidence and impairing the ability of practitioners to 
27 
prepare for trial. The Senate Judiciary Committee, on 
the other hand, felt that without separate residual provi-
sions, "the specifically enumerated exceptions could be-
come tortured beyond any reasonable circumstances which 
they were intended to include", and accordingly reinstated 
28 
them. 
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The Committee felt that evidence such as that ad-
mitted in the case of Dallas County v Commercial Union 
29 Assoc. Co. Ltd., which was found to have a "high degree 
of probativeness and necessity", should be admitted despite 
the fact that it does not fall within one of the estab-
lished exceptions to the rule. However, they added, these 
residual exceptions should enjoy a far narrower scope than 
the version adopted by the Supreme Court, and eventually 
the Rules emerged in their present form, subject to the 
four prescribed conditions of admissibility set out above. 
Conservatism and orthodoxy had once more won the day, and, 
to put the issue beyond all doubt, the Senate Judiciary 
Committee added the following injunction to its report: 
"It is intended that the residual hearsay excep-
tions will be used very rarely, and only in ex-
ceptional circumstances. The committee does 
not intend to establish a broad license for 
trial judges to admit hearsay statements that 
do not fall within one of the other exceptions 
contained in rules 803 and 804(b). The resi-
dual exceptions are not meant to authorize 
major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, 
including its present exceptions. Such major 
revisions are best accomplished by legisla-
tive action. It is intended that in any case 
in which evidence is sought to be admitted 
under these subsections, the trial judge will 
exercise no less care, reflection and caution 
than the courts did under the common law in 
establishing the now-recognized exceptions to 
the hearsay rule." 30 
The criteria of reliability and necessity, therefore, 
after starting out as the primary yardsticks for admissi-
bility, ended up as legislative after-thoughts, cautiously 
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and almost reluctantly appended to a set of specified 
hearsay exceptions, and qualified by four carefully formu-
lated conditions, lest "an overly broad residual hearsay 
exception .•• -emasculate the hearsay rule and the recog-
nized exceptions or vitiate the rationale behind codifica-
31 
tion of the rules". This compromise, it was en-
visaged, would "encourage growth and development in this 
area of the law, while conserving the values and exper-
32 ience of the past as a guide to the future". Whether 
this objective has been achieved, is, however, the subject 
33 
of some debate among American commentators. 
Edward J Imwinkelried, in an article in which he assesses 
the various possible interpretations of the residual ex-
ceptions, submits that they at best preserve the pre-Rule 
common law power of the federal trial judge and at worst 
34 
derogate from such power. The residual exceptions, he 
argues, while seemingly most revolutionary, are in fact 
most traditional. In support of this contention, the 
learned writer examines the case law both before and 
after the adoption of the Federal Rules. 
(a) Before the Rules: 
"The forte of the common law", says Imwinkelried, "has al-
ways been its capacity for evolving new doctrines based on 
35 
accumulated judicial experience". This capacity mani-
fested itself in the field of hearsay law in the emergence 
of a judicial discretion to admit hearsay that eluded 
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a recognized exception. The basis for such a discretion 
was derived by identifying two common denominators to the 
common law exceptions, viz. circumstantial probability of 
trustworthiness and necessity, criteria which were em-
ployed by Wigmore 36 to rationalize the entire system of 
exceptions. 
The first signs of this trend took place in the 1950's in 
New Hampshire, where Wigmore's criteria found implicit 
approval, and soon afterwards in other states, including 
37 New York. In the 1960's, the federal courts endorsed 
this practice, admitting evidence on the ground that it 
was "fundamentally reliable" or conformed to "the general 
policies underlying the exceptions to the hearsay rule". 38 
In some cases, Wigmore's dual test was expressly invoked, 
inducing the court to conduct a careful investigation into 
the hearsay dangers involved, the circumstantial indicia 
of reliability present on the facts of the case, and the 
need for such evidence. 
38 In United States v Barbati, the accused was convicted 
of passing a counterfeit bill to a barmaid. At the 
trial, the barmaid was unable to identify the accused as 
the person who had handed her the bill, but a policeman 
was allowed to testify that she had identified the ac-
cused shortly after the event. It was argued that such 
evidence was not hearsay, but Judge Weinstein preferred 
the "more realistic" view that it was, since "its use re-
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quired reliance upon all elements of her credibility -
observation power, memory, truthfulness and ability to 
40 
communicate". Having thus classified the evidence, he 
found that ·it was "not necessary to decide whether it falls 
41 
within a specific hearsay exception", as the "current 
clear tendency" is for federal courts to admit hearsay 
"when it is highly reliable, highly probative, and where 
th t h d t • k • II 42 e opponen as an a equate oppor un~ty to attac ~t • 
Turning to the facts of the case, the learned judge found 
that "there is no more satisfactory evidence available, 
probative force is high, and availability of the hearsay 
declarant for cross-examination makes the possibility of 
43 prejudice slight". On the question of reliability, he 
carefully considered all the hearsay dangers, and found 
them to be properly accounted for: 
"The statement of the barmaid identifying de-
fendant was spontaneously made within a few 
moments of the time the bill was passed and 
while defendant was still in his place at the 
bar. It is unlikely that her observation of 
the man who gave her the bill was mistaken -
he was awaiting her return with his change. 
There was no time for lapse of memory. No 
reason for her to lie was suggested; in any 
event, any motive she might have had to falsi-
fy, would not have been substantially different 
at the trial than it was at the time of the 
event. The process of pointing out the defen-
dant was so simple that an error in communica-
tion was improbable. The barmaid was unlikely 
to have remained silent if the police had 
collared an innocent bystander rather than the 
man she intended to point out." 44 
In the course of his judgment, Judge Weinstein referred to 
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the decision in Dallas County v Commercial Union Assurance 
45 ~ ~ which Imwinkelried describes as "[e_, asily the most 
. 48 famous federal case embracing Wigmore's cr~teria". The 
Dallas County case was certainly a seminal decision on the 
ambit of the pre-Rule judicial discretion, the philosophy 
behind which was subsequently tersely stated in United 
47 States v Castellana: "We are loath to reduce the cor-
pus of hearsay rules to a straight-jacketing, hypertechni-
cal body of semantical slogans to be mechanically invoked 
regardless of the reliability of the proffered evidence". 
The high-water mark of this approach was reached, however, 
in 1971, in the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
48 Fourth Circuit in Chestnut v Ford Motor Company. The 
court was required to consider the admissibility of a 
statement made by one of the parties which had been ten-
dered as a "spontaneous exclamation", which, it was ar-
gued, constituted a recognized exception to the hearsay 
rule. On the question of this categorization, the court 
expressed the following view: 
"For purposes of convenience we use here the 
term employed by Wigmore to describe the rule 
that has been applied to admit hearsay state-
ments of accident victims, 'spontaneous ex-
clamation.' But we recognize that the modern 
trend is to ignore labels of this type com-
pletely and concentrate on two factors that 
underlie most exceptions to the hearsay rule: 
(1) the necessity of accepting hearsay testi-
mony rather than direct testimony subject to 
cross-examination; (2) the circumstantial 
probability of trustworthiness of the hearsay 
statement." 4i (Italics added.) 
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The hearsay straight-jacket, had, it seemed, been torn 
asunder, but the general satisfaction accompanying its de-
mise was destined to be short-lived. 
(b) After the Rules: 
The legislative history of the residual exceptions in the 
Federal Rules did much to revive old fears, and it seemed 
at one stage that the proposed discretionary provisions 
would never see the light of day. When they did even-
tually emerge, after a painful and hazardous delivery, 
they were severely constrained by five qualifying require-
ments and an injunction by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
that they be employed "very rarely and only in exceptional 
50 
circumstances". How then have the courts construed 
these provisions in the light of the pre-Rule liberation 
of hearsay at the hands of the courts? 
Generally, Imwinkelried finds, the "cases construing the 
residual exceptions assume sub silentio that even after 
the Rules' adoption, the courts have the same degree of 
discretion to admit hearsay which does not fall within an 
51 
orthodox exception". This is borne out by the extent 
52 
of the reliance placed in many post-Rule cases on 
leading pre-Rule decisions, such as Dallas County and 
Chestnut, and, where such cases are not expressly cited, 
by their inclination towards the "pre-Rule tendency to 
place primary emphasis on the testimonial quality of sin-
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53 
cerity in determining the admissibility of .hearsay". 
However, the learned writer adds, despite this general be-
lief in the survival of the judicial discretion, the 
courts seem to have applied the residual exceptions cau-
tiously. In many cases, these exceptions are cited 
' 54 
merely as alternative grounds for admission, while, in 
others, the courts have gone as far as saying that they 
should only rarely be employed. 
55 In Lowery v Maryland, the statement of one Dixon was 
tendered as a statement against interest in terms of Rule 
804(b) (3), and, alternatively, under the residual excep-
tion, Rule 804 (b) (5). The court held that the statement 
did not qualify as a· statement against interest, and 
turned to the alternative argument. This, it found, was 
defective, as it ignored "the first of the four necessary 
conditions to admissibility, ie, the statement must have 
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness 
58 
as the other hearsay exceptions". Turning to the 
general scope of the residual provision, the court de-
clared that "[iJt was the intent of Congress that this 
exception be used rarely and only in exceptional circum-
stances", and concluded that, "[s] ince statements such as 
Dixon's are covered by Rule 804(b) (3), the admissibility 
57 
cannot be considered under 804(b) (5)". 
This re~trictive approach found varying degrees of appro-
val among the divided bench in United States v Medico, 58 
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an appeal from a decision of Judge Weinstein to admit 
double hearsay identification of a getaway car under the 
residual exception in Rule 804. The majority took cog-
nizance of the Senate Judiciary Committee's instruction 
that such exception be used only in "rare and exceptional 
59 
circumstances", but found that, as the evidence satis-
fied the specific conditions of Rule 803(1), it was "con-
sonant with the legislative purposes which the residual 
exception was designed to achieve". 80 It was found, 
moreover, that the evidence contained sufficient indica-
tions of reliability, which were "on par with those which 
81 justify the ennumerated exceptions". Judge Mansfield, 
however, opined that the "admission of the double-hearsay 
identification of the getaway car in the present case 
violated both the spirit and purpose of FRE 804(b) (5) as 
thus expressed, since the evidence failed to satisfy any 
of the basic conditions for exceptions to the hearsay 
82 
rule". In his view, it "lacked any circumstantial 
guarantee of trustworthiness", was "hardly 'more proba-
tive on the point for which it is offered than any other 
83 
evidence which the proponent can procure'", and its 
reception was not in the interests of justice. In the 
light of the drafters' request that the residual excep-
tions be used sparingly, the learned judge concluded, 
therefore, that resort to Rule 804(b) (5) by the trial 
judge was "a serious error", the effect of which would 
be "to emasculate the hearsay rule and violate the funda-
84 damental purposes underlying it" 
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A case which conflicts starkly with this approach is 
United States v American Cyanamid Co. 85 In order to as-
certain the accepted meaning of "production capacity" in 
its industrial sense, the Cyanamid Co. had conducted an 
enquiry among various producers of its product, viz. mela-
mine. The company then sought to tender in evidence, 
under Rule 803(24), the responses of the producers, in 
order to show that it had not dishonoured its agreement to 
limit its production of melamine until its competitors had 
increased their "production capacity" by a determined 
annual amount. The government contended that the evidence 
should be excluded, arguing that the Senate Judiciary 
Committee's report had limited the application of Rule 
803(24) to exceptional cases. The court, however, re-
jected this argum~nt, stating that the text of the Rule 
does not require "that the Court find a case to be 'excep-
tional', whatever that means, in order to receive any evi-
88 dence". Such a construction, the court added, would 
negate the requirement of Rule 102, which encourages a 
liberal interpretation of the Rules, and would render the 
application of the discretionary exception uncertain. 
Instead, the court added, one should look only at the 
specific requirements of the Rule, which contains "suffi-
cient express criteria which must be satisfied before an 
i tern of hearsay will be admissible". 87 
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Of the two approaches apparent in the case law, Imwinkel-
ried prefers the more progressive view expounded in the 
American Cyanamid Co. case. No doubt, he concedes, any 
supporter of the Senate Committee's report would find 
68 
this opinion "not only unacceptable but infuriating". 
However, he submits, despite this ostensible inversion 
of the legislative history of the residual discretions, 
69 
the court in that case reached "the proper conclusion", 
and the approach favoured in cases such as Lowery, 
70 Medico and others is "bad in law". His reasons for 
this seemingly heretical view are as follows: 
1. The Senate Report, although it states that the ex-
ceptions should be used "very rarely and only in excep-
71 
tional circumstances", is not unequivocal in this de-
mand. It cites, for instance, the cases of Dallas 
b . 72 County and Bar at~, two of the most far-reaching de-
cisions on the ambit of the discretion at common law, 
and states that federal trial judges, in applying the 
residual exceptions, are to use "no less care, reflec-
tion, and caution than the courts did under the common 
73 law". This ambivalence, Imwinkelried submits, may 
be the product of political expedience, the final text 
of the exceptions having been a political compromise 
between Congress and the Senate. This, he argues, 
somewhat deflates the "legislative history" argument 
commonly forwarded to support the restrictive construe-
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tion of the exceptions, and opens the way for the more 
liberal view set out by the court in American Cyanamid. 
2. The broad construction is more literal, giving vent 
to the specific words used in the text. 
3. This interpretation is more purposive and consis-
tent with the overall purpose of Article VIII, which is to 
liberalize federal hearsay practice. To adopt the narrow 
construction would be a step backward, giving federal 
trial judges less discretion than they had at common law. 
4 . The Cyanamid approach is also more reasonable. It 
would be absurd, the learned writer points out, to insist 
upon extraordinary probative value in respect of hearsay 
submitted under the discretionary provisions, when we do 
not require such quantum of value in respect of the hear-
say we routinely admit. 
The approach advocated by Imwinkelried, therefore, has 
much merit. It seems to strike a satisfactory balance 
between the "values and experience of the past" and the 
creative innovation needed for the future. The appeal of 
this approach lies in the fact that it has its roots in 
the common law while remaining true to the overall pur-
pose of the Federal Rules. However, this view has en-
joyed scant judicial support, most of the cases having 
preferred the more reactionary view followed in Lowery 
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and Medico, and herein lies a lesson for all would-be re-
formers of the hearsay rule: the legal profession is 
generally a very conservative one, and is reluctant to 
espouse radical doctrinal changes to the law. Examples 
of this inertia have been encountered throughout this 
discussion of the American attempts to reform the hearsay 
rule, such as the hostile reaction to the liberal provi-
sions in the Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the legis-
lative history of the residual exceptions in the Federal 
Rules, and their subsequent treatment at the hands of the 
courts. The breadth of vision and creative flair ex-
hibited by jurists such as Judges Wisdom and Weinstein 
would seem to be the exception rather than the rule, and 
drafters of reform proposals should keep in mind that 
their handiwork is likely to be construed by lawyers and 
judicial officers less inclined towards innovation or ex-
pansive thought. 
It should be borne in mind, therefore, that any attempt to 
create a broad, discretionary basis for admissibility of 
hearsay in South Africa would probably be thwarted by a 
reversion to the principles of the common law. It would 
seem, paradoxically, that to create a wider base for ad-
missibility, a more comprehensive provision, qualified by 
rules or guidelines, is likely to be more successful than 
a tersely-stated general provision that allows for an un-
fettered discretion. 
On the other hand, a discretion that is qualified by ex-
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haustive conditions gives rise to major problems of inter-
pretation. The United States federal courts have en-
countered this problem, as, in determining the admissibil-
ity of an item of hearsay evidence tendered under the 
residual provisions, they are constrained by the specified 
conditions set out in these exceptions. It has therefore 
fallen to the courts to interpret these conditions and to 
establish their precise ambit. The ensuing difficulties 
have prompted one writer, D A Sonenshein, to remark that 
"[o]nly when agreement is reached on the standards to be 
applied will the goal of the residual exceptions - to pro-
vide for the growth and development of the law of hearsay 
without importing too much uncertainty into the hearsay 
74 
rule- be realized". In support of this observation, 
he examines the conditions set out in the residual excep-
tions, viz. trustworthiness, probativeness, the interests 
of justice and notice, and demonstrates how the federal 
courts are divided on the interpretation of each. By way 
of example, it is instructive to examine briefly his com-
ments on the interpretation of the first - and, possibly, 
the most important - of these conditions, viz. trust-
worthiness. 
The residual exceptions prescribe that the proffered 
hearsay statement must possess circumstantial guarantees 
of trustworthiness which are equivalent to the explicitly 
recognized exceptions to the rule. This "general 
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language", says Sonenshein, has "inspired the judicial 
formulation of three independent standards" 75 against 
which to measure such trustworthiness: 
(1) One test is to restrict the enquiry to factors ex-
trinsic to the evidence itself. Such factors include 
the availability of the declarant at trial, corroboration 
of the statement by other admissible evidence, and the 
admission by the declarant at trial of having made the 
76 
statement. 
(2) The second approach discernible from the case law 
is to restrict the ambit of the investigation to circum-
stances surrounding the making of the extra-curial state-
ment. Examples of such factors which have been used by 
the courts to gauge trustworthiness are as follows: 
(a) Factors used to confirm trustworthiness: 
The short time lapse between the event and the statement 
describing it; the fact that the statement was made vol-
untarily; the fact that the statement tended to impli-
cate its maker in a crime; the making of the statement 
under oath; the fact that the statement was based on 
personal knowledge; the fact that the statement was made 
by a disinterested person or official; the richness of 
the detail contained in the statement; the fact that a 
written statement was edited and corrected by its maker; 
77 
and the lack of a motive to falsify. 
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(b) Factors used to negate trustworthiness: 
The fact that the statement was made during dispositional 
negotiations, or in an attempt to curry favour with the 
authorities, or in the hurly-burly of legislative poli-
tics, or for litigation purposes, or in fear of physical 
harm, or by a person known to be a braggart; the fact 
that the statement was later recanted; and the strong 
personal relationship between the declarant and one of 
78 
the parties. 
(3) The third standard is a combination of the first 
two, reflecting those cases where the courts have exam-
ined both extrinsic and intrinsic indicia of trustworthi-
79 
ness. 
Of these three approaches, Sonenshein prefers the second, 
arguing that the other two are based on a misperception 
of an important premiss of the residual exceptions. 
These provisions insist on guarantees of trustworthiness 
which are equivalent to those effected by the enumerated 
hearsay exceptions contained in the rules. These excep-
tions revolve around the reliability factors inherent in 
the making of the statement, and do not refer to extrin-
sic corroboration. The same criteria, Sonenshein 
argues, should therefore apply to the enquiry required 
by the residual exceptions. As the learned writer ob-
serves, moreover: "The vice of hearsay is that the out-
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of-court declarant cannot be cross-examined when the state-
ment is made; the fact that hearsay evidence is corro-
borated at trial does not correct this vice." 80 
A further interpretative difficulty ensuing from this 
trustworthiness requirement is presented by what Sonenshein 
81 describes as the "near-miss situation", where a prof-
fered statement is in the realm of a specific exception but 
just falls short of satisfying such exception because it is 
deficient in one or more of the prescribed conditions. Some 
courts have held that where such evidence complies with the 
spirit, if not the letter, of these exceptions, admissibil-
ity may be appropriate under the residual exceptions. 82 
Others, however, have held the failure of such evidence to 
satisfy the specific requirements of an enumerated rule as 
83 precluding a finding of adequate trustworthiness. 
Similar problems of construction beset each of the prere-
quisites to admissibility contained in the residual provi-
sions, a legacy of Congress's insistence that the judicial 
discretion be fettered and qualified. As a result, the 
courts have "strayed from the congressional intent" and 
have "generated uncertainty by misinterpreting and misap-
84 plying the residual exceptions". 
The above analysis of the residual exceptions has, there-
fore, yielded two vital legislative lessons: 
(1.) The creation of a broad, unqualified discretion to 
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admit hearsay tends to meet with opposition at the hands of 
the generally conservative legal profession and, moreover, 
tends to be counter-productive, in that the absence of 
legislative guidance induces the courts to resort to the 
safety of the common law. 
(2.) A discretion which is exhaustively qualified by a 
closed list of specified prerequisites, on the other hand, 
is also unsatisfactory, as it tends to generate problems of 
interpretation and to create tension between the original 
legislative intent and the growth necessary to accommodate 
legal development. 
The solution, it would seem, lies in the creation of a 
judicial discretion which is qualified by a non-exhaustive 
set of factors which draw attention to the intrinsic hear-
say values, but which are not allowed,individually, to ob-
scure the overall enquiry of whether the admission of the 
evidence is desirable. The precise structure of such a 
85 
qualified discretion will be considered at length below. 
(II) The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules 
Another controversial feature of the Rules is the choice 
of definition in Rule 801. The relevant provisions are 
set out as follows: 
(a) Statement.- A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
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written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a 
person, if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. - A "declarant" is a person who 
makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. - "Hearsay" is a statement, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted. 
ae 
The Advisory Committee ·on the proposed Rules considered 
five categories of evidence to which the hearsay label has 
commonly been applied: 
(i) Verbal assertions: These, the Committee stated, 
"readily fall into the category of 'statement'", provided 
the verbal communication was intended by the declarant to 
be an assertion. 
(ii) Nonverbal conduct that is assertive in nature: 
The Committee considered the example of one who points to 
identify a suspect in a lineup, and observed that this is 
"clearly the equivalent of words, assertive in nature, and 
to be regarded as a statement". 
(iii) Nonassertive nonverbal conduct: This category 
refers to evidence of non-verbal conduct that is "offered 
as evidence that the person acted as he did because of 
his belief in the existence of the condition 
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sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of 
the condition may be inferred". It is arguable, the Com-
mittee conceded, that such evidence falls properly within 
the hearsay concept, in that it is "untested with respect 
to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equiva-
lents) of the actor", but this was not considered suffi-
cient ~o warrant incorporation within the definition of 
hearsay in Rule 801, because 
"the Advisory Committee is of the view that 
these dangers are minimal in the absence of an 
intent to assert and do not justify the loss 
of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class 
of evidence is free from the possibility of 
fabrication, but the likelihood is less with 
nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. 
The situations giving rise to the nonverbal 
conduct are such as virtually to eliminate 
questions of sincerity. Motivation, the 
nature of the conduct, and the presence or ab-
sence of reliance will bear heavily upon the 
weight to be given the evidence." 
(iv) Nonassertive verbal conduct and (v) "verbal con-
duct which is assertive but offered as a basis for infer-
ring something other than the matter asserted", referred 
87 to by Wellborn as "assertions used inferentially": 
Both these categories are summarily dismissed by the Ad-
visory Committee as being governed by "[s] imilar consider-
ations" as those relating to nonassertive nonverbal con-
duct, and, therefore, also to be excluded from the defi-
nition of hearsay in Rule 801 (c). 
Academic response to the decision to exclude the last 
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three categories of evidence from the ambit of the defini-
88 
tion of hearsay has been mixed. Barton and Cowart, in 
a lengthy article in which they discuss all the provisions 
of the Federal Rules on the question of hearsay, welcome 
the decision to exclude implied assertions from the defini-
tion as being a step "resolving one of the most troublesome 
89 issues surrounding the common law of hearsay". They 
cite with approval the above passage in which the Advisory 
Committee furnished its reasons for this restrictive defi-
nition, and add that this is in line with the modern trend 
in the United States to admit implied assertions as being 
90 
circumstantial evidence of the fact inferred. 
Another advocate of the definition of hearsay set out in 
91 Rule 801 is Susan R Kelly, who maintains that the prob-
lems that arise in respect of the Rule's treatment of im-
plied assertions are capable of being remedied by other 
provisions of the Federal Rules. The main problem, she 
argues, is that the definition "aims primarily at elimi-
92 
nating evidence presenting a danger of mendacity", a 
danger which the drafters believed could adequately be 
accounted for by confining the hearsay label to statements 
or conduct not intended to be assertive. This leaves un-
assailed the other recognized hearsay dangers, which are, 
moreover, those which cross-examination is most effective 
in exposing. The solution, the learned writer submits, 
is to be found in Rule 403, which empowers a court to ex-
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elude otherwise relevant evidence "if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or need-
i3 less presentation of cumulative evidence". This Rule, 
it is argued, may be used to exclude evidence "when the 
94 inferential chain becomes extended", as in the case of 
implied assertions, in which case the court should deter-
mine "whether the trier of fact can properly evaluate the 
evidence, considering whether the circumstances indicate 
that the actor's perception and memory were reliable, whe-
ther the event in question is the most probable explana-
tion for his state of mind and ensuing act, and whether the 
trier of fact is a jury of iS laymen or the judge himself". 
Much of the academic comment on the choice of definition 
ee in the Rules has, however, been far from euphoric. 
Blackmore, for instance, in an article entitled "Some 
i7 Things About Hearsay: Article VIII", discusses the de-
finition in Rule 801 under a heading, "Bad Hearsay 
as Things", and demonstrates the inadequacy of this defi-
nition by considering the following example: In terms 
of the restrictive definition adopted, evidence that a 
driver, having first stopped, proceeded through an inter-
section controlled by a traffic light, would be admissible 
on the issue of whether the light had changed. This would 
not be affected by the fact that the driver's perception 
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may be faulty because, the learned writer adds somewhat 
cynically, "there was obviously no intent on the part of 
the driver to tell the world, 'Look folks, the light 
99 
turned green'." 
100 
More vociferous still in his criticism is Stewart, who, 
after considering the reasons advanced by the Advisory 
Committee for leaving implied assertions out of its hear-
101 
say definition, found them "faulty on almost every point". 
He directs his attack at four aspects of the definition: 
(a) It does not afford a proper analysis of need and re-
liability, which is possible only if nonassertive conduct 
is defined as hearsay; (b) it rests on the unjustifiable 
assumption that nonassertive conduct evidences a more re-
liable belief than does assertive conduct- "(t]o their 
dismay people frequently act upon erroneous perceptions 
102 
and beliefs"; (c) it glosses over the difficulty of 
ascertaining the particular belief that underlies a parti-
cular nonassertive act- "[b]ehaviour of children who taunt 
an old lady may be based on numerous beliefs other than in-
103 
sanity"; and (d) it rests on the doubtful proposition 
that people are "more likely to lie than engage in deceit-
104 
ful conduct". If the definition were formulated so as 
to include implied assertions, he concludes, ."the focus of 
analysis would shift to inherent reliability and the need 
to condition the admissibility of that evidence upon a 
showing that the declarant is unavailable for cross-exami-
105 
nation, the oath, and demeanour evidence". 
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Most implacable of all the opponents to the definition in 
the Federal Rules is, however, Wellborn, who describes 
"the attempt to delete from the hearsay concept all out-
of-court verbal expressions that are not simple, direct 
assertions of the matter they are offered to prove" as "a 
novelty so unsound, both in principle and in practice, 
that one cannot help but surmise that the Committee did 
106 
not fully understand the results of its handiwork". 
The problem, according to Wellborn, is that a hearsay 
problem exists "whenever the belief of a human being other 
than the witness is used as evidence" thus necessitating a 
comprehensive definition of hearsay to take account of 
107 
"all the ways in which human beliefs can be communicated". 
Such an all-embracing notion of hearsay, he adds, was 
108 
adopted by the English courts in Wright v doe d ·ratham, 
where the court acceptedthat nonassertive verbal conduct 
fell within the scope of the hearsay rule. Baron Parke, 
moreover, in a famous dictum, accepted that nonassertive 
nonverbal conduct should be similarly treated, thereby 
effecting a conflation of two distinct problems that Well-
born describes as "truly historic, in the sense of conse-
108 quential" in that it triggered off a series of deci-
sions and culminated in "the present mishap, the unwhole-
110 
some hearsay definition in the Federal Rules of Evidence". 
Wellborn examine's.· Baron Parke's "expansive definition of 
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111 hearsay", and finds that it is sound as a matter of 
principle. Critics who have attacked the labelling of 
nonassertive nonverbal conduct as hearsay on the ground 
that it presents fewer or reduced hearsay dangers than ver-
bal assertions have, he submits, "failed to make a persua-
sive case". Their arguments are normally based on ques-
tionable adages such as "actions speak louder than words" 
and "talk is cheap", and do not overcome Finman's observa-
tion that "not all conduct evidencing a belief is suffi-
ciently important to circumstantially evidence the relia-
bility of the memory and perception on which the belief is 
112 
based". Where there are such circumstantial safe-
guards, a strong case exists for regarding the evidence as 
exceptionally admissible, but it is no argument for whole-
sale treatment of the entire class of nonverbal nonasser-
tive conduct as non-hearsay. Conduct, furthermore, raises 
greater dangers of accidental miscommunication, as the 
risks of ambiguity are normally much greater when belief is 
inferred from actions rather than words. 
In principle, therefore, one cannot quibble with Baron 
Parke's approach. However, Wellborn continues, "[P] rin-
ciple is not the only consideration in devising legal rules 
113 for human consumption", and one has further to determine 
the feasibility of adopting this approach in legal prac-
tice. It has been pointed out "that very often, probably 
more often than not the hearsay objection to evidence 
of nonassertive conduct is overlooked in practice with the 
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114 
result that the ... doctrine operates very unevenly", 
an observation which prompts Wellborn to pose the follow-
ing question: "Even though there are hearsay risks in 
this category of evidence, risks perhaps as great on the 
average as those of verbal hearsay, is the magnitude of 
the problem such that the aggregate of these risks justi-
fies taxing our three-pound brains in the effort to 
eliminate them - when experience tells us that, unless we 
all wax as clever in the courtroom as Baron Parke in his 
chambers, the effort will succeed only 'unevenly'?" 115 
To answer this question in the negative, as the drafters 
of the Federal Rules seem to have done, is, therefore, 
according to Wellborn, "an innocuous concession that at 
least has a plausible justification on grounds of con-
116 
venience". Their error, he maintains, was in accord-
ing the same treatment to nonassertive verbal conduct. 
Once again, Wellborn approaches the problem from a dual 
perspective of principle and practicability. As regards 
the first consideration, he finds the case for labelling 
nonassertive verbal conduct as non-hearsay even weaker 
than that concerning nonverbal conduct. Whereas the 
danger of "concealed assertive intent" may be somewhat re-
mote in the latter category, it is much more significant 
in the former, as "it is the nature of speech - unlike 
117 
acts - to convey thought and information". On the 
question of practicability, further, he submits that the 
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"problem of inconsistent recognition" 118 is less likely to 
occur, as a witness's reference to another's statements -
as opposed to conduct - triggers the hearsay objection as 
119 
an almost automatic response. 
While I agree fully with Wellborn's submissions concerning 
nonassertive verbal conduct, I have reservations about 
dismissing the Committee's treatment of nonverbal conduct 
as merely an "innocuous concession". The fact that the 
hearsay doctrine operates "unevenly" in respect of this 
type of evidence - as, indeed, it seems to do in almost 
every other type of evidence - merely bears testimony to 
the unworkable state of the hearsay rule in its present 
form, a fact that is universally recognized. If the 
hearsay concept were clearly defined to include nonasser-
tive conduct - whether verbal or nonverbal - this problem 
would surely be alleviated. The uncertainty concerning 
the borders of hearsay is perhaps a greater impediment to 
consistent results than the inability of counsel to "wax 
as clever in the courtroom as Baron Parke in his chambers". 
Moreover, even if we were to assume that an expansive 
statutory definition of hearsay would not guarantee con-
sistency, would this by itself be sufficient to warrant 
excluding nonverbal conduct from the definition when one 
takes into account what Wellborn concedes to be its 
"dubious" theoretical justification? Would it not be 
preferable to have at least some cases where the court is 
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called upon to consider the hearsay issues involved than 
none at all? The counter-argument that the court would 
thereby be deprived of valuable evidence would, of course, 
be unanswerable in terms of the present law, but, if the 
labelling of evidence as hearsay is seen as a warning 
buzzer rather than an automatic sword of excision, then 
this objection would fall away. 
Wellborn turns next to a consideration of the wording of 
Rule 801, and finds that, besides being theoretically un-
120 
sound, it "is fraught with ambiguity and complexity". 
Academic commentators, he observes, are not in agreement 
as to how Rule 801 should be interpreted, largely because 
of the absence of any definition of "assertion" in either 
the Rule itself or the Committee's Notes. Accordingly, 
three schools of thought have emerged: 
(a.) Only direct, literal assertions are hearsay: 
If the word "assertion" is given its standard, dictionary 
1 21 
meaning, then only a declarative sentence, the terms 
of which affirm positively the matter it is offered to 
prove, can qualify as a hearsay "statement" in terms of 
the Rule. This, says Wellborn, would seem to be the 
most plausible interpretation of the term, although it is 
also the least attractive. It is also the interpreta-
122 
tion that most commentators have accepted, although 
its doctrinal repugnance has caused many to resist it. 
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(b.) Hearsay includes statements which, although not 
direct assertions of the matter sought to be proved, were 
intended to be assertive thereof: 
This approach, which is less mechanical than that in (a.) 
above, finds support in the Advisory Committee's Note, 
where it is stated that "[t] he effect of the definition of 
'statement' is to exclude from the operation of the hear-
say rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not 
intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is 
123 that nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one." 
(Italics added.) Certainly, as Wellborn points out, 
"[s ]orne resort to the declarant's intent will undoubtedly 
be necessary if rule 801 is to work at all in the real 
124 
world of human language", as the results yielded by the 
literal meaning approach are arbitrary and intolerable. 
The problem, however, is that intention, being a subjec-
tive concept, is extremely difficult to determine. This 
presents no problem where the fact sought to be proved is 
a necessary implication of the literal statement - for 
125 
instance "it will stop raining in an hour" necessarily 
implies "it is raining now" - but the question becomes 
more complex when it is only a probable or possible infer-
ence. Is, for example, the statement "it has been rain-
ing a lot here now" or "you will get wet if you don't take 
an umbrella now" intended to be assertive of the fact of 
present .rain? 1 2 e 
At the heart of this problem lies one basic question: If 
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hearsay is to include, as the Advisory Committee seems to 
indicate it does, conduct intended as an assertion, what 
meaning must be given to the word "intention"? Professor 
1 2 7 Ball suggests that it be given a liberal interpreta-
tion, in that a person must be taken to have intended to 
assert Y if he states X but realizes Y at the time of 
utterance. This in effect restores the approach in 
Wright v Tatham, for, as the learned writer points out, 
"[i] f someone had interrupted the men who were writing the 
original letter to John Marsden and asked them 'Do you 
realize you are writing to him in a way that shows you 
think he is sane?' I believe they would have answered: 'Of 
course I do- do you think I'm an idiot?'" 128 
This suggestion, says Wellborn, is too radical, reducing 
intent to a fiction. Instead, he puts forward as a pos-
sible alternative the bifurcated de£inition of intent set 
out in the Restatement of Torts, in terms of which an 
actor intends not only those consequences which he "de-
sires to bring about", but also those which he knows are 
"certain, or substantially certain, to result from his 
130 
act". If this is translated into hearsay terminol-
ogy, an actor or declarant will be taken to have intended 
to assert a matter if "his act or expression was moti-
vated, in whole or in part, by a desire to communicate a 
belief in the matter" or "if he had present, conscious 
knowledge that communication of such a belief was substan-
1 31 
tially certain to occur". 
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No matter which interpretation is accepted, Wellborn finds 
little cause for optimism in this attempt to mitigate the 
rigidity of Rule 801. As he puts it, "[a] subjective de-
termination of the declarant's intent is hopelessly complex 
if not simply hopeless, period" whereas an "objective de-
termination does little if anything to remedy the arbitrari-
ness and artificiality of the rule". 132 
(c.) Hearsay includes nonassertive verbal conduct: 
Some writers have argued against massive odds that Rule 801 
should be interpreted in such a way that the ratio deci-
133 dendi in Wright v Tatham is not disturbed. Chief adher-
ent to this minority view is Professor Michael Graham, whose 
argument is that the Advisory Committee's interpretation is 
not borne out by the actual words used in the Rule. He 
adds: "When a statement is offered to infer state of min~ 
of the declarant from which to infer a given fact in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise, since the truth of the 
matter directly asserted must be assumed in order for the 
nonasserted inference to be drawn, the statement is 
properly classified as hearsay under the language of Rule 
801 (c)." 134 
This contention, as Wellborn points out, does not always 
hold true: If, for instance, the statement "That driver 
is color blind" is tendered to establish that the traffic 
light was red at the time, it is not necessary to assume 
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the truth of the direct statement asserted. Moreover, he 
adds, it would be absurd to reject the Advisory Committee's 
interpretation of its own rule. It seems therefore that 
interpretation (c.) is founded more on wistful optimism 
than solid reality. The fact, however, that it finds sup-
port, not only among academic writers, but also in some 
decided cases, is indicative of the dissatisfaction felt 
about the soundness of Rule 801. 
Turning to the case law, Wellborn finds "inconsistency, un-
predictability and confusion", 135 a result that he finds 
hardly surprising in the light of the above analysis. The 
cases, he finds, fall generally into the following catego-
ries: 
A. Cases adopting the narrow definition of hearsay and 
holding that implied assertions do not fall within the 
purview of the definition in Rule 801. 
Illustrative of this approach is the decision in United 
138 States v Perez: The appellant had been convicted of 
conspiring to distribute cocaine and of distributing 
cocaine. In an appeal, he contested the admissibility of 
testimony given by a government informer, one Nunez, and a 
special agent, one Cazares, in which they had described a 
telephone call taken in their presence by the appellant's 
accomplice, one Perez. By listening to that one side of 
the conv~rsation, the two witnesses had gathered - al-
though no express assertion was made to that effect - that 
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the caller was the appellant, and that the subject dis-
cussed was a transaction concerning drugs. The Court of 
Appeals found that the evidence had been correctly re-
ceived, stating: 
"Perez' verbal conduct acknowledging that the 
caller was [the appellant] , whether express 
or implied, was an implied assertion and ad-
missible as nonassertive conduct under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (a), (c). Con-
sequently, either Cazares or Nunez could 
properly testify to the call and Perez' 
acknowledgment over a double-hearsay objec-
tion." 137 
A similarly restrictive approach was adopted in United 
138 
States v Snow, where the court held that a name tag 
bearing the name of the appellant was non-hearsay when 
offered to prove that a briefcase, to which it had been 
affixed, belonged to the appellant. The court, however, 
did not even identify the problem of whether the evidence, 
being an implied assertion, fell within the ambit of the 
definition of hearsay set out in the Rules. Instead, it 
held the name tag to be a "mechanical trace" and thus a 
13i 
"type of circumstantial evidence". The fallacy of 
140 
this reasoning has been explained at some length above, 
and the decision has justifiably been criticized as yield-
ing the correct result but on erroneous theoretical 
141 grounds. It may seem harsh to point a finger at the 
drafters of the Rules in this regard; after all, the 
"circumstantial evidence" label has long been a convenient 
escape route for courts that either have failed to identi-
fy the hearsay problem or are too familiar with the rig-
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ours of the exclusionary rule. Nevertheless, Wellborn is 
not prepared to exonerate the drafters completely: "It 
may be", he adds, "that by carving the hearsay definition 
down to bare bones in such an unprincipled way, the Com-
mittee may have contributed to an environment in which 
142 
this sort of reasoning is more likely to occur". 
We would do well to take heed of Wellborn's warning: By 
emasculating the hearsay rule through a narrowing of the 
definition of hearsay, the Rules have created a climate 
conducive to admissibility without providing for a proper 
assessment of trustworthiness. A preferable approach 
would be to label as hearsay all nonassertive conduct, 
whether verbal or nonverbal, and to decide the question 
of admissibility on grounds of reliability, either by way 
of a broad judicial discretion, or a statutorily-defined 
residual exception based on equivalent considerations. 
If this approach had been followed in Snow's case, no 
doubt the court would still have reached the same result. 
In the cases that follow, however, the advantages of the 
expansive definition will be more clearly apparent. 
B. Cases applying the expansive definition and holding 
that implied assertions are hearsay. 
(i) Cases decided after the Rules were drafted but be-
fore they became law: 
; 
143 
United States v Pacelli, a case decided in 1974 while 
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the Rules were still before Congress, epitomizes what Well-
born describes as "the tenacity of the sound concept of 
144 
verbal hearsay discernible in modern pre-Rules cases". 
The appellant had been convicted of the murder of a woman, 
Parks, and a witness, Lipsky, had been allowed to testify 
to the conduct and statements of the appellant's wife, 
uncle and friends at a gathering a few days after the mur-
der. The purpose of this evidence, in the words of 
Mansfield J, was "to get before the jury the fact that 
various persons other than Lipsky, who had been closely 
associated with Pacelli, believed Pacelli to be guilty of 
145 
having murdered Parks". The reception of this evi-
dence was held to be prejudicial error on the following 
grounds: 
"Since the extra-judicial statements clearly 
implied knowledge and belief on the part of 
third person declarants not available ~or 
cross-examination as to the source of their 
knowledge regarding the ultimate fact in 
issue, i.e., whether Pacelli killed Parks, 
Lipsky's testimony as to them was exclud-
able hearsay evidence." 146 
The court considered the rationale behind the hearsay 
rule and the values that rule served to protect and 
added: 
"The admission of testimony as to the third 
party's declarations in the present case 
violated the central purpose of the hearsay 
rule, which is to give litigants 'an oppor-
tunity to cross-examine the persons on whom 
the fact finder is asked to rely.' 
Cross-examination of the declarants, had 
they been produced as witnesses, might have 
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established that the information carne from 
Lipsky himself, from third persons, or from 
news media, especially since appellant had on 
the same day been jailed as a result of the 
discovery of Parks' body." 147 
The fact that the statements and conduct "may not have been 
intended by those involved to communicate their belief that 
Pacelli murdered Parks" was dismissed by the court as 
148 
"irrelevant", because, on balance, it could not be said 
that the hearsay dangers had been materially reduced: 
"While the danger of insincerity may be reduced 
where implied rather than express assertions 
of the third parties are involved, .•• there is 
the added danger of misinterpretation of the 
declarant's belief. Moreover, the declarant's 
opportunity and capacity for accurate percep-
tion or his sources of information remain of 
crucial importance. ... Here, for instance, 
there is no suggestion that the declarants 
actually observed Pacelli commit the crimes 
with which he was charged. ... Pacelli was 
entitled to cross-examine the third party de-
clarants in order to test the validity of the 
inference ... that he had told the declarants 
he had killed Parks." 149 
The inexorable logic of this analysis, founded squarely on 
a basic appreciation of hearsay values, would prove diffi-
cult to eradicate. Later that same year, for instance, 
150 
the court in Park v Huff adopted a similar stance on 
the issue of implied assertions on substantially similar 
facts. Curiously, however, the court quoted the defini-
tion contained in Rule 801, and seemed to find no diffi-
culty reconciling it with Professor Morgan's hearsay-
danger analysis 151 upon which it based its decision. It 
was accordingly held that the testimony of the witness, 
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Seay, regarding the out-of-court statements of the declar-
ants, Pinion and Worley, were inadmissible as they 
"clearly implied that Park was involved in the conspiracy 
152 to murder Solicitor General Hoard". The reasoning of 
Judge Wisdom is worth recounting at some length: 
"Implied assertions may in certain circum-
stances carry less danger of insincerity or un-
trustworthiness than direct assertions, ••• but 
not always. The danger of insincerity or un-
trustworthiness is decreased only where there 
is no possibility that the declarant intended 
to leave a particular impression •••• Here we 
cannot exclude that possibility; Pinion's and 
Worley's statements carry the implication that 
they mentioned the 'old man' to Seay with the 
intention of communicating to him, as a fact, 
Park's participation in the plot. 
When the possibility is real that an out-of-
court statement which implies the existence of 
the ultimate fact in issue was made with asser-
tive intent, it is essential that the statement 
be treated as hearsay if a direct declaration 
of that fact would be so treated. Baron Parke 
made an observation to that effect more than a 
century ago in the famous case of Wright v 
Tatham ... 
Were the rule otherwise, the hearsay rule could 
easily be circumvented through clever question-
ing and coaching of witnesses, so that answers 
were framed as implied rather than as direct 
assertions. The federal courts have consist-
ently considered such implied assertions to be 
hearsay." 153 
A year later, in Muncie Aviation Corporation v Party Doll 
154 Fleet, Inc, Judge Wisdom was called upon again to decide 
a similar issue. On a question of negligence following an 
air collision, evidence had been tendered, in the form of 
two advisory circulars published by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, to establish "the standard of care customar-
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155 ily followed by pilots approaching uncontrolled airports". 
Judge Wisdom quoted Rule 801 (a) and observed that although 
the Federal Rules of Evidence were not yet in operation, the 
definition was in any event "merely a codification of exist-
156 
ing law". He continued: 
"Since the advisory circulars contained no asser-
tions of fact, but merely recommended procedures, 
arguably they do not fall within the class of 
'statements' subject to the hearsay rule. On 
the other hand, since the circulars were intro-
duced to prove the F.A.A.'s belief that the pro-
cedures recommended were in fact safer than 
others, they could be construed as implied 
assertions of recommended piloting practices. 
Moreover, since the circulars were prepared by 
persons not available for cross-examination whose 
opinions were not subject to challenge or clari-
fication, the recommendations suffered from the 
usual dangers inherent in traditional hearsay." 157 
Nevertheless, the learned judge held, the "characterization 
of the evidence as hearsay or non-hearsay is not dispositive 
158 
of the outcome of the case". He considered his deci-
sion in the Dallas County case and reiterated his view that 
"the primary criteria for permitting the introduction of 
otherwise inadmissible hearsay were the elements of neces-
15i 
sity and trustworthiness". The former requirement 
manifested itself in this case in the "virtual irnpossibil-
ity, not to mention practical inconvenience and prohibitive 
cost, of locating and calling as witnesses the various corn-
160 
pilers of the advisory circulars", and the latter in 
"the fact that they were recently published by a govern-
mental agency whose only conceivable interest was in insur-
161 ing safety". The evidence had, therefore, correctly 
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been received by the court a quo. 
This decision, according to Wellborn, served as a preamble 
to the "inevitable collision between rule 801 and sound 
162 
common law analysis of verbal hearsay". The sound-
ness of this observation is borne out by two factors: 
(1) A consideration of how the case would have been de-
cided had the Federal Rules been effective. Clearly, as 
the advisory circulars constituted implied assertions, the 
court would have been compelled to regard them as non-
hearsay, thus obviating the need to consider the question 
of necessity or trustworthiness. What then if the circu-
lars had lacked these indicia of reliability? 
(2) A look at case law after the adoption of the 
Federal Rules in July 1975. These cases, says Wellborn, 
reveal the deficiencies of the formulation of hearsay in 
Rule 801 and demonstrate dramatically "the problems that 
163 
will persist unless the rule is rewritten". 
(ii) Cases decided after the Rules became law: 
164 
In Park v Huff, Judge Wisdom had warned against the 
restrictive definition of hearsay, predicting that it 
could lead to the rule being "circumvented through clever 
questioning and coaching of witnesses, so that answers 
[are1 framed as implied rather than as direct asser-
165 
tions". 
166 In United States v Check, this prophecy 
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carne dangerously close to being fulfilled. Check, a 
police officer, had been convicted of possession and dis-
tribution of heroin as well as conspiring to distribute 
narcotic drugs. Chief witness for the prosecution was 
an undercover detective, one Spinelli, who had investi-
gated the case and had employed the assistance of an in-
former, Cali, to introduce him to Check as a prospective 
purchaser of the drug. The preliminary negotiations were 
conducted between Check and Cali, who then passed on the 
information to Spinelli. Cali, however, had refused to 
testify at Check's trial, a problem which the prosecutor 
in the court a quo overcame by employing a method of 
questioning which, it was argued, circumvented the ob-
stacles presented by the hearsay rule. He did this by 
establishing from Spinelli that he and Cali had con-
versed on several occasions, and then by asking Spinelli 
at least thirteen times: "Without telling us what Mr 
187 
Cali said to you, what did you say to him?" At this 
invitation, Spinelli responded with, inter alia, the 
following accounts: 
"At that time I told William Cali I didn't part-
icularly care whether or not Check was con-
cerned about rats and not wanting to meet any-
one new or about being busted by the man, and I 
had again still no intention of fronting any 
money or the $300 which Cali owed him." 188 
. . . . . . . 
"I told William Cali at the time I didn't parti-
cularly care whether or not the cocaine which I 
was supposed to get was 70 percent pure, nor 
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the fact that it was supposed to come from a 
captain of detectives; I had again no inten-
tion of fronting any money to him, the $1 200 
for the ounce of cocaine or the $300 which 
William Cali owed to him." 189 
"I had a conversation with William Cali and at 
the time I informed him that I was glad to 
find out that Check, after seeing me in the 
street, had felt somewhat more comfortable 
now, that he was going to make arrangements 
now to get the ounce of cocaine that I wanted, 
and that I was willing to wait with him to 
call Check at a quarter after 1:00, and then 
subsequently proceeded to pick up that ounce 
of cocaine." 170 
This evidence was admitted in the court a quo, albeit 
somewhat reluctantly, the trial judge remarking that 
Spinelli "doesn't seem to be (testifying to just his part 
of the conversation J. He seems to be weaving the two 
together. We can't distinguish which is which." 171 
The court of appeals, however, was unequivocal in its con-
demnation of the evidence, holding that it "was a trans-
parent attempt to incorporate into the officer's testi-
mony information supplied by the informant who did not 
testify at trial. Such a device", the court continued, 
"is improper and cannot miraculously transform inadmis-
172 
sible hearsay into admissible evidence". It re-
jected out of hand the argument advanced by the prosecu-
tion that the evidence was non-hearsay because it "was not 
offered for the truth of the matters asserted therein but 
was offered instead for more limited, and allegedly per-
Page 424. 
173 
rnissible, purposes". In the view of Waterman J, this 
174 line of reasoning constituted a "subterfuge" and an 
175 
"audacious ... artifice", the effects of which would 
be most prejudicial to Check: 
"[B] y incorporating Cali's hearsay into Spinelli's 
testimony, the government received the benefit 
of having, in effect, an additional witness 
against Check while simultaneously insulating 
from cross-examination that witness, a witness 
whom we can safely assume would have been sub-
jected to a scathing, and perhaps effective, 
cross-examination by defense counsel." 176 
Of some interest is the absence of any reference by the 
court to the definition of hearsay in Rule 801. The court 
did perhaps allude to this problem by stating that Cali's 
out-of-court statements were "no doubt .•. being offered to 
177 prove the truth of the matters asserted in them". 
There can be no doubt as to the correctness, in principle, 
of the court's decision. Of greater concern, however, is 
the question whether this principle can be made to square 
with the wording of Rule 801. This is somewhat doubtful 
in the light of the narrow interpretation that most corn-
rnentators concede would seem to be required by the drafters 
of that rule, and, moreover, in view of cases such as Perez 
and Snow. Obviously, the courts will not allow evidence 
as damaging as that tendered in Check to be admitted, des-
pite anything contained in the Federal Rules, but it would 
seem that their efforts to evade its constricted ambit will 
engender unnecessary difficulty and confusion. 
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These fears are borne out further by the decision in 
17 8 United States v Ariza-Ibarra, another drug case, 
where the state sought to prove indirectly the state-
ments of an informer, Larain, who did not testify, 
through the testimony of an agent, Jorge. By so do-
ing, "[i]t was ... conveyed to the jury, implicitly 
but unmistakably, that Larain knew first-hand that 
Ariza was a drug dealer - and that Larain himself was 
179 
exceptionally reliable in such matters". The court 
of appeals, again, was not prepared to sanction this, 
stating that "the jury may not give any credit whatever 
to the implied testimony, much less the views concern-
180 
ing guilt, of an absent witness". (Italics added.) 
The evidence was, therefore, excluded as being hearsay. 
What causes Wellborn some concern, however, is the fact 
181 
that the court cited, as aut~ority for this proposi-
tion, both Rule 801 and the case of Wright v Tatham, 
without realizing the inconsistency involved. It 
would seem, therefore, as Weinberg once remarked, "as 
though we have not taken what Baron Parke said serious-
182 ly enough". 
(B) AUSTRALIA 
Although the reform of the hearsay rule on a federal level 
is at present in its infancy, state law commissions in 
183 
Australia have long been active. In Tasmania, South 
Australia, Queensland and New South Wales, the hearsay 
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problem has, in varying degrees, come under the micro-
scope and formed the subject of substantial reports and 
recommendations, which, in some cases, have led to legis-
lation. I do not propose to deal with all these reports, 
but one which I submit may be of interest is the report of 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, published in 
184 
1978. 
This proposal advocates the abolition of the hearsay rule 
in its present form, and seeks to substitute it with de-
tailed rules relating to the admissibility of "out of 
court statements". These are defined to include both 
statements and conduct, but only if they are intended as 
assertions, thus excluding implied assertions. Such 
statements are treated as being admissible provided either 
the maker of the statement is called as a witness, or the 
par~y tendering the statement is justified in not calling 
him to testify and the stipulated procedural requirements 
are followed. Grounds of justification are then specifi-
cally enumerated, being wider in civil than in criminal 
proceedings. It is further provided that, in deciding 
whether any of these grounds is satisfied, the court shall 
have regard to the nature and importance of both the state-
ment and the question on which the statement is tendered, 
the resources available to the parties, and, in criminal 
cases, the standard of proof to be met and any other rele-
vant matters. 
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A distinction is drawn between an oral statement, which is 
admissible only if the declarant had knowledge based upon 
his own observations and if the person testifying actually 
heard it, and documentary evidence, which, if it came into 
being in a reliable way, is admissible no matter how many 
links there are in the chain of copies. These provisions 
are supplemented, however, by a series of far-reaching dis-
cretionary measures. The court is given a general discre-
tion to admit hearsay evidence where the statement is not 
otherwise admissible if there are reasonable grounds for 
thinking that it may be reliable. In criminal proceed-
ings, the discretion is extended to allow the reception of 
an otherwise inadmissible statement which supports the ac-
quittal of the accused. 
There are also discretionary measures to allow the court 
to exclude evidence otherwise admissible in terms of these 
proposals, where, inter alia, its weight is too slight; 
its utility is outweighed by its tendency to prolong the 
proceedings; it would operate unfairly against the adver-
sary or mislead the jury; its admission would constitute 
an abuse of process; or the other party would be unfairly 
surprised. 
These recommendations have not yet been implemented, how-
ever, and have not met with unequivocal acclaim. The 
Australian Law Reform Commission has criticized the choice 
of definition on the ground that, although it is designed 
Page 428. 
"to resolve doubts about whether evidence of 'implied as-
sertions' is hearsay", it creates "difficult questions 
about whether assertions that can be inferred from a 
statement or conduct were in fact intended by the person 
18 5 
who made the statement or did the relevant act". The 
Commission also expressed reservations about the discre-
tionary measures, arguing that they create uncertainty 
{which is not alleviated by a notice procedure or by pre-
trial decision) and would be difficult for the court to 
apply. In an article in the Australian Law Journal, 
similar sentiments were expressed: 
"One has some reservations about the allowance 
of such a discretion, unless its scope and 
nature are carefully defined. Is it to be a 
'free' discretion, or a discretion requiring 
to be 'properly exercised'? The judgments 
of individual judges of the High Court during 
recent years are sprinkled with dicta as to 
what considerations may legitimately be taken 
into account or ougnt mandatorily to be given 
particular weight or mandatorily to be disre-
garded in the 'proper' exercise of a statu-
tory discretion. Appeals to the High Court 
against the exercise of a too loosely defined 
discretion to admit hearsay could easily lead, 
not only as contemplated, to the development 
of useful precedents as to the admission of 
reliable classes of hearsay testimony, but 
also to a maze of controlling rules, and ex-
ceptions thereto, no less daunting than the 
present maze of exceptions to the hearsay 
rule." 1 8 8 
The rejection of both the restrictive definition of hear-
say and the discretionary approach to resolving the 
problem.of admissibility constitute, therefore, the two 
most striking features of the proposals of the Australian 
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187 Law Reform Commission. Given the formidable task of 
reviewing Australian evidentiary law and recommending 
appropriate legislation to effect both uniformity and re-
form, the Commission has turned its attention to the 
vagaries of the hearsay rule, examining the reasons tra-
ditionally offered for its justification, its merits, its 
shortcomings, and its treatment at the hands of codifiers 
in the major Anglo-American jurisdictions. Flowing from 
this carefully-compiled analysis is a proposal for the 
reform of the rule, the salient characteristics of which 
are as follows: 
(1) General Approach: 
The Commission follows the common law approach of a gen-
eral exclusionary rule qualified by stipulated exceptions. 
The term "hearsay", however, is avoided, and instead the 
expression "previous representation" is used. Clause 2 
states the general exclusionary rule: 
"Subject to this Act, a party to a trial may not 
tender evidence of a previous representation 
to prove the facts asserted by the representa-
tion." 
(2) Definitions: 
A "previous representation" is defined as "a representa-
tion made by a person otherwise than in the course of 
giving ~vidence in the trial in which the evidence of the 
representation is sought to be given", while "representa-
tion" is defined as "an assertion of a fact, whether the 
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assertion is oral, written, express, implied or to be in-
ferred from conduct, and whether or not the person who 
made the representation intended it to be an assertion of 
188 
that fact". 
The decision to include implied assertions within its de-
finition is justified by the Commission on the following 
grounds: 
"By including conduct and implied representa-
tions in the definijion the debate is avoided 
about whether [such evidence •.. is hearsay 
The difficult questions posed by defin-
ing hearsay as implied assertions 'intended' 
to be assertive are also avoided." 18i 
(3) First-hand hearsay: 
The Commission distinguishes between what it calls 
"first-hand" and "second-hand" hearsay. The former it 
defines as a previous representation, "made by a person 
whose knowledge of the fact asserted by it was or might 
reasonably be supposed to have been based on his own ob-
servations of that fact", the maker of which was, at the 
time he made it, "mentally capable of giving evidence of 
d b II 1i0 the fact asserte y it . The admissibility of 
such representations is governed by specified principles, 
the stringency of which is dependant on whether the 
proceedings are criminal or civil and whether the maker 
of the representation is available to testify. 
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(a) Civil proceedings: 
(i) Where the maker is unavailable, the representation 
is admissible, provided "the person giving the evidence 
witnessed the making of the previous representation" and 
191 
notice is given in terms of the Bill. 
(ii) Where the maker is available, the conditions of ad-
missibility are more strict. The representation must be 
"made at a time when the facts referred to in it were or 
could reasonably be supposed to have been fresh in the 
mind of the person making it"; the maker must be called 
to testify unless there is no objection or the court 
grants leave; other witnesses giving evidence of the re-
presentation must have witnessed its making; and notice 
- except in certain exceptional cases - must be given in 
terms of the Bill. 
(b) Criminal proceedings: 
(i) Where the maker is unavailable: 
Apart from the prerequisites stipulated in (a) (i) above 
for civil cases, a previous representation tendered by 
the prosecution must, in addition, comply with ~ of 
192 It must have been made the following conditions: 
either at a time when the facts referred to in it were 
or could reasonably be supposed to have been fresh in 
the mind of its maker; or by a person acting under 
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a duty to make it; or during and relating to the employ-
ment of its maker; or under oath, in any court of law, 
in proceedings between the parties to the trial, provided 
the maker was cross-examined at those proceedings and a 
reliable record of the cross-examination is tendered in 
evidence; or against the financial interests or reputa-
tion of its maker; or in circumstances tending to estab-
lish that its maker has committed an offence or is liable 
in damages at the suit of another person. This clause 
was designed to incorporate some of the common law excep-
tions, which have been modified to meet the major criti-
cisms traditionally levelled at them, viz. that they 
operate uncertainly and tend often to result in the ex-
elusion of probative evidence. 
Even if these conditions are satisfied, the court is ex-
pressly directed to exclude a representation where the 
accused proves that its maker had a motive to misrepre-
1i3 
sent the facts asserted by it. 
A previous representation tendered by the accused, on 
the other hand, is not subject to these conditions, and 
is admissible provided the person who testifies actually 
witnessed its making, and the prescribed notice procedure 
1i4 is followed. 
(ii) Where the maker is available: 
The conditions of admissibility here are the same for the 
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prosecution and the accused: The previous representa-
tion must have been made at a time when its contents 
were fresh in the mind of its maker; its maker must be 
called to testify; other witnesses giving evidence 
must have witnessed its making; and the required notice 
195 
must have been given. 
(4) Second-hand hearsay: 
Such evidence, the Commission opined, where a representa-
tion of fact is made by a person who does not have per-
sonal knowledge of its contents, is "generally so unre-
liable that a more restricted and specific approach must 
198 
be taken to its admissibility". Accordingly, it 
adopts an approach of identifying specific areas where 
there is a need to admit second-hand hearsay, and formu-
lating "sufficient safeguards of reliability to ensure 
that the court's time is not wasted" and that the adver-
sary is adequately protected. These areas, in the 
Commission's view, were as follows: 
(a) Public and private records: These are rendered 
admissible to prove the facts referred to in them, no 
matter what form they may take. 
(b) Reputation: Specifically reputation as to family 
history and relationships, public and general rights, 
and marriage. 
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(c) Telegraphic messages: These are made admissible 
as evidence of their contents and the person by whom they 
are sent. 
(5) Protection of the adversary: 
The Commission expressed the view that "[i]t is desirable 
that the party against whom hearsay evidence is to be led 
197 
should not be taken by surprise". It accordingly 
recommended that such party be served, not less than four-
teen days before the date fixed for trial, with a notice 
containing (inter alia): the date, time and place at 
which the previous representation was made; the names and 
addresses of the maker of the representation; complete 
details of the evidence proposed to be tendered; complete 
details of the facts sustaining the admissibility of the 
representation in cerms of the proposed Bill; complete 
details of all other relevant representations of the 
maker; and, where the maker of the representation is 
available, and the evidence is tendered in civil proceed-
ings in terms of s 5, a statement as to whether the maker 
will be called to testify, and, if not, the grounds re-
198 
lied on for not calling him. 
Provision is made for objection to the service of notice 
199 in civil trials, and the courts are given a residual 
discre~ion to "permit evidence of a previous representa-
tion to be tendered notwithstanding that notice, as re-
200 quired ... has not been given". 
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Comment on Some Aspects of these Proposals 
(1 .) Choice of definition 
The Commission's decision to adopt a broad definition of 
hearsay is to be welcomed. If adopted, this definition 
will be the only one of its kind in the Anglo-American 
evidentiary world, most codes having adopted a version 
similar to that in the Federal Rules. The merits of the 
expansive formulation have been stressed at length 
throughout this dissertation, and the definition proposed 
by the Commission escapes the criticism levelled at the 
201 American formulation by writers such as Finman and 
202 Wellborn. In the context of the proposals advanced 
by the Commission, this definition fulfils two significant 
functions: First, it subjects implied assertions to the 
identical conditions of admissibility as express asser-
tions: if a doctor's express statement that "X has a 
spinal injury" is to be excluded as not satisfying these 
conditions, then his conduct in treating X for a spinal 
injury must similarly be rejected. Secondly, where the 
conditions of admissibility have been satisfied, the fact 
that an implied assertion has been labelled hearsay as 
opposed to "original" or "circumstantial" will serve to 
warn the court not to attach too much weight to the evi-
dence. In this regard, the traditional hearsay dangers 
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may properly be taken into account, even though they were 
considered insufficiently strong to warrant exclusion. 
(2.) General approach 
Both the Federal Rules and the proposals of the Australian 
Law Commission advocate a broad exclusionary principle 
qualified by exceptions. Here, however, the similarity 
ends. The Federal Rules contain twenty-seven rigidly 
formulated exceptions, which to a large extent embody the 
common law, lubricated by a residual discretion to admit 
hearsay that falls within certain limits. The Australian 
proposal, on the other hand, contains neither a list of 
ad hoc exceptions nor a residual discretion. Instead, 
it reflects a concerted attempt to isolate general prin-
ciples for admitting hearsay, based on the rationale of 
the common law exceptions and the values underlying the 
hearsay rule. The essential variables in this mix are 
reliability, necessity and fairness, and these are re-
flected in the three major distinctions drawn by the 
Commission in its treatment of hearsay: 
(i) First- and second-hand hearsay: The more re-
stricted, specific approach accorded the latter category 
is explained on the basis of its general unreliability. 
( ii) Civil and criminal proceedings: In the view of 
the Commission "considerations of fairness" required 
that a different approach be taken to hearsay evidence 
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in criminal trials as opposed to civil trials, as: 
11 [t] raditionally, the criminal trial is pre-
mised on the view that we should minimise the 
risk of convicting the innocent, even though 
this may result in the acquittal from time to 
time of the guilty. The proceedings are of 
a very serious nature involving allegations 
of breach of the law and involving serious 
consequences for an accused person found 
guilty. 11 203 
(iii) Availability and unavailability of the maker of 
the statement: Where the declarant is unavailable to 
testify, the need for receiving hearsay is obviously 
much greater. The principle of necessity has, as the 
204 
Commission points out, been employed in all legisla-
tion attempting to reform the hearsay rule. 
Apart from these three primary criteria, the Commission 
also took into account the following secondary considera-
tions: Expedition in the proceedings, finality, the need to 
avoid unnecessary expense, certainty, clarity and simpli-
city. The result is a code which avoids the statutory 
catalogue of time-honoured exceptions favoured by the 
Federal Rules, and which is fashioned more by sound legal 
policy than the haphazard erosion of the hearsay monolith 
at the hands of the courts. In this respect, the Austra-
lian approach is, it is submitted, preferable. After 
all, the common law exceptions have been the subject of 
too many barbs and assaults to warrant legal immortality; 
of far greater value is the general policy, or highest 
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common factor, that may be elicited from these excep-
tions. This gives the system a greater degree of co-
hesion, and allows it to deal more flexibly with the 
vicissitudes of practice. In another respect, however, 
the Australian approach is, it is submitted, deficient. 
Unlike the Federal Rules, the Commission's proposed code 
makes no provision for a residual discretion either to 
admit otherwise inadmissible hearsay, or to exclude 
otherwise admissible hearsay. 
It could, perhaps, be argued that there is no need for 
such measures in view of the liberal "general principle" 
approach adopted by the Commission. This argument, how-
ever, ignores three important considerations: 
(i.) Although the Commission eschewed the "specific 
exception" approach of the Federal Rules in favour of 
general principles of exclusion, some areas of the pro-
posed code are more conservative in their treatment of 
hearsay than others. One thinks particularly of evi-
dence tendered by the prosecution in criminal trials, 
where the Commission, by its own admission, attempted 
to incorporate a revised version of the common law ex-
ceptions relating to declarations of deceased persons. 
The entire class of second-hand hearsay, moreover, is 
dealt with along the lines of the specific exception 
approa~h of the Federal Rules. The result is that, 
although the Commission's treatment of hearsay may 
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generally be said to be more flexible than that of its 
American counterpart, in certain specific areas, the op-
posite may be true. By adopting a residual discre-
tionary exception, the drafters of the Federal Rules re-
cognized that no list of specific exceptions could cope 
adequately with the vagaries of hearsay. The Australian 
proposal, it is submitted, could be improved by recog-
nizing that same fact. 
(ii) By defining hearsay to include nonassertive verbal 
and nonverbal conduct, the proposed code brings under the 
hearsay banner a vast welter of evidence, the status of 
which was previously uncertain, and in respect of which 
the hearsay problem was usually ignored. The common law 
exceptions, including those retained in the proposal, 
arose almost exclusively in response to the need to re-
ceive certain express assertions, and may not be appro-
priate to implied assertions. The trustworthiness of 
such assertions is often enhanced by their nonassertive 
quality, thus lending force to the argument that they be 
subjected to less rigorous demands than express asser-
tiona. The Australian proposal, however, ignores this 
distinction, and treats express and implied assertions in 
the same way. The flaws in this approach may be demon-
strated by taking the following example, derived from the 
facts of S v Van Niekerk: 205 
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A magistrate, A, is charged with the theft of a valuable 
rifle that he has confiscated from B. His defence is 
that B had told him to sell the rifle and keep the pro-
ceeds. To rebut this defence, the proseGutor tenders 
evidence of letters written by B to his brother, in which 
he requested him to collect the rifle from A. These 
letters were written after the date on which A was 
allegedly instructed to keep the money, and at a time 
when the issuing of such instructions, if they were in-
deed given, was no longer "fresh in his mind". This evi-
dence would, in terms of the Commission's proposals for 
criminal trials in clause 6, be inadmissible, as none of 
the exceptions listed in clause 6(1) (b) is applicable. 
Nevertheless, a strong argument may be made for admissi-
bility, as the reliability of the evidence is suggested 
by two factors: 
a. the lack of assertive intent, which reduces the 
danger of insincerity; and 
b. the fact that the subject matter of the assertion 
was of importance to A, which reduces the possibility of 
honest error. 
The point that emerges from this example is that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a closed list 
of reliability factors on which to precipitate the ad-
missibility of implied assertions. Such factors are 
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best gleaned from all the circumstantial factors that may 
exist in a particular case. This exercise defies pre-
cise enumeration and lends itself instead to the more 
flexible attributes of a judicial discretion. 
(iii) While the rather liberal approach of the Australian 
Commission may, in some areas, reduce the need for a dis-
cretion to admit, it has the opposite effect in respect of 
a discretion to exclude evidence. The proposed code 
opens the floodgates to a torrent of hearsay assertions, 
many of which may carry minimal probative force. Even 
206 
the more conservative Federal Rules contain a provision 
empowering the court to exclude relevant evidence where 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. The need for a similar discretion in the Aus-
tralian proposal would seem to be even greater if the 
courts are not to be faced with a stream of time-consum-
ing, prejudicial evidence of negligible value. 
(3.) The possibility of a judicial discretion 
In response to criticism of its hearsay proposal, the 
Commission in 1982 issued a further research paper, en-
207 
titled "Hearsay Law Reform- Which Approach", in 
which it examined, respectively, the merits of a system 
that minimizes and maximizes the scope of a judicial 
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discretion to exclude hearsay. 
marized as follows: 
Its analysis may be sum-
A. Minimizing judicial discretion 
(a) Model epitomizing this approach: 
To demonstrate this perspective of hearsay, the Commission 
uses its own previous proposal for reform of the rule, 
which,although it contains some discretionary elements, is 
largely principle-oriented. 
(b) Advantages of this approach: 
(1) Historical consistency: It is consistent with the 
development of the rule at common law, and is therefore 
not entirely alien to legal practitioners and judicial 
officers. 
(2) Certainty and predictability: It allows parties to 
ascertain, with reasonable certainty, in advance, whether 
particular items of evidence will be received. 
(3) Consistency: It is preferable, especially in 
criminal trials, that the rights of the parties be deter-
mined by pre-existing rules rather than the capricious 
whim that characterizes a discretion. 
(4) Economy and efficiency: Specific rules have the 
effect of confining debate and thus reducing litigation 
time and cost. 
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(5) Impetus to reform: The greater the discretion given 
to the court to control the admissibility of hearsay, the 
more likely it will be that the common law will continue to 
flourish in its existing form. 
(6) Focus on principle and policy: By drawing up pre-
cise rules, the legislature is compelled to confront and 
attach priorities to the vital issues. 
(c) Disadvantages of this approach: 
(1) Exclusion of probative evidence: By allowing hear-
say to be received only within the limits of specific ex-
ceptions, it is inevitable that some valuable evidence will 
be lost to the court. In the Australian proposal, this is 
particularly apparent in the case of second-hand hearsay 
and evidence led by the prosecution in criminal trials, 
where the exceptions are more restrictively framed. The 
Commission conceded in its second paper that this may neces-
sitate adding a discretion to admit probative evidence in 
order to moderate these provisions. 
(2) Complexity: Any system of exact categories must 
necessarily be more complex than a discretionary approach. 
This may hinder acceptance of this approach and reduce its 
appeal in the eyes of practitioners. 
(3) Cost: By rendering some probative and valuable 
hearsay· inadmissible, the proposed code necessitates the 
calling of witnesses in situations where cost savings could 
Page 444. 
be achieved by relying on the hearsay evidence. 
(4) Notice requirements: These, the Commission con-
cedes, may be criticized as being unrealistic and imprac-
tical. In the United States, such requirements are 
often ignored, despite being a precondition to admissi-
bility by way of the residual exceptions (viz. Rules 
803(5) and 804(24)). Perhaps, it continues, this proce-
dure should only be required where either the maker of 
the statement is alleged to be unavailable or where a 
party wishes to avoid calling the maker for cost reasons. 
B. Maximizing judicial discretion 
(a) Suggested model: 
As an example of this approach, the Commission proposes a 
general principle of exclusion, qualified by, instead of 
specific exceptions, a general discretion to admit hearsay 
subject to the following four requirements being satisfied: 
( 1 ) Reliability: Whether the evidence is sufficiently 
trustworthy. 
( 2) Convenience: Whether it is more probative on the 
point in issue than any other evidence that could reason-
ably be procured. 
(3) Justice: Whether, on balance, it would be fair and 
in the interests of justice to receive the evidence. 
(4) Public policy: Whether countervailing policy 
considerations require its exclusion. 
208 
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The Commission then elaborates on these conditions, stating 
what factors may be considered in this enquiry. It is 
submitted, however, that these factors are not sufficiently 
comprehensive to be of any real value. If it is necessary 
to give guidance on the exercise of a general discretion, 
then such guidance should be clear and explicit instead of 
confusing and abstruse. 
(b) Advantages: 
(1) This approach avoids the detailed categorization of 
the proposed code, and offers simplicity, flexibility and 
uniformity. The basic hearsay values of reliability, con-
venience and justice are elevated to preconditions of ad-
missibility instead of being the motifs of a system of pro-
liferating exceptions. 
(2) It may easily be grasped by legal practitioners and 
judicial officers. 
(3) It reflects the approach taken in many Continental 
countries, where the hearsay rule is unknown and the judge 
has complete control over the evidence tendered. 
(c) Disadvantages: 
(1) Judges would, in the absence of adequate indica-
tions to the contrary, exercise their discretion conserva-
tively so as to retain the status quo. 
(2) Broad concepts such as reliability, justice and 
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convenience are likely to engender a lack of uniformity. 
Any attempt to remedy this problem, however, would re-
strict its simplicity and flexibility. 
(3) A broad discretion would probably render decisions 
uncertain and unpredictable. Parties would thus have to 
keep witnesses available to testify in the event of cer-
tain hearsay being rejected. Legal advice on evidence 
would become hazardous and pre-trial settlements inhibi-
ted. All this would increase litigation and costs. 
(4) The floodgates would be opened to swamp the courts 
with evidence of marginal relevance. As mentioned above, 
however, this objection would disappear if the courts were 
allowed a general discretion to exclude, similar to that 
provided by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules. 
(5) A litigant could object to the admissibility of any 
hearsay, necessitating deliberation by the court of all 
the factors and guidelines mentioned above. This would 
increase the potential for delays, which could be exploited 
by more wealthy litigants to protract trials. 
(6) All hearsay would stand the risk of exclusion, in-
cluding evidence presently admissible in terms of the ex-
ceptions to the rule. This would further increase uncer-
tainty and reduce uniformity. 
(7) A broad discretionary approach would increase the 
points of objection which may be taken on appeal, increas-
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ing both the number and length of appeals. 
(8) Reliability would become a threshold issue, in that 
the courts would have to determine whether evidence is re-
liable even before it is admitted. This may often prove 
to be difficult, as a proper assessment of reliability may 
not be possible until all the evidence has been led. 
Judicial officers would thus be forced to admit a substan-
tial amount of questionable evidence "subject to objec-
tion". 
Conclusion: 
The need for legislative reform of the hearsay rule has 
long been recognized. As early as 1898, Thayer suggested 
it would be beneficial to "restate the law so as to make 
what we call the hearsay rule the excep~ion, and make our 
main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is relevant is ad-
208 
missible". Almost half a century later, Professors 
Morgan and Maguire found no reason to revise Thayer's 
appraisal of what they termed a "peculiarly absurd portion 
210 
of the law of evidence". In the words of the learned 
writers: "Fifty years have done comparatively little to 
make it sensible, and fifty further years of judicial evo-
lution will do little more. Legislation is imperative 
211 
" Today, another half a century later, these words 
seem, from a South African point of view, prophetic. 
In 1938, in an article entitled "Tomorrow's Law of Evi-
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212 
dence", Me Cormick predicted a "drift ••• from rules of 
exclusion mandatory on the judge, to rules expressed in 
213 
terms of discretionary balancing of considerations", 
concluding that "the time will soon be ripe for us to re-
cognize that the [hearsay rule] calls for a treatment in 
terms of a discretion which needs only to be limited by 
some requirement of fair notice and to be guided by a 
214 
general standard". In view of the arguments submitted 
in this and the following chapter, it is my hope that 
these words will, in the same way as those of Morgan and 
Maguire, be prophetic. 
Page 44 9. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 
A good summary of reform action in these countries may be found 
in a research paper of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
(Cth), viz ALRC, RP 3 Hearsay Evidence Proposal (1981) at 76-
115. 
2 Id at 122-3. See also clause 1(1) of the hearsay proposal at 
p 134 of the report. 
3 Id at 173. 
4 ALRC, RP 9 Hearsay Law Reform- Which Approach? (1982). 
5 R Graham Murray "Evidence: A Fresh Approach. The American Uni-
form Rules of Evidence (1953)" (1959) 37 Canadian Bar Review 
576 at 582. 
6 American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence (1942). 
7 John MacArthur Maguire Evidence - Common Sense and Common Law 
(1947) at 153. 
8 Jack B Weinstein "Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules" 
44 Federal Rules Decisions 375 at 378. 
9 See, for instance, Ted Finman "Implied Assertions as Hearsay: 
Some Criticisms of the Uniform Rules of Evidence" (1962) 14 
Stanford LR 682. 
10 Unif. R. Evid. 63(4)(c). 
11 These being Kansas, New Jersey, California, the Virgin Islands 
and Utah. 
12 See J Weinstein and M Berger Weinstein's Evidence (1975) at 
T - 1 (Supp 1981) • 
13 Olin Guy Wellborn III "The Definition of Hearsay in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence" (1982) 61 Texas LR 49 at 49. 
14 Id at 50. 
15 C Wright and K Graham Federal Practice and Procedure (1977) 
para 5005 at 92. 
16 Fed. R. Evid. 801 Advisory Committee Note. All ensuing quotes 
from the Committee's report are taken from the same reference, 
which will not be repeated. 
17 Par.ticularly Jack B Weinstein "Probative Force of Hearsay" 
(1961) 46 Iowa LR 331. 
18 Quoting James H Chadbourn "Bentham and the Hearsay Rule - A 
Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of -the Uniform Rules of Evidence" 
(1962) 75 Harvard LR 932 at 947. 
Page 450. 
19 Weinstein "Alternatives ..• ", op cit note 8, at 380. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Josiah H Blackmore II "Some Things About Hearsay: Article 
VIII" (1977) 6 Capital University LR 597 at 624. 
22 Supreme Court Rule 36(9); Magistrate's Court Rule 24(9). 
23 See L H Hoffmann and D T Zeffertt South African Law of Evi-
dence 3ed (1981) 84 and cases cited at 84 note 8. 
24 Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). 
25 For a full account see, for instance, Edward J Imwinkelried 
"The Scope of the Residual Hearsay Exceptions in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence" (1978) 15 San Diego LR 239 at 247-252, and 
Kenneth W Barton and Richard G Cowart 11The Enigma of Hearsay" 
(1978) 49 Mississippi LJ 31 at 121-7. 
26 Preliminar Draft of Pro osed Rules of Evidence for the United 
States District Courts and Magistrates 1969 46 Federal Rules 
Decisions 161. 
27 See H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973). 
28 SeeS. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-20 (1974). 
29 286 F. 2d 388 (1961). 
30 s. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974). 
31 Id at 19. 
32 Fed. R. Evid. 801 Advisory Committee Note. 
33 See in this regard Imwinkelried, op cit note 25; Hochman "The 
Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence: A Critical Examination" (1978) 31 Rutgers LR 
543; and David A Sonenshein "The Residual Exceptions to the 
Federal Hearsay Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule" 
(1982) 57 New York University LR 867. 
34 Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 264. 
35 Id at 243. 
36 Wigmore Evidence V 3ed (1940) para 1420. 
37 See Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 244-5. 
38 un'ited States v Kearney 420 F. 2d 170 (1969) at 174-5; see 
also Un1ted States v Brown 411 F. 2d 1134 (1969) and 
Sabat1no v Curt1ss Nat1onal Bank of Miami 415 F. 2d 632 (1969). 
Page 451. 
39 284 F. Supp. 409 (1968). 
40 At 411. 
41 At 413. 
42 At 412. 
43 Ibid. 
44 At 412-3. 
45 286 F. 2d 388 (1961). 
ante. 
This case is discussed ~n full at 344 
46 Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 246. 
47 349 F. 2d 264 (1965) at 276. See also Butler v South Pacific 
Co 431 F. 2d 77 (1970) and United States v Schwartz 252 
~ Supp. 866 (1966). 
48 445 F. 2d 967 (1971). 
49 At 972 note 6. 
50 Supra note 30. 
51 Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 252. 
52 See, for example, United States v Gomez 529 F. 2d 412 (1976), 
Ark-Mo Farms, Inc v Un~ted States 530 F. 2d 1384 (1976) and 
Muncie Av~ation Corp v Party Doll Fleet, Inc 519 F. 2d 1178 
(1975), where reference is made to the Dallas County case; and 
United States v Carlson 547 F. 2d 1346 (1976), where reference 
is made to Chestnut v Ford Motor Company. 
53 Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 253. See also the cases he 
cites at 253-5. 
54 See, for example, Ark-Mo Farms, Inc v United States, supra note 
52; United States v Pfeiffer 539 F. 2d 668 (1976); and 
United States v Iaconett1 406 F. Supp. 554 (1976). 
55 401 F. Supp. 604 (1975). 
56 At 608. 
57 Ibid. 
58 557 F. 2d 309 (1977). 
59 At 315. 
60 Ibid. 
61 At 316. 
62 At 320-1. 
63 At 321. 
64 At 320. 
at 299. 
See also United States v Mathis 559 F. 2d 294 (1977) 
Page 452. 
65 427 F. Supp. 859 (1977). 
66 At 866. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Imwinkelried, op cit note 25, at 258. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 S. Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1974). 
72 Id at 19. 
73 Id at 20. 
74 David A Sonenshein "The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hear-
say Rule: Two Exceptions in Search of a Rule" (1982) 57 New 
York University LR 867 at 905. 
75 Id at 876. 
76 For illustrative cases, see Sonenshein, op cit note 74, at 876 
note 55. 
77 For illustrative cases, see Sonenshein, op cit note 74, at 877 
note 56. 
78 For illustrative cases, see Sonenshein, op cit note 74, at 
877-8, note 56. 
79 See the cases discussed by Sonenshein at 880-3. 
80 Sonenshein, op cit note 74, at 879. 
81 Id at 885. 
82 See, for example, United States v Leslie 542 F. 2d 285 (1976), 
United States v McPartlin 595 F. 2d 1321 (1979) and United 
States v American Tel & Tel. Co 516 F. Supp. 1237 (1981). 
83 See, for example, United States v Love 592 F. 2d 1022 (1979), 
United States v Kim 595 F. 2d 755 11979) and Zenith Radio Corp 
v Matsush~ta Electric Industrial Co 505 F. Supp. 1190 (1980). 
84 Sonenshein, op cit note 74, at 875. 
85 See Chapter X post. 
86 Fed. R. Evid. 801 Advisory Committee Note. All ensuing quotes 
from the Committee's report are taken from the same reference, 
which will not be repeated. 
87 Olin Guy Wellborn III "The Definition of Hearsay in the Federal 
Rules of Evidence" (1982) 61 Texas LR 49 at 52. 
Page 453. 
88 Kenneth W Barton and Richard G Cowart "The Enigma of Hearsay" (1978) 
49 Mississippi LJ 31. 
89 Id at 35. See also R 0 Lempert and S A Saltzburg A Modern Approach 
to Evidence (1977) at 348-51. At 351, the authors submit that the 
drafters of the Federal Rules followed "the wiser course in not 
treating assertions implied from conduct as hearsay". 
90 The learned writers cite State v Izzo 383 P. 2d 116 (1963) as being 
illustrative of this approach. 
91 Susan R Kelly "Hearsay Evidence and the Federal Rules: Article VIII 
- I. Mapping out the Borders of Hearsay" (1975) 36 Louisiana LR 
139. 
92 Id at 147. 
93 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
94 Kelly, op cit note 91, at 145. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Apart from the commentators mentioned below in the text, see also 
Walker Jameson Blakey "You Can Say That If You Want - The Redefini-
tion of Hearsay in Rule 801 of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evi-
dence" (1974) 35 Ohio St LJ 601. 
97 Josiah H Blackmore II "Some Things About Hearsay: Article VIII" 
(1977) 6 Capital University LR 597. 
98 Id at 598. 
99 Id at 599. 
100 I Daniel Stewart Jr "Perception, Memory and Hearsay: A Criticism 
of Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence" (1970) 
Utah LR 1. 
101 Id at 37. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Id at 38. 
106 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 52. 
107 Id at 55. 
108 (1837) 7 Ad & El 313, 112 ER 488. 
length in Chapter V ante. 
109 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 58. 
no Ibid. 
This case was discussed at 
Page 454. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Finman, op cit note 9, at 692, cited by Wellborn, op cit, at 61. 
113 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 63. 
114 See Judson F Falknor "The'Hear-Say' Rule as a 'See-Do' Rule: Evi-
dence of Conduct" (1961) 33 Rocky Mountain LR 133 at 137. 
115 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 63-4. 
116 Id at 64. 
11 7 Id at 6 7. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See Finman, op cit note 9, at 700; Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 
67-8. 
120 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 68. 
121 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (P Gove ed 1971) 131. 
122 See, for example, C T Me Cormick Handbook of the Law of Evidence 
2ed ( 1972) 599-600; Vaughn C Ball "The Changing Shape of the 
Hearsay Rule" (1977) 38 Alabama LR 502 at 506; Blakey, op cit 
note 96, at 611; Finman, op c1t note 9, at 684; Stewart, op cit 
note 100, at 38; and Comment "State of Mind: The Elusive Excep-
tion" (1976) 9 U.C.D. LR 199 at 203-4. 
123 Fed. R. Evid. 801 Advisory Committee Note. 
124 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 78. 
125 Id at 75, derived from an example put forward by Eustace Seligman 
"An Exception to the Hearsay Rule" (1912) 26 Harvard LR 146 at 
150-1. 
126 Id at 76. 
127 Ball, op cit note 122, at 506. 
128 Id at 507. 
129 Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) para SA. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 78. 
132 Id at 81. 
133 See, for example, M Graham Handbook of Federal Evidence (1981) 
paras 801.7 and 801.10, and B Jefferson Cal1forn1a Ev1dence Bench-
book (1972) para 1.4. 
134 M Gr.aham, op cit note 133, para 801.7 at 701. 
135 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 83. 
136 658 F. 2d 654 (l981). 
Page 455. 
137 At 659. 
138 517 F. 2d 441 (1975). 
139 At 443. 
140 See 296-7 ante. 
141 SeeM Graham, op cit note 133, para 801.6 at 693. 
142 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 85. 
143 491 F. 2d 1108 (1974). 
144 Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 85. 
145 At 1115. 
146 At 1116. 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid. 
149 At 1117. 
150 493 F. 2d 923 (1974). 
151 The court, at 927, cited with approval the following passage 
written by Morgan "Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the 
Hearsay Concept" (1948) 62 Harvard LR 177 at 218: 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
"(s] hould we not recognize that the rational basis for the 
hearsay classification is not the formula, 'assertions 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted', but rather 
the presence of substantial risks of insincerity and 
faulty narration, memory and perception?" 
At 927. 
At 927-8. 
519 F. 2d 1178 (1975). 
At 1180. 
At 1181 • 
At 1182. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
Wellborn, op cit note 87, at 87. 
Id at 88. 
493 F. 2d 923 (1974). 
At 928. 
582 F. 2d 668 (1978). 
At 671. 
Ibid. 
Page 456. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 As cited by the Court of Appeals at 679. 
172 At 679. 
173 At 681. 
174 At 680. 
175 At 679. 
176 At 683. 
177 At 679. 
178 605 F. 2d 1216 (1979). 
179 At 1222. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Mark Weinberg "Implied Assertions and the Scope of the Hearsay 
Rule" (1973) 9 Melbourne University LR 268 at 295. Another 
case to have given rise to certain misgivings in this regard is 
State v Galvan 297 N.W. 2d 344 (1980). In this case the court 
evaded the issue by labelling the evidence "assertive", and 
thus concluded that it was hearsay in terms of Rule 801. It 
would seem, however, that the evidence was clearly non-assertive. 
The many risks inherent in the evidence, however, probably in-
duced the court to come to this conclusion. For a criticism of 
this case, see Wendy S Everett "Nonassertive Conduct and State 
of Mind Evidence in Iowa After Galvan: Bridges Over Troubled 
Hearsay Waters" (1981) 66 Iowa LR 985. 
183 For a full discussion of state reform programmes, see ALRC, RP 3 
Hearsay Evidence Proposal (1981) at 99-109. 
184 NSWLRC Report on Hearsay (1978). 
185 ALRC, RP 3,op cit note 183, at 105. 
186 (1979) 53 ALJ 2 at 3-4. 
187 Op cit note 183. 
188 Clause 1(1). 
189 ALRC, RP 3, op cit note 183, at 123. 
190 Clause 3. 
191 Clause 4. 
192 Clause 6(1)(b). 
193 Clause 6(2). 
194 Clause 6(3). 
195 Clause 7(1). 
196 ALRC, RP 3, op cit note 183, at 123. 
Page 457. 
197 Id at 130. 
198 Clause 17(1). 
199 Clause 18. 
200 Clause 19. 
201 Finman, op cit note 9. 
202 Wellborn, op cit note 87. 
203 ALRC, RP 3, op cit note 183, at 121. 
204 Id at 124. 
205 1964 (1) SA 729 (C); this case was discussed fully at 278 et seq. 
206 Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
207 ALRC, RP 9 Hearsay Law Reform- Which Approach? (1982). 
208 Id at 18-20. 
209 James Bradley Thayer Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the 
Common Law (1898) 522. 
210 Edmund M Morgan and John MacArthur Maguire "Looking Backward 
and Forward at Evidence" (1937) 50 Harvard LR 909 at 921. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Charles T Me Cormick "Tomorrow's Law of Evidence" (1938) 26 
American Bar Association Journal 507. 
213 Id at 511. 
214 Id at 512. 
Page 458. 
Chapter X 
CONCLUSION SUGGESTIONS FOR LAW REFORM 
IN SOUTH AFRICA 
What, then, are the choices facing the South African 
Legislature? 
(A) To retain the status quo: This, I have argued, is 
untenable. The flaws in the common-law hearsay-structure 
make reform imperative, and the argument that the rule 
"works in practice" rests upon a curious blend of legal 
fiction and judicial licence. 
(B) To abolish the rule and to allow all relevant evi-
dence to be received subject to an assessment of its 
weight: The simplicity of this approach gives it much 
appeal, but, while it is certainly preferable to the 
present system, its innocuous facade belies certain ser-
ious drawbacks: 
(i) It is too radical a departure from traditional hear-
say theory - even more drastic in its consequences than 
the bitterly opposed Model Code and Uniform Rules - and 
is likely to elicit vociferous resistance from the legal 
profession. 
(ii) Exclusion is a more effective mechanism than the 
evaluation of weight for dealing with hearsay of minimal 
probative value. 
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(iii) An exclusionary rule, by compelling the court to 
label evidence as either hearsay or non-hearsay, is more 
conducive to a proper recognition and assessment of the 
dangers and safeguards contained in such evidence. 
(iv) In the absence of legislative guidance, it is pos-
sible that the courts would allow the traditional hearsay 
objections to colour their determination of relevance, 
thus leading to a resuscitation and re-statement of the 
same problems that currently bedevil the topic. 
(v) A scientifically formulated standard for separat-
ing admissible and inadmissible hearsay would be more 
satisfactory than a vague, broad mandate to receive all 
relevant evidence subject to an evaluation of its weight. 
' (C) To devise s~ientific criteria for determining when 
hearsay should be received or excluded: This, it has 
been submitted, represents undoubtedly the most satisfac-
tory solution to the problem. It raises, however, the 
problem of choice, as here the Legislature is faced with 
a variety of possible formulations: 
(a) A general exclusionary rule qualified by defined 
exceptions: This is the approach of the common law, and 
it has been shown that a concept as slippery as hearsay 
is not' comfortably accommodated within the rigid confines 
of precise categories. It lends itself, rather, to the 
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more flexible qualities of a judicial discretion sometimes 
to receive hearsay, a fact recognized by the drafters of 
the United States Federal Rules when the thirty specified 
exceptions of the Rules were supplemented by the two resi-
dual discretionary exceptions. It is impossible to com-
pile a comprehensive list of acceptable hearsay categories, 
just as it is impossible to identify all relevant evidence, 
and, even if our r·ecognized hearsay exceptions were rationa-
lized, revised and expanded, such an approach, by its very 
nature, is doomed to failure. It could be argued that in 
South Africa the specific exception approach was dealt a 
mortal blow by the decision in Vulcan Rubber Works (Pty) 
1 
Ltd v SAR & H, which, in effect, terminated the expansion 
of the common law exceptions, and that the status quo may be 
salvaged by a statutory circumvention of this decision. 
That this would be a panacea is doubtful. In Canada, for 
instance, where the courts have rejected the restrictive 
2 
view of the majority in Myers v DPP, legislative reform 
3 has still been considered necessary. The stark reality, 
it would seem, is that the category and label approach is 
conceptually defective in that it fails to come to grips 
with the variable character of hearsay. The border be-
tween acceptable and unacceptable hearsay is often very 
thin, and depends on several inter-dependent factors which 
defy precise ennumeration and which may only be garnered 
from the totality of the circumstances of each individual 
case. 
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(b) Defined exceptions qualified by a residual discre-
tion to admit in certain prescribed cases: This approach, 
which was adopted in the Federal Rules, also gives rise to 
certain difficulties. If the residual exception is re-
strictively framed so as to apply only in particular, cir-
cumscribed areas, then one has not really remedied the 
problems encountered in (a) above, and the discretion is 
rendered impotent. If the provision is given a wide am-
bit, one runs the risk that the ensuing tension between 
the specific exceptions and the flexible residual provision 
may create uncertainty and induce the courts to seek 
asylum in the relative safety of the common law. It is 
clear that such a solution is an anomaly, as it creates a 
paradoxical hybrid between rigid rules and a wide discre-
tion, and makes it difficult for a court to resolve diffi-
cult issues by resorting to original legislative intent. 
The approach of the Federal Rules raises, furthermore, 
difficult problems of interpretation, as the courts are 
compelled to resolve questions of admissibility by re-
ferring to the language of the residual provisions rather 
than by adhering to the general spirit and policy underly-
ing them. The ensuing plethora of interpretations has, 
apart from jeopardizing uniformity, given rise to con-
structions and decisions which are incorrect and undesir-
able. One particular problem that has plagued the 
courts concerns assertions which narrowly miss admissi-
bility via one of the recognized categories but which 
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comply substantially with the requirements of the residual 
4 
exceptions. Problems such as these, it is submitted, may 
be avoided by jettisoning, once and for all, the category 
approach and by making discretion the central mechanism 
for controlling admissibility instead of a safety net for 
regulating the imperfections of a flawed system. 
(c) A broad, unqualified discretion to admit hearsay in 
appropriate cases: As with the abolitionist view, this 
proposal is unlikely to find an enthusiastic audience 
among legal practitioners. However, unlike that solu-
tion, this approach may be counterproductive and lead, 
paradoxically, to retrograde results. For judges, sub-
jected to the considerable demands and pressures of liti-
gation, and cast into the very midst of the hearsay 
thicket, could hardly be blamed for evading its unyielding 
briers and resorting to the well-worn paths of the common-
law exceptions. Few would be so bold as to blaze trails 
through the heart of this thicket - a task more appropri-
ately assumed by the Legislature. Certainly legislative 
direction is necessary, but it should be a direction that 
would provide guidance instead of shackles; that would 
fortify and foster the judicial discretion rather than 
stifle it. 
(d) The identification of various categories of hearsay, 
followed by general principles of admissibility rather 
than specific exceptions: This approach, endorsed by the 
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5 
Australian Law Reform Commission, runs into conceptual 
difficulties at both ends of the admissibility spectrum. 
At one end, it would not adequately cover all classes of 
reliable hearsay, no matter how carefully such classes 
are compiled; at the other end, the ennumerated catego-
ries would necessarily be widely defined, allowing hear-
say of minimal probative value to be received. It was 
submitted above 6 that these defects could be cured by 
introducing both inclusionary and exclusionary discre-
tions, but this would result in a system that was cumber-
some and unnecessarily complex. It would, furthermore, 
create uncertainty as to the status of the specific 
principles, as the dual discretionary provisions would 
render them, in large measure, redundant or tautologous. 
Because the provisions of such a system would often en-
compass general situations rather than specific instances, 
the distinction between them and the residual discretions 
would tend to become blurred, and one would be left with 
a bifurcated system for determining admissibility. Each 
particular question would then have to be resolved by hav-
ing recourse to both standards, thus giving rise to con-
fusion and unnecessary problems of construction. 
(e) A judicial discretion qualified by a set of non-
comprehensive guidelines: Here, it is submitted, lies 
the solution to the hearsay dilemma. By liberating 
hearsay from its traditional maze of exceptions, it 
would be possible to come to grips with the true concep-
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tual objections to its reception, and to make these objec-
tions central rather than incidental to the overall en-
quiry, viz the admissibility of reliable evidence. Such 
an approach, moreover, allows one to transcend the present 
debate concerning implied assertions, and to perceive 
hearsay as evidence raising particular objections or 
dangers. This obviates the need to investigate the some-
what abstruse distinction between evidence that gives rise 
to certain permissible inferences and implied hearsay 
assertions, and penetrates the very core of the problem by 
identifying hearsay-like dangers and reciprocal safeguards. 
The challenge that faces the Legislature in this regard is 
four-fold: 
(i) to formulate a satisfactory definition of hearsay 
that will identify any evidenGe raising these 
dangers; 
(ii) to decide whether to adopt a general principle of 
exclusion or inclusion in respect of such evidence; 
(iii) to lay down a set of guidelines that will shepherd 
a judge through the hearsay thicket without having 
his discretion unduly tempered; and 
(iv) to create procedural safeguards to prevent undue 
prejudice to the adversary. 
The drafting of such an enactment should, furthermore, 
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take into account the following factors: 
(1) The origin of the hearsay rule, and, in particular, 
its emergence as both the 'child of the jury' and the 
7 
'product of the adversary system'. Account must there-
fore be taken of, respectively, the prestige of the fact-
finding process and the protection of the adversary. In 
the light, however, of the modern swing towards the latter 
conception of hearsay, together with the abolition of the 
jury in South Africa, it is submitted that greater empha-
sis should be placed on the se~ond of these principles, 
although the first should not be entirely overlooked. 
(2) The traditional rationale underlying the hearsay 
rule. Hearsay has traditionally been excluded because: 
(i) it contains certain intrinsic dangers; (ii) it brings 
into question other dangers, which are not peculiar to 
hearsay, but which are exacerbated by the absence of the 
standard curial procedural devices to which witnesses are 
normally subjected; (iii) the absence of these procedural 
devices may therefore cause prejudice to the adversary in 
the presentation of his case; and (iv) the admission of 
8 
hearsay causes procedural inconvenience and difficulties. 
The proposed judicial discretion should, therefore, be 
structured in such a way as to take account of these ob-
jections, focussing particularly on the traditional 
'hearsa'y dangers' of insincerity, defective memory, faulty 
perception and accidental miscommunication, and the pre-
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judice caused to the adversary through being deprived of 
the effective employment of the recognized procedural 
aids. Such an approach would be in accord with the 
views of Professor Schiff, who submitted that "judges 
should admit any item of hearsay evidence at a trial 
when the purposes of the hearsay rule within our litiga-
tion system would be served no more than barely under the 
8 particular circumstances". 
(3) Considerations of legal policy. The hearsay rule 
spans the straits between two conflicting evidentiary 
principles. On the one hand, it is desirable that all 
relevant evidence be received and evaluated by the trier 
of fact, and on the other, it is equally desirable that 
all witnesses testify subject to the 'ideal conditions' 
of the courtroom, where such P.Valuation may be properly 
conducted. The proposed discretion must therefore, of 
necessity, take account of the tension between these two 
poles and provide some yardsticks as to how these com-
peting priorities may be resolved. In this regard, two 
factors warrant specific attention: 
( i. ) Necessity: Necessity and trustworthiness were 
10 
the two elements identified by Wigmore in his attempt 
to rationalize the common law exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. They were adopted by the United States federal 
courts as being the dual criteria for determining the 
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11 
admissibility of hearsay, and were subsequently modi-
fied for incorporation into the residual exceptions of the 
Federal Rules. As regards necessity, these provisions 
require that the preferred statement be "more probative 
on the point for which it is offered than any other evi-
dence which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
12 
efforts". The Australian proposal, on the other hand, 
comes to grips with the problem by setting out different 
conditions for the admission of hearsay, depending on 
whether the original declarant is available or unavail-
13 
able to testify personally. 
(ii.) The interests of justice: The residual exceptions 
require that "the interests of justice (must] best be 
14 
served by admission of the statement into evidence", a 
requirement which the United States courts seem to have 
conflated with the constitutional confrontation rule of 
15 
the Sixth Amendment. This concept of protecting the 
interests of the accused also finds an echo in the Austra-
lian proposal, which distinguishes between the reception 
of hearsay in civil and criminal trials on the ground that 
"the criminal trial is premised on the view that we should 
minimize the risk of convicting the innocent even though 
this may result in the acquittal from time to time of the 
18 
guilty". It is submitted that this principle may bene-
ficially be utilized in the formulation of the proposed 
' 
discretion, thereby making allowance for the right of con-
frontation which has become inextricably fused with the 
17 
hearsay rule in the United States. 
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(4) The meaning of 'hearsay'. In Chapter IV, it was 
shown that hearsay may generally be viewed in one of two 
ways. It may be seen as an extra-curial assertion 
offered to prove the truth of its contents, or, alterna-
tively, as any evidence which rests for its probative 
value on the untested testimonial factors of an actor or 
declarant other than the testifying witness. The 
theoretical advantages of the latter view have been 
illustrated; it remains to determine whether this 
declarant-oriented approach is practicable in the light 
of the solution which I have submitted should be 
adopted. 
Throughout this dissertation, one leitmotiv has run like 
a thread through the discussion: the conceptual superi-
ority of the declarant-oriented perspective of hearsay 
over its assertion-oriented counterpart. Yet in most 
instances, the full acceptance of this line of thought 
has been thwarted by a major obstacle - its incompati-
bility with the common-law exclusionary rule. The 
proposed judicial discretion, on the other hand, comple-
ments perfectly the broad perspective afforded by such a 
definition. The union of these two concepts would 
allow the court to identify hearsay-like evidence and 
then to· examine whether, on balance, the exclusion of 
such evidence is desirable. In short, the labelling of 
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an item of evidence as hearsay would merely state the ques-
tion of admissibility, not solve it. 
(5) The rOle of hearsay as a "marginal cost factor". It 
was submitted in Chapter III that the exclusion of an item 
of evidence is only justifiable if the total cost of receiv-
18 ing it exceeds the total benefit derived thereby. It was 
further shown that it is fallacious, when applying this 
principle to hearsay evidence, to resolve the question of 
admissibility by comparing the probative value of such evi-
dence (which represents total benefit) with only its hearsay 
cost (being that part of the cost caused by the hearsay 
quality of the evidence). This would be to mis-state the 
problem, and to ignore the other components of total cost. 
What, for instance, of the tendency of the evidence to cause 
confusion, waste of time, lengthy collateral issues etc? 
What, moreover, if such evidence possesses minimal probative 
value? Should it be received merely because all the custo-
mary hearsay dangers are substantially accounted for? It 
was demonstrated above that the rules governing hearsay and 
relevance represented two facets of the same problem, viz. 
admissibility. It would therefore be erroneous in the ex-
treme to overlook this fact in formulating the overall 
enquiry at which the proposed judicial discretion is to be 
directed. 
At first' glance, it may appear that these two enquiries are 
capable of separate resolution, but, on closer examination, 
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this is shown to be impracticable. How, for instance, is 
a court to determine the relevance of opinion evidence 
which is also hearsay, without taking account of the hear-
say dangers involved? Opinion evidence is generally 
admissible if the witness is in a better position than the 
19 
court to draw the relevant inference, an enquiry that 
necessitates examination of his memory and powers of per-
ception and evaluation. How can the court assess these 
qualities when the hearsay character of the evidence ren-
ders them immune to curial scrutiny and cross-examination? 
It is, therefore, clearly impractical to divorce these two 
co-determinants of admissibility, and the only solution is 
an enquiry that conflates them: Hearsay evidence, accord-
ingly, is only justifiably admitted when its probative 
value exceeds the sum of the disadvantages caused by its 
reception. This proposition has the added virtue of being 
20 
consistent with accepted relevance theory. 
In the light of these observations, the following proposal 
is tentatively submitted as a model for legislation on this 
topic: 
DRAFT PROPOSAL FOR HEARSAY REFORM 
Section 1 - Definitions 
(i) For the purposes of this Act and any other law, "hear-
say evidence" means any evidence which does not 
derive its value solely from the credit to be 
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attached to the witness himself, but rests in part or 
in whole on the veracity and competence of some other 
person, hereinafter referred to as the "maker". 
(ii) For the purposes of this Act, the "probative value" 
of an item of evidence means its logical tendency to 
show or indicate the material fact for which the 
evidence is offered. 
Section 2 - Admissibility 
(a) Subject to the provisions contained in [this) or any 
other law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless: 
(i) its probative value exceeds the disadvantages 
caused by its reception; 
(ii) its reception is in the interests of justice; 
and 
(iii) the maker is unavailable to be called as a wit-
ness. 
(b) In determining whether the probative value of any 
item of hearsay evidence exceeds the disadvantages 
caused by its reception in terms of s 2(a) (i), the 
court shall take into account all relevant factors 
including, but without necessarily allowing any of 
these or any other factors to be solely determina-
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tive of the issue, the following: 
(i) the trustworthiness of the evidence, and, in 
particular, the extent of any dangers that 
may arise as a result of relying on the sin-
cerity, narrative competence and powers of 
memory, perception and evaluation of the 
maker; and 
(ii) the extent to which the reception of the evi-
dence raises procedural difficulties such as 
undue delay, waste of time, lengthy collateral 
issues, confusion or the misleading of the 
trier of fact. 
(c) In determining whether the reception of an item of 
hearsay evidence is in the interests of justice in 
terms of s 2 (a) (ii), the court shall take into ac-
count all relevant factors including, but without 
necessarily allowing any one of these or any other 
factors to be solely determinative of the issue, 
the following: 
(i) the extent of any prejudice that may be 
caused to the other party or parties by 
virtue of the fact that the maker is not 
subjected to cross-examination or any of 
the other standard devices to which a wit-
ness is ordinarily subjected; and 
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(ii) the nature of the proceedings - whether civil 
or criminal - and, in the latter instance, 
whether the evidence is tendered by or against 
the accused. 
(d) For the purposes of s 2(a) (iii), the maker will be 
unavailable if he is dead, or unfit by reason of his 
bodily or mental condition to attend as a witness, 
or is outside the Republic and it is not reasonably 
practicable to secure his attendance, or all reason-
able efforts to find him have been made without sue-
cess. 
Section 3 - Notice 
A party must, in any civil proceedings, give his opponent 
notice o~ his intention to adduce any item of hearsay evi-
dence at least four days before the commencement of the 
proceedings. Provided that if such notice is not given, 
the evidence may, subject to the provisions of this Act, 
be admitted subject to such order as to postponement or 
costs, or both, as the court may consider fit. 
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COMMENTS ON THIS DRAFT PROPOSAL 
Section 1 - Definitions 
(i) The definition of "hearsay" is based on the formula-
21 
tion adopted in Jones on Evidence. It is a classic de-
clarant-oriented definition, akin to those endorsed by 
22 23 
writers such as Tribe and Lempert and Saltzburg. The 
scope of this definition is extremely wide, bringing under 
the hearsay banner all evidence that raises particular 
dangers and objections, and avoiding the semantic and 
esoteric difficulties which invariably flow from defining 
hearsay as a particular kind of assertion. It is there-
fore irrelevant, for the purposes of this definition, 
whether a statement or act is intended as an assertion or 
not, or whether an assertion is express or implied. The 
enquiry, instead, revolves around the purpose for which an 
extra-curial act or statement is to be employed, i e 
whether or not it requires the court to treat the absent 
actor or declarant as a witness. This perspective of 
hearsay is in perfect harmony with the basic rationale under-
lying the common law rule and is vastly superior to the tra-
ditional assertion-oriented statements in coming to grips 
with implied assertions and other evidence lying on the 
borders of hearsay. Its functional simplicity serves also 
to alert the court to the fundamental dangers inherent in 
hearsay evidence, and dovetails with the flexible, discre-
tionary approach to admissibility set out in s 2. 
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(ii) The definition of "probative value" is derived 
24 
from a statement of Wigmore, and finds favour with 
25 28 
writers such as Me Cormick and Lilly. It is also in 
27 line with how that concept is understood in South Africa. 
Section 2 - Admissibility 
Section 2 (a) : 
The rule contained in this section is expressly made to 
operate "[s]ubject to the provisions contained in frhis] 
or any other law" so as to take account of other statu-
tory inroads into the law. The adoption of this draft 
proposal would, however, necessitate a re-examination and 
revision of some enactments, particularly Part VI of the 
28 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act and the Computer Evi-
2SI dence Act. These provide, respectively, for the admis-
sibility of certain documents and computer prints-out, 
and it would be anomalous to subject such evidence to the 
technical requirements contained in those enactments while 
allowing other, less trustworthy hearsay to be admitted by 
way of the less restrictive measures set out in the above 
proposal. It would therefore be necessary either to 
amend these statutes by inserting residual discretionary 
provisions, or to repeal them and allow documentary and 
computer evidence to be governed by the same measures as 
other hearsay. The latter alternative, it is submitted, 
may be preferable in that it is simpler and engenders 
greater uniformity. 
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The rule ins 2(a) is stated in the negative, i e hearsay 
is inadmissible unless the three stipulated conditions are 
satisfied. The reason for this approach is that it is 
more in line with the common law than a positive formula-
tion, and is therefore less likely to encounter resis-
tance at the hands of legal practitioners. Lawyers are 
familiar with the traditional r6le of hearsay as an exclu-
sionary rule, and the American experience demonstrates 
clearly the hazards of disturbing firmly-entrenched 
notions and principles. 
The three conditions for admissibility, as qualified and 
explained in section 2(b), (c) and (d), create a delicate 
balance between, on the one hand, flexibility and judicial 
creativity, and, on the other hand, legislative guidance 
and direction. The wide wording used in the formulation 
of these conditions in s 2(a) is indicative of the ex-
tent to which admissibility is left to the discretion of 
the court, a notion which is further strengthened by the 
following factors: 
(i) the court is empowered and, in fact, obliged to take 
account of "all relevant factors" in resolving the 
enquiries stipulated in subsections (b) and (c); 
(ii) no attempt is made to list comprehensively these 
.factors, and the matter is left to the discretion 
of the court; and 
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(iii) it is expressly provided that those factors that 
are listed are not to be considered as being 
either exhaustive or decisive of the issue. 
There are, however, areas where the judicial discretion is 
curtailed, and where the courts are compelled to follow 
the Legislature's lead: 
(i.) the court is obliged to exclude an item of hearsay 
evidence unless all three conditions are shown to be sat-
isfied; 
(ii.) one of these conditions (s 2(a) (iii)) is capable of 
simple factual determination, thus removing it entirely 
from the province of the judicial discretion; 
(iii.) in the determination of the other two conditions 
(s 2(a) (i) and (ii)), the court is compelled to consider 
all relevant factors; if one or more such factors are not 
considered, the discretionary power of the court will not 
have been properly exercised, leaving the way open for a 
party to appeal against the court's finding; and 
(iv.) in conducting the enquiries set out ins 2(b) and 
(c), the court is obliged to include in its investigation 
an examination of certain specific factors. Although 
these factors are not necessarily solely determinative of 
the issue, a failure to consider them will constitute an 
irregularity. 
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The result, therefore, is a qualified discretion, which 
must be judicially exercised and which provides guidance 
without unnecessary shackles. It ensures, in effect, 
that the courts follow a particular line of reasoning 
without limiting the factors that may be employed during 
the course of such reasoning. The proposal, in short, 
sets the lower limits of admissibility, and allows the 
court to resolve the remaining questions subject to a 
minimum of legislative interference. It is instructive 
in this regard to consider each of these three conditions 
in turn, in order to examine the rationale underlying 
their incorporation and the chain of reasoning the court 
is required to employ. 
Condition (i): 
This condition is central to the entire question of admis-
sibility, and rests on the fundamental premiss that evi-
dence is only beneficially received if the total benefit 
exceeds the total cost caused by its admission. It also 
embraces the rOle of hearsay as a marginal cost factor, as 
it measures the probative value of an item of hearsay evi-
dence against all the disadvantages flowing from its re-
ception. Ins 2(b), the court is instructed to take ac-
count of all relevant factors in conducting this enquiry, 
but two sets of disadvantages are singled out as warrant-
ing particular attention: 
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Section 2(b) (i): 
This provision compels the court to conduct a hearsay-
danger analysis along the lines advocated by Professor 
Edmund Morgan in his well-known article, 11 Hearsay Dangers 
30 
and the Application of the Hearsay Concept... Implicit 
in this analysis is an assessment of the risks that may 
arise through relying on the testimonial factors of an 
actor or declarant who is not before the court, and an 
evaluation of the degree to which these risks may be re-
duced or eliminated by recourse to the circumstantial 
indicia of trustworthiness surrounding the making of the 
act or statement. By way of example, the court could 
consider the following factors: 
(A) Factors relating to the danger of insincerity: 
Whether the evidence was assertive or nonassertive; 
whether it was against the interests of the maker; 
whether there was any motive to falsify or misrepresent; 
the relationship between the maker and the parties to 
the case; whether or not the making of the act or 
statement preceded the controversy; whether it was sub-
jected to cross-examination, the oath or any equivalent 
device designed for procuring the truth; whether it was 
voluntarily or spontaneously made; the status of the 
person by whom and to whom it was made; and the reputa-
tion of the actor/declarant for honesty. 
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(B) Factors relating to the danger of defective memory: 
Whether any or substantial reliance was placed on the 
actor's/declarant's memory; the importance of the act or 
statement to the maker; whether the act or statement con-
cerned the maker's own affairs or the affairs of another; 
the length of time that had elapsed between the act or 
statement of the maker and the event or condition it pur-
ported to describe; whether the evidence is first- or 
second-hand hearsay; and the amount of detail which the 
evidence contained. 
(C) Factors relating to the danger of faulty perception: 
Whether the maker had a proper opportunity to perceive the 
facts which his act or statement is offered to show; 
whether the facts were within his personal knowledge; 
whether the evidence is first- or second-hand hearsay; and 
whether there is any reason to doubt the maker's ability 
to perceive properly the facts in issue. 
(D) Factors relating to the danger of accidental mis-
communication: The manner in which the material facts 
were conveyed by the maker to the witness (i e whether 
oral or in writing); whether the maker's act or state-
ment could have been motivated by a belief other than 
the one which it is tendered to establish; the simpli-
city or complexity of the act or statement; whether the 
evidence is first- or second-hand hearsay; and the 
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court's impressions of the ability of the witness to con-
vey accurately the act or statement of the maker in the 
light of the peculiar susceptibilities of hearsay to 
erroneous transmission. 
(E) Factors relating to the danger of erroneous evalua-
tion: Where the evidence relies for its value on an in-
ference or opinion drawn by the maker, the court should 
consider whether the maker was in a proper position to 
draw that inference; his qualifications; how much is 
known of the facts on which the inference is based; and 
whether there is any reason to question the maker's judg-
ment. 
Section 2 (b) (ii): 
This provision takes into account the other disadvantages 
of receiving an item of hearsay evidence and is based 
31 
largely on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
It incorporates those disadvantages which have tradition-
ally been considered by our courts in the enquiry relat-
32 ing to "legal relevance". The co-dependence of these 
two provisions, viz. ss 2(b) (i) and (ii), is a manifesta-
33 
tion of the principle, expressed above, that only when 
the two rules relating to hearsay and relevance are work-
ing in harness may,a proper answer be found to the ques-
tion of admissibility. 
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Condition (ii) : 
This condition is designed to give expression to the 
modern notion of the hearsay rule as the product of the 
adversary system of trial procedure. The primary con-
sideration, therefore, is whether it is in the interests 
of justice that an item of hearsay evidence be admitted, 
and in this regard, two factors (inter alia) must be 
considered: 
Section 2 (c) (i): 
Cognizance is taken here of the chief objection to hear-
say evidence - the fact that it rests for its evidential 
value on the veracity and competence of a person who is 
34 
not subjected to the standard "ideal conditions" of 
the courtroom. According to Professor Schiff, the 
function of the hearsay rule is "to protect the opposing 
party against evidence of relevant matters presented in 
a fashion not satisfying the well-settled demands of 
35 
witness examination in our trial system". The 
learned writer then goes on to list eight such demands 
which characterize the in-court testimony of a witness 
but which are of no avail to the adversary in respect of 
38 
hearsay evidence. The extent of the ensuing prejudice 
may, it is submitted, be assessed by looking at the fol-
lowing dual enquiry: 
(a) What utility would these procedural devices have 
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enjoyed? Each of these aids should be considered, but 
it is cross-examination that usually has the greatest 
potential for uncovering errors in perception, memory, 
narration and evaluation. Its value in exposing insin-
cerity is somewhat less celebrated, although still by no 
1 0 0 bl 37 means neg 1g1 e. It should be remembered, moreover, 
that because the adversary has been deprived of these de-
vices, the focus falls upon the potential results of 
38 
their skilful application. 
(b) What substitutes are there, if any, for the inapplic-
able procedural devices? Here regard may be had to the 
conditions under which the act or statement was made - was 
the maker under oath; did the adversary have the opportun-
ity to question him? 
Section 2 (c) (ii): 
One of the requirements for admissibility via the residual 
exceptions contained in the Federal Rules is that the re-
ception of the proffered evidence be in the interests of 
3i justice. 40 As was pointed out above, this requirement 
has been linked to the investigation regarding confronta-
tion under the Sixth Amendment. This constitutional 
41 provision, it has been shown, owes its origin to the 
premiss that it is desirable that the accused in criminal 
proceedings be given the opportunity to confront his 
accusers. However, as the United States Supreme Court 
Page 484. 
has found, this principle must occasionally yield to the 
dictates of public policy, and confrontation may be dis-
pensed with where its utility is low or where the dual test 
of necessity and 
42 
trustworthiness is satisfied. Section 
2(c) (ii) is designed to accommodate this experience; it 
alerts the court to the different priorities that apply in 
criminal proceedings - where the risk of convicting an inno-
cent man necessarily carries more weight than the general 
need to receive all relevant evidence - without fettering 
the judicial discretion. The court would therefore be free 
to conclude that, on the facts of a particular case, the re-
ception of an item of hearsay evidence would serve the 
interests of justice despite the deprivation of the accused's 
right to confrontation. 
Condition (iii): 
43 Trustworthiness and necessity were identified by Wigmore 
as the essential criteria on which to predicate the ad-
missibility of hearsay. The former element has been 
incorporated into this proposal ins 2(b) (i), where the 
court is obliged to assess trustworthiness by conducting 
the requisite hearsay-danger analysis; the third condi-
tion to s 2(a) (as qualified by s 2(d)) takes cognizance 
of the latter. The treatment accorded these two con-
cepts is, however, strikingly different. Whereas the 
enquiry ·as to trustworthiness is left largely to the dis-
cretion of the court, subject only to the mandatory 
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hearsay-danger computation, necessity is removed entirely 
from the nebulous realm of discretion and given the hard 
substance of legislative control. It is tersely stated 
that hearsay evidence is inadmissible unless .•• "the 
maker is unavailable to be called as a witness". This 
is followed ins 2(d) by a definition of unavailability, 
which is derived from Part V1 of the Civil Proceedings 
44 
Evidence Act. 
The restrictive effort of this condition is justified, it 
is submitted, on grounds of legal policy. It was stated 
45 
above that the hearsay rule straddles two conflicting 
principles, viz. the need to subject witnesses to the 
ideal conditions of courtroom testimony and the need to 
receive all relevant evidence. This conflict, it is 
submitted, should only be resolved in favour of the 
48 
latter where the maker is shown to be unavailable. In 
the residual exceptions to the Federal Rules, a different 
approach is taken, and the proffered hearsay evidence is 
required to be more probative "than any other evidence 
which the proponent can procure through reasonable 
47 
efforts". Because of the potential uncertainty and 
problems of proof, it is submitted that this approach 
is not altogether satisfactory. It tends, furthermore, 
to conflate the hearsay rule with the best evidence rule, 
48 
a union which is neither necessary nor desirable. 
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Section 3 - Notice: 
Because of the wide admissibility base created for hearsay 
evidence by sections 1 and 2, it is necessary to ensure 
that the adversary is not taken by surprise by its presen-
tation at trial. To remedy this problem, the residual 
exceptions to the Federal Rules require the proponent to 
provide his opponent with notice of his intention to offer 
it "sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to pre-
49 
pare to meet it". This provision, moreover, is made a 
prerequisite to admissibility, thus giving the courts, on 
the face of it, no latitude or scope for discretionary 
manoeuvre. Despite this apparent inflexibility, the 
United States courts have split on the issue of whether 
50 
notice may, in appropriate cases, be dispensed with. 
The mQjority view is in favour of admissibility where the 
proponent only becomes aware of the need to adduce such 
51 
evidence after the trial has commenced, whereas the 
52 Second Circuit has adopted a stricter approach, main-
taining that there is "no doubt that Congress intended 
that the requirement of advance notice be rigidly en-
53 forced". 
Academic opinion seems to be in favour of the more flexible 
54 
approach, and Sonenshein has suggested that the residual 
exceptions should be amended to conform to this view and 
to "rescue the courts that have adopted it from decisions 
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which are unquestionably correct as a matter of policy, 
55 but erroneous as a matter of law". 
In the light of these difficulties, it was decided to di-
vorce the notice requirement from the conditions for ad-
missibility, and to allow the court a wide discretion in 
dealing with a defaulting party. The court may, in such 
cases, refuse to receive the evidence, or, in its discre-
tion, receive the evidence subject to any order as to 
postponement or cost which it deems fit. 
Conclusion: 
Over three decades ago, Professor Morgan once expressed 
the following sentiment: 
"If we were privileged to start anew and were un-
willing to treat the hearsay objection as affect-
ing weight rather than admissibility, we should 
do well to put in the category of hearsay all 
evidence which requires the trier to rely upon 
the use of language or the sincerity or the memory 
or the observation of a person not present and not 
subject to all the conditions imposed upon a wit-
ness. But we should have as the basis of the 
system the principle that all relevant evidence is 
admissible . . . " 56 
Today, in South Africa, we have this privilege, as the 
hearsay rule is currently awaiting the attention of the 
Law Commission. An opportunity such as this is too valu-
able to waste by resorting to the spurious and illusory 
safety of traditionalism and orthodoxy - such retrogres-
sive timidity has for too long hampered the reform of the 
hearsay rule in foreign countries. It is time for a 
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revaluation of out-moded notions and a bold change of 
perspective. Such a change, it is submitted, has been 
attempted in the draft proposal set out above. Although 
this proposal is my own, it is consistent with what may 
be garnered from the accumulated wisdom of many percep-
tive minds that have graced the law of evidence, and its 
claim to validity rests on the basic values underlying 
not only the hearsay rule, but also the adversary system 
that created it. I have attempted to expose the hear-
say rule as merely being a functional instrument of the 
adversary trial, and, thereby, to create a holistic sub-
stitute for it, in which ostensibly disparate concepts 
fit harmoniously together. I have endeavoured to 
achieve this result (a) by effecting a linguistic purge, 
in which terms such as res gestae (in so far as it im-
pinges on hearsay), implied assertions, nonassertive con-
duct, verbal acts, verbal parts of acts, double hearsay 
and many others are rendered redundant; (b) by conflat-
ing the exclusionary rules relating to irrelevance and 
hearsay, so as to yield a composite solution to the 
problem of admissibility; and (c) by reducing the hear-
say concept to four elements - trustworthiness, pro-
bativeness, justice and necessity. 
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